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THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
COMPOSITIONS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH:   
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
THANH TUAN CHU 
Abstract 
The aim of this research is broadly to achieve 3 main objectives. The first objective is 
to investigate the relationship between the composition of government expenditure and 
economic growth. This objective further extends to examine how low to middle-income 
countries compare in their growth effects of government spending compositions with 
other economies from high-income countries. The second objective is to examine the 
effect of corruption on economic growth via the compositions of government expenditure. 
The third objective is to investigate the impact of government expenditure on human 
capital and its important indicators (health and education) on economic growth. These 
objectives are achieved by using quantitative data techniques. 
For the first objective, the research develops an endogenous growth framework 
drawing on variables from existing models, and separates government expenditure into 
productive and non-productive forms. This analysis addresses some gaps in existing 
knowledge that persist in current economic growth research: comparing the impact of 
government expenditure compositions on economic growth at different stages of 
development, the possible endogeneity of fiscal variables and consequences of relying on 
the period-averaging process. Using panel data from 37 high-income and 22 low to 
middle-income countries covering 1993 to 2012, the findings are based on Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) two-way fixed effects and Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
techniques. It challenges much of the existing empirical literature in relation to 
developing economies by showing that a shift in government expenditure away from non-
productive government expenditure and towards productive forms of expenditure are 
associated with higher levels of growth in both high-income and low to middle-income 
economies. Moreover, this analysis identifies the differing components of government 
expenditure that are most associated with increased long-run output levels in both high-
income and low to middle-income economies.  
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For the second objective, this thesis focuses on one channel that has received limited 
attention in current literature by examining the effect of corruption on the relationship 
between economic growth and government expenditure compositions. The research has 
formulated a system of equations in which corruption is modelled analytically as 
something that reduces the productivity of government spending in order to take account 
of the interdependency between government expenditure compositions, corruption and 
economic growth. The empirical strategy applied OLS two-way fixed effects methods to 
a panel of 37 high-income and 20 low to middle-income nations based on the availability 
of International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index during the period from 
1993 to 2012. The findings show that by comparing the corruption-adjusted coefficient 
of productive and non-productive government expenditure for both low to middle-income 
and high-income economies, there is no evidence that corruption has a marked impact on 
the strength relationship between government expenditure, whether in from of productive 
or non-productive, and economic growth. These findings do not discount the possibility 
of corruption affecting growth through other means. For example, through altering the 
division of total government expenditure between productive and non-productive types. 
Lastly, the third objective focuses on examining the association between human capital 
and economic growth on a sample of high-income and low to middle-income economies 
(25 OECD countries and 5 ASEAN countries) for the period 1993 to 2012. There are a 
number of empirical researches carried out in developed economies, but there is limited 
research on the case of Asian countries, especially the ASEAN area, to investigate the 
effect of government expenditure on human capital on economic growth. Education has 
often been the main factor in the literature on human capital and economic growth, but 
this thesis also includes health as another factor. Therefore, this thesis concentrates on 
assessing the growth effects of government expenditure on human capital and its 
components (education and health). The findings show that an increase in the share of 
government expenditure on education enhances economic growth for both sets of data. 
However, the analysis recognises a negative effect of shifting more public spending 
towards the health component in OECD economies, while there is no significant impact 
of this component in ASEAN countries. With regards to the combined government 
expenditure on human capital, this analysis observes that there is a positive and significant 
connection between this expenditure and economic growth in ASEAN economies, but no 
significant effect in OECD countries.  
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PART A: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGY 
APPROACHES 
Chapter One 
General Overview  
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the impact of government expenditure on economic growth. Can 
a government enhance long-term economic growth by changing the composition of 
government spending? This question has been raised by many economists and 
policymakers around the world for various reasons. For example, if a government faces 
high levels of indebtedness and decides to carry out fiscal austerity measures to reduce 
the debt burden, increasing government expenditure might be unrealistic for several 
years. The UK government in “2012 autumn statement” states that the ongoing fiscal 
austerity program would remain through 2018. Therefore, with limited budget for 
increasing total government spending, it is important for governments to reallocate 
government spending compositions in alternative areas in order to promote economic 
growth. With current demographic trends of population aging, governments may find it 
foreseeable to raise health and social protection expenditure over the next decade. Since 
at least part of the increasing bill may need to be covered by a reduction in spending in 
other components, policymakers will need to decide which type of expenditure to reduce 
while trying to preserve growth. One relevant historical example of spending 
reallocations is found in western countries after the end of the Cold War. Facing the fall 
in defence-related outlays, policymakers then needed to consider how to reallocate this 
so-called ‘peace dividend’ to other components such as economic infrastructure or social 
protection to cope with the economic and social challenges of that time (Acosta-
Ormaechea and Morozumi, 2013). 
In addition to examining the effect of government expenditure compositions on 
economic growth, the role of different levels of economic development and the size of 
government expenditure may also have important consequences on this relationship. 
Figure 1 display the average economic growth rate for 37 high-income, 22 low to middle-
income and mixed sample of 59 economies from 1993 to 2012. The average growth rate 
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of low to middle-income economies was lower than high-income countries for the period 
1993 to 2001 as most of the low to middle-income countries are Asian and experienced 
financial crisis in 1997-1998. However, the growth rate of these economies has improved 
and been higher than high-income economies during 2002 to 2012, especially after high-
income economies suffered the global financial crisis in 2007-2008.  
Figure 1.1: Economic growth rate (GDP per capita, %) for high-income economies, low 
to middle-income economies and mixed sample economies (1993-2012) 
 
Figure 1.2: Total government expenditure (% of GDP) for high-income economies and 
low to middle-income economies (1993-2012) 
 
Meanwhile, figure 2 shows that high-income economies have bigger size of 
government expenditure than low to middle-income economies during this period, which 
accounts for approximately 39% and 26% of total GDP respectively. Despite the 
decreased average growth rate from 2007 to 2012 due to global financial crisis, the high-
income and low to middle-income economies have still kept or increased total 
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government spending as a percentage of GDP. In response to the financial slowdown and 
its impact on the economy, the government plays a key role by reallocating government 
spending and thereby alter the compositions of budgetary spending in alternative areas in 
order to boost economic growth. With so much spending going in this area, it becomes 
important for the policymakers to review which compositions of government expenditure 
are actually promoting economic growth.  
Figure 1.3: Productive government expenditure and Non-productive government 
expenditure for high-income economies and low to middle-income economies (1993-
2012) 
 
Again, understanding how best to allocate scarce public resources between various 
productive or growth-enhancing components of expenditure and non-productive 
components is not just an issue for policymaker but also for economic researchers. Pushak 
et al. (2007) indicated that while small governments tend to focus spending on the 
provision of key public goods (defence and infrastructure) and efficiency-improving 
services (education and health care), large governments are likely to spend more on ”un-
productive” core government functions, such as: social transfer and subsidies that are not 
conducive to growth. Figure 3 displays evidence of this feature. Low to middle-income 
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countries spend over 78% of government spending on productive spending such as 
infrastructure, health, defence and education, to help boost economic growth and catch 
up with the development of high-income countries who spend approximately 61% of total 
government expenditure on productive components for the period 1993 to 2012. 
Meanwhile, high-income countries use roughly 39% of total expenditure on non-
productive spending, compared to 22% in low to middle-income countries. With limited 
resources, governments must choose what services need to be provided in priority, 
whether it is to maximise the rate of economic growth or individual welfare (Agenor and 
Neanidis, 2011).  
It can be seen that there are differences in allocating government expenditure 
compositions between high-income and low to middle-income economies during the 
period 1993 to 2012. With these differences, it is meaningful to ask the following 
question: how does the growth effect of changing government expenditure compositions 
depend on the stage of economic development? In addition, most previous studies use a 
mixed sample of high-income and low to middle-income countries, or examine 
exclusively high-income or low to middle-income countries only (Kneller et al., 1999; 
Bleaney et al., 2001; Gupta et al., 2005; Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2008; Afonso and Alegre, 
2011; Christie, 2012; Gemmell et al., 2016). Accordingly, there remains little 
understanding of the process by which public spending compositions shape the prospect 
of economic growth for high-income vis-à-vis low to middle-income countries. The first 
contribution of this thesis is to bridge this gap in the existing literature.  
While the theory linking the growth effects of government expenditure compositions 
in which classify into two groups: productive and non-productive government 
expenditure appears reasonably clear (Barro, 1990; Devarajan et al., 1996; Kneller, 1998; 
and Kneller et al., 1999), the results from related empirical research are not, especially 
when distinguishing between the effects of changes in the absolute level of government 
expenditure and changes in relative amount of these categories expenditure. In term of 
absolute levels of expenditure compositions (as a share in GDP), empirical results have 
consistently reported a positive relationship between productive government expenditure 
and economic growth, and either a negative or no-impact relationship between non-
productive expenditure and economic growth for high-income economies. However, 
findings on the relationship between the level of public spending and economic growth 
in low to middle-income economies are mixed. It is surprising that relatively little 
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attention has been given to comparing and contrasting the impact of the relative division 
of total expenditure between productive and non-productive uses on economic growth in 
countries at different stages of development. Therefore, the second contribution of this 
thesis is that it focuses exclusively on examining the effect of the composition of public 
expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure on long-run economic growth. The main 
added value of the analysis is to show that changing the absolute value of government 
expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) has a crowding out effect and thus negative/neutral 
impact on economic growth. In addition, by shifting the mix of public spending away 
from non-productive forms of expenditure and towards productive forms, countries can 
move closer to a more optimum growth level. This key distinction has been emphasised 
throughout this thesis. 
In evaluating fiscal policy effects on economic growth, the empirical methodology 
proposed by Kneller et al., (1999); Bleaney et al., (2001); Bose et al., (2007); Ghosh and 
Gregoriou, (2007) and Gemmell et al., (2016) have suggested that it should ideally take 
into account both the sources and the uses of funds. These studies recognised the fact that 
the growth effect of public expenditure depend not only the volume and composition of 
the public spending but also on how these expenditures are financed. An empirical does 
not incorporate the government budget constraint in full into the analysis could have 
biased results in their parameter estimates (Kneller et al., 1999; and Ghosh and Gregoriou, 
2007). From this empirical standpoint, this thesis contributes to a growing debate on 
effects of government spending compositions on growth by including variables on the 
revenue side of the government budget more fully, e.g., tax revenue, non-tax revenue and 
budget surplus or deficit variables. This will enable the thesis to compare with the 
previous studies which are heterogeneous in terms of results when consider the overall 
budget constraint. The results find strong support that countries should not increase 
revenue by tax or non-tax means to have a greater government budget surplus (which 
enhances economic growth), as this increase would have a negative impact on economic 
growth.   
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), and Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) suggest that a possible 
reason for misallocating government funds towards non-productive spending was 
attributed to the possible presence of corruption that generally affects government 
expenditure compositions. The literature finds that corruption either may facilitate 
economic growth by helping firms circumvent the burden of the public sector or may 
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hinder it by increasing this burden and reducing the efficiency of government expenditure 
that contributes to productivity and growth (Huntington, 1968; Lui, 1985; Mauro, 1995; 
Knack and Keefer, 1997; Colombatto, 2003; Paul, 2010; Ugur, 2014 and Huang, 2016). 
The literature highlights that whether the positive or negative impact dominates rely on 
the size of the public sector, the structure of government expenditure, and the level of 
economic development; as these factors play an important role in corruption outcomes 
(Dzhumashev, 2014). However, there are some inconsistencies and gaps in the literature 
in explaining the dependence of the corruption growth nexus on these factors, which need 
a further research. This thesis addressed these gaps by capturing corruption in terms of a 
parameter that potentially reduces the productivity of government spending in the 
analytical model. As this thesis has considered two types of government spending and 
corruption could impact on these two to differing extents, the thesis can examine the effect 
of corruption on growth via the composition of government expenditure and provide 
insights on the role that different levels of economic development play in moderating the 
level of corruption impact. 
The next contribution is that this thesis investigates the growth effect of government 
expenditure on human capital and its components on economic growth. Since human 
capital investments are essential for the accumulation of human capital and human capital 
has been underlined as the key engine of growth in endogenous growth theory, the 
empirical evidence about their growth impacts is mixed and inconclusive (Barro, 1990; 
Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro and Lee, 1993; Perotti, 1996; Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001; 
Prichett, 2001; Baldacci et al., 2004; Miyakoshi et al., 2010; and Dalic, 2013). Besides, 
although health has been identified as another vital element of human capital, literature 
has often paid much attention on education impact on economic growth. This thesis is to 
bridge this gap in the existing literature of human capital and economic growth. It also 
contributes to shedding some light on examination the effect of government expenditure 
on education and health on economic growth in ASEAN countries in which there is a 
limited research that has been focused on so far. ASEAN countries are now the emerging 
economies of the world, the third largest market next to China and India and also have a 
substantial influence on world economy. Due to the growing economic activities of this 
area, the development of education sector, health system and their contributions to the 
economic development is crucial. Therefore, it is interesting to seek an answer to the 
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question: how government expenditure on education and health affect economic growth 
in ASEAN countries compared with OECD countries. 
Previous efforts to examine the relationship between government expenditure and 
economic growth have been affected by limitations in data availability and sensitiveness 
of the results to small variations in the model specification (Barro, 1990; Easterly and 
Rebelo, 1993). Recently, data quality has improved and the large numbers of empirical 
research have provided valuable information about the variables that should be included 
in economic growth model (Devarajan et al., 1996; Bose et al., 2003; Ghosh and 
Gregoriou, 2008; Gemmell et al., 2016). However, there remains a need for more research 
to address two specific limitations that persist in current economic growth regressions: 
the selection of estimation method and the consequences of relying on the period-
averaging process to capture long-term growth rates (Bleaney et al. 2001; Kneller et al. 
1999). The effects of government expenditure can be adequately captured by the OLS 
fixed effects method. Nonetheless, with the introduction of GMM technique by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998), it can be 
argued that this technique captures the endogeneity aspects of the model better given the 
cross-country heterogeneity in the data. In addition, the association of economic growth 
to fiscal variables has been traditionally estimated under the form of static model in which 
the use of variables expressed in long-frequency periods accounts for the long-term 
relationship. However, some studies found the sensitivity of the results due to averaging 
process of variables (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Kneller et al., 1999; Afonso and Alegre, 
2011). The reason for these sensitive results may be due to the absence of automatic 
stabilisers in different levels of economic developments and the impact of some 
categories of public expenditure on growth distributed across several periods. Although 
there are several studies that are very similar in terms of the method estimated and the 
dataset used, previous studies are extremely heterogeneous in terms of results. For this 
reason, the contribution of this thesis is useful is terms of shedding some light on the 
fragility of the results to alterations of the model and the methodology used. 
The above discussed contributions for this thesis spurred some research objectives in 
the areas of government expenditure, human capital, corruption and economic growth. 
• Determine the different effects on economic growth rate of size and structure of 
productive and non-productive government spending in the presence of the 
revenue side of government budget constraint. 
 24 
 
• Compare and contrast the impact of government expenditure components on 
economic growth in low to middle and high income countries. 
• Determine the influence of widespread corruption presence to economic growth 
in terms of government spending components.  
• Determine the role that differing levels of economic development play in 
investigating the economic growth effects of corruption via indirect channel, 
government expenditure compositions. 
• Assess the impacts of government expenditure on human capital and its important 
components (Education and Health) on economic growth. 
• Compare and contrast the effects of government expenditure on human capital 
and its important components (Education and Health) on economic growth in 
ASEAN and OECD countries. 
Based on those contributions and objectives, this thesis consists of three distinct 
empirical analysis chapters ranging across the relationship between government spending 
compositions and long-term economic growth. The first chapter deals with the growth 
effects of government expenditure compositions in which categorise into two groups: 
productive and non-productive government expenditure. This classification of 
government expenditure elements has widely been applied in the public policy 
endogenous growth models such as: Barro (1990), Devarajan et al. (1996), Kneller et al. 
(1999), Gupta et al. (2005), Ghosh and Gregoriou (2007), Christie (2012), Acosta-
Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013), and Gemmell et al. (2016). In the endogenous growth 
model – one extension of neoclassical growth model, it is believed that policies which 
encourage factor input accumulation induce faster growth. Barro (1990) and Devarajan 
et al. (1996) have developed endogenous growth models that fiscal policy can determine 
both the level of the output path and the long term growth rate. Barro’s model (1990) 
indicated that public spending is discriminated according to whether they are involved in 
the private production function or not. Productive government expenditures affect private 
sector productivity and therefore have a direct impact on the rate of growth. Whereas, 
non-productive spending do not contribute to private production function and thereby do 
not affect the steady-state growth rate, but have impact on citizens’ welfare (including the 
possibility of zero welfare impact). Devarajan et al. (1996) extended the Barro’s model 
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and showed that the long-run growth effects not only depend on the structure of 
government spending but also their relative budget shares. In regardless of its apparent 
importance, the impacts of government spending compositions on economic growth have 
been rarely examined, apart from a few notable exceptions. Barro (1990) was one of the 
pioneers to investigate the link between public expenditure composition and growth under 
the endogenous growth literature. His model indicated that when a government increases 
“utility enhancing” government consumption while reducing “production enhancing” 
government spending, economic growth rates will decrease despite of the level of total 
government expenditure. A number of recent researches have modelled the association 
between government expenditure compositions and economic growth, such as, 
Blankenau and Simpson (2004), Agenor and Neanidis (2011), Agenor (2008), Agenor 
(2010) and Agenor (2011). They have investigated various extensions of the 
Barro/Devarajan models which focus explicitly on particular public spending categories 
(infrastructure, education and health expenditures) as inputs into private production and 
their interactions on economic growth. For example, Agenor (2010) stated that a shift 
from non-productive government expenditure to infrastructure expenditure supports a 
country move to a steady state of higher growth. While theoretical models linking various 
components of government expenditure to economic growth appears reasonably clear, 
their empirical research results are often not specific enough for active policymaking.  
Over the past two decades, a substantial volume of empirical research has been 
directed towards identifying how compositional reallocation in government expenditure 
affects economic growth. However, this empirical literature varies in terms of data sets 
and econometric techniques, and often produces conflicting results. For high-income 
countries, empirical results are consistent in finding a positive effect of productive 
government expenditure on economic growth, and either a negative or no-impact 
relationship between non-productive expenditure and economic growth (Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 2006; Bleaney et al., 2001; Kneller et al., 1999 and Gemmel et al., 2016). 
However, findings on the relationship between the structure of public spending and 
economic growth in low to middle-income countries are mixed. Gupta et al. (2005) used 
a panel of 39 low-income countries between 1990 and 2000 and found that productive 
government spending enhances growth, whilst non-productive expenditure fails to do so. 
Meanwhile, Ghosh and Gregoriou (2007) and Christie (2012) revealed an inverse 
relationship between productive government spending as a share of total government 
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spending and real GDP per capita for developing economies. Given these inconsistencies 
in empirical findings, it is surprising that relatively little attention has been given to 
comparing and contrasting the impact of government expenditure composition on 
economic growth in countries at different stages of development. Besides, Adam and 
Bevan (2005), Bose et al. (2007) and Gemmel et al. (2016) highlight that the need to 
consider both the sources and the uses of simultaneously for a meaningful evaluation of 
the impacts of government expenditures on economic growth, e.g. ignoring the 
implications of the GBC for expenditure-growth regression may bring bias to the 
estimates of the growth impacts. 
The first analysis chapter helps fill in these gaps and thereby makes three distinct 
contributions to the body of knowledge. Firstly, this analysis examines the growth effects 
of government expenditure compositions for a panel data of 37 high-income and 22 low 
to middle-income countries for the period 1993 to 2012, thus providing insights on the 
role that differing levels of economic development play in moderating the relationship. 
In both groups of countries, the analysis finds that increased levels of government 
expenditure has a negative impact on growth, while a change in the expenditure mix 
towards productive forms of expenditure and away from non-productive forms of 
expenditure enhances economic growth rate. Secondly, by regressing economic growth 
on budgetary economic categories, which takes into account variables on the financing 
side more fully (tax revenue, non-tax revenue and budget deficit variables) and a set of 
other relevant variables, the first analysis chapter contributes to a growing debate on 
variations between productive and non-productive forms of government expenditure. The 
results show that budget deficit variables encourage growth for both sets of countries, 
while tax revenue and non-tax revenue variables have different effects on growth. Finally, 
this analysis contributes to overcoming the methodological issues commonly found in 
similar studies. It computes a 5-year moving average for all variables instead of the 
traditional 5-year average to smooth over some of the cyclical features of the data. 
Moreover, based on previous analysis studies and the developments in econometrics 
theory (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998), this analysis applies a 
dynamic panel GMM one-step system approach to deal with the issue of growth and fiscal 
variables not always being strictly exogenous.  
The second analysis chapter examines the role of corruption in the effects of 
government expenditure compositions on long-run economic growth. In theory, many 
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researchers and international organisations state that corruption causes unfavourable 
effect on long-run economic growth and sustainable development by increasing the 
production costs, linking with tax evasion, decreasing national and foreign investment, 
distorting the effectiveness of allocating national resources, increasing inequality and 
poverty in society, and creating uncertainty in government decision making (Mauro, 
1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Wei, 1997; Mo, 2001; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004; 
Meon and Sekkat, 2005; Blackburn et al., 2006; Podobnik et al., 2008; Ugur, 2014, 
Huang, 2016 and Abdixhiku et al., 2017). Meanwhile, other researchers believe that 
corruption can make a positive contribution on economic growth as individuals and 
corporations under certain circumstances may bride policy makers to turn around 
unfavourable situations caused by existing laws and regulation, which in turn ends up 
promoting economic efficiency (Leff, 1964; Bayley, 1966; Huntington, 1968; Lui, 1985; 
Colombatto, 2003; Paul, 2010; Meon and Weill, 2010; and Swaleheen, 2011).  
The empirical findings on the relationship between corruption and economic growth 
are heterogeneous due to different measures of corruption, different estimation methods, 
country coverage and sample periods (Ugur, 2014). While not denying that corruption 
may have a positive effect at particular times in specific countries, however the main 
findings of theoretical and empirical literatures have been that corruption leads to lower 
growth, weakens both private and public investment spending and inhibits the efficiency 
of public services (Mauro, 1995; Tanzi, 1995; Jain, 1998; Gupta et al., 2002; Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2002; Lambsdorff, 2006; Ugur, 2014 and Ben Ali and Sassi, 2016). 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the cost of corruption for each country is different, 
depending on their level of development and on surges in their national incomes. Saha 
and Gounder (2013)’s study shows that corruption increases at low economic 
development stage and decreases as nations' achieve higher levels of economic 
development. A small increase in income at a low economic development stage is not 
sufficient to reduce corruption; instead it increases opportunities for more corruption. 
Consequently, as nations' achieve a higher economic development status (i.e. higher 
income level) corruption declines.  
While generally accepting the impact of corruption on economic growth, the literature 
remains divided on the channels and magnitude of the direct and indirect effects. One 
channel that has received limited attention in current literature is government expenditure. 
Mauro (1996, 1998) represented the first cross-country evidence that corruption has an 
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effect on the composition of government spending. In his conclusion, corruption misleads 
government spending away from high-productivity areas, such as education and health 
toward other areas which are less productivity promoting. Similar to Mauro’s research, 
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) showed that corruption can reduce economic growth by 
increasing public investment while quality of this investment tends to fall. The authors 
came to a conclusion that corruption distorts public expenditure to where brides are 
easiest to collect, implying a diversion of government expenditure compositions towards 
low-productivity areas at the expense of growth-promoting projects. They also state that 
corruption can reduce economic growth by lowering government revenue needed to 
finance productive government expenditure. More recent empirical research has had 
access to examine the effect of corruption on government expenditure, such as, 
Delavallade (2006), Hessami (2010), Hashem (2014), Jajkowicz and Drobiszova (2015) 
and Hague and Kneller (2015). Their conclusions have reached the same point as higher 
level of corruption distorts the structure of government expenditure in favour of defence 
and general public service, whereas the proportion of spending on education, health, 
recreation, culture and religion decrease. 
There exists empirical evidence to suggest that corruption associated with a 
misallocation and misappropriation of government expenditure components, hence has 
indirect effect on economic growth. Therefore, the second analysis paper examines the 
effect of corruption on economic growth via the composition of public spending for a 
panel data of 37 high-income and 20 low to middle-income countries, hence providing 
insights on the role that different levels of economic development play in moderating the 
level of corruption impact. In order to take the interdependency between government 
expenditure compositions, corruption and economic growth we have formulated a system 
of equations where corruption is modelled analytically as something that reduces the 
productivity of public spending. The findings show that corruption has impacts on 
economic growth through government expenditure components, but the effect is rather 
small. The results suggest that corruption reduces the growth benefits by decreasing share 
of productive spending component as a proportion of total expenditure in high-income 
economies, while it helps to lessen the negative impact of non-productive expenditure 
share in this sub-sample. On the other hand, corruption in low to middle-income countries 
is good in the context of reducing the share of productive government expenditure, which 
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is extreme high and perhaps above the optimal level in the first analysis chapter, and thus 
is associated with higher levels of growth.  
The third analysis studies the association between government expenditure on human 
capital and its components and economic growth. In this chapter, I examine the robustness 
of the empirical results in first and second analyses with respect to some important 
functional components of productive government expenditure (e.g. education and health) 
and also some useful information contained in the common structure in a regional context 
(e.g. ASEAN and OECD countries). It is well known and widely accepted that investment 
in human capital is important for economic growth and sustainable development. 
Education and health are two critical indicators of human capital. The growing global 
focus on the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nation has further emphasised 
the importance of making tangible progress in key education and health indicators. 
Theoretical contributions highlight different mechanisms through which human capital 
has impact on economic growth. First, education and health care spending improve the 
quality of workforce and positively contribute to the production capacity and thus to the 
economic growth (Kesikoglu and Ozturk, 2013). Second, in endogenous growth theories, 
education and health care expenditures play an important role in increasing the innovative 
capacity of the economy, knowledge of new technologies, products and processes, and 
therefore has a significant contribution to the sustainable economic growth in long-run 
(Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008). 
While there is strong theoretical support for a vital role of human capital in the growth 
process, empirical evidence is not straightforward to policymakers. There are some 
empirical studies that show an important positive relationship between human capital and 
long-run economic growth (Barro, 1990; Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro and Lee, 1993; 
Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2002; Baldacci et al., 2004; Bose et al., 2007). However, some 
other studies have found that there is a negative (Prichett, 1996; Bil and Klenow, 2000; 
and Dalic, 2013) or in some cases insignificant effect (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; 
Perotti, 1996; Miyakoshi et al., 2010). Besides, studies either assess the growth effects of 
public spending on education or health primarily focus on the impact of the government 
expenditure on education, while the empirical literature on the effects of government 
spending on health on growth is relatively thin. In a meta-analysis, Churchill et al. (2015) 
examines the relationship between economic growth and human capital by using a sample 
of 306 estimates drawn from 31 primary studies, but only 12 studies focus on health 
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expenditure. Furthermore, even empirical research generally confirm that government 
expenditure on education boost economic growth (Barro and Lee, 1993; Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 1995; Zhang and Casagrande, 1998; Bose et al. 2007; Baldacci et al., 2008; 
Neycheva, 2010; Afonso and Jalles, 2013; and Mallick et al., 2016), some studies find 
the macroeconomic evidence to be unconvincing and inconsistent with the findings at 
microeconomic level and theoretical on the impact of this public spending (Devarajan et 
al., 1996; Kelly, 1997; Keller, 2006; Mo, 2007; Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2007; and 
Miyakoshi et al., 2010). The mixed results from empirical studies are also found on the 
effects of government expenditure on health on economic growth (Landau, 1997; Miller 
and Russek, 1997; Singh and Weber, 1997; Bloom and Canning, 2003; Bloom et al., 
2004; Gyimah-Brempong and Wilson, 2004; Jamison et al., 2004 and Cooray, 2009; Dao, 
2012; Dalic, 2013).  
One possible explanation for the inconsistent results on economic growth effects of 
human capital and its important indicators is the matter of country heterogeneity. The 
solution for its problem is to estimate single-country regressions. However, while single-
country estimates of the parameters of physical capital and human capital can capture the 
heterogeneity of the individual country structures, they ignore some useful information 
contained in the common structure in a regional context. A common geographical terrain, 
similar governance structure and similarities in level of economic development and other 
similarities in culture and economic indicators should be considered when examine the 
effects of human capital and its government spending components. Therefore, the third 
analysis focuses on investigating the association between human capital and its 
components and economic growth for a panel data of 25 OECD countries and 5 ASEAN 
countries for the period 1993 to 2012; also examining the impact of corruption from those 
countries on economic growth via government expenditure on human capital and its 
indicators. The findings show that an increase in the share of government expenditure on 
education enhances economic growth for both sets of data. For the association between 
public expenditure on health and growth, this analysis recognises a negative effect of 
shifting more public spending on health component in OECD economies, while there is 
no significant impact of this component in ASEAN countries. With regards to the 
combined government expenditure on human capital, this analysis observes that there is 
a positive and significant connection between this expenditure and economic growth in 
ASEAN economies, but no significant effect in OECD countries.  
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1.2 Thesis Outline 
The remainder of this thesis contains 6 chapters divided in 3 parts. Part A – Theoretical 
and Methodology approaches, which includes the first three chapters represents the 
general overview of the thesis on literature reviews on the relationship between economic 
growth and government expenditure compositions, and methodology for estimating this 
relationship. Chapter two provides the review of both theoretical and empirical literature 
on the effects of government expenditure and its components in endogenous growth 
models. Under the neoclassical growth model, governments are restricted to adopt 
policies which encourage technological change if they wish to permanently raise growth 
rate. In the endogenous growth model – one extension of neoclassical growth model, it is 
believed that policies which encourage factor input accumulation induce faster growth 
(Kneller, 1998). The endogenous growth model thus offers governments a much broader 
range of effective policies to choose from. However, the complexity and nature of the 
debate have yielded no unified conclusion as to which theory best fits the answer in terms 
of countries seeking positive significant changes in their growth rate. Hence, this PhD 
research thesis which is based on the foundation of neoclassical theory and its extension 
– the endogenous growth model will review the models’ strength and weaknesses 
theoretically as well as empirically in order to recommend the most suitable model which 
can thoroughly depict the relationship between government expenditure components and 
economic growth.  
Chapter three discusses in details the research method employed, sample and data. The 
construction of the dataset and the differences between the IMF’s government finance 
statistics manual (GFSM) 1986, 2001 and 2014 frameworks will be introduced. These 
differences explain the reason why time period from 1993 to 2012 was chosen for this 
PhD thesis. This chapter introduces 10 categories of government expenditure used into 
productive and non-productive groups based on functional classification of expenditure. 
The methodology used to analyse the panel data will be presented. The two-way fixed 
effects which control both time-invariant individual country characteristics and time fixed 
effect is chosen as the main method of estimation for this thesis. This method addresses 
an issue that excluding unobservable country-specific effects could lead to serious biases 
in the econometric estimates, especially when these effects are correlated with other 
covariates. Besides, GMM dynamic panel estimators developed by Arellano and Bond 
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(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) are using for assessing 
the robustness of the baseline results. These estimators have advantages of dealing with 
unobserved country-specific effects and potential endogeneity problems.  
In the next three chapters of part B – Selected outputs of empirical analyses, which 
focus on examining how government spending and governance policies affect economic 
growth. Chapter four examines the growth effects of government expenditure 
compositions – productive and non-productive government spending for a panel data of 
37 high-income and 22 low to middle-income countries for the period 1993 to 2012, thus 
providing insights on the role that different levels of economic development play in 
moderating the relationship. Meanwhile, chapter five investigates the impacts of 
corruption on economic growth via the compositions of government spending for a panel 
data of 37 high-income and 20 low to middle-income countries. Chapter six then 
concentrates on assessing the relationship between human capital and its components and 
economic growth for 2 groups (ASEAN and OECD). The thesis was concluded with 
chapter seven of part C - Perspective. Chapter seven discusses a summary of the research 
objectives, research contributions, possible policy implications, limitations of research, 
and possible areas of further research. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
As this thesis focuses on the impact of government expenditure on economic growth, 
this chapter provides the review of both the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
government spending and economic growth. The literature on the growth effects of 
corruption and government spending on human capital are discussed in detail in chapter 
5 and 6. Therefore, this chapter is divided into two sections: economic growth theories 
are introduced in section one and government expenditure is inserted into growth models 
in section two. In section one, the research begins with a brief description of the classical 
and neoclassical growth model, before moving to the ‘AK’ model and Romer type one-
sector endogenous growth models and conclude by discussing the two-sector endogenous 
growth models and other growth theories. Section two starts with a discussion of fiscal 
policy irrelevance in the neoclassical growth model, before describing the impact of 
government expenditure in a simple one-sector model and then expanding the model to 
include two-sector endogenous growth models. Section two also examines relevant 
empirical findings in the area.  
2.1 Economic Growth Theories 
Classical economists, such as Adam Smith (1776), Thomas Malthus (1798) and David 
Ricardo (1817) identified many of the basic ingredients in modern theories of economic 
growth: the basic approaches of competitive behaviour and equilibrium dynamics; the 
role of diminishing returns and its relation to the accumulation of physical and human 
capital; and the interplay between per capita income and the growth rate of population. 
However, from a chronological viewpoint, the classic article of Ramsey (1928) is 
considered as the starting point for modern growth theory. Ramsey’s treatment of 
household optimisation over time goes far beyond its application to growth theory and 
his separable utility function is as commonly used today as the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. Building on Ramsey (1928), Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) made an effort 
to integrate Keynesian analysis with elements of economic growth, to which they 
attempted to apply production functions with little substitutability among the inputs and 
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stated that the rate of economic growth in an economy is dependent on the level of saving 
and the capital output ratio. 
More important contributions to growth theory were those of Solow (1956) and Swan 
(1956), who developed a model of economic growth utilising the neoclassical form of the 
production function. Their specification assumes constant returns to scale, diminishing 
returns to each input, and some positive and smooth elasticity of substitution between the 
inputs. This production function is combined with a constant-saving-rate rule to generate 
a simple general-equilibrium model of the economy (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2006). 
After the mid-1980s, research on economic growth experienced resurgence as a result of 
the concerns about a slowdown in global economic growth (Liu and Premus, 2000), 
beginning with the studies of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). The inspiration for their 
studies was the determinants of long-run economic growth, which have become a solid 
pillar for modern economic growth and have proved even more significant than the 
mechanics of business cycles or the countercyclical effects of fiscal and monetary 
policies. As a result, the designation of Endogenous growth models was introduced (Agell 
et al, 1997). 
2.1.1 Classical Growth Theories 
Classical growth theories refer to studies done by a group of economists in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The generalised classical theory on growth is a 
combination of the contributions of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Robert Malthus. 
These theories described the growth process in terms of rates of technological progress 
and changes in the population. Technological progress depended on capital accumulation, 
which would permit increasing mechanisation and greater division of labour (Smith, 
1776). Meanwhile, the rate of capital accumulation depended on the level and trend of 
profits (Higgins, 1968). Even though classical economists did not always agree with each 
other, their basic approach and framework for growth theories is the same and consist of 
the production function, technological progress, investment, the determinant of profit, 
size of labour force and the wage system (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2006). They all 
expressed the same production function in which output depends on the stock of capital, 
labour force, land and the level of technology. Therefore, the classical theory of economic 
development may be stated as follow: suppose an expected increase in profits brings about 
an increase in investment, which adds to the existing stock of capital and to the steady 
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flow of improved techniques. This increase in capital accumulation raises wages and 
induces accelerated population growth, which causes the demand for food to increase. 
Food production is raised by employing additional labour and capital. However, 
diminishing returns to land brings about a rise in labour cost and as a result the price of 
corn goes up. In turn, rents increase, wages rise, thereby reducing profits. Reduction in 
profit implies a reduction in investment, retarded technological progress, diminution of 
wage funds and slowing down of population growth and capital accumulation. When this 
happens, capital accumulation ceases, population becomes constant and stationary state 
sets in.  
However, there are two main limitations in the classical theory of growth: the role of 
entrepreneurs in the process of production has not been addressed; and technical progress 
is assumed to be greatly dependent on savings and investment (Higgins, 1968). 
2.1.2 Harrod – Domar Growth Theory 
Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) attempted to integrate Keynesian analysis with 
elements of economic growth. They used production functions with little substitutability 
among the inputs to explain changes in the economic growth rate (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2006). In their model, the rate of growth of GDP is determined jointly by the net 
national savings ratio and the national capital-output ratio. The savings ratio has a positive 
impact on the growth rate of national income in the absence of government (Harrod, 1939; 
Domar, 1946). The model showed that the savings rate times the marginal product of 
capital minus the depreciation rate equals the output growth rate. Hence, a nation can 
increase its economic growth rate by increasing the savings rate, increasing the marginal 
product of capital or decreasing the depreciation rate (Hochstein, 2006). The model also 
implies that the more investment an economy uses, the higher growth rate it can generate 
(Hagemann, 2009). The model suggested that less developed countries do not normally 
have an adequately high income to enable a sufficient rate of savings to replace exhausted 
or managed capital goods. Therefore, accumulation of physical-capital stock through 
investment is low, and this leads to reduce economic progress (Todaro and Smith, 2009). 
Since Harrod and Domar wrote their theory during or immediately after the Great 
Depression, these arguments have received support from many economists. Although 
these contributions generated a good deal of research at the time, there have been many 
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criticisms of their work and very little of their analysis plays a role in today’s thinking 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2006). The main limitation to the Harrod and Domar model is 
the relatively low level of new capital formation in developing and poor economies. The 
model implies that these countries should seek financial investment in capital from abroad 
to trigger economic growth, but history has shown that this often causes repayment 
problems later (Jackson and Pearson, 1998).  
2.1.3 Neoclassical Growth Theory 
Those limitations in classical growth theories and Harrod-Domar growth models had 
pushed economists to find the way to improve or supersede them. Neoclassical growth 
theory developed in the late 1950s and attempted to explain long-run economic growth 
by looking at capital accumulation, labour or population growth and increases in 
productivity. This neoclassical methodology and language have introduced some 
concepts such as aggregate capital stocks, aggregate production functions, and utility 
functions for representative consumers for modern growth theory later on. Vital 
contributions to the neoclassical theory model came from the work done by Solow and 
Swan model (1956) which extended the Harrod-Domar model. 
The Solow-Swan growth model is known as an exogenous growth model which puts 
labour as a factor of production and does not assume fixed capital labour ratio (Helpman, 
2010; Reyes, 2011). The central point to their growth model is the production function 
with some key assumptions on it. Furthermore, by acknowledging a constant-saving-rate 
rule, the production function (Cobb-Douglas) creates a simple general-equilibrium model 
in which it is impossible to achieve sustained long-run economic growth and the economy 
can be stagnated at its zero growth dynamic equilibrium (Savvides and Stengos, 2008).  
One important suggestion of the Solow-Swan model is conditional convergence. Their 
model pointed out that a country with a lower starting level of per capital GDP will have 
a faster growth rate in the short-run relative to the long-run position. This is due to the 
assumption of diminishing returns to capital, as economies have a tendency to receive 
higher output and a higher economic growth rate when they have less short-run capital 
per worker relative to long-run capital per worker (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2006). The 
reason the convergence is conditional in the Solow-Swan model is that different 
economies could have a different savings rate, a different growth rate of population and 
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a different position of the production function, which affect the steady-state levels of 
capital and output per worker. Hence, the concept of conditional convergence in the 
Solow-Swan model helps explain economic growth across countries and regions (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 2006; Savvides and Stengos, 2008).  
Another important recommendation of the model is identifying the role of technology 
in the economic growth process. Increasing the amount of any input quickly does not lead 
to increased growth in output in the long run due to diminishing returns in the 
accumulation of inputs. As adding an additional unit of an input increases output, but by 
less than the previous unit, then per capita output stops growing and becomes stagnant 
(Savvides and Stengos, 2008). By continuing an improvement in technology, the model 
can allow accumulating production function inputs over time and thus the positive rates 
of per capita growth can persist for long term and these growth rates have no clear 
tendency to decline. Technical progress offsets the diminishing returns to capital 
investment that would otherwise limit growth (Liu and Premus, 2000; Petrakos et al, 
2007). However, the obvious limitation in Solow-Swan growth model is that the long-run 
per capita growth rate depends on exogenous elements – the rate of technological progress 
and population growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2006 and Acemoglu, 2009). Moreover, 
the Solow-Swan model does not explain the determinants of long-run per capita growth 
(Acemoglu, 2009; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2006; Snowdon, 2009). (The Solow-Swan 
growth equation is expressed in Appendix A). 
2.1.4 Endogenous Growth Theories 
Developments in endogenous growth theories have been motivated by theorists 
dissatisfied with common accounts of exogenous factors determining long-run growth. 
The initial wave of new research built on the work of Arrow (1962), Sidrauski (1967), 
and Uzawa (1965). In endogenous growth models, a constant positive rate of steady state 
growth is possible in the nonexistence of labour and technology growth. In the one-sector 
models this arises by preventing the private returns to capital from falling towards zero 
over time; whereas in the two-sector models this is attained through the separate 
endogenous accumulation of human capital. By introducing human capital as a 
component of capital goods, which does not exhibit diminishing returns, the growth rate 
of capital and output is prevented from falling to zero. Furthermore, technological change 
resulting from purposive R&D activity has a significant impact on the growth framework 
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(Romer, 1987; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; and Grossman and Helpman, 1991). The growth 
rate can be positive in the long run if the economy does not tend to reduce innovation. 
The following section will introduce a brief description of the endogenous growth 
models. 
2.1.4.1 AK Endogenous Growth Models 
One way to construct a theory to surpass the problem of exogenous model is to 
eliminate the long-run tendency for capital to experience diminishing returns. The AK 
model (Jones and Manuelli, 1990), which is the simplest endogenous growth model, gives 
a constant positive steady state growth rate of output. The constant positive growth rate 
is an assumption rather than a result of the model. There are constant returns to capital 
and therefore the rate of interest and the growth rate are also constant in the steady state. 
The violation of the Inada condition of diminishing marginal returns to capital is vital for 
this result1. In the AK model, technology is considered so that the returns to capital 
diminish but asymptotically approached a positive constant. It has been assumed for 
simplicity that the supply of labour is constant and therefore can be taken out of the 
production function. The capital term is generally understood as including both physical 
and human capital as a means of justifying the assumption of constant returns.  
The simplest form of production function with non-diminishing return is (Jones and 
Manuelli, 1990): 
  𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐾) = 𝐴𝐾       (1.1) 
                                                          
1 The Inada conditions of production function is that the marginal product of capital or labour approaches 
infinity as capital or labour  goes to 0 and approach 0 as capital or labour goes to infinity: 
lim
𝐾→0 
(
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐾
) =  lim
𝐿→0 
(
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐿
) =  ∞ 
lim
𝐾→∞ 
(
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐾
) =  lim
𝐿→∞ 
(
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐿
) =  0 
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Where 𝐴 is a positive constant that reflects the level of the technology. K is capital 
(including physical and human capital). Assuming that output per capita is determined by 
the constant 𝐴 > 0 
  𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑘) =  𝐴𝑘       (1.2) 
where 𝑘 is capital per worker, and 𝑦 is output or income per worker. 
By substituting 
𝑓(𝑘)
𝑘
= 𝐴 in equation of transitional dynamics of Solow-Swan model 
(Appendix A, equation 1.9).  
   𝛾𝐾 = 
?̇?
𝑘
=
𝑠𝑓(𝑘)
𝑘
− (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)
𝑘
𝑘
      (1.3)
  
where 𝑛 and 𝑔 are the rate of population growth and the rate of labour augmenting 
technological progress. 𝛿 is the constant depreciation rate of capital. The number of 
effective units of labour grow at the rate (𝑛 + 𝑔). The term (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)
𝑘
𝑘
 is the break-
even investment.  
They return here to the case of zero technological progress, 𝑔 = 0, because it can be 
showed that per capita growth can occur in the long-run even without exogenous 
technological change. 
  𝛾𝐾 = 𝑠𝐴 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)       (1.4) 
The net marginal product of capital 
𝛿𝑌
𝛿𝐾
= 𝐴 −  𝛿, can be substituted for the interest rate 
in the consumption growth equation to yield the consumption growth equation, 
  𝛾𝑐 = 
1
𝜎
[𝐴 −  𝛿 − 𝑛 − 𝑝]      (1.5) 
where 𝑝 is the constant rate of time preference, 𝜎 is the rate at which households are 
willing to substitute consumption across time. 
It can be seen that the steady state of growth rate is then a positive constant value 
when𝐴 > (𝛿 + 𝑛 + 𝑝). The growth rate of consumption therefore does not depend on the 
capital stock in this model, which results in permanent differences in growth rates across 
countries. Fiscal policies have impact on the steady state growth rate in AK model due to 
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their influences to shift the technology parameter A. Thus, the AK model presents a 
dramatically different picture of growth, and one in which the link between government 
actions and growth is much more obvious than in the Solow model (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2006). 
The preceding model showed that AK models cannot be dismissed as easily as one 
might first have thought. There are still some reasons to doubt the predictions about long-
run growth generated by this model. There are some non-accumulated factors in the real 
world, such as land, that cannot simply be accumulated indefinitely such as energy. Other 
reason is the treatment of human capital. The strict parallel between human capital and 
physical capital in the model is probably not completely accurate. For instance, not all 
expenditures on education will produce the same effect on output. Thus, there may be 
limits to which one can increase growth just by boosting educational enrolment 
(Helpman, 2010; Savvides and Stengos, 2008). 
In conclusion, the AK approach may overestimate the effect of savings rates on long-
run growth rates, despite them having larger level effects than in the basic Solow model. 
Also, while the AK models may be wrong about there being no “convergence dynamics” 
towards a steady-state level of output, these dynamics may be slower than the Solow 
model predicts (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2006). 
2.1.4.2 Romer-type Endogenous Growth Model 
There are some forms of externality to the accumulation capital, which can lead to 
constant returns to capital at the aggregate level. It can be seen that in Romer model 
(1986), the accumulation of capital can rise by the stock of generally available knowledge, 
which is known as learning-by-doing. Romer mentioned that aggregate knowledge is a 
non-rival and non-excludable input for all firms’ production function and it is offered to 
all at a zero cost. Knowledge accumulation and thus growth is believed as endogenous to 
the economy, however it is assumed by each individual firm to be exogenously 
determined due to the influence of its own investment being small (Kneller, 1998). This 
assumption is vital to allow the model to retain the assumption of perfect competition at 
the firm level. By using Cobb-Douglas functional form, the production function for the 
individual firm in which no growth in the labour input and removing it from the 
production function for simplicity is assumed, is given: 
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  𝑌𝑖 = 𝐴𝐾𝑖
𝛼𝐾1−𝛼       (1.6) 
where 0 < 𝛼 < 1 is the elasticity of output with respect to capital for individual firm. 
The diminishing marginal return still happens to physical capital but constant returns 
apply across physical capital and knowledge. This assumption of constant returns to scale 
across physical capital and knowledge is important as we aggregate all firms to arrive 
back at an AK type of production function, 𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾. It can be seen that the marginal 
product of capital is constant and therefore a sustainable positive constant growth rate in 
the steady state of an economy can be gained (Acemoglu, 2009 and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2006). 
2.1.4.3 Two-sector Endogenous Growth Models (Role of Human Capital) 
Long-term per capita growth without exogenous technological progress can be 
achieved if the returns to capital are constant. It has been widely argued that the absence 
of diminishing returns might apply as a broad view of capital which includes both human 
and physical capital. This section will outline models that separate the role of physical 
and human capital on economic growth. The amount of human capital investment is 
expressed by utility-maximising households and is produced using alternative technology 
to that of consumption goods. 
Following Rebelo (1991) and using a setup with two Cobb-Douglas production 
functions: 
  𝑌 = 𝐶 + ?̇? +  𝛿𝐾 = 𝐴(𝑣𝐾)𝛼(𝑢𝐻)1− 𝛼    (1.7) 
  ?̇? +  𝛿𝐻 = 𝐵[(1 − 𝑣) × 𝐾]𝜂[(1 − 𝑢) × 𝐻]1−𝜂    (1.8) 
where Y is the output of goods (consumables and gross investment in physical capital); 
A, B > 0 are technological parameters; α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) and η (0 ≤ η ≤ 1) are the shares of 
physical capital in the outputs of each sector; ν (0 ≤ ν ≤ 1) and μ (0 ≤ μ ≤ 1) are the fraction 
of physical and human capital used in production function respectively. (1 – ν) and (1 – 
μ) are the fraction of physical and human capital used in education in order to generate 
human capital. As α ≠ η, equation 1.8 indicates that human capital is produced from a 
technology that differs from that for goods. Both equations use a setup of Cobb-Douglas 
production functions which each describe a constant return to scale in the quantities of 
the two capital inputs. Therefore, the model will exhibit endogenous steady-state growth 
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of AK type that presented in section 4.1.1 (indeed in the steady-state C, K, H and Y all 
grow at a common rate) (Acemoglu, 2009 and Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2006).  
If the utility function is maximised in the usual way, it presents a time path of 
consumption that looks similar to those described in different sections above, 
  𝛾𝐶 = 
1
𝜎
[𝐴 (
𝑢𝐻
𝑣𝐾
)
(1− 𝛼)
−  𝛿 −  𝜌]     (1.9) 
Since H and K grow at identical rates in the steady-state then the marginal product of 
physical capital is constant and the economy presents a sustainable rate of growth. 
The inclusion of fiscal policy is not necessary to endogenise the growth rate in these 
two-sector models. Even if fiscal policy performs the same function as in the Romer 
model, there are problems of how to model increasing return to scale in a dynamic 
optimisation framework and retain the assumption of perfect competition. One possible 
means of overcoming this problem is to restrict the form of government expenditures such 
that they amount to one-off shifts in the level of technology through the parameters A and 
B. This behaves in the same way as in the one-sector AK models.  
There are some other models of endogenous growth and other growth theories, such 
as the role of non-economic (socio-cultural factors, demography and geographical 
factors), management and organisation, and institution framework factors. However, in 
the scope of this thesis, this research does not focus further on them. 
2.1.5 Conclusion 
As the literature suggests, there have been a lot of theoretical research on the 
determinants of economic growth. However, the complexity and nature of the debate has 
generated no unified conclusion as to which theory best fits in terms of countries seeking 
positive significant changes in their growth rates. Diminishing returns to capital 
investment in the neoclassical growth model means firms find it profitable to invest only 
when technology in the economy improves. On the other hand, in the endogenous growth 
model, output is not limited by diminishing returns and grows as fast as firms invest in 
the factors of production. These different theories on the causes of growth have therefore 
had diverse implications for government policy. Under the neoclassical growth model, 
governments are restricted to adopting policies that encourage technological change if 
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they wish to permanently raise growth rates. In the endogenous growth model, in contrast, 
policies which encourage factor input accumulation induce faster growth. Therefore, the 
endogenous growth model offers governments a much broader range of effective policies 
to choose from. The next part of this chapter considers the role of government expenditure 
in economic growth models in both theoretical and empirical research.   
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2.2 Government Expenditures in Models of Economic Growth 
In the previous chapter it was said that governments can boost economic growth rates 
if they can bring goods and services to private sectors in which there would otherwise be 
sub-optimal investment. Under the neoclassical model, taxation and government 
expenditure may affect the incentive to invest in human and physical capital, but in the 
long-run these affect only the equilibrium factor ratios, not the growth rate, although in 
general there will be transitional growth effects. Meanwhile, the endogenous growth 
model predicts that taxation and government expenditure will influence the long-run 
growth rate. Within this part, this thesis will focus solely on reviewing government 
expenditures side, which is assumed to be financed using lump-sum tax in order to 
recognise the differences of government spending between neoclassical and endogenous 
growth models. A lump-sum tax are favoured for building an economic growth 
framework as it has no effect on household or firm’s decisions (saving and investment) 
and thus will not change the effects of expenditures on growth. Policy enters both models 
in an identical manner, so the differences in the results rest not on the behaviour of fiscal 
policy, but instead of on the treatment of capital in the production function (Kneller, 
1998). In addition, the categorisation of government expenditure has a different impact 
on economic growth. Expenditure that is labelled productive results in government goods 
and services that complement private sector production. Meanwhile, expenditure labelled 
as non-productive includes much of government consumption that enters into the 
household’s utility function. In this part, the research reviews the characteristics of 
expenditures and their role in economic growth models. In the neoclassical growth model, 
the distinction between productive and non-productive types of spending is unnecessary 
as no type of expenditure determines the steady state level of growth (results are reviewed 
in section 2.2.2). The endogenous growth models discussed in this chapter start from an 
‘AK’ form, before moving to multiple forms of productive government expenditure in 
section 2.2.3. This section adds government expenditure to a two-sector endogenous 
growth model where growth is achieved through the separate accumulation of human 
capital. Finally, section 2.2.4 provides the review of the empirical literature. 
2.2.1 Characteristics of Government Expenditure 
One issue that concerns researchers when they study public spending in endogenous 
growth models is whether fiscal policy fits into either the production or consumption 
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sectors of the model. Only productive expenditures that are included in the production 
sector as a complementary to private sector production can have a direct effect on growth 
(Barro, 1990). Meanwhile, non-productive expenditures which include much of 
government consumption are assumed to be perfect substitutes for private consumption 
and therefore modelled as additional inputs to the household utility function. The non-
productive expenditures have no effect on the saving and investment decision due to the 
assumed nature of the preference function (Kneller, 1998). A large proportion of 
government spending could be thought of as increasing or decreasing the production of 
output in the economy, but it is possible that only a few of them affect output growth in 
a homogeneous manner. By using Barro (1990)’s model, the relationship between  
government expenditures and the growth of output can be discussed widely under two 
types; i) changes in the manner by which spending affects the production of output 
(spending that encourages the accumulation of additional reproducible factors); and ii) 
changes to characteristics of the productive spending term. 
Barro (1990) and Kneller (1998) assume that all productive expenditures are 
complementary to private production and can be modelled as additional inputs to the 
firm’s production function. Government expenditures are expected to encourage growth 
by correcting the market failure caused by the public good nature of some types of capital, 
as they will reallocate the stock of available resources. This assumption obviously limits 
the role of expenditure policies, and ignores expenditures that have an indirect effect on 
production via investment or human capital accumulation for instance, such as public 
sector R&D or health expenditures. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2006) developed the idea of 
these productive expenditures and modelled them as increasing the possibility of 
maintaining ownership of output, as in the protection of property rights and then the 
investment decision. The underlying transmission mechanism is altered in these models, 
but it has no consequence for the way public goods behave in the steady state. 
Barro (1990) assumed that all public spending are productive government expenditure 
as flows of goods into the production function. This characteristic of productive 
expenditure may not be correct in every case, as some forms of productive expenditures, 
for example transport infrastructure may be thought of as a stock of public capital. 
Therefore, the difference between flows and stocks of public goods make very little 
contribution to the model in term of classifying productive and non-productive spending. 
Other assumption on productive expenditure which has been given by Barro is that 
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productive public spending is homogeneous in its impact on production. The marginal 
benefits of different expenditure categories are identical; therefore they can be aggregated 
into a single term. In reality it is unlikely that the impact of one unit increase in health 
expenditure on the rate of growth is the same as to that of education expenditure, and this 
is proved by empirical evidence (Devarajan et al. 1996). Hence, removing this assumption 
and allowing multiple forms of productive goods within the same production function 
adds to the set of results, through the probability of growth influences from the mix as 
well as the level of expenditure. 
To sum up, this thesis classifies productive government spending as the spending 
influence private sector productivity and hence has a direct impact on economic growth. 
Meanwhile non-productive expenditures, which normally have effect on citizens’ 
welfare, are likely to have a zero or negative growth impact. There are some 
characteristics of productive expenditure which has been considered by Barro (1990) and 
Kneller (1998) such as, flows of public capital, homogeneous and subject to rivalry and 
excludability; however given that the interest of the thesis is in the empirical analysis 
rather than theoretical model building this is not a model this thesis explores in any great 
depth. 
2.2.2 Policy Ineffectiveness 
Growth models regarding the effect of fiscal policy mainly come in two main forms, 
Neoclassical and Endogenous. In what follows, it begins with a discussion of policy 
irrelevance in the neoclassical model, before describing a simple one-sector endogenous 
growth model. Once it has discussed some of the developments in this basic one sector 
model, this thesis will move to public policy in two-sector endogenous growth model. To 
demonstrate the distinction between neoclassical and endogenous growth models clearly, 
it involves fiscal policy in an identical manner to the Barro (1990) endogenous growth 
model. It is assumed that the rate of growth of the labour force and labour-augmenting 
technological change are zero.  
The production function is written in a Cobb-Douglas form, with constant returns to 
scale in capital and labour for simplicity. The term GY is used to denote productive 
government expenditures. Productive expenditures are described as non-rival, non-
excludable public goods and a flow of goods and services. GY is presumed to be produced 
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under an identical technology to that of private goods; to affect production directly; and 
for all productive goods have a homogeneous effect on output (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1992 and Kneller, 1998). The elasticity of output with respect to government spending is 
given by 𝛽, and it is assumed that 0 < 𝛽 < 1 so that public goods like all inputs in (2.1) 
are subject to diminishing marginal returns (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2006). 
  𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝛼𝐿1−𝛼𝐺𝑌
𝛽
       (2.1) 
Government spending is financed by a lump-sum tax at the rate 𝜏. The reason the lump-
sum taxes have been chosen is that they are non-distortionary and therefore have no 
impact on any part of the models that we consider. The GBC which is assumed to balance 
at every moment in time is given by: 
  𝐺 =  𝜏         (2.2) 
Where 𝐺 =  𝐺𝑌 + 𝐺𝐶 and 𝐺𝐶 denotes as government consumption expenditure 
The resource constraint of the economy is given as: 
  𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺       (2.3) 
Where C is consumption, I is investment and G is total government spending. 
Using 𝐼 =  ?̇? +  𝛿𝐾 and 𝐺 =  𝜏 the growth equation of capital can be written as given: 
  ?̇? = 𝑌 − 𝐶 −  𝛿𝐾 −  𝜏      (2.4) 
As in previous chapter, household utility is supposed to be a function of private 
consumption and government consumption expenditure. It further supposes that 
government consumption expenditure and private consumption are perfect substitutes. 
Household utility is maximised subject to economy’s resource constraint to yield the 
growth path for consumption as given: 
  𝛾𝑐 = 
1
1−(1−𝜎)(1−𝜉)
[𝛼𝐴𝐾𝛼−1𝐿1−𝛼𝐺𝑌
𝛽
− 𝛿 −  𝜌]   (2.5) 
The interest rate is constant, ?̇? = 0, when the growth rate of the capital stock is equal 
to the growth of the labour force plus technology and when the growth in government 
spending is constant. This can be seen in equation 2.5 where the growth rate of 
consumption is constant when the capital-labour ratio is constant and the level of 
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government expenditure is constant. If it differentiates the production function with 
respect to time and substitute for the growth of technology, population and government 
expenditure similar to equation 1.18; it can show that the growth rate of output is also 
zero, 
?̇?
𝑌
= 
?̇?
𝐴
+ 𝛼
?̇?
𝐾
+ (1 − 𝛼)
?̇?
𝐿
+  𝛽
𝐺?̇?
𝐺𝑌
= 0. This happens because of an assumption that 
the growth of population and technology is zero, 
?̇?
𝐴
= 
?̇?
𝐿
= 0 and differentiating the GBC 
in (2.2) reveals that the growth of government spending is also zero, 
?̇?
𝐺
= 
?̇?
𝜏
= 0. Including 
public goods to aid private production or provide utility to households has no impact on 
the steady state growth rate in this model. Even if it alters the mix of government 
expenditures between productive and non-productive expenditures, it has no effect on the 
steady state growth rate. Hence, firms can find it optimal to invest only to the point at 
which the capital stock depreciates; therefore there is no growth in the inputs and then 
output. These results are robust to all changes in the characteristics of productive 
government expenditures (Kneller, 1998). The role of fiscal policy in the neoclassical 
model has been well researched even though the fact that it is ineffective in influencing 
the growth rate. 
2.2.3 Endogenous Growth Model – Effective Fiscal Policy 
2.2.3.1 AK Endogenous Growth Model 
Barro (1990) established one of the first and simplest models of public policy 
endogenous growth model in the literature. His model uses an identical set of assumptions 
to the neoclassical model. Production is supposed to be linearly homogenous in capital, 
so fiscal policy is believed to be effective in this model. Furthermore, the addition of 
productive government expenditures to a growth model is not adequate in itself to 
endogenise the growth rate; therefore endogenise growth is expected as an assumption of 
the model. Endogenous growth is not caused by fiscal policy in the ‘AK’ model as this 
has been made one of the assumptions through constant returns to capital. The distinction 
between the results of the neoclassical and endogenous models is based mainly on as 
mathematical restriction on the assumed nature of production technology (Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 2006).  
The production function is given by the ‘AK’ form described in chapter 1 section 
2.1.3.1. Now we add government spending as an input into this process. There is a 
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constant return to capital, but increases in public goods are subject to diminishing 
marginal returns. 
  𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝐺𝑌
𝛽
   0 < 𝛽 < 1    (2.6) 
Household utility is assumed to be a function of private consumption and government 
consumption expenditure. Utility is maximised in the usual way (Euler’s equation) and 
the steady state growth rate of consumption is as equation: 
  𝛾𝐶 = 
1
1−(1−𝜎)(1−𝜉)
[𝐴𝐺𝑌
𝛽
−  𝛿 − 𝜌]     (2.7) 
The growth rate of consumption is a positive constant because the determinants of the 
steady state are all constant, as there is no growth in technology and the level of 
government expenditure. In equilibrium productive government expenditures have a 
positive impact on the marginal product of capital and then on the growth rate (Kneller, 
1998). The steady state growth rate is an increasing function at all sizes of government, 
but subject to diminishing returns as the slope of the function is given by the elasticity of 
parameter𝛽. Government consumption expenditures have little influence on the steady 
state of consumption, because it does not distort the Euler equation. Cashin (1994) stated 
that some forms of government consumption have a positive impact on the rate of growth 
rate and achieved it by modelling government consumption as an input into the production 
function. Therefore, by altering the mix of total government spending towards productive 
government spending and away from non-productive spending there should be an 
increase in the steady state growth rate. 
2.2.3.2 Multiple forms of Productive Government Expenditure 
Devarajan et al. (1996) and Kneller (1998) developed the Barro (1990) model to allow 
multiple forms of public goods to enter the aggregate production function. In Kneller 
(1998), output is produced using Cobb-Douglas production technology and for 
straightforwardness there are two forms of productive public goods 𝐺𝑌1 and 𝐺𝑌2: 
  𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾𝐺𝑌1
𝛽
𝐺𝑌2
𝜆        (2.8) 
This productive government spending allows for a better description of the connection 
between the rate of growth and government spending, as the elasticity parameters on 
government spending are no longer constrained to be identical, 𝛽 ≠ 𝜆. The government 
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is supposed to fully finance expenditure, 𝐺𝑌1 and 𝐺𝑌2, through lump-sum taxation and to 
be balanced at every moment in time. Using 𝐺𝑌1 =  ∅𝐺𝑌 and 𝐺𝑌2 = (1 − ∅)𝐺𝑌 in 
equation 2.8 (where ∅ is the proportion of each spending in the budget) and maximising 
household utility lead to the following equation for the steady state growth rate of 
consumption: 
  𝛾𝐶 = 
1
1−(1−𝜎)(1−𝜉)
{𝐴[∅𝐺𝑌]
𝛽[(1 − ∅)𝐺𝑌]
𝜆 − 𝛿 − 𝜌}  (2.9) 
Both forms of government expenditure have an impact on the rate of growth through 
the marginal production of capital; however their relative influence varies upon the 
relative productivity of 𝐺𝑌1 and 𝐺𝑌2, and their relative budget shares, ∅ and(1 − ∅). If 
𝐺𝑌1has a greater elasticity value than 𝐺𝑌2 (𝜆 < 𝛽) then the rate of growth may still not 
increase if the expenditure share of 𝐺𝑌1 to 𝐺𝑌2 is too high. The condition for the mix of 
productive government expenditures to be at its optimum is: 
  
∅
1−∅
=
𝛽
𝜆
        (2.10) 
On the other hand, Devarajan et al. (1996) described G1 and G2 as either productive 
or non-productive spending, depending whether the effect on growth from changing the 
mix of expenditure is either positive or negative. This definition differs with the 
classification between productive and non-productive used in Kneller (1998) and Kneller 
et al. (1999).  
Devarajan et al. (1996) used a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production 
function. The aggregate production function (Y) has three arguments: private capital K, 
and two types of government expenditures G1 (productive) and G2 (non-productive): 
𝑌 = [𝛼𝐾−𝜁 + 𝛽𝐺1
−𝜁
+  𝛾𝐺2
−𝜁
]
−1 𝜁⁄
  𝛼 > 0;  𝛽, 𝛾 ≥ 0;  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 = 1;  𝜁 ≥ −1 (2.11) 
They assumed that the government finances its expenditure by a flat rate income tax, 𝜏 
  𝐺1 + 𝐺2 = 𝐺 =  𝜏𝑌       (2.12)
  
The share of total government expenditure that is used to two type of government 
spending, 
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 𝐺1 =  ∅𝜏𝑌 and 𝐺2 = (1 −  ∅)𝜏𝑌  0 ≤ ∅ ≤ 1  (2.13) 
With an isoelastic utility function, Devarajan et al. (1996) indicated that the long-run 
growth rate in this model, λ, given by: 
 𝜆 =
𝛼(1−𝜏){𝛼𝜏𝜁 [𝜏𝜁−𝛽𝜙−𝜁−𝛾(1−𝜙)−𝜁]⁄ }
−(1+𝜁) 𝜁⁄
−𝜌
𝜎
     (2.14)
  
where σ and ρ are constant that reflect parameters in the utility function.  
From equation 2.14, it can be derived a relationship between long-run growth rate, λ, and 
the share of government spending devoted to G1: 
  
𝑑𝜆
𝑑𝜙
=
𝛼(1−𝜏)(1+𝜁)(𝛼𝜏𝜁)−(1+𝜁) 𝜁⁄ [𝛽𝜙−(1+𝜁)−𝛾(1−𝜙)−(1+𝜁)]
𝜎[𝜏𝜁−𝛽𝜙−𝜁−𝛾(1−𝜙)−𝜁]−1 𝜁⁄
    (2.15) 
From equation 2.15, the government expenditure component g1 is productive if 𝑑𝜆 𝑑𝜙⁄ >
0. Since 𝜁 ≥ −1, equation 2.15 indicates that 𝑑𝜆 𝑑𝜙⁄ > 0 if: 
 
∅
1−∅
< (
𝛽
𝛾
)𝜃         (2.16) 
where 𝜃 = 1 (1 + 𝜁)⁄ is the elasticity of substitution    
Similar to Kneller (1998), a shift in the compositions of government expenditure to 
increase the growth rate depends not only on the productivity of these components, but 
also on the initial share. Hence, an increase in an objectively more productive type of 
expenditure may not raise the growth rate if its initial share is too high.   
In the special case of Cobb-Douglas technology (𝜉 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃 = 1), the condition in the 
equation 2.16 for the two types of government expenditure becomes: 
 
∅
1−∅
 <  
𝛽
𝛾
         (2.17) 
It can be seen that if the relative share of government expenditure on the two goods G1 
and G2 is below their relative output elasticity (𝛽 and 𝛾), then a shift in the mix towards 
G1 will increase the long-run economic growth rate. Both elasticities may be positive (i.e., 
both components of government expenditure are complementary with private production 
and both expenditures are described as being productive in Kneller (1998) model), yet if 
the above condition holds, relocating resources from G2 to G1 will increase the long-run 
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growth rate. However, 𝛽 >  𝛾 is not sufficient to ensure that increase in favour of G1 will 
raise the growth rate; it must be the case that the relative budget shares are below the 
relative output elasticities.  
Assume  𝛽 >  𝛾 and define ∅∗ as the critical value above in general case of a CES 
technology (where 𝜃 ≠ 1) which an increase in the share of expenditure going to G1 
will not increase the growth rate. Then condition in equation 2.16 becomes 
 
∅∗
1−∅∗
= (
𝛽
𝛾
)
𝜃
         (2.18) 
Simple manipulation shows that: 
 
𝑑∅∗
𝑑𝜃
= (1 − ∅∗) (
𝛽
𝛾
)
𝜃
𝑙𝑛 (
𝛽
𝛾
)       (2.19) 
Since 𝛽 >  𝛾 so 𝑑∅∗ 𝑑𝜃 > 0⁄ . ∅∗ increases as the two components of public spending 
become more and more substitutable. It is possible that the more substitutable the two 
components of expenditure are, the more likely that an increase in the share going to the 
one with the higher coefficient will increase the growth rate. On the other hand, when 
substitution elasticity is low, shifting the amount toward G1 may not increase the growth 
rate even if the initial share is small.  
The Devarajan et al. (1996) model described above introduced an important 
understanding into what makes particular components of government expenditure 
productive. The outcome depends on the relationship between the coefficient and the 
actual share in the budget, which determines whether a component is productive or not. 
However, their model concentrated on the composition of expenditure and disregarded 
financing issues of government spending, as they assumed that the government finances 
its expenditure by a flat-rate income tax. Kneller et al. (1999) and Bose et al. (2007) have 
cautioned that by not taking full account of GBC in growth models, the coefficient 
estimates tend to be biased. Therefore, when one evaluates the effect of fiscal policy on 
growth it should ideally take into account both the sources and the uses of funds. This 
thesis will base on Devarajan et al. model (1996), but also take into account a balance 
budget as recently theoretical models do. 
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2.2.3.3 Two-sector Models with Government Expenditure 
The productive government expenditure in a two-sector endogenous growth model 
performs similar way to the one-sector ‘AK’ model. The two-sector framework models 
the accumulation of human capital under an alternative technology to private output, and 
then distinguishes between expenditures which influence human capital accumulation 
from those which aid private production. The main factor of the steady state is the 
accumulation of physical and human capital changes in government expenditures, which 
are similar to changes in the level of technology. 
Using the same two-sector model as the model introduced in Section 1.3.3.2, it has 
added government spending to the model where the production aggregate output and 
human capital sector are given by the following equations: 
 𝑌 = 𝐶 + ?̇? +  𝛿𝐾 + 𝐺 = 𝐴(∅𝐺𝑌)
𝛽1(𝑣𝐾)𝛼(𝑢𝐻)1− 𝛼   (2.20) 
 ?̇? +  𝛿𝐻 = 𝐵[(1 − ∅)𝐺𝑌]
𝛽2[(1 − 𝑣) × 𝐾]𝜂[(1 − 𝑢) × 𝐻]1−𝜂   (2.21) 
where 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the elasticity parameters of output with respect to public goods 
and ∅ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (1 − ∅) the budget shares allocated to each public good. Both sectors present 
constant returns to human and physical capital in production, then for this reason K and 
H growth at identical constant rates in the steady state. 
The steady state growth rate of consumption is as equation: (maximising household 
utility) 
 𝛾𝐶 = 
1
1−(1−𝜎)(1−𝜉)
[𝐴(∅𝐺𝑌)
𝛽1(
𝑢𝐻
𝑣𝐾
)(1−𝛼) − 𝛿 − 𝜌]    (2.22) 
If H and K grow at identical constant rates in the steady state, the marginal product of 
physical capital is constant and the economy demonstrates a sustainable rate of growth. 
An increase in public goods in the production sector (a change in𝐺𝑌1) performs as a once 
and for all increase in the technology parameter in the private goods sector, A. 
Meanwhile, an increase in expenditure on public goods in the human capital accumulation 
sector, 𝐺𝑌2 acts like once and for all increase in the technology parameter B. Hence, there 
are both direct and indirect impacts from changes in spending on public goods (Monteiro 
and Turnovsky, 2008). 
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It can be seen that fiscal policy is only effective in endogenous growth models. 
Furthermore, these theoretical models have not been much different for both developed 
and developing countries; however, the empirical results are slightly varied. The next 
section of this literature review pays close attention to the previous empirical studies 
which present the effects of government expenditure components on economic growth 
between developed and developing countries. 
2.2.4   Review of the Empirical Literature 
Endogenous growth models provide a number of possible channels by which 
government policy can have an impact on the long-run growth rate of a country. There 
are several empirical research studies examining the relationship between various 
components of government expenditure and economic growth. These studies vary in 
terms of data set, econometric technique and quality. One objective of this research is to 
determine the effects of productive and non-productive government spending on 
economic growth, so the classification of expenditures into productive and non-
productive plays a vital role. Researchers have differentiated between productive and 
non-productive government expenditure and have shown how a country can increase its 
economic growth by changing the mix between these alternative forms of expenditure. 
Kneller et al. (1999) underlined that productive government spending influences private 
sector productivity and hence has a direct impact on growth, while non-productive 
expenditure, which normally has an effect on citizens’ welfare, is likely to have a zero or 
negative growth impact. Devarajan et al. (1996) was one of the first to introduce a model 
that expresses the difference between productive and non-productive expenditures by 
how a change in the proportion of total expenditure dedicated to either one impacts on 
long run economic growth. They stated that a country’s desire to reach a more optimal 
growth rate can be achieved by increasing the proportion of total government expenditure 
dedicated to productive areas. The broader empirical literature on the classification of 
government expenditure shows a mixed record for the effects of productive and non-
productive expenditure on economic growth.  
Another objective of this review is to demonstrate how the growth performance of 
different groups of countries over time was affected by the composition of their public 
expenditures. Little attention has been given to comparing and contrasting the impact of 
government expenditure composition on economic growth in countries at different stages 
 55 
 
of development. Therefore, this section will firstly review previous empirical research on 
the effects of government compositions on growth, and then revise recent studies on 
comparing the growth performance of different groups of countries. 
2.2.4.1 Productive versus Non-productive Government Expenditure 
Landau (1983) used a cross-sectional study of 104 countries for the period 1961 – 1976 
and found a negative relationship between the share of government consumption 
expenditure and the growth rate of real per capita GDP. His definition of government 
consumption was government spending excluding public investment and transfer. It also 
found the same results for sub-set sample for high income, upper-middle income and low 
income economies in his paper. Meanwhile, the negative relationship did not hold for the 
lower-middle income countries. A positive and significant impact of total investment in 
education on the growth rate, which would be one component of an economy’s defined 
investment (Barro, 1990), has been realised for all time periods and both the full set and 
subsets of sample data. However, due to weaknesses in the data availability, the 
conclusion drawn from the results of this paper may be tentative (Landau, 1983).  
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) studied cross-sectional of 47 countries during the post-
war period, using data on total government consumption expenditure and other variables 
from International Financial Statistic. Government consumption measurement was the 
same as Landau (1983), but included most expenditure on defence and education. Using 
data for each country averaged over 20-year period, they found that average growth rates 
or levels of the share of government consumption spending in GDP has no significant 
impact on average growth rates of real GDP. Grier and Tullock (1989) extended 
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) empirical model of cross-country growth by using 5-year 
average for a pooled cross-sectional and time-series data of 115 economies from 1950 to 
1981. They stated that government production of basic valuable public goods, such as, 
roads and property rights, contributed to provide the enabling environment for growth; 
while government consumption expenditure was again the same as Landau’ study (1983). 
They separated the sample into the 24 OECD countries and other 89 rest of the world 
countries (ROW), then further divided the ROW by continents to test the validity of a 
pooled sample. They found a significant negative relationship between the government 
consumption’s share of GDP and the growth rate of real GDP for both sets of countries. 
This result was not found by Kormendi and Meguire (1985) who used the same variable 
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definition, but a different countries sample and data source. They also indicated that it is 
inappropriate to pool OECD and ROW countries. Aschauer (1989) stated that government 
investment expenditure, such as the provision of infrastructure, provides the environment 
for enhancing economic growth. His research found that investment in core infrastructure 
(streets, highways, airports, mass transit, and other public capital) increase the private-
sector productivity in the US between 1949 and 1985, thereby leading to higher economic 
growth.   
Barro (1991) based on his simple version of economic growth model in 1990 which 
took government expenditure to be complementary with private production and assumed 
that all government expenditure is productive in his case. His study introduced some 
empirical literature on the topic that highlighted the different effects of productive and 
non-productive expenditure on growth for 98 countries over the period 1960 – 1985. 
While Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Grier and Tullock (1989) classified government 
spending on defence and education as government consumption and hence non-
productive, Barro (1991) modelled them as productive. The idea was that these 
expenditures are likely to affect private-sector productivity or property rights, which 
matter for private investment. Using a cross-sectional of 98 countries, Barro (1991) 
showed that an increase in the ratio of government consumption expenditure to GDP is 
associated with lower growth rate of per capita real GDP. He explained that this non-
productive government spending introduced distortions, such as high tax rates, but did 
not provide an offsetting stimulus to investment and growth. He also found a positive 
relationship between public investment and economic growth rate. However, it could not 
explain a weak relationship between government expenditure and growth performances 
of developing countries in his sample (Sub-Sahara Africa and Latin America). 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) used a set of 119 cross-sectional countries for the period 
1970 – 1988 to provide a comprehensive conclusion of the statistical association between 
measures of fiscal policy and the rate of growth. They found a positive relationship 
between the share of public investment in transport and communication and economic 
growth. Besides, general government investment had a positive impact on growth. The 
government budget surplus was consistently correlated with growth rate and private 
investment in their cross-section data. However, the association between government 
expenditure in education and housing, and economic growth was insignificant. They 
suggested that public spending on infrastructure has a supernormal return, but they 
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needed much more data collection on infrastructure to address the causality from 
infrastructure to growth and the high magnitude of coefficient on public infrastructure 
expenditure in their sample. 
Devarajan et al. (1996) observed the above empirical studies and was one of the first 
to express a theoretical framework in which there are two types of government 
expenditure, productive and non-productive. Their model showed the difference between 
productive and non-productive government spending in how a change in mix between 
them affects the long run growth rate. Their empirical analysis was focused exclusively 
on developing countries. They used a panel data of 43 developing countries from 1970 
through 1990 to shed light on the association between the compositions of government 
spending and long run economic growth. To test whether the share allocated to different 
components of public spending is related to higher growth, their key explanatory 
variables were the share of each component in total government expenditure. These 
components were classified by two main lines of International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
Government Financial Statistic (GFS). The first line is based on the economic 
classification of expenditure in which central government expenditure divides into capital 
(productive) and current (non-productive) expenditure. The second line is based on the 
functional classification of expenditure in which components are grouped as expenditures 
on defence, health, education and transportation and communication. Contrary to 
expectations, their paper found a positive relationship between a greater share of total 
government expenditure toward non-productive government expenditure and economic 
growth, while also reporting a negative relationship between a greater share on productive 
expenditure and growth. Their empirical analysis also reported that infrastructure and 
health government expenditures have a negative correlation with per capita real GDP 
growth. On the other hand, expenditures in defence and education are positive and 
significant impact on economic growth on 43 developing countries. One limitation of the 
paper is that they focus exclusively on the expenditure rather than revenue side of the 
GBC; therefore, their coefficient would tend to be biased (Bose et al., 2007 and Ghosh 
and Gregorious, 2007). 
Kneller et al. (1999) and Bleaney et al. (2001) used a similar sample set of 22 OECD 
countries during 1970 and 1995 to investigate the effect of fiscal policy on economic 
growth. Both papers pointed out four problems arising when testing regression of public 
policy endogenous growth models. Firstly, there may be limited data on government 
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expenditures and revenues, and the definition of particular public expenditure as 
productive or non-productive or particular taxes as distortionary and non-distortionary 
can be controversial. The second problem is that economic growth regression equations 
can easily be biased if the researcher focuses on one side of the budget constraint and 
ignores the other. The third problem is that whether this is an adequate procedure based 
on single cross-sectional or panel of five-year averages on the period-averaging process 
to capture long run economic growth. The final problem is the possibility of endogeneity 
of regressors in growth equations. They pointed out that the coefficients in growth 
equations based on cross-section or static panel approaches may be biased if fiscal 
variables are not strictly exogenous. Kneller et al. (1999) focused on solving the first two 
of these problems. They found that complete specification of the GBC and careful 
attention to fiscal classifications gives different results compared with previous empirical 
literature. They classified government spending according to whether they are 
participated in the private production function or not. If these expenditures are, they are 
grouped as productive expenditure, a sum of expenditure on education, health, defence, 
housing, economic affairs and general public services; hence have a direct impact on 
economic growth. If these expenditures are not, they are classified as non-productive 
expenditure; a form of expenditure on social security, welfare and recreation, which do 
not have an effect on long run growth. Using panel data of 22 OECD countries, Kneller 
et al. (1999) found that there is a positive relationship between productive government 
expenditure and economic growth, while non-productive expenditure does not have an 
impact on the growth rate. Their results also showed that an increase in distortionary 
taxation significantly reduces economic growth, whilst non-distortionary taxation does 
not. Budget surplus has a positive and significant impact on the growth rate. Kneller et 
al. (1999) run robustness test with reclassification of fiscal variables to determine the 
relationship between fiscal variables with economic growth for developed countries case. 
They separated public spending based on the functional classification of expenditure 
similar to Devarajan et al. (1996). Their new government spending variables included: 
productive flows (expenditure on defence and general public services), productive stocks 
(expenditure on education, housing and transport and communication), health 
expenditure, social security and welfare expenditure and other expenditure (expenditure 
on recreation and economic services). They summarised that the further disaggregation 
of the budgetary data does not improve the fit of the model.  
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Bleaney et al. (2001) handled the latter two problems with the same panel data of 22 
OECD countries from 1970 to 1995.  They focused on answering the questions whether 
five-year averaged data are enough to capture long run economic growth rate, and 
whether using static results will be undermined when they allow for dynamic responses 
and the endogeneity of fiscal policy. Instead of taking five-year averages, they used 
original annual data with long lags to estimate the model. Their results suggested that the 
period averaging does not appear to capture full fiscal effects on long run economic 
growth, but both approaches produce consistent evidence of fiscal effects on growth. 
They had also tested the robustness of their results to potential endogeneity of the fiscal 
regressors by comparing the dynamic panel data model with static one. They considered 
the potential endogeneity between investment and fiscal variables and the growth rate. 
They found no clear evidence on the endogeneity of investment; while there are some 
changes in the coefficient magnitude of these fiscal variables, but these do not 
substantially affect the long-run estimates of the main fiscal variables. They concluded 
that there is evidence in favour of potential endogeneity of the endogenous growth model. 
Other than those discussed above, there are also many studies to estimate the link 
between government expenditure and economic growth during the period from 1980s to 
1990s. It can be seen that most of these studies use a mixed sample of developed and 
developing countries or developed countries only. Due to the poor data availability and 
restrictions in relevant estimation methodology techniques, the results from these 
empirical research studies are not consistent. The findings of these empirical studies are 
summarised in Table 2.1. With the improving of data quality, the large number of 
empirical research studies on the determinants of government expenditure compositions 
effects on growth provides valuable information in the next period (2000s – 2010s). 
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002) pointed out that empirical study, which use a large 
mixed set of countries to examine the relationship between fiscal policy and growth, 
present unsatisfied results. Once the research focuses on the OECD sub-sample, the cross-
country variability in both fiscal explanatory and growth variables is smaller. By using 
pooled cross-country time-series of 21 OECD countries over period 1971 – 1998, their 
empirical results explained both cross-country differences in growth performance as well 
as the evolution of performance over time in each country. Their study found that the 
overall size of government in the economy may reach a level which can be harmful for 
growth. Government consumption expenditure and government investment expenditure 
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in their sample tend to have non-negative impacts on output per capita. Furthermore, 
government investment spending may affect growth by improving the framework 
conditions in which private agents operate. Besides, public spending on health, education 
and research sustain living standard in long term but they have to be financed. 
Adam and Bevan (2005) examined the relationship between fiscal deficits and growth 
for a panel data of 45 non-OECD countries during the period 1970-1999. They grouped 
total non-interest government spending into two groups. Productive spending defined as 
spending on health, education, infrastructure, public order and safety (including defence) 
and public administration; as they believed that all of these have been identified to have 
positive impact on growth. Meanwhile, residual spending (non-productive) is classified 
as spending on economic services, recreation and culture, and other miscellaneous 
expenditure. They mentioned that they could not assume residual expenditure have no 
impact on growth as some previous research. Furthermore, they noticed the necessary of 
GBC in examining the relationship between fiscal variables and growth; therefore there 
are five ways to finance government spending in their models. These include taxes, grants 
and three forms of deficit finance by printing money and issuing domestic or external 
debt. Their results found that there is a negative relationship between economic growth 
and residual expenditure financed by tax and non-tax revenue. However, grant financing 
of residual expenditure has no significant effect on growth. It can be seen that the impact 
of non-productive expenditure on economic growth depends on how it is financed. 
Meanwhile, higher productive expenditure significantly increases average per capita 
growth in either grant or tax financing. Adam and Bevan also found that a deficit 
financing increase in residual expenditure reduces the average growth.  
Similar to Adam and Bevan (2005), Gupta et al. (2005) tested the effects of fiscal 
consolidation and government expenditure composition on growth in a panel data of 39 
low income countries between 1990 and 2000. To estimate these effects by regressing the 
annual rate of real per capita GDP growth on a set of regressors, Gupta et al. (2005) used 
different specification models. One of these models is that fiscal variables are measured 
as a share of GDP without a variable included on the fiscal balance; this allows them to 
assess the effects of particular expenditure items. Other model estimated fiscal variables 
in relation to total spending or total revenues so as they can capture the direct effect of 
expenditure or revenue compositions on growth, while it included a variable for budget 
balance at the same time. The empirical results found that reducing selected current (non-
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productive) expenditure is likely to raise growth rates, while boosting capital (productive) 
expenditure does the same in low income countries sample. A decrease in the ratio of 
fiscal deficit to GDP leads to an increase in per capita real GDP growth. They drew 
attention to presence of endogeneity in the literature on fiscal policy and economic 
growth. Accounting for the endogeneity of fiscal variables, the robustness test leads to 
the same effects on the growth as in the baseline regressions. Their empirical result 
recommended that introducing a dynamic specification does not change the results 
significantly from baseline regressions, but it improves the results compared to the static 
model. The study also found that in post-stabilisation countries (sub-sample from their 
data) an expansion of selected non-productive expenditure may be compatible with higher 
growth; low budget deficits additional fiscal consolidation may not increase economic 
growth. Hence, the role of macroeconomic stability is important factor to assess the fiscal 
policy effects on economic growth. 
 Park (2006) tested the complex relation between government fiscal policy and 
economic performance by collecting data from 93 industrial and developing countries 
between 1990 and 2000. His study found that a productive government spending, a sum 
of expenditure on education, transport and communication, defence, housing, health and 
general public services, can have direct positive impacts on the efficiency and growth of 
private economic sectors. In his model with endogenous fiscal variables, there is a 
negative relationship between tax rate and productive government expenditure both in the 
short and long run of OECD sub-sample countries. Therefore, when public spending is 
productive, the tax rate can be decreased in a socially optimal allocation of OECD 
countries. The study suggested that the effective implementation of government policy is 
crucial to economic growth, as weak institution and corruption can reduce the efficiency 
of government policy. 
Bose et al. (2007) examined the impacts of government expenditure by sector on 
economic growth rate from a set of 30 developing countries using decade averages over 
period 1970 – 1990. They paid attention to the GBC by including the important financing 
variables (government budget surplus/deficit and tax revenue) to avoid the biased 
coefficient that would result from their omission. Their empirical findings were that the 
share of productive government spending (capital expenditure) has a significant positive 
impact on economic growth, while the non-productive expenditure (current expenditure) 
is insignificant correlated with economic growth. At the disaggregated level, government 
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expenditure on education was the only sector that remains significant positive effect on 
economic growth throughout their analysis. Public spending on other sectors (defence, 
transport and communication) initially had significant association with growth, but did 
not persist when they incorporate the GBC into their analysis. They also found that tax 
revenue has a negative impact (not always significant) on economic growth, and the 
government deficit has the same highly negative significant effect on growth. They 
recommended the allocation of scarce government resources from other sectors towards 
the education sector, or from current to capital expenditure, will enhance growth for at 
least some developing countries in their sample. Their paper result is consistent with 
developed country experience. 
On the other hand, Ghosh and Gregoriou (2007) attempts to study optimal fiscal policy 
and concludes a opposite result with Bose et al. (2007) that non-productive rather than 
productive government expenditure has contributed to economic growth for 15 
developing countries over 28 years (1972 – 1999). Like Devarajan et al. (1996), they do 
not classify government expenditure as being productive and non-productive to start with, 
they allow the data prove it. Taking into account the possible reverse causality between 
government expenditure and economic growth, they use a five-year moving average of 
growth to remove business cycle –type short run fluctuations induced by shifts in 
government spending. Furthermore, paying attention to GBC, they take into account 
variables on the financing side more fully (including the government budget 
deficit/surplus, tax revenue and non-tax revenue). Their empirical results find that tax 
revenue and non-tax revenue both have significant positive effect on economic growth in 
15 developing countries sample. The government deficit/surplus variable turns out to 
have an insignificant impact on the growth rate. They also run the robustness test with 
respect to some important functional components of capital expenditure (productive) like 
education and health expenditure and current expenditure (non-productive) with 
operations and maintenance expenditure. They observe that the coefficients on both 
education and health expenditure variables are significant negative, while operations and 
maintenance expenditure have a significant positive impact on the per capita growth rate. 
These results seem counter-intuitive from the view of previous expectations. One reason 
for these differences is that Ghosh and Gregoriou (2007) is that they focus on the growth 
effect of government expenditure compositions as the share of total government 
expenditure, similar to Devarajan et al. approach (1996). They also suggest that 
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corruption can contribute to tax evasion and inefficient tax administration, and therefore 
gave the link between corruption and capital spending on low tax revenue.  
Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) use data for general government expenditure and 
revenue in all EU member state from 1960 to 2001 to assess the potential impact of fiscal 
policy on growth. The public capital formation have been counted as productive 
expenditure, while government consumption includes wage payments, salaries and 
purchases for the social security system assume to be non-productive expenditure in their 
sample. By using time series properties of the data, they find public finances provide 
policy instruments contributing to higher trend growth in the short run. They estimate the 
relationship between fiscal policies and long run growth rate by using a distributed lag 
approach and by better controlling for real business cycle effects and reverse causality. 
The empirical findings are that the expenditure size of the budget seems to have 
consistently impact on long run growth over the business cycle. Government size and 
government consumption negatively affect growth, while public investment has a positive 
effect on growth which reveals the likely gains in economic performance from shifting 
welfare expenditure to productive investment. 
 In a panel data set of 15 EU countries over the period 1971 – 2006, Afonso and Alegre 
(2011) attempt to determine whether a reallocation of government budgetary components 
has been useful to enhance economic growth. They have suggested that public variables 
have an impact on economic growth not only through an effect on productivity, but also 
by altering the conditions in the production factor market, labour and productivity. They 
estimate a dynamic panel date model with lags of the explanatory variables from which 
they are able to capture long run relationships. This methodology let them cope with the 
main problems in current growth regressions: the presence of endogeneity, the dynamic 
behaviour of the relations and the omitted variables issue. Their empirical results are 
government consumption and social security contributions expenditures have a negative 
effect on long run growth, while public investment expenditure has positive impact. The 
budget deficit has a positive impact on economic growth, even if it is not always 
statistically significant in their sample.  
Christie (2012) uses a panel of 136 countries over the period 1971 – 2005 to analysis 
the relationship between government size and long run economic growth. The empirical 
finding is that government size as measured by total government expenditure as a share 
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of GDP has significant negative impact on growth. Productive government expenditure 
has similar definitions have been used by Adam and Bevan (2005), Bleaney et al. (2001), 
and Park (2006), as a sum of expenditure on education, health, defence, and transport and 
communication. The effect of productive government spending on economic growth is 
similar to the comparable case using total government expenditure. Christie (2012) re-
runs the productive spending models using dynamic GMM to account for endogeneity. 
The results are consistent with the baseline regressions. The study also suggests highly 
effective governments appear to be able to offset some of the negative impact of large 
size. 
Based on the theoretical and empirical of Afonso and Alegre research (2011), Afonso 
and Jalles (2014) examine the relationship of fiscal composition and long-term growth 
using a large panel of 155 developed and developing countries for the period 1970 to 
2008. Their empirical findings suggest that government expenditures seem to have 
significant negative impact on economic growth, while revenues appear to have no impact 
for full sample. Regarding sectoral decompositions of government expenditure, the 
results are more robust and consistent across samples and econometric specifications; in 
particular public wages, interest payments, subsidies and government consumption are 
found to negatively affect economic growth. Whereas, government expenditure on 
education and health increases long run economic growth. Expenditures on social security 
and welfare obstruct growth. 
Gemmell et al. (2016) has indicated new evidence for 17 OECD countries on the 
impact of size and composition of public expenditure on economic growth during period 
1972 – 2007. The study is based on an extension of the Kneller et al., (1999), and Bleaney 
et al., (2001) dataset. Their empirical results find that there is robust long run positive 
effects on economic growth for government spending on transport and communication, 
and education, with some evidence supporting positive impacts from expenditure on 
housing and health; while spending on welfare have negative effects. They cannot find a 
positive effect from switching expenditure towards defence spending on per capita GDP 
levels. Their findings also suggest that the assumed form of expenditure financing is 
crucial, as there is an evidence of negative long run effects on output from deficit-financed 
increases in total government expenditure. 
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Despite the fact that the link between government spending compositions (productive 
and non-productive expenditure) and economic growth has been investigated in the 
literature, the results from related empirical research are not, especially when 
distinguishing between the effects of changes in the absolute level of government 
expenditure and changes in relative amount of productive and non-productive 
expenditures. In term of absolute levels of expenditure compositions (as a share in GDP), 
empirical results have consistently reported a positive relationship between productive 
government expenditure and economic growth, and either a negative or no-impact 
relationship between non-productive expenditure and economic growth for high-income 
economies. However, findings on the relationship between the level of public spending 
and economic growth in low to middle-income economies are mixed. On the other hand, 
fewer studies have examined the case of effects of the relative division of government 
expenditure between productive and non-productive uses (as a proportion of total 
expenditure) on economic growth.  It is interesting that studies focused on developing 
countries have presented a slightly different result to those looking at developed 
countries. Therefore, in the next section this thesis will review previous empirical 
research in which examine the impacts of productive and non-productive expenditure on 
economic growth but in terms of comparing developed to developing countries.  
2.2.4.2 Developed versus Developing Countries 
Devarajan et al. (1996) was one of the first to have a clear comparison impact of 
government spending compositions on growth between developed and developing 
countries. They firstly used a panel data of 43 developing countries from 1970 to 1990 
and found that allocating public spending in favour of productive expenditure at the 
expense of non-productive expenditure have a significant negative impact on economic 
growth. They subsequently re-tested their regressions with a sample of 21 developed 
countries for the same period and found that the results are reversed, with shifting towards 
productive government expenditure encouraging economic growth and non-productive 
expenditure failing to do so. There are several reasons why productive government 
expenditure could be more productive in developed countries had been explained by 
Devarajan et al., (1996). First reason is that an increase in the share going to productive 
government expenditure components may not raise the growth rate as the initial shares of 
these are already too much, so this increase is counterproductive. Other reason is due to 
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distortions in the economy. If distortions in developing countries are in smaller desired 
level of public goods, then an additional spending on these public goods may be non-
productive.  
Bose et al. (2007) based on a data set over period 1972-1999 for 40 developing 
countries and 21 OECD countries and generated the results that the growth effect is large 
and significantly negative in the case of developing countries, while the same coefficient 
is found to be insignificant for developed countries. Unfortunately, their research focused 
on the optimal public expenditure financing policy or government revenue side only, 
hence will not assess this relationship in terms of different level of economic 
development. 
Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) capture the effect of government 
expenditure allocation on growth using 56 countries (14 low-income, 16 medium-income 
and 26 high-income countries) for the period from 1970 to 2010. They recognised that 
the reallocation effects may differ relying on the different development level, thus it 
would be ideal to run separate regressions for different income levels country groups. 
They run the regressions without the G20-Advanced countries as they knew that having 
a smaller sample makes estimation results inaccurate because the number of instruments 
in their methodology technique become too relative to the number of countries. Their 
study found that the share of education spending to total spending (productive 
expenditure) enhances economic growth, particularly when an increase in this spending 
component is compensated by social protection spending (non-productive expenditure) 
to the subset of countries with a lesser degree of development. However, this result is not 
entirely satisfied with their full sample results. 
Recently, Afonso and Jalles (2014) use a panel data of 155 countries (OECD and 
emerging countries) during the period 1970-2008 to assess the fiscal decomposition 
effects on economic growth. They differentiate the impacts of spending on education, 
health and social security from the main items of government spending (a share of GDP) 
to compare these impacts on growth between OECD and emerging sub-groups. In the 
case of OECD sub-sample, expenditures on social security are less growth enhancing, 
while spending on both education and health increase long run growth. Meanwhile, only 
expenditure on education is found to have a positive impact on growth in the emerging 
economies sub-group. 
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It can be seen that there are a limited number of studies paying attention to comparing 
and contrasting the impact of government expenditure compositions on economic growth 
in countries at different stages of development. The results are opposite between effects 
of developed and developing economies on long-run economic growth. This provides 
some gaps in existing empirical research to examine the link between government 
expenditure compositions and economic growth at different stages of development, 
especially when distinguishing between the effects of changes in the absolute level of 
government expenditure and changes in relative amount of those expenditures 
compositions. Therefore, this thesis is to bridge these gaps in existing empirical research 
by investigating the growth effects of government expenditure compositions (as relative 
division of total expenditure), corruption and government expenditure on human capital 
in the next three empirical chapters (chapter 4,5 and 6). 
 Furthermore, there have recently been many empirical researches to determine the 
effects of government expenditure, government expenditure compositions on economic 
growth. With the improving of data quality, a wide range of methodology techniques, the 
number of empirical studies has contributed useful information to economic growth 
effects of fiscal policy fields. These studies now focus more on each group country sample 
and specific country case study, but the results from those are not consistent, especially 
when considering low and middle-income economies. The finding of these studies are 
also summarised in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1: Empirical studies on the relationship between Economic Growth and Government Expenditure 
 
Author Countries Years Econometric  
method 
Length  
of average 
Main results 
Landau (1983) 104 countries 1961-1976 Cross-section 16 years Government consumption expenditure has a negative 
effect; while a positive impact of total investment in 
education 
 
Kormendi, 
Meguire (1985) 
47 countries Post-war Cross-section 28 years Government consumption expenditure has no effect 
 
Grier, Tullock 
(1989) 
115 countries 1950-1981 Panel data 5-year Government consumption expenditure has a negative 
effect 
Aschauer (1989) US  1949-1985 Time-series 36 years Investment in core infrastructure leads higher growth 
Romer (1990) 90 countries 1960-1985 Cross-section 16 years Government consumption expenditure has a positive 
effect 
Barro(1991) 98 countries 1960-1985 Cross-section 16 years Transport & communication are significant; total 
public investment is insignificant 
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Easterly, Rebelo 
(1993) 
100 countries 1970-1988 Cross-section 19 years Transport & communication are significant; total 
investment, education, health are insignificant 
Devarajan, 
Swaroop, Zou 
(1996) 
14 developed 
countries 
1970-1990 Panel 5-year 
moving 
average 
Health, transport & communication are significant 
positive; defence, education are significant negative. 
Total capital expenditure is significant positive 
Devarajan, 
Swaroop, Zou 
(1996) 
43 developing 
countries 
1970-1990 Panel 5-year 
moving 
average 
Health, transport & communication are significant 
negative; defence, education are significant positive. 
Total capital expenditure is significant negative; 
current expenditure is positive 
Kocherlakota, 
Yi (1997) 
US, UK US 1891-
1991 
UK 1831-
1991 
Time-series Annual Health, transport and communication are significant 
positive; Defence and education is significant 
negative. Total capital expenditures are positive 
Fuente(1997) 21 OECD 1965-1995 Panel 5-years Public investment is significant positive impact on 
economic growth 
Kneller, 
Bleaney, 
Gemmell(1999) 
22 OECD 1970-1995 Panel 5-years Productive government expenditure enhances growth, 
whilst non-productive expenditure does not 
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Bleaney, 
Gemmell, 
Kneller (2001) 
22 OECD 1970-1995 Panel 5-year Productive government expenditure enhances growth, 
whilst non-productive expenditure does not 
Bassanini, 
Scarpetta (2002) 
21 OECD 1971-1998 Panel Annual Government consumption and investment expenditure 
have non negative impacts. Health, education, 
research public spending are positive 
Gupta, 
Clements, 
Baldacci and 
Mulas-Granados 
(2005) 
39 low income 
countries 
1990-2000 Panel 10-year Cutting selected current expenditure tend to raise 
growth rates, while protecting capital expenditure 
does the same 
Adam, Bevan 
(2005) 
45 developing  
countries 
1970-1999 Panel 5-years Residual (non-productive) expenditure has a negative 
impact. Productive expenditure has a positive effect. 
Park (2006) 93 countries 1990-2000 Cross-country 10 years Productive expenditure has a positive impact. negative 
relationship between tax rate and productive 
government spending 
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Bose, Holman 
and Neanidis 
(2007) 
40 developing and 
21 developed 
countries 
1972-1999 Panel 5-year Total government expenditure have a negative impact 
on growth in the case of developing countries, while it 
is found to be insignificant for developed countries 
Bose, Hague 
and Osborn 
(2007) 
30 developing 
countries 
1970-1990 Panel 10-year Productive expenditure has a positive effect. Non-
productive is insignificant correlated. Education 
expenditure has a positive effect. Defence, transport 
and communication do not persist. 
Ghosh, 
Gregoriou 
(2007) 
15 developing 
countries 
1972-1999 Panel 5 years 
moving 
average 
Current (capital) spending has positive (negative) and 
significant effects on the growth rate. 
Education and health are negative, while operation 
and maintenance expenditure are positive. 
Romero-Avila, 
Strauch (2008) 
All EU members 1960-2001 Time-series Annual Public investment has a positive effect, government 
size and government consumption has a negative 
impact. 
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Afonso, Alegre 
(2011) 
15 EU countries 1971-2006 Panel 5-years Government consumption and social security have a 
negative effect. Public investment spending has a 
positive impact. 
Bayraktar, 
Moreno-Dodson 
(2012) 
7 fast-growing 
countries 
1970-2005 Panel Annual Public expenditures in core sectors, which consist of 
a combination of current and capital spending on 
infrastructure, health, education have a significant 
impact on growth.  
Chamorro-
Narvaez (2012) 
12 Latin American 
countries 
1975-2000 Panel 5-years Neither government capital spending nor current 
spending have any impact on the per capita economic 
growth rate 
Christie (2012) 136 countries 1972-2005 Panel 5-years  Total government spending has a negative effect on 
growth. Productive government expenditures have a 
negative impact on economic growth. 
Acosta-
Ormaechea, 
Morozumi 
(2013) 
56 countries 1970-2010 Panel 5-years Education expenditure is growth-enhancing effect. 
Infrastructure and social protection expenditure are 
insignificant. 
 73 
 
Bojanic (2013) Bolivia 1940-2010 Time-series Annual Defence and health expenditure are negative effect. 
Education expenditure is positive impact 
Afonso, Jalles 
(2014) 
155 1970-2008 Panel 5-years Public wages, interest payments, subsidies and 
government consumption are negative. Expenditure 
on education and health are positive. Expenditure on 
social security and welfare are negative. 
Olulu, 
Erhieyovwe and 
Andrew (2015) 
Nigeria 1970-2014 Time-series Annual Expenditure on administration, social and community 
services are positive; economic services expenditure is 
negative. 
Gemmel, 
Kneller and 
Sanz (2016) 
17 OECD countries 1970s-2008 Panel 5-years Expenditure on transport &communication, education 
are positive. Spending on welfare is negative.  
  
 74 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
The major difference between the impacts of government policy in the neoclassical 
and endogenous growth theories is that government expenditures only affect the growth 
rate in the endogenous growth theory. However, not all types of government expenditures 
are expected to have influence on the steady state in endogenous growth models. The 
government’s expenditures are constrained to be financed solely by lump-sum taxation in 
this chapter and with the implication that the level of government expenditure is constant 
in the steady state. Due to the linear relationship between fiscal policies implied by the 
GBC, biases can easily be present in regression equations if the studies ignore the implicit 
financing assumption built into the specification. Also, there remains a need for more 
research to address how the changes in relative amount of government expenditure 
compositions have effects on economic growth, especially at different stages of 
development. Based on the theoretical and empirical of government expenditure 
composition on endogenous growth model, the next chapter will apply the most suitable 
methodology to determine the impact of government expenditure compositions on 
economic growth. It can be seen that the empirical evidence about impact of government 
expenditure compositions on economic growth is varied. Different types of government 
expenditure, different types of methodology and different kinds of countries present 
different results. Chapter 4 will focus on examining the relationship between composition 
of government expenditure and long-run economic growth, with particular attention on 
comparing and contrasting high-income to low and middle-income countries. 
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
This chapter provides information on the research method employed. Firstly, the 
construction of the dataset and the differences between the GFSM 1986, GFSM 2001 and 
GFSM 2014 frameworks will be introduced. These differences explain the reason why 
the time period from 1993 to 2012 was chosen for the economic growth model. The 
discussion then classifies the 10 categories of government expenditure used into 
productive and non-productive groups, and explains the difference in the level effect as a 
percentage of total spending and a percentage of GDP. This chapter also discusses the 
classification of countries based on estimates of gross national income per capita from 
the World Bank. It also explains the advantages of applying 5-year forward moving 
averages for all variables. Finally, the methodology used to analyse the panel data will be 
presented.  
3.1 Construction of the Dataset 
3.1.1 GFSM 1986 vs GFSM 2001 vs GFSM 2014 
To study the compositional effects of changes in government spending on growth, data 
availability from sources such as the IMF’s GFS yearbook is an important factor for both 
country selection and period examined. The GFS manual (GFSM) is a series of 
international guidelines on statistical methodology that have been issued by IMF. The 
GFSM, which updated the first edition published in 1986, is designed for compilers of 
government finance statistics, fiscal analysts, and other users of fiscal data. Under the 
analytic framework of GFSM 1986, governments had kept their accounts on a cash basis. 
Meanwhile, with developments in government accounting and fiscal analysis during 
period from middle 1990s to early 2000s, the analytic framework of GFSM 
2001introduced the accrual basis of recording economic events so all resource flows are 
included, integrates balance sheets with transactions and other flows. Also, the concepts 
and principles set out in the GFSM 2001 were reconciled with those of the System of 
National Account 1993 therefore government finance statistics can be utilised with other 
macroeconomic statistics. Recently, IMF has introduced GFSM 2014, however its 
framework is new for collecting data, hence the recent studies are normally using either 
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GFSM 1986 or GFSM 2001. Most of the recent empirical research use fiscal data 
covering a wide set of countries from 1970s forward, which mean that both GFSM 1986 
and GFSM 2001 framework have been applied (Adam and Bevan, 2005; Ghosh and 
Gregoriou, 2007; Afonso and Alegre, 2011; Afonso and Jalles, 2014 and Gemmel et al., 
2016). However, a major methodological change with the introduction of GFSM 2001 
compared to GFSM 1986 makes the previous fiscal data series somewhat incomparable 
with later ones. The recent empirical research studies above do not explain how they deal 
with these methodological changes in constructing comparable data series covering a 
period from 1970. These changes may bring biased results to their empirical analysis. In 
what follows, this thesis briefly illustrates some major changes that were introduced in 
GFSM 2001 and explains the chosen regression time from 1993 to 2012. 
First of all, expenditures are classified differently by GFSM 1986 and GFSM 2001 
(Wickens, 2002). For example, the definitions of current and capital expenditure is 
somewhat different. The capital spending concept, denoted as net acquisition of non-
financial assets in GFSM 2001, accepts a net concept in the sense that the government 
revenue from the sale of fixed capital assets are taken into account. Meanwhile, capital 
government spending concept under GFSM 1986 adopts a gross concept which the 
revenue from capital sales is not deducted. Furthermore, capital transfers under GFSM 
2001 are one component of the current expenditure concept, while these expenditures are 
part of the capital expenditure in GFSM 1986. In terms of the functional classification, 
GFSM 1986 divides expenditures into 14 functional categories, while GFSM 2001 
divides them into 10 categories.  
Secondly, the form that governments report statistics has been changed between 
GFSM 1986 and GFSM 2001. The reporting in GFSM 1986 is based only on a cash basis, 
while under GFSM 2001 this is mainly on accrual basis. To understand the difference, 
transactions are recorded when cash actually flows under cash concept. Meanwhile, flows 
are recorded at the time when transactions accrue, independently of the flow of cash under 
accrual concept. Some countries data for the different subcategories are recorded by 
different accounting bases during a different given year under GFSM 2001 framework.  
Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) is unique amongst empirical studies as 
being the only one that has mentioned and converted all expenditure items of their dataset 
under GFSM 1986 into the concepts defined by GFSM 2001. They defined capital 
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expenditure as a net concept while the functional expenditure components divided into 
10 categories. Facing these differences between GFSM 1986 and GFSM 2001 framework 
guidelines, this thesis focuses on the fiscal data covering time period from 1993 to 2012 
under GFSM 2001 framework only. 
3.1.2 Subcomponents of Expenditure: Economic and Functional 
Classifications 
Devarajan et al. (1996) was one of the first empirical studies to test whether the share 
allocated to different components of public spending is related to higher growth. Their 
key explanatory variables were the share of each component in total government 
expenditure. These components were based on the IMF’s GFS yearbook from 1970 to 
1990, and these were classified by two main lines under GFSM 1986. The first line is 
based on an economic classification of expenditure in which central government 
expenditure divides into capital and current expenditure. In their theoretical framework, 
capital expenditure is denoted as productive government expenditure while current 
expenditure is denoted as non-productive government expenditure. Following this 
economic classification, Gupta et al. (2005) and Ghosh and Gregoriou (2007) separated 
government expenditure components into capital and current for their datasets, from 1990 
to 2000 and 1972 to 1999 respectively. One common feature of these empirical analyses 
is that they are limited to the data period from 1970s to 1990s. To include data from after 
2000, they would face the challenges arising from difference between GFSM 1986 and 
GFSM 2001 framework for economic classifications report. Some empirical studies that 
examine the relationship of composition of expenditure and growth for the period after 
2000 concentrate more on items in economic classification, such as: compensation of 
employees, interest payments, subsidies, consumption of fixed capital, and net acquisition 
of non-financial assets (Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi, 2013; and Afonso and Jalles, 
2014).  
The second line of Devarajan et al. (1996) is based on the functional classification of 
expenditure in which components are grouped into 14 categories under GFSM 1986. 
Most of empirical studies use this functional classification of expenditure to examine the 
relationship between various components of government expenditure and economic 
growth. It could be easier to convert all 14 expenditure items under GFSM 1986 to 10 
categories under GFSM 2001 in functional classifications compared to economic 
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classifications. Table 2 presents the details of total outlays which are classified under 
GFSM 2001 and GFSM 1986. Given that this thesis focus is on the composition of 
expenditures (i.e., the expenditure shares among subcomponents to total government 
expenditure), the difference in timing of recording between cash and accrual basis appears 
to be less of a problem as long as all expenditure items are recorded on the same 
accounting basis within a given year. Regarding the economic classification, there are 86 
countries which have reported all relevant components at least once in the period 1970 to 
2010. Turning to the functional classification, the number of countries covered at the same 
period is 102 (Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi, 2013). From this point of view, this 
thesis collects all historical fiscal data available for 59 countries that have reported data 
to the IMF’s GFS yearbook from 1993 to 2012 under GFSM 2001 and also bases on the 
functional classifications to group productive and non-productive government 
expenditure from 10 categories. 
Table 3.1: Functional classifications under GFSM 2001 and GFSM 1986 
GFSM 2001 Category Comprise GFSM 1986 category 
701 General public services 
General public services [B1] plus 
expenditure not classified by major 
group [B14] 
702 Defense Defense affairs and services [B2] 
703 Public order and safety Public order and safety affairs [B3] 
704 Economic affairs Economic affairs [B9 through B13] 
7041 General economic, commercial and labour 
affair 
General economic and commercial 
affairs other than general labour affairs 
[B13.4] plus general labour affairs and 
services [B13.5] 
7042 Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting affairs and services [B10] 
7043 Fuel and energy 
Fuel and energy affairs and services 
[B9] 
7044 Mining, manufacturing, and construction 
Mining and mineral resource affairs and 
services, other than fuels; manufacturing 
affairs and services; and construction 
affairs and services [B11] 
7045 Transport Transport and communication affairs 
and services [B12] 7046 Communication 
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7047 Other industries 
Distributive trade affairs and services 
including storage and warehousing; 
hotel and restaurant affairs and services 
[B13.1] plus tourism affairs and services 
[B13.2] plus multipurpose development 
projects affairs and services [B13.3] 
7048 R&D: Economic affairs 
Cannot be compiled from GFSM 1986 
due to lack of detail. 
7049 Economic affairs n.e.c 
Other economic affairs and services 
n.e.c. [B13.6] 
705 Environmental protection 
The GFSM 1986 did not classify 
environmental protection separately. 
706 Housing and community affairs 
Housing and community amenity affairs 
and services [B7] 
707 Health Health affairs and services [B5] 
708 Recreation, culture, and religion 
Recreational, cultural, and religious 
affairs and services [B8] 
709 Education Education affairs and services [B4] 
710 Social protection 
Social security and welfare affairs and 
services [B6] 
 
3.1.3 The Difference in the Level Effect as a Percentage of GDP and 
Percentage of Total Government Expenditure 
The model in this thesis is based on that of Devarajan et al. (1996), which studies the 
effects of public expenditure compositions as a proportion of total expenditure on long-
run economic growth. Its level effect has been controlled for separately in the regression 
analysis by each GDP variable being expressed as a share of total expenditure. The 
Devarajan et al. (1996) approach was also followed by Ghosh and Gregoriou (2007), 
Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) and Gemmel et al. (2016), while alternative 
empirical studies examined the relationship between economic growth and government 
expenditure compositions as a percentage of GDP. The rationale for expressing 
productive expenditure as a ratio of total government expenditure is that under this 
measure a unit increase in the budgetary share of productive expenditure has to be 
matched by a unit decrease in non-productive expenditure, as the size of total spending 
remains fixed. Under the alternative approach to measurement (i.e. expenditure as a ratio 
of GDP), a unit increase in the share of productive government expenditure in GDP does 
not necessarily mean that other expenditure items are decreasing. This may lead to varied 
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findings for different sets of data. For example, Devarajan et al. (1996) found that there 
is a negative relationship between public investments in transport and communication and 
economic growth in their developing countries sample, and this result contrasts with the 
finding of Easterly and Rebelo (1993). These contrasting results were due to Devarajan 
et al. (1996)’s empirical analysis focusing on the composition effect of public expenditure 
(the share of transportation and communication in total government expenditure) on 
growth; while Easterly and Rebelo (1993) found a positive coefficient on the share of 
transportation and communication expenditure in GDP, a variable that mixed the level 
effect of spending with the composition effect. There are several reasons why this thesis 
follows the Devarajan et al. (1996) approach. First, as an increase in total government 
expenditure normally has a crowding out effect and thus has a negative impact on 
economic growth, it is worth noting for policy makers and researchers to find approach 
to reallocate government expenditure components in a more optimal way to increase 
economic growth within a given government expenditure decision. Second, there are 
limited studies in existing current growth literature have examined the effects of the 
relative division of government expenditure between productive and non-productive uses 
(as a proportion of total expenditure) on economic growth, especially comparing high-
income and low to middle-income economies. Therefore, this thesis examines the 
relationship between government expenditure compositions and economic growth, so the 
main variables, such as productive and non-productive public spending are a percentage 
of total government expenditure and their financing is controlled by GBC variables. 
Furthermore, in chapter 4 this thesis also re-runs the robustness test on the regression 
equations with productive and non-productive government expenditures as a percentage 
of GDP to see how the results are changing compared with previous studies.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
3.1.4 Central Government and General Government 
Another important element to clarify about our dataset is the institutional coverage 
level of government. Countries under GFSM 1986 framework reported data mostly at the 
consolidated central government level. Meanwhile, under GFSM 2001 framework they 
also provide data for the consolidated general government. Central government 
expenditure is defined as the central government budget expenditure as reported in the 
final central government accounts. Meanwhile, general government spending, as a share 
of GDP and per person, provides an indication of the size of the government across 
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countries. General government spending generally consist central, state and local 
governments, and social security funds. The degree of fiscal decentralisation (measured 
by the share of spending at the central government level relative to that of the general 
government level) differs across subcomponents. Thus, the central government level data 
may not accurately capture the share of those subcomponents at a national level. This 
actually appears to be the case, because some components such as defence tend to be 
centralised in most countries, while other such as health and education tend to be more 
decentralised. Furthermore, when the trend of fiscal decentralised differs across those 
components over time, using the central government level data can be problematic in a 
panel data analysis (Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi, 2013). Christie (2012) mentions 
that using the consolidated central government means that not all government expenditure 
items in countries with a decentralised system are captured. As previous empirical 
research (Devarajan et al., 1996 and Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi, 2013) retest the 
results when comparing data between consolidated central government level and 
consolidated general government level, and provide evidence suggesting the same 
statistically results for both level; this thesis will use either consolidated central 
government or consolidated general government level which depends on its availability 
from each country under GFSM 2001 framework. 
3.1.5 Country Classification 
Each year on July 1, the World Bank revises analytical classification of the world's 
economies based on estimates of gross national income (GNI) per capita for the previous 
year. The updated GNI per capita estimates are also used as input to the World Bank's 
operational classification of economies that determines lending eligibility. As of 1 July 
2013, low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using 
the World Bank Atlas method, of $1,025 or less in 2012; middle-income economies are 
those with a GNI per capita of more than $1,026 but less than $12,476; high-income 
economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,476 or more. Lower-middle-income 
and upper-middle-income economies are separated at a GNI per capita of $4,035. 
Therefore, based on the World Bank’s classification using GNI per capita, the panel data 
sample of 59 countries in this thesis is separated into 2 sub-groups: 37 high-income 
economies and 22 low to middle-income economies covering the period from 1993 to 
2012.  
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There are some reasons why this thesis chose those countries for sample group and 
separated them into 2 sub-groups. First, it can be seen that previous studies commonly 
used to categorise the world into developing and developed countries without a clear 
definition. The recent World Bank Group Strategy (World Bank, 2013) stated that the 
traditional grouping of developing countries become less relevant and fragility across the 
development spectrum. Therefore, classification using thresholds for income categories 
based on the current GNI per capita indicator is a useful benchmark to analyse 
development trends. In order to comparing with existing literature in the area of 
examining growth effects of government expenditure compositions, this thesis classifies 
the country sample into 2 sub-groups: high-income and low to middle-income, similar to 
OECD uses income classification to distinguish two groups of countries: the developed 
countries (i.e, high-income) and developing countries (i.e, low and middle-income) 
(OECD,2015). It also has been applied by Gupta et al. (2005), Park (2006), Christie 
(2012), Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013), and Afonso and Jalles (2014). Second, 
some of the values were outliers that would bias the estimates, a few countries were 
removed. For example, Belarus was excluded from the analysis on account of high 
volatile of inflation rate or Seychelles was excluded due to missing the labour force 
growth information. Also, due to the availability of all historical fiscal data from 
IMF’GFS yearbook during the period 1993 to 2012, only 59 countries (37 high-income 
and 22 low to middle-income) has been collected to this research. Table 3.2 below 
presents the list of countries covered in the thesis.   
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Table 3.2: List of countries  
High-income Economies Low to Middle-income Economies 
Country Classification Country Classification 
Bahamas High Income Ethiopia Low Income 
Bahrain High Income Kenya Low Income 
Croatia High Income Nepal Low Income 
Cyprus High Income Bolivia Lower Middle Income 
Latvia High Income Egypt Lower Middle Income 
Malta High Income India Lower Middle Income 
Oman High Income Indonesia Lower Middle Income 
Singapore High Income Philippines Lower Middle Income 
Australia High Income OECD Sri Lanka Lower Middle Income 
Austria High Income OECD Vietnam Lower Middle Income 
Belgium High Income OECD Zambia Lower Middle Income 
Canada High Income OECD Bulgaria Upper Middle Income 
Chile High Income OECD China Upper Middle Income 
Czech Republic High Income OECD Costa Rica Upper Middle Income 
Denmark High Income OECD Hungary Upper Middle Income 
Estonia High Income OECD Iran Upper Middle Income 
Finland High Income OECD Jordan Upper Middle Income 
France High Income OECD Lebanon Upper Middle Income 
Germany High Income OECD Mauritius Upper Middle Income 
Greece High Income OECD Romania Upper Middle Income 
Iceland High Income OECD Thailand Upper Middle Income 
Ireland High Income OECD Tunisia Upper Middle Income 
Israel High Income OECD     
Italy High Income OECD     
South Korea High Income OECD     
Luxembourg High Income OECD     
Netherlands High Income OECD     
New Zealand High Income OECD     
Norway High Income OECD     
Poland High Income OECD     
Portugal High Income OECD     
Slovak Republic High Income OECD     
Slovenia High Income OECD     
Spain High Income OECD     
Sweden High Income OECD     
Switzerland High Income OECD     
United Kingdom High Income OECD     
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3.1.6 Five – year Averages versus Five – year Moving Averages 
Traditionally, to capture the long-run relationship of economic growth to fiscal 
variables and eliminate business cycle effects, the data is expressed in long-frequency 
periods – usually 5 years. While some previous studies applied 5-year average for all 
variables (see for example: Adam and Bevan, 2005; Bleaney et al., 2001; and Christie, 
2012) or decade average value for all variables (see for example: Bose et al., 2007); others 
used 5-year forward moving averages of GDP growth on yearly fiscal variables 
(Devarajan et al., 1996, and Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2007). However, both of these period-
averaging processes have some drawbacks. Using five-year moving average only for 
dependent variables could lead to the possibility of reverse causality, as governments 
would predict the increase in the growth rate up to five years into the future and raise 
productive government expenditure today. Meanwhile, using five-year average for 
growth regressions tends to produce biased result. The reason for these biased results may 
be the absence of automatic stabilisers. Developed economies normally achieve 
macroeconomic stability, so changing between 5-year average and 5-year moving 
average is unlikely to affect the relationship between components of government 
spending and long-run economic growth. Meanwhile, for developing economies, 5-year 
average for pre-stabilisation countries may lead to bias results as their governments set 
up several five-year Socio-Economic Development Plans to achieve development and 
economic growth. Therefore, any study uses the wrong 5-year average period between 
the two 5-Year Plans may lead to incorrect estimates. Regarding the autoregressive 
behaviour of economic growth, fiscal variables may bring an influence on economic 
growth distributed across several periods. Some categories of government spending may 
induce a certain effect in the period in which they are actually realised and a different 
impact later on. Other variables could have the same story. 
Therefore, this thesis will use 5-year forward moving averages for all variables, as we 
believe that it can remove business cycle effects, increase the number of time series 
observation in our panel data, minimise the reverse causality argument in our model and 
account for endogeneity. 
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3.1.7 Additional Macro Variables 
The dataset also contains some macroeconomic variables including: initial level of 
GDP, investment, labour growth, inflation rate and openness of a country (calculated as 
the value of imports and exports relative to GDP). These variables are used as control 
variables in the regression analysis for the impact of government expenditure, corruption 
on economic growth in the next chapters. They have been obtained from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), Government Finance Statistics (GFS) database of the IMF, and 
the World Bank’s Development Indicators (WDI). Initial GDP, investment ratio and 
labour force growth conditioning variables are found in the usual Barro-type regression. 
The initial level of GDP is a logarithm, to control for the convergence effect mentioned 
in Solow-Swan model (Adam and Bevan, 2005; Christie, 2012 and Kneller et al., 1999). 
Investment is an important determinant of the growth rate and expected to express the 
positive effects of physical capital accumulation (Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2007 and Gupta 
et al., 2005). Labour force growth is one of the production factors related to economic 
growth and has therefore been added by previous researchers (Afonso and Alegre, 2011; 
Bleaney et al., 2001 and Gupta et al., 2005). The latter variables (inflation rate and 
openness variables) capture macroeconomic policy. The inflation rate is believed to have 
an adverse effect on growth rates when it is high. High inflation is associated with 
increased price variability and an uncertainty about future profitability of investment 
projects, then this lead to lower levels of investment and economic growth (Christie, 2012 
and Pushak et al., 2007). Rodrik (1998) stated that openness to international trade has a 
higher rate of industrial concentration and it is therefore an important variable in empirical 
models testing fiscal policy and growth.  
In additions, this thesis is based on Devarajan et al. (1996) model which takes into 
account the balance budget variables as recent theoretical models. Hence, the revenue 
side of the GBC which includes government budget deficit or surplus, tax revenues and 
non-tax revenues; will be included in this study’s analysis. These variables, as proportion 
of GDP, are obtained from GFS database of the IMF. 
The rest of the additional macro variables are corruption and human capital variables. 
The current literature on corruption commonly uses subjective measures created by 
Transparency International (TI), the World Bank (WB) and Political Risk Services (PRS). 
The TI and WB measures are composite indices based on individual surreys of corruption.  
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The PRS measure uses expert rankings by specialised institutions. The corruption index 
which uses for examining the growth effects via government expenditure compositions 
will be discussed further in chapter 5. Meanwhile, the government expenditure on human 
capital and its components (education and health) will be collected from IMF’s GFS 2001. 
They will be discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
3.2 Methodology 
The empirical analysis of this thesis uses panel data to examine the relationship 
between government expenditure and economic growth. Panel data is also called 
longitudinal data or cross-sectional time-series data. This longitudinal data has 
observations on the same units in several different time periods (Kennedy, 2008). A panel 
data set has multiple entities, each of which has repeated measurements at different time 
periods. Panel data may have individual (group) effect, time effect, or both, which are 
analysed by fixed effect and/or random effect models. Panel data have more variability 
and allow exploring more issues than doing cross sectional or time series data alone. 
“Panel data produce more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the 
variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” (Baltagi, 2001). Panel data may 
be long or short, balanced or unbalanced, and fixed or rotating. A short panel data has 
large numbers of individuals (N) but short in time periods (T), whilst a long panel data 
has many time periods but few individuals. Either a problem of too few N – type I error 
(incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis) or too large N problem– type II error 
(incorrectly retaining a false null hypothesis) is a matter for researchers when examining 
these kinds of data. In a balanced panel, all individuals have been measured in all time 
periods. In cross-table of cross-sectional and time-series variables, each cell should have 
only one frequency. Thus, the total number of observations is NxT. Whereas, when some 
cells in the cross-table have zero frequency (i.e. each individual has different numbers of 
observation), the panel data is a unbalanced panel. The total number of observations is 
not NxT (Park, 2011). Furthermore, if the same individuals (or groups) are observed for 
each period, the panel data set is called a fixed panel. If a set of individuals changes from 
one period to the next, the data set is a rotating panel (Greene, 2008). This thesis has a 
well-organised balanced and fixed panel data set; therefore, this data can provide ways of 
dealing heterogeneity and test fixed and/or random effects in the longitudinal data. The 
first and second analysis of this thesis use short panel data, as these analysis examine the 
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relationship between government expenditure components, corruption and economic 
growth for a panel data of 37 high-income and 22 low to middle-income countries (N = 
37 and 22) for the period 1993 to 2012 (T = 15 for applying five-year moving averages). 
The final analysis uses long panel data as this thesis focuses on the growth effects of 
government expenditure on human capital and its components (education and health) for 
an Asia case study.  
For a brief description of the methodology panel estimators based on the endogenous 
growth models, this thesis write basis growth equation as: 
    𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡    (3.1) 
Where Git is the GDP growth of country i at the time period t, Xit is a vector of the 
explanatory variables for country i in time period t, and eit is the error for country i at the time 
period t. ui is individual effect (country or time specific effect). 
This panel data models are based on the work of Park (2011), who presents a brief and 
clear explanations of this methodology. Panel data models examine country effects, time 
effects, or both in order to deal with heterogeneity and individual effect that may or may 
not be observed. These effects are either fixed or random. A fixed effect model examines 
if intercepts vary across country or time period, whereas a random effect model explores 
differences in error variance components across country or time period. A one-way model 
includes only one set of dummy variables (e.g., country1, country 2 …) while a two-way 
model considers two sets of dummy variables (e.g., country1, country 2 … and year1, 
year2 …). 
There are various approaches that can be used to examine the endogenous growth 
models. The commonly approaches which had been applied in previous studies are 
Pooled OLS, one-way (country dummies) fixed and random effects, and two-way 
(country and time dummies) fixed and random effects. Recently, the empirical research 
are using the GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) as it helps to address problem of potentially 
endogenous of fiscal variables. The following sections introduces some approaches which 
were considered in this study. 
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3.2.1 Pooled OLS 
If individual effect uit does not exist (uit=0), ordinary least square (OLS) produces efficient 
and consistent parameter estimates. 
OLS consists of five core assumptions (Kennedy, 2008): 
1. Linearity says that the dependent variable is formulated as a linear function of a set of 
independent variable and the error (disturbance) term. 
2. Exogeneity says that the expected value of disturbances is zero or disturbances are not 
correlated with any regressors. 
3. Disturbances have the same variance (3.a homoskedasticity) and are not related with 
one another (3.b non-autocorrelation) 
4. The observations on the independent variable are not stochastic but fixed in repeated 
samples without measurement errors. 
5. Full rank assumption says that there is no exact linear relationship among independent 
variables (no multi-collinearity). 
If individual effect ui is not zero in longitudinal data, heterogeneity (individual specific 
characteristics that are not captured in regressors) may influence assumption 2 and 3. In 
particular, disturbances may not have same variance but vary across individual 
(heteroskedasticity, violation of assumption 3.a) and/or are related with each other 
(autocorrelation, violation of assumption 3.b). This is an issue of nonspherical variance-
covariance matrix of disturbances. The violation of assumption 2 renders random effect 
estimators biased. Hence, the OLS estimator is no longer the best unbiased linear 
estimator. Hence, panel data models provide a way to deal with these problems. 
3.2.2 Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
Panel data models examine fixed and/or random effects of country or time. The core 
difference between fixed and random effects models lies in the role of dummy variables. 
A parameter estimate of a dummy variable is a part of the intercept in a fixed effect model 
and an error component in a random effect model. Slopes remain the same across group 
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or time period in either fixed or random effect model. The functional forms of one-way 
fixed and random effect models are: 
Fixed effect model: 𝐺𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖) + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡    (3.2) 
Random effect model: 𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + (𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡)    (3.3) 
where 𝑢𝑖is a fixed or random effect specific to country or time period in the growth 
models that is not included in the regression, and errors 𝑒𝑖𝑡  are independent identically 
distributed. 
A fixed group effect model examines country differences in intercepts, assuming the 
same slopes and constant variance across country. Since an individual specific effect is 
time invariant and considered a part of the intercept, 𝑢𝑖  is allowed to be correlated with 
other regressors, so OLS assumption 2 is not violated. This fixed effect model is estimated 
by least squares dummy variable (LSDV) regression (OLS with a set of dummies) and 
within effect estimation methods. 
A random effect model assumes that country effect (heterogeneity) is not correlated 
with any regressor and then estimates error variance specific to countries (or times). 
Hence, 𝑢𝑖 is an individual specific random heterogeneity or a component of the composite 
error term. This is why a random effect model is also called an error component model. 
The intercept and slopes of regressors are the same across country. The difference among 
countries (or time periods) lies in their individual specific errors, not in their intercepts. 
If one cross-sectional or time-series variable is studied, this is called a one-way fixed 
or random effect model. Two-way effect models have two sets of dummy variables for 
individual and time variables, therefore they cause estimation and interpretation issues 
(Park, 2011). 
3.2.3 Estimating Fixed Effect Models 
There are a number of approaches to estimate a fixed effect model such as, least 
squares dummy variable (LSDV), within estimation and between estimation. LSDV with 
a dummy dropped out of a set of dummies is broadly used since it is relatively easy to 
estimate and interpret. However, this approach can become problematic when there are 
large numbers of individuals in panel data. If the number of time periods (T) is fixed and 
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the number of groups (N) is infinite, parameter estimates of regressors are consistent but 
the coefficients of group effect are not (Baltagi, 2001). In the short panel data, LSDV 
includes many dummy variables and the number of these parameters increase as the 
number of groups increase. Hence, LSDV loses N degrees of freedom but returns less 
efficient estimators (Park, 2011). Under this situation, LSDV is ineffective and thus 
another approach should be considered, the within effect estimation.  
Unlike LSDV approach, the within estimation approach does not need to use dummy 
variables, but it uses deviations from individual or time period means. Therefore, it uses 
variation within each individual rather than a large number of dummies. The within 
estimation is: 
(𝐺𝑖𝑡 − 𝐺𝑖.) = (𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖.)
′
𝛽 + (𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒𝑖.)     (3.4) 
Where 𝐺𝑖.is the means of dependent variables of individual i, 𝑋𝑖.represent the means 
of independent variables of group i, and 𝑒𝑖.is the means of errors of group i. 
In this approach, the incidental parameter problem is no longer an issue. The parameter 
estimates of regressors in this approach are identical compared to those of LSDV (Park, 
2011). This within estimation approach represents corrects the sum of squared errors 
(SSE). On the other hand, this approach has some drawbacks. One of them is that data 
transformation for within estimation eliminates all time-invariant variables that do not 
vary within an individual. As deviations of time-invariant variables from their average 
are all zero, it is not possible to estimate coefficients of such variables in within 
estimation. Therefore, LSDV is better to apply when a model has time-invariant 
independent variables. Second, within estimation approach may provide inaccurate 
statistics. Since no dummy is used, the within approach produces larger degrees of 
freedom for errors, then small mean squared errors (MSE), standard errors of the 
estimates (SEE) or square root of mean squared errors (SRMSE) and incorrect standard 
errors of parameter estimates. Finally, the R2 of the within estimate approach is incorrect 
as the intercept term is suppressed (Kennedy, 2008). 
The between estimation approach, known as the group mean regression, uses variation 
between individual entities. This approach calculates group means of the dependent and 
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independent variables and as a result decreases the number of observations down to N. 
Therefore, it needs to run OLS on these transformed.  
3.2.4 Estimating Random Effect Models 
The one-way random effect model incorporates a composite error term; 𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖 +
 𝑒𝑖𝑡. The 𝑢𝑖 is assumed independent of error term 𝑒𝑖𝑡 and regressor 𝑋𝑖𝑡, which are also 
independent of each other for all 𝑖 and 𝑡. This assumption is not necessary in a fixed effect 
model. A random effect model is estimated by generalized least squares (GLS) when a 
covariance structure of an individual i, Σ (sigma), is known. The feasible generalized least 
squares (FGLS) or estimated generalized least squares (EGLS) method is used to estimate 
the entire variance-covariance matrix V (Σ in all diagonal elements and 0 in all off-
diagonal elements) when Σ is not known. As Σ is regularly unknown, FGLS/EGLS is 
more commonly applied than GLS. A random effect model is normally more complicated 
to estimate compared to a fixed effect counterpart (Park, 2011). There are various 
estimation methods for FGLS including the maximum likelihood method and simulation 
(Baltagi and Chang, 1994). 
A random effect model reduces the number of parameters to be estimated but will 
produce inconsistent estimates when individual specific random effect is correlated with 
regressors (Greene, 2008). 
3.2.5 Testing Fixed Effect and Random Effect 
Fixed effects are tested by the F test, while random effects are examined by the 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). The F test helps to compare s 
fixed effect model and OLS to see how much the fixed effect model can improve the 
goodness-of-fit. Meanwhile, the LM test contrasts a random effect model with OLS. If 
the null hypothesis is not rejected in either test, the pooled OLS regression is favoured. 
The Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) compares a random effect model to its 
fixed counterpart. If the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with 
the other regressors is not rejected, LSDV and GLS are consistent but LSDV is inefficient; 
otherwise, LSDV is consistent but GLS is inconsistent and biased. The estimates of LSDV 
and GLS should not differ systematically under the null hypothesis (Park, 2011).  
𝐿𝑀 = (𝑏𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑉 − 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚)?̂?
−1(𝑏𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑉 − 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚)~ 𝑥
2(𝑘)   (3.5) 
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Where ?̂? = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑏𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑉 − 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚] = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏𝐿𝑆𝐷𝑉) − 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚)  is the 
difference in the estimated covariance matrices of LSDV and GLS. This test follows the 
chi-squared distribution with 𝑘 degrees of freedom. 
The formula mentions that a Hausman test examines if the random effects estimate is 
insignificant different from the unbiased fixed effect estimate (Kennedy, 2008). If the null 
hypothesis of no correlation is rejected, it may conclude that individual effects 𝑢𝑖 are 
significant correlated with at least one regressors in the model and therefore the random 
effect model is inconsistent and biased. Hence, it needs to use a fixed effect model rather 
than the random effect.  
If one cross-sectional or time-series variable is considered, this is called a one-way 
fixed or random effect model. Two-way effect models have two sets of dummy variables 
for country and/or time variables and thus entail some issues in estimation and 
interpretation. 
It can be seen that it is common from previous empirical analysis to use five different 
forms of panel data estimator to examine the relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth: Pooled OLS, one-way (country dummies) fixed and 
random effect and two-way (country and time dummies) fixed and random effects 
models. The thesis initially considered these different forms and model selection is based 
on the log-likelihood and the adjust R2 for the pooled OLS and the null hypothesis in the 
Hausman test between fixed effects and random effects. Based on those criteria, the two-
way fixed effects which control both time-invariant individual country characteristics and 
time fixed effect is chosen as the main method of estimation for this thesis. This method 
addresses an issue that excluding unobservable country-specific effects could lead to 
serious biases in the econometric estimates, especially when these effects are correlated 
with other covariates. 
3.2.6 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
A common issue in the previous literature on fiscal policy and growth is the probable 
presence of endogeneity and reverse causality (Afonso and Alegre, 2011 and Ghosh and 
Gregoriou, 2007). It could be the case that economic growth itself affects fiscal variables. 
If economic growth is a determinant of any of the right hand side variables in equation 
(3.1); estimation techniques that do not take into account this endogeneity will be biased 
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and will lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. To tackle possible endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables in the panel, GMM technique has been applied by recent empirical 
analysis (Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi, 2013; Afonso and Alegre, 2011; and 
Christie, 2012). GMM was introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). We estimate this dynamic panel data model using 
a GMM approach. There are various reasons for this choice. First, the GMM framework 
is flexible enough to accommodate our balanced panel. Second, it allows us to deal with 
country fixed effects. Third, it enables us to handle the potential endogeneity of all 
explanatory variables through the use of internal instruments (i.e., instruments based on 
lagged values of those variables). This is important because endogeneity issues appear to 
be non-trivial concerns in our context. In addition to the reverse causality issue mentioned 
in the introduction, omitted variable problems are also likely to be present. There are two 
common approaches of GMM estimator for dynamic panel data, Difference GMM and 
System GMM.  
For a brief description of the GMM panel estimators, the equation (3.1) is rewritten to 
have a dynamic equation in which the lagged dependent variable appears in the right hand 
side.  
  𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛾𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (3.6) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡    
𝐸[𝑢𝑖] = 𝐸[𝑒𝑖𝑡] = 𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑡] = 0  
Subtracting 𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 from both side of equation (3.6) gives an equivalent equation for 
growth, 
∆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = (𝛾 − 1)𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (3.7) 
Difference GMM is a proceeding estimation after first-differencing the data to 
eliminate the fixed effects. Whereas, System GMM strengthens Difference GMM by 
estimating simultaneously in differences and levels where the two equations being 
distinctly instrumented (Roodman, 2009b).  
One advantage of GMM is the set of internal instruments used and built from past 
observations of the instrumented variables. In two-stage least squares (2SLS), there is a 
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trade-off between the lag distance used to generate internal instruments and the depth of 
the sample for estimation. The standard instrument set for difference GMM [Holtz-Eakin, 
Newey and Rosen (HENR), 1988] avoids the trade-off between instrument lag depth and 
sample depth by giving the missing observations of lags a zero value. It also includes 
separate instruments for each time period. For example, to instrument ∆𝐺𝑖3, a variable 
based on the twice-lag of G is used and it takes the value of ∆𝐺𝑖1 for period 3 and is 0 for 
all other periods (Roodman, 2009a). The result is a sparse instrument matrix Z, 
[
 
 
 
 
0 0 0
𝐺𝑖1 0 0
0 𝐺𝑖2 𝐺𝑖1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
⋯
⋯
⋯
0    0    0
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
 
𝐺𝑖3 𝐺𝑖2 𝐺𝑖1
⋮ ⋮ ⋮
⋯
⋱]
 
 
 
 
     (3.8) 
This matrix corresponds to the family of (𝑇 − 2)(𝑇 − 1)/2 moment conditions: 
𝐸(𝐺𝑖,𝑡−𝑧∆𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0 for each 𝑡 ≥ 3, 𝑧 ≥ 2    (3.9) 
The single equation GMM panel estimator generally specifies a dynamic panel model 
in first differences and exploits the above moment conditions. Therefore, the lagged (three 
time periods or more) levels of endogenous and weakly endogenous variables of the 
model become appropriate instruments for addressing endogeneity. The single difference 
GMM panel estimator provides consistent coefficient estimates. 
However, while the GMM approach yields consistent estimators, the original 
difference GMM estimators developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and 
Arellano and Bond (1991) may suffer from finite sample biases. When the time-series 
dimension of the panel is fairly small, the single equation estimator suffers from the 
problem of weak instruments. In other words, there is a weak correlation between the 
regressors and the instruments. As a result of this problem, the estimated coefficients 
suffer from poor precision (Staiger and Stock, 1997). This problem can be overcome by 
using panel GMM system estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998), which radically reduces the imprecision associated with the single 
equation estimator. 
To perform system GMM, a data set is built out of a copy from the original dataset in 
levels and another in differences. The standard instruments and any others specific to the 
differenced equation are assigned zero values for the levels equation while new 
instruments are added for the levels equation and are zero for the differenced data. The 
assumption behind these new instruments for levels is that past changes in 𝐺 are 
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uncorrelated with the current errors in levels, which include fixed effects. Based on this 
assumption, it can be built an exploded HENR-style instrument set, separately 
instrumenting 𝐺 for each period with all lags variable to that period as in equation (3.8). 
However, most of the associated moment conditions are mathematically terminated with 
the HERN instruments for the differenced equation. Consequently, only one lag is used 
for each period and instrumenting variable (Blundell and Bond, 1998 and Roodman, 
2009a). The typical instrument set to instrument 𝐺 is a stack of blocks as follow: 
[
 
 
 
 
0 0 0  ⋯
∆𝐺𝑖2 0 0  ⋯
0
0
⋮
∆𝐺𝑖3
0
⋮
0
∆𝐺𝑖4
⋮
⋯
⋯
⋱]
 
 
 
 
      (3.10) 
This corresponds to the moment conditions: 
𝐸(∆𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1∆𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0 for each 𝑡 ≥ 3     (3.11) 
From the point of view of instrument count, the story looks the same when changing 
from difference to system GMM where the overall count is typically quadratic in T. 
However, the system GMM, an extended from difference GMM estimator, has provide 
smaller finite sample bias and greater precision when comparing to first-difference GMM 
(Bond et al., 2001). Therefore, this thesis will use system GMM to capture the 
endogeneity involve in the simultaneous determination of the key variables in the 
theoretical model. Furthermore, to reduce the number of instruments generated in the 
system, this thesis combines instruments through additions to smaller sets. This can be 
done by asking the estimator to minimize the magnitude of empirical moments only for 
each lag length rather than for each lag length and time. This measure had been taken 
because as Roodman (2009b) emphasizes, having too many instruments (relative to the 
number of countries) makes estimation results unreliable. 
To ensure the validity of this system approach in the thesis context, this research 
conducts a number of specification tests. The first is the Arellano-Bond test. The 
consistency of the Arellano and Bond estimator depends on the assumption that the errors 
are not serially correlated. It is therefore crucial to test for the presence of serial 
correlation. Arellano and Bond’s test reports for first and second order serial correlation 
of the differenced residuals. Hence, there should be first order but not second order 
correlation (Roodman, 2009a). The second is the Hansen test for over-identifying 
restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments when applying GMM 
technique. The null hypothesis for Hansen J test is that the instruments are valid in the 
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sense that they are not correlated with the errors in the first differenced equation 
(Roodman, 2009a).  
Difference and system GMM are typically used in one-step and two-step variants. In 
the one-step GMM estimator, the parameters are estimated based on an initial weight 
matrix and no updating of the weight matrix is performed except when calculating the 
appropriate variance-covariance matrix. The two-step variants use a weighting matrix that 
is the inverse of an estimate, S, of 𝑣𝑎𝑟[𝒁𝜀]́ , where Z is the instrument vector. This optimal 
weighting matrix makes two-step GMM asymptotically. However, the number of 
elements to be estimated in S is quadratic in the number of instruments. Furthermore, the 
elements of the optimal matrix, as second moments of the vector of the moments between 
instruments and errors, are fourth moments of the underlying distribution, which can be 
hard to estimate in small sample (Hayashi, 2000).  The usual formulas for coefficient 
standard errors in two-step GMM tend to be downward biased when the instrument count 
is high. Therefore, this thesis is using the GMM one-step system for dynamic model 
instead of GMM two-step system. One-step GMM estimator is efficient when the errors 
are homoscedastic and not correlated over time. This is often too restrictive. However, 
the one-step results are consistent, and robust standard errors that adjust for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are easily obtained.  
Recently, with increasing availability of data covering a large number of time series 
observations (T) and a large number of countries (N), some recent works on fiscal policy 
and growth (Arnold et al., 2011 and Gemmell et al., 2011) use the Mean-Group (MG) 
and/or Pooled Mean-Group (PMG) estimators developed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) 
and Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999), respectively. These estimators have their own 
advantages. Most notably, they allow for a simultaneous investigation of long-run 
equilibrium relations and short-run adjustments processes, in which key parameters are 
allowed to be heterogeneous. Since there is no particular reason to think that the effects 
of fiscal policy on long-run growth should be homogeneous, this could be an advantage 
over a GMM approach, where only the long-run relation is considered and heterogeneity 
is allowed only in terms of an intercept. However, one potential downside of these 
alternative approaches is that since ‘large T’ requires the use of annual data, the effect of 
business cycles can be more problematic than in the thesis 5-year moving averaged case. 
Besides, from a practical viewpoint, due to the fact that this highly disaggregated fiscal 
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expenditure dataset which have several missing data, particularly for low-income 
countries, it does not allow to use either of these alternative estimators. 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on providing the information of construction of the dataset and 
methodology used in this thesis. The data used cover in total 59 countries (3 low-income, 
8 lower-middle, 11 upper-middle and 37 high-income economies) during the period 1993-
2012. The reason why this thesis chooses regression time from 1993 to 2012 for economic 
growth models is due to the difference between GFSM 1986 and GFSM 2001 framework 
for the main variables. With clear functional classification under GFSM 2001 of IMF’s 
GFS yearbook, this thesis can easily estimate the effect of government expenditure 
components on long-run economic growth. Another important element about the 
institutional coverage level of the government in the dataset has been clarified in this 
chapter. This thesis will also use fiscal data at either consolidated central government or 
consolidated general government level which depends on its availability from each 
country. Since this research attempts to capture the effects of government spending 
reallocation on growth in terms of functional classification of expenditure, this thesis uses 
public expenditure compositions variables as a proportion of total expenditure which has 
been controlled in the regression analysis by the share of GBC in GDP variables. It is 
different to alternative empirical studies which examined the relationship between 
economic growth and government expenditure compositions as a percentage of GDP. 
This will help to compare and contrast the thesis results with previous studies. The 
impacts of fiscal policy when the government expenditure compositions shares are 
exogenously given can be captured by the OLS fixed effect. The OLS fixed effect model, 
known as the Least Squares Dummy Variable model is often applied to panel estimation. 
This method can perform better than Pooled OLS and OLS random effect depended on 
the log-likelihood and the adjust R2 and the Hausman test. Therefore, based on these tests, 
the main results are reported by using the OLS fixed effect two-way method. However, 
even if this model is extensively used in the panel literature, it may fail to capture the bias 
from unobserved country-specific effect and deal with potential endogeneity problems. 
The GMM estimators developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano 
and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) make use 
of lagged instruments of the endogenous variables for each time period to tackle possible 
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endogeneity of the explanatory variable in the dynamic panel data. Both difference and 
system GMM methods can capture this problem, but based on advantage of the system 
GMM this thesis will apply the one-step system GMM to retest the robustness of the 
thesis baseline results.  
 99 
 
PART B: SELECTED OUTPUTS OF EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSES 
Chapter Four 
The Impact of Government Expenditure Compositions on 
Economic Growth 
4.1 Introduction 
As presented in the literature reviews chapter, endogenous growth theory predicts that 
any policy encouraging factor input accumulation results in enhanced long run economic 
growth. Researchers have differentiated between productive and non-productive 
government expenditure and have shown how a country can increase its economic growth 
by changing the mix between these alternative forms of expenditure. Kneller et al. (1999) 
underlined that productive government spending influences private sector productivity 
and hence has a direct impact on growth, while non-productive expenditure, which 
normally has an effect on citizens’ welfare, is likely to have a zero or negative growth 
impact. Devarajan et al. (1996) was one of the first to introduce a model that expresses 
the difference between productive and non-productive expenditures by how a change in 
the proportion of total expenditure dedicated to either one impacts on long run economic 
growth. They stated that a country’s desire to reach a more optimal growth rate can be 
achieved by increasing the proportion of total government expenditure dedicated to 
productive areas. 
If the theory linking various components of government expenditure to economic 
growth appears reasonably clear, the results from related empirical research are not, 
especially when distinguishing between the effects of changes in the absolute level of 
government expenditure and changes in relative amount of productive and non-
productive expenditures. In term of absolute levels of expenditure compositions (as a 
share in GDP), empirical results have consistently reported a positive relationship 
between productive government expenditure and economic growth, and either a negative 
or no-impact relationship between non-productive expenditure and economic growth for 
high-income economies (Afonso and Alegre 2011; Bleaney et al. 2001; Kneller et al. 
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1999). However, findings on the relationship between the level of public spending and 
economic growth in low to middle-income economies are mixed. Gupta et al. (2005) used 
a panel of 39 low-income countries and found that productive government spending 
enhances growth, whilst non-productive expenditure fails to do so. Christie (2012) 
revealed an inverse relationship between productive government spending and real GDP 
per capita for developing economies. Regarding the relative division of total expenditure 
between productive and non-productive uses, Devarajan et al. (1996) found that diverting 
expenditure from productive to non-productive can promote economic growth by using 
43 developing countries. They subsequently re-tested their regressions with a sample of 
21 developed countries for the same period and found that the results are reversed. Ghosh 
and Gregoriou (2008) also found similar results with Devarajan et al. (1996) in 15 
developing countries, where a greater proportion of current (non-productive) spending 
was found to have a positive effect on the growth rate. Recently, Chu et al. (2018) 
compare the growth effects of government expenditure compositions between 37 high-
income and 22 low to middle-income countries for the period 1993 to 2012. Their studies 
find that a change in the expenditure mix towards productive forms of expenditure and 
away from non-productive forms of expenditure enhances economic growth rate for both 
groups. Given these inconsistencies in empirical findings, it is surprising that relatively 
little attention has been given to comparing and contrasting the impact of government 
expenditure compositions on economic growth in countries at different stages of 
development.  
Previous efforts to examine the above issues have also been affected by limitations in 
data availability and estimation methods (Barro 1990; Easterly and Rebelo 1993). More 
recent empirical studies have had access to data of improved quality and as a result 
developed more useful variables and estimation methods (Ghosh and Gregoriou 2008; 
Gemmell et al. 2016). Nevertheless, there remains a need for more research to address 
two specific limitations that persist in current economic growth regressions: the possible 
endogeneity of fiscal variables and the consequences of relying on the period-averaging 
process to capture long-term growth rates (Bleaney et al. 2001; Kneller et al. 1999). 
This chapter attempts to address these gaps in existing literature and thereby make 
three distinct contributions to the body of knowledge. Firstly, it examines the growth 
effects of government expenditure compositions for a panel data of 37 high-income and 
22 low to middle-income countries for the period 1993 to 2012, thus providing insights 
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on the role that differing levels of economic development play in moderating the 
relationship. In both groups of countries, the analysis finds increased levels of 
government expenditure has a negative impact on growth, while a change in the 
expenditure mix towards productive forms of expenditure and away from non-productive 
forms of expenditure enhances economic growth rate. Secondly, by regressing economic 
growth on budgetary economic categories and a set of other relevant variables, this 
chapter contributes to a growing debate on variations between productive and non-
productive forms of government expenditure. The results show that budget deficit 
variables encourage growth for both sets of countries, while tax revenue and non-tax 
revenue variables have different effects on growth. Thirdly, this study contributes to 
overcoming the methodological issues commonly found in similar studies.  It computes 
a 5-year moving average for all variables instead of the traditional 5-year average to 
smooth over some of the cyclical features of the data. Moreover, based on previous 
analysis studies and the developments in econometrics theory (Arellano and Bover 1995; 
Blundell and Bond 1998), this study applies a dynamic panel Generalise Methods of 
Moments (GMM) system approach to deal with the issue of growth and fiscal variables 
not always being strictly exogenous.  
This chapter is progressed as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model specification and 
Section 4.3 exhibits a description of the data and empirical methodology used. The main 
empirical results and the tests for robustness are then discussed in Section 4.4 and Section 
4.5, respectively. Finally, Section 4.6 summarises the results and concludes with some 
policy implications. 
4.2 Model Specification 
The theoretical framework is based on Devarajan et al. (1996)’s model in which two 
types of government expenditure, productive and non-productive, are linked with the long 
run growth rate. However, this analysis includes a feature that is not present in Devarajan 
et al. (1996), namely a balanced budget (see part 2.4.2 of Literature Review chapter). In 
this section, the research will discuss the key equations of the model in the CES (constant 
elasticity of substitution) functional form. The aggregate production function (y) has three 
arguments: private capital k, and two types of government expenditures g1 (productive) 
and g2 (non-productive): 
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𝑦 = [𝛼𝑘−𝜁 + 𝛽𝑔1
−𝜁
+  𝛾𝑔2
−𝜁
]
−1 𝜁⁄
  𝛼 > 0;  𝛽, 𝛾 ≥ 0;  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 = 1;  𝜁 ≥ −1 (4.1) 
The government budget constraint is: 
 𝑔1 + 𝑔2 + 𝑏 =  𝜏𝑦 + 𝑁𝑇𝑅       (4.2) 
Where τ is the (constant over time) income tax rate, b is the budget surplus, and NTR 
is non-taxation revenue. 
Defining net revenue (NR) as total revenue less budget surplus or plus budget deficit, 
the share of NR that are used to finance two type of government spending, 
 𝑔1 =  ∅𝑁𝑅 and 𝑔2 = (1 −  ∅)𝑁𝑅  0 ≤ ∅ ≤ 1  (4.3) 
With an isoelastic utility function, Devarajan et al. (1996) indicated that the long-run 
growth rate in this model, λ, given by 
𝜆 =
𝛼(1−𝜏){𝛼𝜏𝜁 [𝜏𝜁−𝛽𝜙−𝜁−𝛾(1−𝜙)−𝜁]⁄ }
−(1+𝜁) 𝜁⁄
−𝜌
𝜎
     (4.4)
  
where σ and ρ are constant that reflect parameters in the utility function.  
From equation (4.4), it can be derived a relationship between long-run growth rate, λ, 
and the share of government spending devoted to g1: 
 
𝑑𝜆
𝑑𝜙
=
𝛼(1−𝜏)(1+𝜁)(𝛼𝜏𝜁)−(1+𝜁) 𝜁⁄ [𝛽𝜙−(1+𝜁)−𝛾(1−𝜙)−(1+𝜁)]
𝜎[𝜏𝜁−𝛽𝜙−𝜁−𝛾(1−𝜙)−𝜁]−1 𝜁⁄
      (4.5) 
From equation (4.5), the government expenditure component g1 is productive if 
𝑑𝜆 𝑑𝜙⁄ > 0. Since 𝜁 ≥ −1, equation (4.5) indicates that 𝑑𝜆 𝑑𝜙⁄ > 0 if: 
 
∅
1−∅
< (
𝛽
𝛾
)𝜃 where 𝜃 = 1 (1 + 𝜁)⁄ is the elasticity of substitution  (4.6) 
Both forms of government expenditure have an impact on the rate of growth through 
the marginal production of capital; however their relative influence varies upon the 
relative productivity of g1 and g2, and their relative budget shares, ∅ and(1 − ∅). If g1has 
a greater elasticity value than g2 (𝛽 < 𝛾) then the rate of growth may still not be increased 
if the expenditure share of g1 to g2 is currently too high. In the special case of Cobb-
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Douglas technology (𝜉 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃 = 1), the condition for the two types of government 
expenditure to be at its optimum is: 
 
∅
1−∅
=
𝛽
𝛾
         (4.7)
  
In the model, a government’s expenditure decision is taken as a given rather than 
deriving from some optimising framework. As an optimising framework requires 
specifying the government’s objective function and the results will depend on this 
function. Therefore, similar to Devarajan et al. (1996) work, this analysis does not attempt 
to exercise this extension in this paper. The importance of this model is to create insights 
into what makes particular components of government spending productive. The answer 
depends on the relationship between the coefficient and the actual share in the budget 
rather than the sign of the exponent in the production function. This thesis attempts to 
answer this question by examning empirically how the growth performance was affected 
by the composition of government expenditures with differing levels of economic 
development. Like Devarajan et al. (1996) and Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), this study 
does not classify government spending as being productive and non-productive to begin 
with, but let the data direct us. As we shall see, if the regression results show that 
expenditures which are sum of public expenditure on education, health, general public 
services, etc; show themselves to have more growth effects, then it can be said that this 
type of expenditures is indeed more productive than expenditures that are perhaps in the 
form of public order and safety, recreation and social protection. 
To see the implication of this for empirical testing, real output per capita growth is 
modelled as a function of government size (productive and non-productive government 
spending) and control variables. This analysis draws together variables from a number of 
existing endogenous growth models in order to create a more robust model to capture the 
relationship between components of government expenditure and growth. The set of 
control variables includes initial GDP per capita, labour force growth, investment (gross 
capital information as % of GDP), the inflation rate, and openness to trade (sum of exports 
and imports to GDP). Kneller et al. (1999) and Bose et al. (2007) have cautioned that by 
not taking full account of GBC in growth models, the coefficient estimates tend to be 
biased. Therefore, when one evaluates the effect of fiscal policy on growth it should 
ideally take into account both the sources and the uses of funds. To control for this view, 
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we add components from the revenue side of the government budget to the model, 
including tax revenue, non-tax revenue and budget surplus or deficit variables. 
The first set of regression model specifications for capturing the relationship between 
productive government expenditure and economic growth, which is based on the 
Devarajan et al. (1996)’s model is: 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽1 (
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾1 (
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
)  + ∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡  
(4.8) 
The second set of regression model specifications for capturing the non-productive 
government expenditure is: 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽2 (
𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾2 (
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
)  + ∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡  
(4.9) 
where i and t denote the cross-sectional and time series dimensions respectively, capturing 
the time-invariant unobserved country-specific fixed effects and the unobserved 
individual-invariant time effects. G is the per capita real GDP growth rate. 
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜/(𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 +  𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜), 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜/(𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 +  𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜) are productive and non-productive 
expenditure as a proportion of total government expenditure.(𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 +  𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜)/y is the 
public expenditure-to-GDP ratio. y is GDP and Iilt is a vector of non-fiscal independent 
variables (initial GDP per capita, inflation, labour force growth, investment and 
openness). 
Kneller et al. (1999), Bleaney et al. (2001), Bose et al. (2007) and Gemmell et al. 
(2016) have cautioned that by not taking full account of the GBC in growth models, the 
coefficient estimates tend to be non-robust. Therefore, when one evaluates the effect of 
fiscal policy on growth it should ideally take into account both the sources and the uses 
of funds. This analysis assesses whether our empirical results in regression equations (4.8) 
and (4.9) with the inclusion of this feature that is not present in the Devarajan et al. 
(1996)’s model. 
Since the GBC describes a closed system, total government expenditure must be 
financed by revenues (𝑇𝑅 + 𝑁𝑇𝑅) and/or a budget surplus/deficit (𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟). To 
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control for this view, this paper adds components from the revenue side of the government 
budget to the model, including tax revenue, non-tax revenue and budget surplus or deficit 
variables. 
The third set of regression model specifications for capturing the relationship between 
productive government expenditure and economic growth in the presence of three 
revenue-side variables in the GBC is: 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽3 (
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾4 (
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾5 (
𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾6 (
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +
∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡           (4.10) 
The fourth set of regression model specifications for capturing the non-productive 
expenditure is: 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽4 (
𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾7 (
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾8 (
𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾9 (
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +
∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡           (4.11) 
where TR is tax revenue, NTR is non-tax revenue and 𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟 is budget surplus or 
deficit to GDP ratios.  
4.3 Data and Empirical Methodology 
The sample of countries used in this analysis consists of a panel of 59 countries (37 
high-income and 22 low to middle-income) covering the period from 1993 to 2012 (list 
of countries can be seen in Table 3.2). The classification of high and middle to low-
income countries is based on the World Bank’s classification using gross national income 
per capita. One important objective of this analysis is to determine the effects of 
productive and non-productive government expenditure components on economic 
growth, so the classification of expenditures into productive and non-productive plays a 
vital role. This analysis classifies productive government spending as the sum of 
expenditure on education, health, defence, housing, economic affairs and general public 
services expenditure, while non-productive expenditure consists of expenditure on public 
order, recreation and social protection. This classification is based upon those applied by 
Bleaney et al. (2001), Adam and Bevan (2005), Park (2006), Christine (2012), and Chu 
et al. (2018). 
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The fiscal variables for the consolidated central government and general government 
are collected from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) and are subject to 
availability for each country. Devarajan et al. (1996) rerun their regression on a subset of 
countries which have data available for both central and general government and found 
that the results for both kinds of data are consistent. An advantage of this data source is 
that it also includes sectorial decompositions of total government expenditures and total 
revenues, which allow the separation of productive and non-productive elements of 
government spending, as well as tax and non-tax elements of government revenue (see 
Table 4.1 for the classification of fiscal data). The remaining data are attained from World 
Bank’s Development Indicators (WDI).  
Traditionally, to capture the long-run relationship of economic growth to fiscal 
variables and eliminate business cycle effects, the data is expressed in long-frequency 
periods – usually 5 years. While some previous studies applied 5-year average for all 
variables (see for example: Bleaney et al., 2001; Adam and Bevan, 2005; and Christie, 
2012) or decade average value for all variables (see for example: Bose et al., 2007); others 
used 5-year forward moving averages of GDP growth on yearly fiscal variables 
(Devarajan et al., 1996, and Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2007). However, both of these period-
averaging processes have some drawbacks which have been explained in section 3.1.5 of 
the Methodology chapter. Therefore, this analysis uses 5-year forward moving averages 
for all variable as it can remove business cycle effects, increase the number of time series 
observation in our panel data, minimise the reverse causality argument holding in our 
model and account for endogeneity. In the robustness section, this analysis will re-run the 
growth regression models with 5-year average period for all variables to see the difference 
between 5-year average periods with the analysis choice’s 5-year moving average period. 
Also, it will re-run the growth regression models with annual data to see the different 
impact of government expenditure components on economic growth in the short run and 
long run. 
Table 4.1: Theoretical aggregation of functional classifications 
Classification Functional classification 
Government expenditure categories 
Productive expenditures General public services expenditure 
 Defence expenditure 
 Educational expenditure 
 Health expenditure  
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 Economic affairs 
 Housing expenditure 
Non-productive expenditures Public order expenditure  
 Expenditure on recreation  
 Expenditure on social protection  
Government revenue categories 
Taxation Revenue Taxation Revenue 
Non-taxation Revenue Social Contribution (% of GDP) 
 Grant (% of GDP) 
 Other Revenues (% of GDP) 
 
An issue that is encountered in panel data estimation is the presence of unobserved 
country-specific effects (Easterly et al., 1997). Excluding unobservable country-specific 
effects could lead to serious biases in the econometric estimates, especially when these 
effects are correlated with other covariates. The OLS fixed effects, also known as the 
Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) are often applied to panel estimations to address 
this concern (Bleaney et al., 2001 and Gupta et al., 2005). Pooled OLS regression, two-
way random effects and two-way fixed effects estimations are considered. Based on the 
log likelihood and the adjusted R2 for the pooled OLS and a rejection of the null 
hypothesis in the Hausman test between fixed effects and random effects, the two-way 
fixed effects which control both time-invariant individual country characteristics and time 
fixed effect is chosen as the main method of estimation for this thesis. The results for 
Pooled OLS and two-way random effects are described in Appendix B. 
Furthermore, a major concern when running regressions of the form in equation (4.10) 
and (4.11) is the potential for simultaneity between GDP per capita growth and the right-
hand side variables - especially the fiscal variables, a point stressed by Ghosh and 
Gregoriou (2007), Afonso and Alegre (2011), Gemmell et al. (2016), and Chu et al. 
(2018). Estimation techniques that do not take into account this endogeneity will be 
biased and will lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. Ghosh and Gregoriou (2007) 
applied GMM technique to tackle possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables in 
the panel. Recently, Christie (2012) re-estimated productive public spending variable 
using dynamic GMM to account for endogeneity and found that the results are consistent 
with her main result using Fixed Effect Method. Therefore, this analysis also applies the 
dynamic panel one-step system GMM estimation (Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell 
and Bond, 1998) to address those concerns. The single equation GMM panel estimator 
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(difference GMM) normally specifies a dynamic model in first differences and is able to 
provide consistent coefficient estimates. However, the difference GMM estimator can 
experience a weak correlation between the regressors and the instruments. To overcome 
this problem Blundell and Bond (1998) have proposed the panel GMM system estimator, 
which combines a system of equations in first differences and levels, and has been shown 
to perform much better (less bias and more precision). The reason for using one-step 
GMM estimator is that this technique is efficient when the errors are homoscedastic and 
not correlated over time. This is often too restrictive. However, the one-step results are 
consistent, and robust standard errors that adjust for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation are easily obtained. Furthermore, the estimated standard errors of the two-
step GMM estimator tend to be too small when the analysis has a small sample (small 
number of individuals), similar to our sample. To sum up, the system GMM estimation is 
specifically designed to handle some of the problematic features of panel data, such as: 
country-specific fixed effects, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within countries. 
However, this thesis uses GMM approach as robustness analysis to assess the sensitivity 
of the econometric results presented by two-way fixed effects rather than the main 
estimation approach. There are a few reasons for this decision. First, Roodman (2009b) 
stated that if the number of time series observations (T) is large, dynamic panel sometimes 
becomes insignificant, and a more straightforward fixed-effects estimator works. 
Furthermore, the number of instruments in different and system GMM tend to explode 
with T. Second, if the number of countries (N) is small, the cluster-robust standard errors 
and the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test may be unreliable (Bond et al., 2001 and 
Roodman, 2009b). Lastly, an underappreciated problem often arises in the application of 
different and system GMM is instrument proliferation (Roodman, 2009a). Tauchen 
(1986) demonstrated in simulations of very small samples (50–75 observations) that the 
bias of GMM raises as more instruments, based on deeper lags of variables, are 
introduced. Ziliak (1997) obtains similar results. In Monte Carlo tests of difference GMM 
in particular, on 8×100 panels, Windmeijer (2005) reports that reducing the instrument 
count from 28 to 13 cuts the average bias in the two-step estimate of the parameter of 
interest by 40%. The first and second analysis of this thesis use short panel data, as these 
analysis examine the relationship between government expenditure components, 
corruption and economic growth for a panel data of 37 high-income and 22 low to middle-
income countries (N = 37 and 22) for the period 1993 to 2012 (T = 15 for applying five-
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year moving averages). The final analysis uses a shorter panel data as this thesis focuses 
on the growth effects of government expenditure on human capital and its components 
(education and health) for an Asia case study. Therefore, the two-way fixed effects which 
control both time-invariant individual country characteristics and time fixed effect is 
chosen as the benchmark for this thesis. Meanwhile, the GMM estimation has the 
advantage of using internal instruments, formulated from lags of the endogenous and pre-
determined variables for each time period to tackle possible endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables in the panel. Hence, it is used as robustness analysis. 
Table 4.2 lays out some descriptive statistics for the data set. It can be seen that high-
income economies have a lower average growth rate than low and middle-income 
economies, at 2.6% and 3.3% respectively. It has been observed that high-income 
economies have bigger size of government expenditure than low to middle economies, 
which accounts for approximately 39% and 26% of total GDP respectively. Small 
government sizes tend to concentrate spending on productive government spending. Low 
to middle-income countries spend over 78% of government spending on productive 
spending such as infrastructure, health, defence and education, to help boost economic 
growth and catch up with the development of high-income countries who spend 
approximately 61% of total government expenditure on productive components. 
Meanwhile, countries with bigger governments tend to allocate a larger share of total 
government spending to social welfare and transfer payments (Gray et al., 2007). In the 
estimation sample, high-income countries use roughly 39% of total expenditure on non-
productive spending, compared to 22% on low to middle-income countries. Moving to 
other fiscal variables, developing countries have a lower average budget deficit as 
percentage of GDP than developed countries, at -0.9% and -2.8% respectively. 
Meanwhile, tax revenue and non-tax revenue variables as percentage of GDP in 
developed countries have a higher average rate compared to developing countries, 23% 
compared with 15% for tax revenue and 15% compared with 8% for non-tax revenue. 
Looking at other macroeconomic variables in table 4.2, high income countries have a low 
average inflation rate during this period at 3.4%; while low to middle income countries 
have markedly high inflation rate with average of 13.8%. Regarding trade openness as 
percentage of GDP, high income economies have a higher average rate than low to middle 
economies, at 100% and 78% respectively. The remaining variables such as investment 
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and labour force growth show no significant difference between the two sub-group 
country samples. 
 Table 4.3 describes the correlation matrix between variables. It can be seen that 
productive and non-productive government spending as a percentage of total government 
expenditure have a highly negative correlation with each other (-0.9983) as they are both 
part of total expenditure. Therefore, this analysis introduces productive and non-
productive expenditure in separate regression models. This exercise can also help to solve 
the collinearity problem when we combine tax revenue, non-tax revenue and budget 
deficit or surplus variables of GBC in this analysis.  
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics 
  
Full sample  High-income economies 
Low to Middle-income 
economies 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
GDP p.c. growth (% p.a) 2.594 3.419 2.141 3.337 3.343 3.424 
Productive government expenditure (% TGE) 67.012 14.373 60.599 10.996 78.040 12.718 
Non-productive government expenditure (% TGE) 32.988 14.234 39.401 10.965 21.960 12.574 
Total government expenditure (% of GDP) 34.630 12.565 39.803 11.329 25.658 9.074 
Log Initial p.c. GDP (constant 2005 US$) 9.042 1.540 10.055 0.641 7.346 1.013 
Investment (Gross capital formation as % of GDP) 23.460 5.935 23.376 5.761 23.600 6.219 
Inflation rate (%) 7.324 30.654 3.419 4.638 13.784 48.940 
Labour force growth (p.a) 1.521 2.041 1.280 2.091 1.926 1.888 
Openness (Sum of exports and imports as % of 
GDP) 
91.665 55.954 100.024 64.453 77.617 33.188 
Deficit or Surplus (% of GDP) -2.111 4.667 -2.843 4.765 -0.859 4.214 
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 20.240 8.219 23.268 8.266 15.007 4.803 
Non-Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 12.215 7.122 14.818 6.409 7.716 5.959 
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Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix 
  GRO INF INV LFG LIG NTR OPN SOD TR PGE1 UPGE1 TGE 
Growth (GRO)                         
Inflation (INF) -0.0047                       
Investment (INV) 0.5046 -0.1001                     
Labour force growth 
(LFG) 
-0.1942 -0.1036 0.0069                   
Log initial GDP (LIG)  -0.2835 -0.2143 -0.1783 -0.1861                 
Non-tax revenue (NTR) -0.2333 -0.0176 -0.1838 -0.1123 0.537               
Openness (OPN) 0.0001 -0.0725 0.0283 0.1266 0.2865 0.0921             
Surplus or deficit 
(SOD) 
0.0699 -0.0465 0.0687 0.0763 0.2878 0.2293 0.2626           
Tax revenue (TR) -0.1949 -0.1105 -0.3404 -0.3542 0.6423 0.2349 0.023 0.1622         
Productive spending 
(PGE1) 
0.1065 0.0961 0.1704 0.449 -0.6893 -0.585 0.0034 -0.1326 -0.6315       
Non-productive 
spending (UPGE1) 
-0.1049 -0.0923 -0.1743 -0.4491 0.6852 0.5865 -0.0058 0.1346 0.6295 -0.9983     
Total government 
expenditure (TGE) 
-0.2636 -0.0806 -0.3036 -0.3506 0.687 0.6818 -0.008 -0.045 0.7626 -0.7396 0.7373   
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The reason for using productive and non-productive government expenditure as a 
percentage of total government expenditure instead of as a percentage of GDP has been 
explained in Section 3.1.3 in the methodology chapter. 
4.4 Results 
Table 4.4 presents the estimated effects of productive and non-productive government 
expenditure on economic growth in high-income and low to middle-income economies 
by using a two-way fixed effects method. The main variable of interest is share of 
productive and non-productive expenditure on total government spending, which have a 
respective positive and negative statistically significant coefficient effect on economic 
growth for high-income economies (column [1] and [2]). For high-income economies, a 
one percentage point shift in the ratio of government expenditure away from non-
productive areas and toward productive areas of spending will increase per capita real 
GDP growth by 0.05 percentage points. These results are unsurprising and consistent with 
previous findings for high-income economies (see for example: Devarajan et al., 1996; 
Gemmell et al., 2016 and Chu et al., 2018).   
Meanwhile, Column [3] and [4] display the regression results of growth against the 
ratio of productive and non-productive expenditure in low to middle-income economies. 
However, no statistically significant relationship is found between composition of 
government expenditure and growth in this group of countries. These findings differ from 
those of Devarajan et al. (1996) and Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), who in similar work 
found significant impacts. The reason for this may be due to the absence of the GBC 
variables in their studies, as criticised by other authors (Kneller et al. 1999; Bleaney et al. 
2001; Adam and Bevan 2005; Afonso and Alegre 2011; Gemmell et al. 2016). Devarajan 
et al. (1996) did not include this feature in their model, while Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) 
compared their main results with and without the presence of GBC and found there is not 
much difference for the main variables of interest. The vital role of GBC in main results 
will be seen in Table 4.5. 
Regarding total government expenditure as a ratio to GDP, it can be seen that it has a 
negative and significant impact on economic growth for both high-income and low to 
middle-income group. This is the level effect of total government expenditure on per 
capita growth, which has been found to be positive but insignificant by Devarajan et al. 
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(1996) and positive significant by Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) for developing countries. 
So this results of ours is somewhat different from their findings, but consistent with 
previous studies for developed countries (Romero-Avila and Strauch 2008; Afonso and 
Alegre 2011; Christie 2012). Increases in government expenditure might increase the tax 
burden on citizens - either now or in the future – which leads to a reduction in private 
spending and investment (crowding-out effect) and thus retards economic growth (Barro 
1990; Bose et al. 2007). With a negative effect of total government spending on growth, 
it is important for governments to reallocate government expenditure in a more optimal 
way and thereby to increase economic growth within a given government expenditure 
decision.  
Table 4.4: Productive and Non-productive government spending with FE technique 
Estimation technique: 5-year moving average - two-way fixed effect   
Dependent variable: Per capita growth       
  
High Income 
Low and Middle 
Income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Productive expenditure 0.0513** 
 0.0289  
 (0.0265) 
 (0.0354)  
Non-productive expenditure 
 -0.0510*  -0.0237 
 
 (0.0294)  (0.0366) 
Total government expenditure -0.1136*** -0.1145*** -0.1344* -0.1390*  
(0.0403) (0.0405) (0.0921) (0.0919) 
Log Initial GDP -2.4789 -2.4123 -0.3023 -0.2821 
 (2.6749) (2.6965) (2.0513) (2.0714) 
Investment 0.1219** 0.1223** 0.1747** 0.1740** 
 (0.0591) (0.0591) (0.0658) (0.0655) 
Inflation -0.0304 -0.0308 -0.0028 -0.0025 
 (0.0443) (0.0444) (0.0050) (0.0049) 
Labour force growth 0.0717 0.0689 -0.2096 -0.2129 
 (0.1531) (0.1530) (0.2674) (0.2700) 
Openness 0.0427** 0.0420** -0.0053 -0.0053 
 (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0202) (0.0202) 
Constant 22.7369 27.3148 2.8611 4.2648 
 (23.547) (25.387) (15.669) (13.564) 
Observations 591 591 344 344 
No of countries 37 37 22 22 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5612 0.5605 0.5022 0.5011 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but not reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1     
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Turning our attention to other variables, the positive coefficient attached to investment 
for both sets of countries follows standard economic theory, in which an increase in the 
investment results in increase in production, and conforms to previous studies (Adam and 
Bevan 2005; Bose et al. 2007; Afonso and Alegre 2011; Christie 2012). The same effect 
is expected to apply for the labour force growth variable, but this analysis cannot report 
any statistically significant effect. This may indicate that growth in endogenous growth 
models could be influenced by fiscal policy rather than the rate of labour force growth. 
Unlike Christie (2012), this thesis finds that neither log initial GDP nor inflation has a 
significant impact on growth (indeed the inflation coefficient is negative). Therefore, 
there is no conditional convergence hypothesis for this initial GDP variable. The openness 
variable in terms of trade is normally positive for low and middle-income countries since 
trade is assumed to be growth-enhancing, but this analysis observes no relationship 
between them for low to middle-income economies sample (similar to Ghosh and 
Gregoriou 2008). However, in the sample of high-income economies, international trade 
has a positive and significant impact on economic growth. 
As an alternative procedure, this thesis estimates growth regression by including three 
revenue-side variables in the GBC instead of total government expenditure in equations 
(4.10) and (4.11). This will help to compare the new results with the benchmark 
specification, where total government expenditure was assumed as the only variable to 
represent the revenue side in Devarajan et al. (1996)’s model. An issue worth noting is if 
it included all the budget components in the regression it can create perfect collinearity 
(Gupta et al. 2005; Bose et al. 2007). This thesis avoids this by including productive and 
non-productive government expenditure in separate regressions.  
Table 4.5 reports the results of the new set of regressions where clearly the main 
sources of funds are included as three separate variables. It can be seen that the economic 
growth effects of productive and non-productive expenditure are similar to those in table 
2 for high-income economies. However, both of these expenditures show a significant 
impact on economic growth in low to middle-income group. The result is stronger for low 
to middle-income economies with per capita real GDP rising by 0.06 percentage points 
in response to reallocating one percentage point away from non-productive spending and 
toward productive expenditure. Though this result opposes the result of Devarajan et al. 
(1996) and Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) for developing countries, it is similar to some 
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previous empirical findings for developing countries (Adam and Bevan 2005; Gupta el 
al. 2005; Park 2006), despite quite different samples and approaches to estimation. 
Table 4.5: Productive and Non-productive government spending with FE technique 
in the presence of three revenue-side variables in the GBC 
Estimation technique: 5-year moving average - two-way fixed effect 
Dependent variable: Per capita growth    
  High-income Low and Middle-income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Productive expenditure 0.0507*  0.0648*  
 (0.0282)  (0.0334)  
Non-productive 
expenditure 
 -0.049*  -0.0602* 
  (0.0307)  (0.0336) 
Log Initial GDP -2.6191 -2.5341 0.4827 0.4977 
 (2.4902) (2.5067) (1.4092) (1.4181) 
Investment 0.0936* 0.0935* 0.1956*** 0.1935*** 
 (0.0595) (0.0601) (0.0607) (0.0609) 
Inflation -0.044 -0.0442 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.0445) (0.0449) (0.0047) (0.0046) 
Labour force growth 0.0963 0.0935 -0.0883 -0.0862 
 (0.1332) (0.1342) (0.2524) (0.2575) 
Openness 0.0424*** 0.0415*** 0.0058 0.0052 
 (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0186) (0.0183) 
Non-tax revenue -0.1465*** -0.1476*** 0.0069 0.0031 
 (0.0529) (0.0532) (0.0757) (0.0764) 
Tax revenue 0.1359 0.1339 -0.2321** -0.2315** 
 (0.0978) (0.0984) (0.0843) (0.0836) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.2053*** 0.2060*** 0.2202*** 0.2262*** 
 (0.0644) (0.065) (0.0696) (0.0702) 
Constant 3.524 24.1057 -6.6917 -0.2553 
 (1.5661) (22.894) (11.6589) (8.8435) 
Observations 591 591 344 344 
No of countries 37 37 22 22 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6077 0.6065 0.5677 0.5655 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but not reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
   
As previous research focused on either high-income or low-income countries, but 
never both together, it is difficult to directly compare and contrast results. By using the 
same period of analysis and methodology, this study can for the first time directly 
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compare countries effects. The findings show that an increase in the absolute level of total 
government expenditure has a crowding-out effect and thus obstructs economic growth. 
However, by shifting the mix of spending way from non-productive forms of expenditure 
and towards productive forms, countries can move closer to a more optimum growth level 
for both high-income and low to middle-income groups. These results are consistent with 
the theoretical framework and the empirical strategy used in previous studies, which 
predict that the coefficients estimated for government expenditure components 
(productive and non-productive) should be of similar size but different signs.  
Concerning the GBC variables, this analysis finds that increased tax revenue in low to 
middle-income countries has a negative and significant impact on economic growth. The 
result is consistent with previous empirical studies for developing countries (Bose et al. 
2007; Lee and Gordon 2005). Tax rate cuts encourage individuals, businesses and 
shareholders to work, save, invest, and build capital; thereby directly impacting economic 
growth. It is expected the same effect of tax revenue on economic growth for high-income 
countries (Arnold et al. 2011; Gemmell et al. 2011), but this expectation is not supported 
by these findings. To fully examine the impact of taxation on economic growth for high-
income countries, it may need to decompose total tax revenue into different types of taxes 
as previous studies have done. For example; Arnold et al. (2011) found that corporate 
taxes are most damaging to economic growth over the long-run, followed by taxes on 
personal income, consumption and property. In the scope of this thesis, I do not focus on 
this aspect of government revenue. On the other hand, non-tax revenue is found to be 
negative and significant effect on growth in high-income economies, while it is not 
significant in low to middle-income countries.  
In addition, greater budget surplus or reduced deficit estimated coefficients indicate a 
positive and significant effect on long-term growth for both sets of countries. Previous 
research on this same relationship has produced mixed results.  Afonso and Alegre (2011) 
and Kneller et al. (1999) found a positive coefficient effect of budget surplus on economic 
growth for a panel of 15 EU and 22 OECD countries. Meanwhile, Bose et al. (2007) and 
Gupta et al. (2005) found the budget deficit adversely affects growth in their panels of 
developing countries. Adam and Bevan (2005) found that budget deficits could be 
growth-enhancing in their 45 developing sample economies. The financing assumptions 
may help explain these different results. If greater budget surplus or reduced deficit is a 
result of an increase in public investment or a decrease in tax, it should promote economic 
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growth. However, table 4.4 and table 4.5 suggest that as the coefficients estimated for 
budget surplus are positive and significant while the coefficients estimated for revenue 
side are negative (on non-tax revenue or tax revenue from high-income and low to 
middle-income respectively), the level of total public expenditure may be at or beyond its 
optimum and increasing it further would hinder economic growth. Therefore, 
governments should consider reducing total government spending and focus on 
reallocating funds towards productive and away from non-productive spending to achieve 
a closer to optimum growth level.  
The results in table 4.5 also suggest that not incorporating full GBC into the analysis 
could tend to make the coefficient estimates biased which have been warning by some 
researchers, e.g., Kneller et al. (1999); Bleaney et al. (2001); Bose et al. (2007); Afonso 
and Alegre (2011); Gemmell et al. (2016). The coefficients on the other important 
variables remain strikingly similar to what was obtained in table 4.4. 
4.5 Robustness 
In this section, this analysis assesses the robustness of the baseline results by 
conducting the following four exercises. First of all, a critical econometric issue arising 
in estimating our empirical model is that the right-hand side variables in equations (4.10) 
and (4.11) may not be exogenous. They can be determined by each other, by growth rate, 
by other variables that are not controlled for in the empirical specification. The one-step 
system GMM dynamic panel is used to provide more reliable and precise results as it 
offers more rigorous treatment of the endogeneity of fiscal variables on growth. Secondly, 
this analysis assesses whether the baseline results are sensitive to the choice of time 
period. It re-runs the regression models using five-year average of all variables to examine 
the consequences of the period-averaging process to capture long-term economic growth. 
Also, using annual data for all variables, this exercise compares the impact of government 
expenditure components on growth between long-run and short-run. Thirdly, this section 
examines the definitions and classifications of productive and non-productive 
government expenditure. Finally, this analysis considers the difference in the level effect 
of spending on long-run economic growth. 
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4.5.1 Robustness Test: Testing for Endogeneity 
A common issue in literature for fiscal policy and growth is the likely presence of 
endogeneity. The validity or interpretation of aggregate growth regressions is the 
possibility that estimated relationships represent correlations but not causation (Gemmell 
et al., 2016). This thesis cannot discount the possibility that a direct impact of fiscal 
variables on GDP, changes in GDP may induce changes in these fiscal variables. Fiscal 
policy changes may also be associated with country-specific time-varying variables, such 
as political conditions, that influence GDP levels or growth rates. Economic downturns 
reduce taxable capacity and lead to increases in certain types of public expenditure such 
as unemployment benefits and social insurance payments. Though these may be at the 
expense of other types of expenditure, this is often insufficient to prevent total spending 
from rising in downturns (Sanz, 2010). As previously noted, social welfare expenditures 
might be expected to rise in response to an economic downturn yielding negative 
correlations with GDP. On the other hand, some productive expenditure shares may rise 
when faster GDP growth generates additional revenues, and demands for social welfare-
related expenditures weaken. This would have contrasting effects on the shares of these 
different components of expenditure in total expenditure and for total expenditure as a 
ratio to GDP. In addition, over the longer term, the income elasticity of demand for 
education and health may be high, leading to upward pressure on public spending 
(Slemrod, 1995). Moreover, some degree of reverse causality could also be present in the 
relationship between growth and investment, and growth and openness (Christie, 2012; 
Gupta et al., 2005 and Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2007). If economic growth is a determinant 
of any of the right-hand side variables in thesis model, estimation techniques that do not 
take into account this endogeneity may yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. 
Since the GMM technique was first improved by Arellano and Bond (1991) it has 
become a common method to apply and capture the endogeneity involved in the 
simultaneous economic growth regressions. The reason for its popularity is that GMM 
has the benefit of using internal instruments to deal with the problem of the main variable 
of interest not being strictly exogenous. The consistency of the Arellano and Bond 
estimator depends on the assumption that errors are not serially correlated. It is therefore 
crucial to test for the presence of serial correlation. Arellano and Bond’s test reports for 
first and second order serial correlation of the differenced residuals. Hence, there should 
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be first order but not second order correlation (Roodman, 2009a). Furthermore, Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggested a Sargan or Hansen test for 
over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments when 
applying the GMM technique.  
Bleaney et al. (2001) and Bose et al. (2007) found substantial lagged effects of growth 
for a set of 21 OECD countries and 40 developing countries respectively, and suggested 
that long-run effects of fiscal policy may take more than one interval to be effective. To 
account for this, this analysis applies dynamic model with lagged growth as an 
explanatory variable for both group samples. Fiscal, investment and openness variables 
entered as endogenous, whereas all other variables with time dummies are assumed to be 
exogenous and instrument for themselves (Bose et al., 2007, Christie, 2012 and Gupta et 
al., 2005). To capture the effect of lagged growth and to be consistent with the approach 
of Bose et al. (2007), this analysis excludes log initial GDP from the regressions. 
The estimated dynamic models with lagged growth as an explanatory variable and 
capturing the productive expenditure:  
𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 +  𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 (
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾1 (
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +
 𝛾2 (
𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾3 (
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) + ∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡       (4.12) 
The estimated dynamic models with lagged growth as an explanatory variable and 
capturing the non-productive expenditure: 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 +  𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 (
𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾1 (
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +
𝛾2 (
𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾3 (
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) + ∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡      (4.13) 
where Git−1is the first lag of the growth variable 
The results for the dynamic panel GMM one-step system technique for productive and 
non-productive expenditures on both group countries sample are presented in Table 4.6.  
Table 4.6: Productive and Non-productive government spending with GMM 
technique in the presence of three revenue-side variables in the GBC 
Estimation technique: 5 years moving average - GMM one-step system 
Dependent variable: Per capita growth 
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High-income  Low and Middle-income 
 
(1) (20 (3) (4) 
Productive expenditure -0.0308*  0.0299**   
(0.0208)  (0.0135)  
Non-productive expenditure  0.0314  -0.0323**  
 (0.0266)  (0.0155) 
Lagged growth 0.9314*** 0.9216*** 0.9445*** 0.9356*** 
 (0.0712) (0.0757) (0.0335) (0.0384) 
Investment 0.0406 0.0551 0.0045 0.0116  
(0.0557) (0.0568) (0.0179) (0.0192) 
Inflation -0.0161 -0.0062 0.0023 0.0026  
(0.0536) (0.0569) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Labour force growth 0.08483 0.1047 -0.0431 -0.0410  
(0.0824) (0.0918) (0.0673) (0.0697) 
Openness 0.0022 0.0028 -0.0014 0.0025  
(0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0050) (0.0050) 
Non-tax revenue 0.0440 0.0531 0.0146 0.0084  
(0.0434) (0.0401) (0.0434) (0.0444) 
Tax revenue 0.0314 0.0464 0.0253 0.0389  
(0.0602) (0.0623) (0.0510) (0.0515) 
Surplus or Deficit -0.0183 -0.0122 0.0448 0.0574  
(0.0551) (0.0549) (0.0724) (0.0665) 
Constant -0.1490 -4.1736 -2.773* 0.0995  
(3.6369) (3.6784) (1.5056) (0.9932) 
Observations 554 554 323 323 
No of countries 37 37 22 22 
No of instruments 44 44 37 37 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.014 0.018 0.02 0.018 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.027 0.027 0.154 0.178 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.540 0.900 0.983 0.935 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but not 
reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
These results also report Arellano-Bond’s test for autocorrelation and the Hansen J-
test of over-identifying restriction. When the model is estimated only for low to middle-
income economies, the results closely align with those of the fixed effects model for both 
productive and non-productive government spending. This implies that the main results 
for those economies are not purely an object of endogeneity biases. The coefficients of 
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those main interests (productive and non-productive variables) are smaller under GMM 
than fixed effect model, but the standard errors are also smaller. While the coefficients 
on the control variables are of different magnitudes and signs. On the other hand, GMM 
estimation for high-income group does not appear to be valid. While the Hansen J test for 
over-identifying restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are 
uncorrelated with the residuals for both samples, we only fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of no second order serial correlation for the developed economies at the 10% level. 
Notably, lagged growth appears significant for both sets of samples as foreseen by 
Bleaney et al. (2001) and Bose et al. (2007), but with five-year moving average data this 
dynamic specification presents high value (approximately 0.90) of lagged growth. One of 
the reasons for the invalidity of GMM technique in high income countries may be 
common characteristics among macro data sets. 
4.5.2 Robustness Test: Time-series Period and Using 5-year Average 
This further robustness test was carried out by using 5-year averages instead of 5-year 
moving averages for all variables in both group samples. The results are reported in table 
4.7 (using OLS two-way fixed effects technique). It can be seen that productive 
government spending has a positive and statistically significant effect on per capita 
growth rate, while non-productive government spending is significantly negative for 
high-income sample data. In particular, the higher growth effects for productive and non-
productive expenditure is attached to this 5-year average period (0.08 percentage point 
compared with 0.05 for productive expenditure and -0.08 percentage point compared with 
-0.05 for non-productive expenditure). These results are consistent with the main results 
in part 4.4 for high-income economies and give a reliable parameter estimates for our 
sample. Other control variables present the same results with the main one even though 
some have higher estimated coefficients, such as, investment, openness and non-tax 
revenue. Surprisingly, there is a positive and significant effect between labour force 
growth and long-run economic growth in high-income sample data (Column [1] and [2]). 
It is common and popular practice of taking 5-year average when examining relationships 
between government expenditure components and long-run economic growth, as seen in 
Table 2.1 in Literature Review chapter (except: Devarajan et al. (1996), Ghosh and 
Gregoriou (2007) and Gemmell et al. (2016) used 5-year moving average for dependent 
variable). This approach smooths out changes due to cyclical effect and also eliminates 
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potential econometric biases due to endogeneity problems arising from short-run cyclical 
simultaneity when applying static panel econometric techniques (Christie, 2012).  
Table 4.7: Productive and Non-productive government spending with five-year 
average  
Estimation technique: 5-year average – two way Fixed Effects 
  
Dependent variable: Per capita growth   
 High Income  
Low and Middle 
Income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Productive expenditure 0.0777***   0.0393   
 (0.0257) 
 
(0.0381) 
 
Non-productive 
expenditure 
 
-0.0807*** 
 
-0.0361 
 
 
(0.0268) 
 
(0.0372) 
Log Initial GDP -1.0991 -1.0681 -0.3173 -0.3275 
 (2.0833) (2.0943) (1.1876) (1.1813) 
Investment 0.2014*** 0.2026*** 0.1921*** 0.1927*** 
 (0.0564) (0.0570) (0.0585) (0.0582) 
Inflation -0.0490 -0.0488 0.0023 0.0029 
 (0.0495) (0.0496) (0.0061) (0.0059) 
Labour force growth 0.1990* 0.1931* -0.1047 -0.1068 
 (0.1250) (0.1258) (0.2470) (0.2507) 
Openness 0.0415*** 0.0407*** -0.0111 -0.0112 
 (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0138) (0.0137) 
Non-tax revenue -0.1874*** -0.1896*** -0.0703 -0.0722 
 (0.0627) (0.0632) (0.0884) (0.0883) 
Tax revenue 0.1320* 0.1269 -0.1582** -0.1616** 
 (0.0860) (0.0869) (0.0776) (0.0770) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.1040* 0.1050* 0.1932* 0.1996* 
 (0.0577) (0.0584) (0.1086) (0.1067) 
Constant 0.6171 8.4063 1.7861 5.8107 
 (17.6205) (19.1919) (10.7664) (8.2412) 
Observations 147 147 84 84 
No of countries 37 37 22 22 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7576 0.7074 0.6299 0.6288 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but not 
reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1    
 
For low to middle economies group, however, the coefficient on productive (non-
productive) government spending is positive (negative), but not statistically significant. 
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The reason for this insignificance may be due to the absence of automatic stabilisers. 
Developed or high-income economies have normally achieved a degree of 
macroeconomic stability, so changing between 5-year averages and 5-year moving 
average is unlikely to affect the relationship between components of government 
spending and growth. Meanwhile, for low to middle-income countries, 5-year average for 
pre-stabilisation countries may lead to bias results as their governments set up several 
five-year Socio-Economic Development Plans to achieve development and economic 
growth. Therefore, any study that uses the wrong 5-year average period between two 5-
Year Plans may result in incorrect estimates. Hence, using a 5-year moving average for 
all variables, as in our model, is more reliable and efficient.  
In addition, the research also ran the test with annual data for all variables to see the 
short-run effects on growth and the results are reported in Table 4.8. Productive 
government spending in both groups has a positive and significant impact on growth, 
consistent to our main results with 5-year moving average. Similar results are found for 
non-productive government spending for high-income and low to middle-income 
economies groups (negative and statistically significant effect on growth). Taking into 
account the role of control variables, this analysis also finds the same results as in part 
4.3. Hence, the thesis model could be applied to capture the effect of both the short-run 
and long-run impact of government spending on growth. However, as mentioned before, 
fiscal performance is highly likely to be endogenous to economic growth, especially in 
the short-run (Adam and Bevan, 2005 and Christie, 2012). Therefore, the finding suggests 
that applying a 5-year moving average for all variables is the most efficient and reliable 
method to capture the effect of government expenditure on long-term economic growth. 
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Table 4.8: Productive and non-productive government spending with annual data 
Estimation technique: yearly with OLS two-way fixed effect   
Dependent variable: Per capita growth    
 High Income Low to Middle Income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Productive expenditure 0.0755**  0.0577*  
 (0.0347)  (0.0280)  
Non-productive 
expenditure 
 -0.0774**  -0.0542 
  (0.0368)  (0.0272) 
Log Initial GDP 0.2221 0.2304 1.2327 1.2248 
 (2.4403) (2.4386) (1.4398) (1.4366) 
Investment 0.2075*** 0.2066*** 0.2797*** 0.2780*** 
 (0.0532) (0.0532) (0.0488) (0.0491) 
Inflation -0.0452 -0.0457 -0.0020 -0.0020 
 (0.0325) (0.0322) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Labour force growth -0.0576 -0.0565 0.0049 0.0041 
 (0.0732) (0.0731) (0.1306) (0.1306) 
Openness 0.0441*** 0.0435*** -0.0096 -0.0100 
 (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0162) (0.0162) 
Non-tax revenue -0.1783*** -0.1800*** 0.0643 0.0626 
 (0.0648) (0.0642) (0.0565) (0.0568) 
Tax revenue 0.0433 0.0430 -0.2527*** -0.2529*** 
 (0.0955) (0.0953) (0.0831) (0.0846) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.1942*** 0.1940*** 0.1237* 0.1278* 
 (0.0548) (0.0553) (0.0664) (0.0657) 
Constant -10.849 -3.2296 -13.385 -7.507 
 (21.221) (23.035) (10.708) (9.3029) 
Observations 686 686 397 397 
No of countries 37 37 22 22 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7576 0.7074 0.387 0.3857 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but 
not reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1   
 
4.5.3 Robustness Test: Classification of Fiscal Variables 
The next change this analysis makes to the regression equation is to re-test the 
classification of productive and non-productive variables. The aggregation of the 
functional classification in the data source into theory-based categories in Table 4.1 has 
been a controversial issue. Moreover, much of the empirical literature testing for the 
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effects of public expenditure decompositions on long-run economic growth shows 
inconsistent results. Regarding high-income economies, it has been found that education, 
health and economic affairs (transport and communication) are positively associated with 
long-run economic growth (Barro, 1991; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Kocherlakota and 
Yi, 1997; Kneller et al., 1999; Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2002; Afonso and Alegre, 2011; 
and Gemmel et al., 2016). Meanwhile, these expenditure components showed different 
results in the case of developing economies. Bose et al. (2007), Bayraktar and Moreno-
Dodson (2012), and Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) found that education 
expenditure has a positive impact on economic growth, while health and transport & 
communication spending do not. In contrast, Ghosh and Gregoriou (2007) stated that 
education and health expenditure have a negative impact on economic growth in their 15 
developing countries for the period from 1972 to 1999. The differences in applying 
various methodological approaches, specification models and time periods are the reason 
for these variable results. Also, little attention has been given to comparing the impact of 
government expenditure decompositions on economic growth at the different stages of 
country development. Devarajan et al. (1996) were one of the first to compare the 
different between two groups: developed and developing countries. They used panel data 
of 43 developing countries from 1970 through 1990 and found a positive relationship 
between health and transport & communication expenditure and economic growth, while 
reporting a negative relationship between defence and education spending and growth. 
They subsequently re-tested their regressions with a sample of 21 developed countries for 
the same period and found that the results are reversed. Recent study, Afonso and Jalles 
(2014) use a large panel of OECD and emerging countries (155 countries) for the period 
1970 to 2008 to differentiate the effects from expenditure on education and health 
between each group. However, the results are not clear to compare and contrast between 
two sub-group sample data as they find an only positive and significant effect of education 
spending on economic growth in the emerging economies sub-group (insignificant 
impacts on other expenditure and other group). Moving to social protections (and welfare) 
which constitutes the main item of non-productive expenditure, it is found to have a 
negative impact on growth in either developed or developing countries sample in previous 
empirical studies (for example, Kneller et al., 1999; Afonso and Alegre, 2011; Acosta-
Ormaechea and Morozumi, 2013; Afonso and Jalles, 2014; and Gemmel et al., 2016).  
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To highlight the concern about the classification of productive and non-productive 
expenditure and also the difference in comparing the impacts of public spending 
decompositions between two sub-group samples, this analysis now separates out 
productive and non-productive government spending to their components.  It then re-runs 
the regression with each component in functional classification by applying OLS two-
way fixed effects to test the relationship between them and economic growth. Expenditure 
on recreation, a non-productive spending, to total government spending ratio is too small 
and will therefore not be considered in this test. The results are displayed in Table 4.10, 
while the descriptive statistics of these components are presented in Table 4.9. In general, 
most of the components of productive government spending for each group data have a 
positive (either significant or insignificant) impact on growth, while expenditure on social 
protection (major percentage of non-productive spending) is opposed, which is consistent 
with the main results. Taking the education expenditure as one of the most important 
components in government expenditure (Barro (1990) believed that spending on 
education as investing in human capital), the analysis finds a significant positive 
relationship between expenditure on education as a ratio of total government expenditure 
and economic growth in high-income sub-group countries, while it also is positive but 
not significant in low to middle-income countries. The result is similar to previous studies.  
With regards to expenditure on defence which is included in productive spending as 
raising the probability of receiving the marginal product of capital through supporting the 
protection of property rights (Barro, 1991), it is  found to be significant and negative 
impact on growth in low to middle-income countries. This is in line with the findings of 
Bose et al. (2007) with 30 developing countries sample and Bojanic (2013) with a 
Bolivia’s case study. It seems that investing more money on defence is not a good choice 
for economic improvement, but developing government’s policy makers have to spend 
on it for political purposes. However, there is a positive but insignificant relationship 
between spending on defence and economic growth in high-income economies group.  
Looking into expenditure on health, another component that has been argued to have 
a positive effect on growth due to its investment in human capital, this analysis finds a 
positive and significant impact on economic growth in low to middle-income economies 
(whereas insignificant effect in high-income countries). The further analysis on the 
growth effects of government expenditure on education and health will be represented in 
chapter 6.  
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Regarding expenditure on economics affairs, there is a positive and significant 
coefficient effect on economic growth for low to middle-income countries, while the 
coefficient is insignificant and negative for high-income countries. This component 
which includes agriculture, fuel and energy, manufacturing, construction, and transport 
& communication, plays an important role in government spending structure in 
developing countries (average of 18% in total of government expenditure). It also is one 
of the main engines in boosting economic growth in low to middle-income countries and 
has made a marked contribution to development in some countries over the past 20 years, 
such as China, India, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam. For high-income countries group, 
this expenditure may not contribute to economic growth because the infrastructure and 
these economies have been stabilised. General public services expenditure as a percentage 
of total expenditure is found to be positive and significant impact on long-run growth in 
high-income countries group. Meanwhile it has insignificant impact in low to middle-
income countries even though this expenditure has the largest fraction on total 
government spending in this sub-group (nearly 28% average). This may be due to how 
efficient governments are in using this expenditure.  
Finally, expenditure on social protections, which has the largest fraction of total 
government spending in high-income group (around 32% average), has a negative and 
significant effect on economic growth for both sub-group data. These results are 
consistent with the main results on non-productive government spending and previous 
research on social protections component. Public order expenditure, a non-productive 
expenditure component, has a positive impact on growth, but this share to non-productive 
spending is much smaller than expenditure on social protection, therefore does not change 
substantial effect of non-productive expenditure on growth. For other control variables, 
the coefficients of those variables are similar to the main results in part 4.3. The 
coefficient associated to investment is somehow positive and significant for low to 
middle-income countries only, while international trade has a positive and significant 
impact on economic growth in the sample of high-income countries. Regarding the 
budget constraint variables, budget deficit or surplus coefficients in all different 
estimations show a positive and significant effect on long-term growth for both sets of 
sub-group sample. In addition, tax-revenue coefficients find to have a positive impact on 
growth in some components estimation in high-income countries, while it is reversed 
result in low and middle-income countries.  
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Table 4.9: Descriptive statistics for government expenditure components 
  Full Sample 
High Income 
Countries 
Low and Middle 
Income Countries 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Education expenditure (% of 
TGE) 
13.198 4.833 12.424 4.052 14.539 5.709 
Defence expenditure (% of 
TGE) 
6.902 6.616 6.145 7.129 8.223 5.368 
Health expenditure (% of 
TGE) 
9.764 5.114 11.928 4.790 6.023 3.100 
Economic affairs (% of 
TGE) 
13.771 7.308 11.136 4.514 18.334 8.824 
General public services 
expenditure (% of TGE) 
20.253 11.682 15.896 6.781 27.852 14.274 
Housing expenditure (% of 
TGE) 
2.796 2.638 2.543 2.526 3.253 2.773 
Public order expenditure (% 
of TGE) 
4.988 2.551 4.336 2.327 6.123 2.529 
Social protections 
expenditure (% of TGE) 
25.248 14.512 31.470 12.422 14.340 11.074 
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Table 4.10: Classification of fiscal variables with five-year moving average 
Estimation technique: 5 years moving average - two-way FE 
      
Dependent variable: Per capita growth 
              
 
HIC LIC&MIC HIC LIC&MIC HIC LIC&MIC HIC LIC&MIC HIC LIC&MIC HIC LIC&MIC HIC LIC&MIC HIC LIC&MIC 
Education exp 0.1055* 0.0036 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
(0.0615) (0.0808) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Defence exp - - 0.0143 -0.2172** - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
- - (0.0291) (0.0836) - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Health exp - - - - -0.0244 0.2139* - - - - - - - - - - 
 
- - - - 0.0430 0.1428 - - - - - - - - - - 
Economic 
affairs 
- - - - - - -0.0021 0.0957** - - - - - - - - 
 
- - - - - - (0.0414) (0.0417) - - - - - - - - 
General pub sev - - - - - - - - 0.1066*** -0.0013 - - - - - - 
 
- - - - - - - - (0.0341) (0.0199) - - - - - - 
Housing - - - - - - - - - - 0.1499** 0.0281 - - - - 
 
- - - - - - - - - - (0.0735) (0.0934) - - - - 
Public Order - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.2859** 0.0504 - - 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - (0.1385) (0.2051) - - 
Social Pro - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -0.0420* -0.0479* 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - (0.0281) (0.0330) 
Log Initial GDP -1.9586 -0.1574 -1.6595 -1.4720* -1.5942 -0.0201 -1.6488 -1.8370** -3.7471* -0.1973 -1.3512 -0.2725 -1.1976 -0.0834 -2.3041 0.2742 
 
(2.3130) (1.2620) (2.2959) (0.8462) 2.3373 1.1462 (2.2628) (0.7074) (2.6427) (1.1294) (2.2529) (1.1723) (2.1230) (1.0101) (2.3910) (1.2950) 
Investment 0.0790 0.1892*** 0.0761 0.2472*** 0.0746 0.2086*** 0.0726 0.1900*** 0.1388** 0.1889*** 0.0547 0.1946*** 0.1018 0.1864*** 0.0903* 0.1884*** 
 
(0.0581) (0.0604) (0.0621) (0.0643) 0.0587 0.0627 (0.0613) (0.0569) (0.0652) (0.0609) (0.0568) (0.0597) (0.0662) (0.0607) (0.0571) (0.0605) 
Inflation -0.0511 0.0019 -0.0505 0.0045 -0.0504 0.0049 -0.0518 0.0013 -0.0475 0.0019 -0.0471 0.0022 -0.0362 0.0022 -0.0432 0.0011 
 
(0.0462) (0.0049) (0.0463) (0.0047) 0.0457 0.0061 (0.0493) (0.0047) (0.0488) (0.0048) (0.0428) (0.0044) (0.0463) (0.0048) (0.0463) (0.0046) 
Labour force gro 0.1089 -0.1470 0.1015 -0.0876 0.0883 -0.1162 0.1004 -0.1554 0.0369 -0.1482 0.0584 -0.1436 0.1208 -0.1529 0.0757 -0.0992 
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(0.1257) (0.2440) (0.1334) (0.2549) 0.1303 0.2218 (0.1348) (0.2485) (0.1268) (0.2456) (0.1401) (0.2291) (0.1157) (0.2488) (0.1342) (0.2461) 
Openness 0.0359** 0.0038 0.0323** 0.0008 0.0312* 0.0049 0.0321** 0.0051 0.0440*** 0.0037 0.0316** 0.0057 0.0320* 0.0043 0.0398*** 0.0059 
 
(0.0154) (0.0179) (0.0164) (0.0159) 0.0166 0.0174 (0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0144) (0.0177) (0.0146) (0.0191) (0.0164) (0.0180) (0.0140) (0.0185) 
Non-tax revenue -0.1424** -0.0265 -0.1500** -0.0144 -0.1503** -0.0077 -0.1519** -0.0108 -0.1678*** -0.0280 -0.162*** -0.0185 -0.1013* -0.0281 -0.159*** 0.0037 
 
(0.0573) (0.0885) (0.0631) (0.0795) 0.0630 0.0740 (0.0627) (0.0773) (0.0598) (0.0833) (0.0599) (0.0900) (0.0615) (0.0825) (0.0552) (0.0753) 
Tax revenue 0.1223 -0.2098* 0.1529* -0.1802** 0.1522* -0.2436** 0.1529* -0.1995** 0.1097 -0.2086** 0.1741* -0.2423 0.1241 -0.2061** 0.1440* -0.2305** 
 
(0.0981) (0.1150) (0.0961) (0.0763) 0.0952 0.1005 (0.0949) (0.0813) (0.0893) (0.0940) (0.0907) (0.1103) (0.0976) (0.0956) (0.0985) (0.0897) 
Surplus or 
Deficit 
0.1938*** 0.2519*** 0.2086*** 0.2490*** 0.2130*** 0.2487*** 0.2121*** 0.2258*** 0.2228*** 0.2522*** 0.2152*** 0.2542*** 0.1879*** 0.2493*** 0.1963*** 0.2276*** 
 
(0.0684) (0.0676) (0.0697) (0.0582) 0.0643 0.0675 (0.0641) (0.0647) (0.0559) (0.0723) (0.0675) (0.0771) (0.0691) (0.0704) (0.0637) (0.0688) 
Constant 16.3642 3.5864 14.3721 12.9589** 14.2875 1.1190 14.5484 13.258** 31.953* 3.9698 11.2865 4.5253 7.8525 2.8271 21.4739 0.8688 
 
(20.2773) (8.6106) 20.1051 (5.5098) 20.2774 8.0706 (19.835) (4.2023) (23.313) (7.8722) (19.821) (7.393) (18.228) (6.3011) (21.511) (8.1811) 
Observations 591 344 591 344 591 344 591 344 591 344 591 344 591 344 591 344 
No of countries 37 22 37 22 37 22 37 22 37 22 37 22 37 22 37 22 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.6081 0.5501 0.5978 0.5845 0.5982 0.5613 0.5974 0.5847 0.6257 0.5501 0.6054 0.5558 0.614 0.55 0.6051 0.5601 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but not reported 
         
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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4.5.4 Robustness Test: The Difference in the Level Effect 
The final robustness test this analysis makes is to re-test the difference in the level 
effect of spending on long-run economic growth. In the theoretical and empirical model, 
this analysis results are on the composition effect of expenditure on growth (the ratio of 
productive and non-productive government expenditure on total government expenditure) 
and the level effect has been controlled separately in the regression analysis by the GBC 
variables. This analysis follows the studies of Devarajan et al. (1996), Ghosh and 
Gregoriou (2007), Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013), Gemmel et al. (2016) and 
Chu et al. (2018) in which the compositions are as the percentage of total government 
expenditure, while other empirical previous studies which has been mentioned in table 
2.1 examined the relationship between economic growth and government expenditure 
compositions as a percentage of GDP. The difference is that a unit increase in the 
budgetary share of education spending (productive expenditure) in term of calculating as 
the ratio on total government expenditure has to be matched by a unit decrease in some 
other spending shares (non-productive expenditure), as the size of total spending remains 
fixed. On the other hand, a unit increase in the share of education or productive 
government expenditure in GDP does not necessarily mean that other expenditure items 
are decreasing in other studies. This may lead to varied findings in the previous studies 
for different sets of sample. Therefore, this robustness test re-runs the regression 
equations with productive and non-productive government expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP to see how the results are changing compared with previous studies. Table 4.11 
represents the descriptive statistics of these expenditures and table 4.12 shows the 
estimated of these expenditures on economic growth in high-income and low to middle-
income economies with five-year moving average period. Both sub-group countries 
spend roughly the same on productive government expenditure (21.7% compared with 
19.7%), whilst high-income economies spend higher on non-productive government 
expenditure than low to middle-income countries (15% and 6.6% respectively). For high-
income economies group, the analysis finds that neither productive nor non-productive 
has a significant effect on long-run economic growth (even the sign of both expenditures 
are similar to the main results). Regarding low to middle-income countries, we find only 
non-productive expenditure variable has a negative and significant impact on growth, 
while productive expenditure’s is insignificant. This may be a result of the period 
technique that this analysis picks up to re-run the equations – five-year moving average. 
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Table 4.13 displays the results of productive and non-productive impact on economic 
growth with five-year average, a common and popular time period using by previous 
research. It can be seen that the coefficient for productive expenditure is significant and 
positive in high-income sub-group, while coefficient for non-productive expenditure is 
opposite. This result is similar to this analysis main result and consistent with the previous 
studies, such as Kneller et al. (1999), Bleaney et al. (2001), Afonso and Alegre (2011). 
However, neither productive expenditure nor non-productive expenditure is found to have 
significant impact on growth in low to middle-income countries. The reason for this may 
be the wrong chosen 5-year time period as mentioned in robustness test part 4.5.2 
Table 4.11: The descriptive statistics for the difference level effect 
  
Full sample data 
High Income 
Countries 
Low and Middle 
Income Countries 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Productive 
government 
expenditure (% GDP) 
21.558 8.312 21.662 5.847 19.694 5.329 
Non-productive 
government 
expenditure (% GDP) 
11.756 7.276 15.101 6.443 6.618 5.155 
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Table 4.12: The level effect with five-year moving average  
Estimation technique: 5-year moving average - two-way fixed effect 
Dependent variable: Per capita growth   
  High Income 
Low and Middle 
Income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Productive expenditure 0.0995  0.0401  
 (-0.0729)  (0.0721)  
Non-productive 
expenditure 
 -0.0941  -0.1861** 
  (0.0859)  (-0.0336) 
Log Initial GDP -1.7917 -2.2545 -0.3555 0.4181 
 (2.2654) (2.4618) (1.1847) (1.2681) 
Investment 0.0729 0.087 0.1921** 0.1931** 
 (-0.0590) (0.0621) (0.0603) (0.0595) 
Inflation -0.0492 -0.0487 0.0009 -0.0003 
 (0.0449) (0.0462) (0.0049) (0.0048) 
Labour force growth 0.1168 0.0868 -0.1368 -0.1053 
 (0.1342) (0.1363) (0.2502) (0.2474) 
Openness 0.0316** 0.0384** 0.0041 0.0055 
 (0.0153) (0.0156) (0.0173) (0.0183) 
Non-tax revenue -0.2060*** -0.1225* -0.0403 0.0325 
 (0.0599) (0.0640) (0.0777) (0.0764) 
Tax revenue 0.0813 0.1722* -0.2255** -0.2141** 
 (0.1060) (0.0995) (0.0902) (0.0836) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.2614*** 0.1858** 0.2632*** 0.1988*** 
 (0.0782) (0.0725) (0.0710) (0.0702) 
Constant 16.33683 19.97012 4.5377 -0.2349 
 (19.983) (21.711) (7.2153) (8.1178) 
Observations 591 591 344 344 
No of countries 37 37 22 22 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6028 0.6021 0.551 0.5691 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but 
not reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table 4.13: The level effect with five-year average  
Estimation technique: 5-year average - two-way fixed effect   
Dependent variable: Per capita growth   
  High Income Low and Middle Income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Productive expenditure 0.1465** 
 -0.084  
 (0.0695)  (0.0901)  
Non-productive 
expenditure 
 
-0.1577* 
 -0.0998 
  (0.0819)  (0.1260) 
Log Initial GDP 0.2085 -0.704 -0.5936 -0.4114 
 (1.7832) (2.0616) (0.9072) (1.085) 
Investment 0.1694*** 0.1954*** 0.1919*** 0.1910*** 
 (0.0575) (0.0635) (0.0584) (0.0570) 
Inflation -0.0558 -0.055 0.007 0.003 
 (0.0441) (0.0508) (0.0063) (0.0064) 
Labour force growth 0.2344 0.1681 -0.1837 -0.1297 
 (0.1259) (0.1268) (0.2388) (0.2412) 
Openness 0.0247* 0.0366** -0.0106 -0.011 
 (0.0155) (0.0146) (0.0137) (0.0136) 
Non-tax revenue -0.2626*** -0.1468** -0.0631 -0.0656 
 (0.0708) (0.0673) (0.0757) (0.0930) 
Tax revenue 0.0453 0.1838** -0.1058 -0.1506* 
 (0.0871) (0.0873) (0.0799) (0.0836) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.1841*** 0.0716** 0.1824* 0.1908* 
 (0.0668) (0.0673) (0.0936) (0.1197) 
Constant -5.0344 2.607754 7.8376 6.159422 
 (15.337) (18.018) (6.1693) (7.9751) 
Observations 147 147 84 84 
No of countries 37 37 22 22 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6979 0.6966 0.6274 0.628 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but 
not reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1   
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This analysis characterises the impact of fiscal policy on growth within an endogenous 
growth framework with two government spending components, productive and non-
productive. The added value of this analysis is to compare and contrast the effect of 
government expenditure on economic growth in high-income and low to middle-income 
countries over a fixed time period and a given set of measures, therefore providing 
consistency comparison. The empirical strategy applied OLS fixed effects methods to a 
panel of 59 countries during the period from 1993 to 2012. Additionally, potential biased 
problems in the relationship between growth and government structure were tackled using 
GMM system dynamic estimation techniques. A final important feature of our 
methodology is that we took into account both the sources and uses of government budget 
in assessing the effect of fiscal policy on growth. 
Consistent with those existing studies using developed country data; the findings show 
that that a shift in government expenditure towards productive government expenditure 
and away from non-productive expenditure has a positive relationship with economic 
growth. In relation to low to middle-income countries, this study finds a similar 
relationship, which runs contrary to the findings of other papers that examined developing 
countries. The popular view in the past was that low to middle-income countries lacked 
the basic infrastructure and other type of public goods and therefore increased productive 
spending may not bring increased economic growth. The average productive government 
expenditure (as a ratio of total expenditure) was 21% for nine developing countries during 
period 1970s to 1990 in the Devarajan et al. (1996) study. Furthermore, countries that 
have allocated fund towards productive spending and away from non-productive 
spending in this period have often done so for other reasons other than productivity 
considerations, and this is where the role of corruption assumes importance. As Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1997) have noticed that private companies often get contracts for large public 
investment projects by paying a “commission” to government officials. However, for this 
samples from 1990 to 2012, low to middle-income countries spent a much larger 
proportion of public spending on productive expenditure components (78% in total 
government expenditure) which helps to develop infrastructure, create innovation and 
improve labour productivity. This may have boosted GDP per capital growth and 
achieved fruitful sustained development economics during the sample period. Non-
 137 
 
productive expenditure (mainly on social protections) is found to have a negative impact 
on economic growth in our analysis, as this spending contributes to the standard of living 
for countries’ residents instead of impacting growth directly. This is especially true for 
high-income countries, which spend 39% of total government spending on non-
productive components. The empirical results show that low to middle-income countries 
have been following the approach of high-income countries in allocating government 
expenditure in favour of productive government spending at the expense of non-
productive expenditure, with the aim to enhance economic growth. However, this 
approach still depends on the size of the government. While low to middle-income 
countries have small governments (average total spending is about 26% of GDP) and tend 
to concentrate spending on productive government spending, high-income countries that 
have a large government size (40% of GDP) tend to spend more on non-productive 
government compositions. Furthermore, for high-income countries, allocating more 
expenditure to education, housing and general public services will enhance economic 
growth; meanwhile spending more on health and economics affair bring the same result 
for low to middle-income countries. It can be indicated that investment in human capital 
and quality of life issues are more important in high income countries, while basic health 
and infrastructure issues are more important in low to middle-income countries.  
In addition, as it can be seen in table 4.4 and 4.5, an increase in total government 
expenditure has a crowding out effect and thus has a negative impact on economic growth 
in both groups. Both sets of countries should not increase revenue by tax or non-tax means 
to have a greater government budget surplus (which enhances economic growth), as this 
increase would have a negative impact on economic growth. However, by reallocating 
the mix of existing spending away from non-productive forms of expenditure and towards 
productive forms, countries can move closer to a more optimum growth level. Economic 
growth is assuredly not the only criteria a government considers when deciding how to 
allocate public spending. There are other crucial elements such as employment and 
income equality that should also be considered. Even when social protection spending 
may be an obstruction to greater growth, it may help promote income equality. Even 
though the results suggest that a rise the ratio of productive from non-productive 
expenditure raises economic growth, increasing this kind of productive expenditure 
composition too much may be counter-productive.  
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The analysis also finds that the dynamic panel GMM one-step system technique shows 
that the baseline regression results do not experience the possible endogeneity biases, 
especially low to middle-income economies sample. Also, by comparing the results 
between using five-year moving averages to common five-year average, the analysis 
indicates that applying five-year moving average for all variables is the most efficient and 
reliable method to capture the impact of public spending components on long-run 
economic growth due to the macroeconomic stability in low to middle-income 
economies. 
While this analysis provides more specific insights than previous studies, this analysis 
results should still be taken with some caution, especially in relations to low and middle-
income economies. Without controlling for the efficiency of public spending, the results 
obtained above can be to some extent misleading. Chapter 5 with introduction of 
government effectiveness, bureaucracy quality and corruption indexes in the regression 
will help to expand the thesis policy recommendation. Furthermore, it is important to 
notice that, in order to draw generalisations regarding the composition of government 
spending at the country level, the analysis should be followed by additional individual 
country empirical studies which should consider country specific characteristics affecting 
the government expenditure composition as well as other determinants of growth. In 
chapter 6, this thesis will focus on the effects of government expenditure on human capital 
and its important components (education and health) on long-run economic growth in 
some low and middle-income case study countries to examine how the results change 
from country to country.
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Chapter Five 
The Impact of Corruption on Economic Growth in terms of 
Government Expenditure Compositions 
5.1 Introduction 
Corruption is a significant global social ethics problem. Due to the common perception 
that corruption is bad for economic development, both emerging market economies and 
developed countries have paid attention to the impact it has on economic growth and have 
invested resources in mitigating and controlling its effect. Over the past two decades a 
substantial volume of theoretical and empirical research has also been directed toward its 
relationship. The studies’ conclusion varies and in some cases they have conflicting 
results.  Theory suggests that corruption generates unfavourable effect on long-term 
economic growth and sustainable development. Among many defenders of this opinion 
belong much research and international organisations. For example, Mauro (1995), 
Knack and Keefer (1997), Wei (1997), Mo (2001), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), Meon 
and Sekkat (2005), Podobnik et al. (2008), Ugur (2014), Huang (2016) and Abdixhiku et 
al. (2017). Corruption has been linked to an increase of production costs, positively 
related to tax evasion, reduced national and foreign investment, inefficient allocation of 
national resources, increased inequality and poverty in the society, and uncertainty in 
decision making. On the other hand, some scholars believe that corruption can have a 
positive impact on growth. Leff (1964), Bayley (1966), Huntington (1968), Lui (1985), 
Colombatto (2003), Paul (2010), Meon and Weill (2010) and Swaleheen (2011) have 
recommended that individuals or corporations under certain circumstances may bride 
policy makers to turn around unfavourable situations caused by existing laws and 
regulation, which in turn ends up promoting economic efficiency.  
While generally accepting the impact of corruption on economic growth, the literature 
remains divided on the channels and magnitude of the direct and indirect effects. One 
channel that has received limited attention in current literature is government expenditure. 
Specifically, it is the corruption is connected with a misallocation and misappropriation 
of government expenditure components. In the previous chapter, this thesis compared and 
contrasted the impact of government expenditure components, productive and non-
productive, on economic growth in high-income and low to middle-income economies 
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during the period from 1993 to 2012, but has not yet considered the role of corruption in 
the process. Therefore, this chapter examines the effect of the composition of public 
spending on economic growth in the presence of corruption for a panel data of 37 high-
income and 20 low to middle-income countries, hence providing insights on the role that 
different levels of economic development play in moderating the level of corruption 
impact. Again, this analysis uses a 5-year moving average for all variables, instead of the 
traditional 5-year average or 5-year moving average for dependent variables, to smooth 
over some of the cyclical features of the data. The OLS two-way fixed effects and the 
dynamic panel one-step system GMM estimation are also applied to address the concerns 
of unobservable country-specific effects and endogeneity for the model. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents 
measurement of corruption and an overview of the literature on the effect of corruption 
on growth. Section 5.3 describes the model specification and discusses the data and 
specifies the econometric model and methodology. Section 5.4 reports the empirical 
estimates and links these with the analytical results. In Section 5.5, robustness tests are 
carried out on some different measurement of corruption index. Finally, Section 5.6 
concludes the results with some policy implications. 
5.2 Corruption Definition and Literature Reviews 
5.2.1 Corruption Definition and Measurements 
Corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon with multiple causes and 
effects, as it takes on various forms and functions in different contexts. The phenomenon 
of corruption can be identified from the choice of a single act of an illegal payment to the 
failure of a political and economic system. The problem of corruption can be recognised 
either as a structural problem of politics or economics, or as a cultural and individual 
moral problem (Ahmad et al., 2012). Transparency International (TI) defined corruption 
as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. In their definition, corruption can be 
classified as “grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the 
sector where it occurs” (Transparency International, 2017). Meanwhile, the World Bank 
has defined corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (World Bank, 
2005).  
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This chapter examines the corruption impact on economic growth through government 
spending allocation; therefore we will focus on the definition of on political and 
administrative corruption. The creation and implementation of government budget goes 
through wide and complex decision making management. Hence, it is highly likely that 
the decisions relating to the scope and allocation of government expenditures are more 
propitious for various kinds of corruption (Jajkowicz and Drobiszova, 2015). Delavallade 
(2006) stated that when public decisions are made during the preparation stage of the 
budget, they are called political corruption; during the execution stage of the budget it is 
referred to as another form of corruption which is administrative or bureaucratic 
corruption. Both the administrative and political corruption has a direct effect on the 
amount and allocation of government expenditure into different areas of economy. 
However, due to the aim of this thesis we consider only political corruption as it has the 
aforementioned direct effect on government expenditure allocation and therefore has 
impact on economic growth. Garamfalvi (1997) demonstrated that “political corruption 
has particularly damaging effects on the allocation of resources because it will produce 
an allocation that will be different from the one that would have been arrived at through 
a corruption free process. In other words, political corruption occurs when political 
decision makers independently, or in collusion with corrupt officials, will divert public 
resources in a way that will reduce the welfare of society or will be contrary to public 
interest”.  
The current literature on corruption commonly uses subjective measures created by 
Transparency International (TI), the World Bank (WB) and Political Risk Services (PRS). 
The TI and WB measures are composite indices based on individual surveys of 
corruption.  The PRS measure uses expert rankings by specialised institutions. It is 
commonly accepted that these measures equally reflect the frequency of corruption as 
well as its depth, and they are also highly correlated with each other (Swaleheen, 2011). 
The corruption in government index from the International Country Risk Guide (referred 
to as the ICRG index) is provided by PRS. The PRS Group which was established in 1979 
is among the earliest institution providers of political and country risk forecasts. The 
ICRG index is a measure of corruption within the political system that threatens foreign 
investment by distorting the economic and financial environment, decreasing the 
efficiency of government and business by enabling people to undertake positions of 
power through patronage rather than ability. It includes 22 variables in three 
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subcategories: political, financial and economic. A separate index is formed for each of 
subcategories. The Political Risk index is based on 100 point, Financial Risk on 50 point 
and Economic Risk on 50 point. The total point from 3 subcategories is divided by two 
to present the weights for inclusion in the composite country risk score. The score ranges 
from zero to 100 with a higher number (80 to 100 point) signifying very low risk. 
Corruption index is measured as part of Political index and ranges from zero to six with 
a higher number meaning lower corruption.  
TI has published a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) every year since 1995. Each 
year TI rates up to 176 countries on how corrupted their public sectors appear to be. The 
measure ranks countries from zero to ten points during period 1995 to 2011, with a score 
of zero representing the highest corruption. Since 2012 the countries have been ranked 
on a scale 0 to 100. The lower-ranked countries in CPI index are plagued by 
untrustworthy and badly functioning public institutions like the police and judiciary. Even 
where anti-corruption laws are on the books, in practice they are often skirted or ignored. 
Whereas, higher-ranked countries tend to have higher degrees of press freedom, access 
to information about public expenditure, stronger standards of integrity for public 
officials, and independent judicial systems (International Transparency, 2017).  
Lastly, the WB provides a World Governance Indicator (WGI) report. This indicator 
summarises a variety of individual indicators for 212 countries in a total of 6 
subcategories of governance. These categories are voice and accountability, political 
stability, absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption. Individual sources of data based on which are the summary 
indexes from wide number of various researchers of private, non-profit organisations and 
international organisation (Hashem, 2014). The World Bank control of corruption index 
is based on the corruption perceptions of firms’ manager and interpreted as indicating the 
extent to which public power is executed for private gain (D’Agostino et al., 2016). The 
indicator values ranges from a zero to 100, with zero being a non-corrupted country. 
However, these data are only available in limited timeframe (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 
until now) and Ugur (2014) on a meta-analysis recognises that ICRG and TI corruption 
data used more heavily compared to WGI and other corruption data sources. Therefore, 
it will not be used for the purpose of this analysis as it does not provide the data continuity. 
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5.2.2 Corruption and Economic Growth 
Empirical literature in the field has most consistently reported a negative relationship 
between growth and level of corruption. Since Mauro (1995), it is acknowledged that 
severe corruption significantly hinders investment and economic growth. In his paper, 
Mauro brought together indices on corruption and institutional efficiency and found that 
corruption decreases private investment and thereby economic growth. Tanzi (1998) and 
Rose-Ackerman (1999) found that corruption has a negative effect on nation’s 
competitiveness by not only lowering financial investment and economic growth, but also 
causing imbalanced expenditures and poorly allocated national resources. Corruption 
reduces tax revenues for the government due to tax evasion and to the emergence of the 
underground economy by rent-seeking activities (Lambsdorff, 2006). Tax evasion causes 
a decrease in public investment capacity and in public sector productivity (Jain, 1998 and 
Tanzi, 1995). Corruption also affects international investment by inducing less FDI flows 
into the economy (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). Moreover, it increases inflation (Ben Ali 
and Sassi, 2016), reduces investment (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002), positively associates 
with tax evasion (Abdixhiku et al., 2017), demotivates entrepreneurial activities (Bui et 
al., 2018) and diverts it away from productive activities (United Nations Development 
Program, 2008), deepens income inequality and poverty (Gupta et al., 2002) and weakens 
public sector quality (Lambsdorff, 2006). More recently, Ugur (2014) with a meta-
analysis that takes into account 327 estimates of the direct impact of corruption on growth 
from 29 primary studies and found that those studies are likely to report negative effects 
on growth even though they are using different measures of corruption and growth, 
estimation methods, country coverage, and sample periods. 
Although most empirical research agree that corruption negatively influences 
economic growth, there are still some researchers believe that corruption have a positive 
impact. Leff (1964), Bayley (1966) and Huntington (1968) believed that corruption may 
“grease in the wheel” by enabling economic agents to engage in beneficial activities that 
may be otherwise unfeasible because of high levels of bureaucratic hold-ups in highly-
regulated countries. Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) used the theoretical model to suggest 
that while the optimal level of corruption may be relatively low, it exists due to a cost of 
anti-corruption efforts itself. Colombatto (2003) found that in certain developing 
countries or totalitarian countries, corruption helps eliminate certain factors which 
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obstruct economic development. Meon and Weill (2010) stated that corruption has regime 
specific effects on growth, meaning a detrimental effect of corruption in economies with 
effective institutions but a positive relationship between corruption and efficiency in 
economies when institutions are ineffective. 
While not denying that corruption may have a positive effect at particular times in 
specific countries, however the main findings of theoretical and empirical literatures have 
been that corruption leads to lower growth, weakens both private and public investment 
spending and inhibits the efficiency of public services. Furthermore, it is worth noting 
that the cost of corruption for countries is different depending on their level of 
development and on surges in their national incomes. At the early stages of development, 
income is rather limited and so is the level of corruption. As income increases, corruption 
increases. However, as a country reaches a certain level of development, high income 
levels increase corruption’s costs in the way that corruption is considerably dissuaded 
(Saha and Gounder, 2013).  
While generally accepting the negative impacts of corruption on growth, the literature 
still remains divided on the channels and sizes the direct and indirect effects. The impact 
of corruption on certain components of government expenditure is vital and this provides 
a link between how the effects of the composition of government expenditure on growth 
can be related with corruption. Mauro (1996, 1998) represented the first cross-country 
evidence that corruption has an effect on the composition of government spending. His 
studies examined the relationship between corruption and government expenditure 
compositions by using a sample of 100 countries in period from 1970 to 1985. His 
research presented evidence that government expenditure on education as a ratio to GDP 
has a negative and significant associated with corruption. In his conclusion, corruption 
misleads government spending away from high-productivity areas, such as education and 
health toward other areas which are less productivity promoting (large-scale 
infrastructure and defence). Similar to Mauro’s research, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) 
showed that corruption can reduce economic growth by increasing public investment 
while quality of this investment tends to fall. The authors came to a conclusion that 
corruption distorts public expenditure to where brides are easiest to collect, implying a 
diversion of government expenditure compositions towards low-productivity areas at the 
expense of growth-promoting projects. They also state that corruption can reduce 
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economic growth by lowering government revenue needed to finance productive 
government expenditure.  
Delavallade (2006) examined the effect of corruption on the structure of government 
expenditure by different sectors. The author addressed the issue of which public spending 
sectors are favoured by corruption and which are hindered. The paper found that 
corruption seems to deform the structure of public expenditure in the areas of defence, 
fuel and energy, culture and public service and order, at the expense of social areas 
(education, health and social protection). In the similar vein, Hessami (2010) analysed 
the impact of corruption on the composition of public spending. The research concludes 
that the percentages of spending on health and environment protection increases with 
higher levels of corruption, while the percentages of spending on social protection and 
recreation, culture and religion decreases with an increase in corruption. Another 
conclusion from this author is that a distortion in the allocation of public expenditures 
leads to a failure of the government in fulfilling its objective and it affects economic 
growth.  
Hashem (2014) and Jajkowicz and Drobiszova (2015) used different sets of countries, 
but their conclusions have reached the same point, that higher levels of corruption distort 
the structure of government expenditure in favour of defence and general public service, 
whereas the proportion of spending on education, health, recreation, culture and religion 
decrease. Again, Hague and Kneller (2015) focus their study on analysing empirically the 
impact of public investment (productive government expenditure) on economic growth 
which is influenced by the presence of corruption in an economy. Their research is one 
of very few to combine three different literatures on corruption and growth, public 
investment and growth and corruption and public investment to capture the impact of one 
on the other. The study concludes that the countries with lower level of corruption (a 
score of less than 4 in ICRG) can have significant efficient return on public investment 
so that it raises growth. Meanwhile, for highly corrupted countries (a score of 4 or above) 
the returns from productive government expenditure are reduced by the presence of 
corrupt agents in the economy and therefore productive government expenditure fails to 
create higher economic growth. Furthermore, they also suggest that corruption has an 
indirect negative impact on growth through decreasing private investment. 
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Furthermore, in addressing the effects of corruption, with few exceptions, majority of 
the empirical studies have investigated various country case-studies and/or regions but 
cross-sectional comparative analysis have been lacking. Saha and Gounder (2013) 
examined the relationship between corruption and economic development by using data 
covering 100 countries and income classification for the period 1995 to 2008. They found 
that there is a cost involved in reducing corruption. Reducing corruption is mostly 
dependent on the building of a sound institutional framework of a country that can combat 
corruption effectively. However, a low level of income does not provide enough support 
to build the institutional structures in low-income countries and that makes the cost of 
reducing corruption very high. On the other hand, middle-income countries are more of 
a transitional stage that provokes a high level of corruption. As when income level is 
moderately high, it can enhance corrupt activities by transferring resources to the non-
productive sectors. But at the mature stages of development, a very high level of income 
makes it possible to build the institutional foundation and thereby increases the efficacy 
of anticorruption reform and the cost of getting caught while corrupt and punished. This 
raises some questions, such as, how the levels of country’s economic development affect 
corruption?, and do the growth effects of government expenditure compositions in the 
presence of corruption differ between high-income and low to middle-income 
economies? 
Overall, in the line of research, there exists empirical evidence to suggest that 
corruption not only has an effect on economic growth, but also is associated with a 
misallocation and misappropriation of government expenditure components. However, 
little attention has been given to the relationship between the composition of government 
expenditure and economic growth in the presence of corruption and the role that differing 
levels of economic development play in this relationship. Therefore, this chapter will 
focus on examining the impact of the composition of government expenditure (productive 
and non-productive government spending) on long-run economic growth in the presence 
of corruption, with particular attention on comparing high-income and low to middle-
income countries.  
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5.3 Model specification, Data and Methodology 
5.3.1 The Analytical Framework 
In this section, we modify the model of fiscal policy and growth developed in chapter 
4, section 4.2 to include corruption variable, which affects government expenditure 
compositions. The aggregate production function (y) has three arguments: private capital 
k, and two types of government expenditures g1 (productive) and g2 (non-productive): 
𝑦 = [𝛼𝑘−𝜁 + 𝛽(1 − 𝛿1)𝑔1
−𝜁
+  𝛾(1 − 𝛿2)𝑔2
−𝜁
]
−1 𝜁⁄
    (5.1) 
Where 𝛼 > 0;  𝛽(1 − 𝛿1), 𝛾(1 − 𝛿2) ≥ 0;  𝛼 + 𝛽(1 − 𝛿1) + 𝛾(1 − 𝛿2) = 1;  𝜁 ≥
−1 
In this specification, we define 𝛽 and 𝛾as the “pure” productivity parameters related 
with two types of government expenditure. In another way, the “net” productivity of 
public spending is given by 𝛽(1 − 𝛿1) and 𝛾(1 − 𝛿2) respectively when corruption 
distorts the effect of public spending on output. Corruption in this circumstance is like a 
leakage that decreases the returns to government investment and drives a wedge between 
the growth rate that society could have achieved in its absence, and what it actually 
achieves (Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2007). Higher level of corruption in g1 or g2 is captured 
by a higher value of 𝛿1 or 𝛿2, and the corruption parameter is bounded between 0 and 1. 
There is no difference between the pure and net productivities in an absence of corruption. 
The corruption parameter is 0 <  𝛿1, 𝛿2  < 1, as activities like bride-taking reward costs 
of procurement of public goods and procurement of low-quality products, which typically 
decrease the productivity of the goods purchased by bureaucrats and hinder growth. 
However, as it has been noticed in the literature review section above that corruption may 
have a positive impact on economic growth through the avoidance of bureaucratic delays 
and red-tape in getting things done more efficiently in some situations. Despite stating 
the range of 𝛿1, 𝛿2as we have here, we will investigate in the empirical section whether it 
is possible for corruption to increase economic growth rate. 
The rest of set-up for theoretical framework model is similar to section 4.2 in chapter 4. 
The relationship between long-run growth rate, λ, and the share of government spending 
devoted to g1: 
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𝑑𝜆
𝑑𝜙
=
𝛼(1−𝜏)(1+𝜁)(𝛼𝜏𝜁)−(1+𝜁) 𝜁⁄ [𝛽(1− 𝛿1)𝜙
−(1+𝜁)−𝛾(1− 𝛿2)(1−𝜙)
−(1+𝜁)]
𝜎[𝜏𝜁−𝛽𝜙−𝜁−𝛾(1−𝜙)−𝜁]−1 𝜁⁄
   (5.2) 
Both forms of government expenditure have an impact on the rate of growth through 
the marginal production of capital; however their relative influence varies upon the 
relative productivity of g1 and g2, and their relative budget shares, ∅ and(1 − ∅). In the 
special case of Cobb-Douglas technology (𝜉 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃 = 1), the condition for the two 
types of government expenditure to be at its optimum is: 
∅
1−∅
=
𝛽(1− 𝛿1) 
𝛾(1− 𝛿2)
         (5.3) 
5.3.2 Data and Choices of Variables 
The empirical analysis used panel data on 37 high-income and 20 low to middle-
income countries covering the period from 1993 to 2012 (list of countries can be seen in 
Appendix C). The list of 37 high-income economies is similar to analysis in chapter 4, 
while we take out 2 countries (Nepal and Mauritius) in the list of low to middle-income 
countries as there is limited information about corruption in these countries. The 
classification of high and middle to low-income countries is based on the World Bank’s 
classification using gross national income per capita. The fiscal variables for productive, 
non-productive government expenditure and tax, non-tax revenue are collected from 
IMF’s GFS and are subject to availability for each country. Other variables (without 
corruption variables) are attained from World Bank’s Development Indicators (WDI). 
One variable of main interest in this empirical exercise is corruption. The data for 
corruption indices are obtained from ICRG. There are some critical points in using the 
ICRG index as a measure of corruption. First of all, the ICRG index strictly measures the 
risk to political stability owing to corruption, not corruption itself. Secondly, the index is 
gathered for foreign investors by non-resident country experts and measures only 
corruption that threatens foreign investment rather than corruption faced by all firms, 
foreign and domestic. Finally, the ICRG scores may lag the major events they seek to 
measure and therefore may be an inaccurate reflection of current situations (William and 
Siddique, 2008). However, although the ICRG index is not a direct measure on 
corruption, it is still a trusted proxy of corruption under the sensible assumptions that: (1) 
the risk of political uncertainty to foreign investor owing to corruption increases linearly 
with the incidence of corruption in the country, (2) corrupt bureaucrats make no 
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difference at the margin between foreign and domestic firm when it comes to taking 
bribes, and (3) the experts apply the same range of information for all countries when 
considering country risks (Swaleheen, 2011). Moreover, the problem of inaccurate 
measure of current corruption by using the ICRG index is solved in this chapter if long-
run averages are used (a five-year moving average of the ICRG index in place of the 
annual ICRG index).  
In the ICRG index, higher corruption score implies that “high government officials are 
likely to demand special payments” and “illegal payments are generally expected 
throughout lower levels of government” in the forms of “brides connected with import 
and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, police protection, or loan”. The 
ICRG index ranges from zero to six with a high number denoting lower corruption. As 
the 𝛿 in our theoretical model ranges between 0 and 1, and is a positive function of 
corruption, we have rescaled the index as 0 to the least corrupt category and 6 to the most 
corrupt category, and used a scale conversion to transform the numbers to be within the 
0 to 1 range.  
This analysis uses the TI’s CPI index to check for the robustness of the estimation 
using ICRG index. The CPI is a composite index based on individual surveys among 
international business people, risk analysts, local residents and expatriates. It ranges from 
zero to ten with a score of ten signifying the least corruption for the period 1995 to 2011. 
Since 2012 the countries have been ranked on a scale 0 to 100. The index is rescaled as 
Corr = 10 – CPI (in case of 2012, corr = 100 – CPI), so that a high score means that 
corruption is perceived to be high. The usefulness of the CPI index in year-to-year 
comparisons has been questioned by many researchers (William and Siddique, 2008) as 
the set of countries covered by the index has changed over time when new countries have 
been added. The addition of new data sources has improved the accuracy of the CPI index, 
but it can disturb the continuity of this index. Lambsdorff (1999) pointed out that the 
problem of designing the CPI index is similar to the problem of the price index for a 
basket of goods when the compositions of the basket has been changing. However, a study 
of Lambsdorff (2004) stated that the impact of a changing sample and methodology on 
the continuity of the CPI seems to be small, especially looking at the long-term trend. It 
is generally accepted that these measures equally reflect the frequency of corruption as 
well as its depth (Swaleheen, 2011). 
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Based on our data and availability of CPI index for these countries, the test examines 
a panel data of 50 countries (32 high-income and 18 low to middle-income countries) 
during period 1998 to 2012 (list of countries for this robustness test is described in 
Appendix D). 
In contrast to Ghosh and Gregoriou (2010)’s study where they assume there is no 
corruption in non-productive government expenditure and whatever corruption there is in 
the economy can be solely attributed to productive spending, this chapter assumes that 
corruption applies to both productive and non-productive government expenditure as it 
fits rather well with reality. Since 𝛿 is the corruption index, which denotes a higher value 
corresponding to higher corruption, 𝛿. 𝑔 is an interaction term that presents the impact of 
government expenditure composition on growth with presence of corruption. Hence, the 
term (1 − 𝛿). 𝑔 is the productivity of government expenditure composition net of 
corruption. In this set-up, we first examine the impact of (1 − 𝛿). 𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 and 
(1 − 𝛿). 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜 on the economic growth rate for high-income and low to middle-income 
economies, then compare these coefficients of the modified equations with the original 
coefficients of 𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 and 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜 in chapter 4. The idea is that if the (1 − 𝛿). 𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 
coefficient turns out to be smaller than 𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 coefficient, this implies that the pure 
productivity effect of this productive government spending exceeds the productivity of 
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 net of corruption. In other words, corruption has a negative impact on economic 
growth in the situation of 𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜. The same explanation is used for 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜.  
The first set of regression model specification for capturing the relationship between 
productive government expenditure and economic growth in the presence of corruption 
is:  
𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 +  𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 (
(1−𝛿)𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾1 (
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +
𝛾2 (
𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾3 (
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) + ∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡     (5.4) 
The second set of regression of model specification for capturing the non-productive 
expenditure: 
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𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 +  𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 (
(1−𝛿)𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾1 (
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +
𝛾2 (
𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾3 (
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) + ∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡       (5.5) 
where i and t denote the cross-sectional and time series dimensions respectively; capture 
the time-invariant unobserved country-specific fixed effects, and capture the unobserved 
individual-invariant time effects. G is the per capita real GDP growth rate, Git−1is first 
lagged of growth variable is introduced for applying dynamic panel GMM techniques. 
gpro, gnonpro are productive and non-productive expenditure as a proportion of total 
government spending. y is GDP, TR is tax revenue, NTR is non-tax revenue and (Def or 
sur) is budget surplus or deficit. Iilt is a vector of non-fiscal independent variables (initial 
of GDP per capita, inflation, labour force growth, investment and openness variables 
capture the inter-national dimension).  
5.3.3 Methodology 
Similar to methodology has been used in chapter 4, this section uses two-way OLS 
fixed effects which control time-invariant individual country characteristics and time 
fixed effect as the main method of estimation to capture the long-run relationship of 
economic growth to fiscal variables in the presence of corruption. This technique 
addresses the common concern of excluding unobservable country-specific effects in 
panel data estimation. Furthermore, dealing with the endogeneity and simultaneity 
aspects of our model, this analysis also applies the dynamic panel one-step system GMM 
estimation. The advantages of using this technique have been mentioned in methodology 
chapter and the impact of government expenditure on economic growth chapter. Also, 
this analysis uses five-year forward moving averages for all variable as it can remove 
business cycle effects, increase the number of time series observation in our panel data, 
minimise the reverse causality argument holding in our model and account for 
endogeneity. 
Table 5.1 lays out the descriptive statistics about corruption and development using 
the World Bank’s income classification of countries together with the corruption index 
from ICRG for the period from 1993 to 2012 and from CPI for the period from 1998 to 
2012. 
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Table 5.1: Corruption across countries 
  
Low 
Income 
Lower-
middle 
Income 
Upper-
middle 
Income 
High 
Income 
ICRG 
index 
No of countries 2 8 10 37 
Mean 1.97 2.52 2.73 4.19 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.65 0.72 1.09 1.16 
Range of index 0.50 - 3.46 1.00 - 4.00 1.00 - 5.00 2.00 - 6.00 
CPI 
index 
No of countries 2 7 9 32 
Mean 2.43 2.78 4.25 7.12 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.44 0.444 0.803 1.925 
Range of index 1.90 - 3.50 1.70 - 3.70 2.60 - 5.70 2.70 - 10.00 
 
It can be seen that a compelling feature of the data is the higher corruption rating of 
poor countries than rich countries throughout the period. This is indicative of the negative 
relationship between corruption and development that has been reported in many 
empirical researches (Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; 
Campos et al., 2010; and Ugur, 2014). Another notable feature is the much greater 
diversity in corruption score range among middle-income and high-income economies. 
For ICRG index in high-income economies classification, there are number of countries 
which have the corruption level score less than 3.5 average score during period from 1993 
to 2012 (Bahrain, Croatia, Latvia, Oman, Czech, Estonia, Greece, Italy, South Korea, 
Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia). The reasons for higher corruption rating of these 
countries are that some of them have transferred from transition economies to developed 
economies (such as Estonia, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia); or have a long 
history of corruption (for example, Greece, Italy and South Korea). The foregoing 
observations on middle-income countries’ higher corruption index can be explained as 
following: below some critical level of capital, there is a low-development regime that 
displays a unique equilibrium in which the incidence of corruption is high; above some 
other critical level of capital, there is a high-development regime that displays a unique 
equilibrium in which  the incidence of corruption is low; and in between the two 
thresholds, there is an intermediate-development regime that present both types of 
equilibriums (Blackburn et al., 2011). Therefore, it explains why corruption is not only 
higher in low-income countries than high-income countries, but also more varied among 
middle-income countries. From this point of view, this thesis tried to classify our 
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countries sample based on ICRG average score index to test the relationship between 
government spending components and economic in term of corruption classification. The 
result shows that for those countries with lower corruption, the effects of government 
expenditure compositions on growth rate are consistent with high-income economies in 
the main result. Meanwhile, the result presents to be an insignificant impact of 
government spending components on economic growth for those countries with higher 
corruption index as these countries group has mixed up all three different kinds of income 
categories (low-income, middle-income and high-income) and therefore this section will 
not report these results. (The results for this test and the explanations for the insignificant 
impact of higher corruption index group on economic growth are described in Appendix 
E). 
The annual average of CPI for low and middle-income country averages ranges from 
1.70 to 5.70, while its high-income country varies between 2.70 to 10.00. Again, it can 
be seen that the descriptive statistics for CPI are similar results with descriptive statistics 
for ICRG. For the correlation matrix between variables with presence of corruption 
variable, it has been described in Appendix F. 
5.4 Empirical Results 
Table 5.2 represents the effect of productive and non-productive government spending 
on economic growth in high-income countries by using a two-way fixed effects method 
with two different corruption measure resources. It also shows the impact of corruption 
by comparing models with and without corruption included in government spending 
compositions (productive and non-productive). In term of using ICRG measure, the set 
of data is similar to the main results’ analyses for high-income economies in chapter 4 
when we excluded the influence of corruption on government spending compositions. A 
percentage point increase in the ratio of productive spending to total government 
expenditure will increase real GDP per capita growth by 0.051 percentage point, while 
one percentage point increase in the ratio of non-productive spending to total government 
expenditure will decrease real GDP per capita growth by 0.050 percentage point. 
Comparing these results with presence of corruption as a component of government 
expenditure, the coefficient on (1 − 𝛿). 𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 and (1 − 𝛿). 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜is 0.047 and -0.045 
respectively. It can be seen that the corruption-adjusted coefficient of productive 
expenditure is still positive, but the growth benefits of its spending turn out to be lower 
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which shows that corruption is bad in the context of the productivity of productive 
expenditure. In term of non-productive government spending, the corruption-adjusted 
coefficient of this expenditure is again negative and significant but is not as negative as 
when did not take into account corruption. However, the effect size of corruption on both 
government expenditure compositions is very small (the impact of corruption on 
economic growth in both cases is, 𝛿𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 ≈ 𝛿𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜 and roughly 0.004 percentage 
point). Furthermore, this thesis also run a robustness test to check whether the coefficients 
of interested variables (productive and non-productive government expenditure) are 
significant different between before and after including corruption adjustment. The test 
name is “seemingly unrelated estimation” which was developed by Weesie (1999) to 
examine whether some relationship between the estimators holds either on different 
datasets, on overlapping datasets, or on the same dataset. Such a hypothesis is often that 
the coefficients estimated by one estimator are equal to the coefficients estimated by the 
other estimator. The results have shown that the coefficients are not significant different 
from each other (the results have been reported in Appendix X).  
The same result is found using the CPI index in table 5.2. A unit increase in the ratio 
of productive government expenditure without corruption influence on total government 
spending increases real GDP per capita by 0.16 percentage points in high-income 
economies. It implies that greater weight of productive expenditure could contribute to a 
more positive impact on economic growth in OECD countries as five countries eliminate 
from the high-income sample group are Bahamas, Bahrain, Cyprus, Malta and Oman. 
Comparing the corruption-adjusted coefficient of productive government spending, the 
analysis finds that productive public spending still has a positive impact and it provides 
higher positive effects on economic growth than when we did not take into account 
corruption. The net impact of corruption in productive government expenditure (the 
𝛿𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 term) is 0.004. This result is opposed to ICRG’s result. Meanwhile, the coefficient 
on non-productive government expenditure without corruption presence is negative and 
significant (-0.16). The corruption-adjusted coefficient of non-productive spending is 
again negative and it is more negative than that we did not take into account corruption 
for high-income countries. The test for the difference between coefficients of productive 
and non-productive before and after using CPI corruption index shows that they are 
significant different to each other (Appendix I). 
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 Table 5.2: Contribution of productive and non-productive spending to growth in high-income countries (with and without 
corruption) 
Estimation technique: 5 years moving average - two-way Fixed Effects - High Income countries     
Dependent variable: Per capita growth         
  ICRG Index CPI Index 
  Without Corruption With Corruption Without Corruption With Corruption 
Productive expenditure 0.0507*   0.0471*   0.1551**   0.1590**  
  (0.0282)   (0.0141)   (0.0686)   (0.0692)  
Non-Productive 
expenditure   -0.0498*  -0.0448***   -0.1579**  -0.1699** 
    (0.0307)  (0.0148)   (0.0690)  (0.0707) 
Log Initial GDP -2.6191 -2.5341 -1.9593 -1.9126 -5.427313 -5.412151 -5.6627 -5.2176* 
  (2.4902) (2.5067) (2.4129) (2.5067) (3.4296) (3.4497) (3.4310) (3.3996) 
Investment 0.0936* 0.0935* 0.0973* 0.0955** 0.2756** 0.2829** 0.2738** 0.2857** 
  (0.0595) (0.0601) (0.063) (0.0619) (0.1322) (0.1313) (0.1329) (0.1313) 
Inflation -0.044 -0.0442 -0.0613 -0.0592 -0.2075** -0.2139** -0.2045** -0.2182** 
  (0.0445) (0.0449) (0.046) (0.0424) (0.1019) (0.1010) (0.1017) (0.0997) 
Labour force growth 0.0963 0.0935 0.1351 0.1343 0.0868 0.067497 0.0948 0.0598 
  (0.1332) (0.1342) (0.1248) (0.1342) (0.3160) (0.3162) (0.3160) (0.3136) 
Openness 0.0424*** 0.0415*** 0.0409*** 0.0398*** 0.0545** 0.0561** 0.0539** 0.0570** 
  (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0270) (0.0270) 
Non-tax revenue -0.1465*** -0.1476*** -0.1510** -0.1536*** -0.3082** -0.3114** -0.3104** -0.3237** 
  (0.0529) (0.0532) (0.0563) (0.0532) (0.1413) (0.1407) (0.1398) (0.1401) 
Tax revenue 0.1359 0.1339 0.1244 0.1239 -0.131521 -0.1269 -0.1363 -0.1218 
  (0.0978) (0.0984) (0.0995) (0.0984) (0.1899) (0.1938) (0.1880) (0.1930) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.2053*** 0.2060*** 0.2025*** 0.2027*** 0.2188** 0.2186** 0.2195** 0.2165** 
  (0.0644) (0.065) (0.0148) (0.065) (0.0912) (0.0910) (0.0914) (0.0901) 
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Constant 3.524 24.1057 13.734 18.0328 45.18802 60.33997 47.829 58.5966 
  (1.5661) (2.894) (20.946) (8.124) (30.9871) (33.4411) (30.8215) (32.9154) 
Observations 591 591 583 583 351 351 351 351 
No of countries 37 37 37 37 32 32 32 32 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6077 0.6077 0.6104 0.6089 0.7063 0.7077 0.7063 0.7103 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but not reported   
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1               
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So, these empirical results for high-income economies suggest that the presence of 
corruption in productive and non-productive expenditure may or may not have an impact 
on economic growth depending on corruption index. However if it has, its impact is rather 
small. In term of ICRG index, a change in the expenditure mix towards productive forms 
of expenditure and away from non-productive forms of expenditure still enhances growth 
but the growth benefit is lower in presence of corruption. On the other hand, the growth 
benefit of a change toward productive forms of expenditure from non-productive forms 
is higher in associated with corruption in case of CPI index. The reason is that dissimilar 
ranges of corruption indexes (from zero to six for ICRG and from zero to ten for CPI), 
which reduce the share of total expenditure to productive and non-productive components 
differently, and different high-income countries group covered explain this difference 
result. Therefore, it implies that shifting more how much percentages on productive 
government expenditure from non-productive government expenditure to achieve higher 
economic growth is not an easy question for policymaker. It would be interesting to see 
how the growth effects of government expenditure compositions change with the 
presence of corruption in low to middle-income economies compared with high-income 
economies.   
Table 5.3 repeats the result of table 5.2, but for low to middle-income economies. It 
can be seen from table 5.3 that in the bench case, productive government expenditure still 
has a positive and significant impact on economic growth when the effect of corruption 
is included (with a coefficient of 0.050) in term of using ICRG index. When its effect is 
netted out, the growth benefit of productive spending surprisingly turn out to be lower 
(the coefficient becomes 0.045, but the effect is rather small (the difference in this case, 
𝛿𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 = 0.005). The test for the difference between coefficients of productive when the 
effect of corruption is included or netted out is significant different to each other 
(Appendix I). A similar result finds in case of non-productive government spending for 
low to middle-income countries data. There is a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between the corruption-adjusted coefficient of non-productive spending and 
economic growth (-0.037), but it is not as negative as when to remove the effect of 
corruption in the regression (-0.038). So, netting out the effect of corruption in non-
productive spending do not provide better outlook for this spending on growth even this 
effect is really small (𝛿𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜 = 0.001). Also, there is no difference between two 
coefficients of this variable (Appendix I). It can be seen that the effect of corruption in 
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non-productive government expenditure for high-income and low to middle-income 
economies sub-groups are similar where its effect reduces the negative impact of non-
productive spending on economic growth.  The difference with the previous (high-income 
countries) result for productive government expenditure is that low to middle-income 
countries spend roughly 78% of total government spending on productive spending, while 
high-income countries spend approximately 61% of total government expenditure on 
productive components. Remembering that with a negative effect of total government 
spending on growth, it is important for governments to reallocate government expenditure 
in a more optimal way and thereby a change in the expenditure mix towards productive 
forms of expenditure and away from non-productive forms of expenditure enhances 
economic growth rate (chapter 4). However, it has been mentioned by Devarajan et al. 
(1996) that a shift in favour of an objectively more productive type of expenditure may 
not raise the growth rate if its initial share is too high. It is correct for the case of low to 
middle-income sample as these countries may currently spend too much public spending 
on productive components, therefore with presence of corruption it implies that a decrease 
percentage of productive spending based on ICRG index can create greater growth benefit 
of this spending.  
The corruption-adjusted coefficient of productive spending is still positive and it 
provides higher positive effects on economic growth than when the research did not take 
into account corruption for low to middle-income countries when using CPI index. The 
net impact of corruption in productive government expenditure (the 𝛿𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 term) is 0.002. 
The result is the same when using ICRG index. Whereas, the corruption-adjusted 
coefficient of non-productive spending is again negative and it is more negative than that 
the analysis did not take into account corruption. The net impact of corruption in non-
productive government expenditure for low to middle-income economies (the 𝛿𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜 
term) is -0.005 respectively. Once again, the corruption-adjusted coefficients of 
productive and non-productive expenditures when using CPI index show that low to 
middle-income economies may have too high initial share on productive government 
spending. Although shifting the mix of spending way from non-productive forms of 
expenditure and towards productive forms, low to middle-income countries can achieve 
higher economic growth level, but reducing the share of productive spending can even 
have a greater economic benefit. Both ICRG and CPI indexes show the same results for 
low to middle-income countries. 
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Table 5.3: Contribution of productive and non-productive spending to growth in low to middle-income countries (with and without 
corruption) 
Estimation technique: 5 years moving average - two way Fixed Effects - Low to Middle Income     
Dependent variable: Per capita growth                
  ICRG Index CPI Index 
  Without Corruption With Corruption Without Corruption With Corruption 
Productive expenditure 0.0448*   0.0499*   0.0552*   0.0572*  
  (0.0294)   (0.0299)   (0.0295)   (0.0312)  
Non-Productive expenditure   -0.0383**  -0.0375*   -0.0519*  -0.0571* 
    (0.0195)  (0.0202)   (0.0287)  (0.0308) 
Log Initial GDP -0.2191 -0.202 -0.2121 -0.2253 1.251734 1.378371 1.2842 1.381505 
  (1.4092) (0.9759) (1.3205) (0.9776) (1.4431) (1.4408) (1.4427) (1.4401) 
Investment 0.1988*** 0.1955*** 0.1979*** 0.1956*** 0.1739*** 0.1727*** 0.1718*** 0.1729*** 
  (0.0661) (0.0287) (0.0661) (0.0287) (0.0458) (0.0459) (0.0460) (0.0459) 
Inflation 0.002 0.0022 0.0017 0.0024 0.1152*** 0.1150*** 0.1158*** 0.1148*** 
  (0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0066) (0.0033) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0198) 
Labour force growth -0.1558 -0.1581* -0.152 -0.1602* 0.2509* 0.2619* 0.2508* 0.2657* 
  (0.2576) (0.0892) (0.2565) (0.0893) (0.1471) (0.1490) (0.1474) (0.1493) 
Openness -0.0048 -0.0052 -0.0048 -0.0054 -0.0643*** -0.0632*** -0.0641*** -0.0632*** 
  (0.0169) (0.0078) (0.0169) (0.0078) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0108) 
Non-tax revenue -0.0366 -0.0413 -0.0345 -0.0427 -0.05295 -0.05453 -0.05412 -0.05338 
  (0.0729) (0.0503) (0.0727) (0.0503) (0.0657) (0.0657) (0.0657) (0.0657) 
Tax revenue -0.1909* -0.1911*** -0.1912** -0.1898*** -0.02467 -0.03361 -0.02796 -0.03256 
  (0.0872) (0.0551) (0.0852) (0.0552) (0.0817) (0.0819) (0.0817) (0.0818) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.2462*** 0.2523*** 0.2435*** 0.2538*** 0.2477*** 0.2560*** 0.2498*** 0.2545*** 
  (0.0635) (0.0444) (0.0642) (0.0444) (0.0651) (0.0636) (0.0649) (0.0637) 
Constant 0.5811 5.0042 0.2187 5.1487 -9.97836 -5.31861 -9.97703 -5.34162 
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  (10.4606) (6.6803) (10.4606) (6.6911) (10.193) (10.059) (10.205) (10.052) 
Observations 312 312 312 312 195 195 195 195 
No of countries 20 20 20 20 18 18 18 18 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6026 0.6004 0.6043 0.5997 0.6383 0.6378 0.638 0.6382 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but not reported     
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1               
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The test for the difference between coefficients of productive and non-productive 
before and after using CPI corruption index shows that they are significant different to 
each other (Appendix I). 
Turning our attention to the other explanatory variables affecting the economic growth 
rate, the results are similar to the main empirical results’ analyses in chapter 4. 
Concerning the budget constraint variables, there is a positive and significant relationship 
between the budget surplus or deficit variable and economic growth in all regressions. 
The results find that the tax revenue variable in low to middle-income countries has a 
negative and significant impact on economic growth for both scenarios with the effect of 
corruption or without. The same result is found for non-tax revenue variables in high-
income countries dataset. The positive coefficient attached to investment for two groups 
and both scenarios follows standard economic theory, in which an increase in the 
investment will result in greater production. The openness variable in terms of trade is 
normally positive for low and middle-income countries since trade is assumed to be 
growth-enhancing, but it is observed that no relationship between them for low to middle-
income sample (similar to Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2007). However, in the sample of high-
income economies, international trade has a positive and significant impact on economic 
growth. Other variables with effect of corruption are insignificant and have the same 
results as when we remove the effect of corruption out of regressions. For other 
explanatory variables measuring by CPI, the coefficients of those variables are similar to 
the main results in part 4.3, except inflation and openness variables. Inflation has negative 
and significant impact on economic growth in high-income economies, while a positive 
and significant effect has been found in case of low to middle-income economies. Similar 
results have been obtained by openness variable. Also, labour force growth variable 
shows a positive relationship with economic growth for low to middle-income countries 
during the period 1998 to 2012. 
In sum, by comparing the corruption-adjusted coefficient of productive and non-
productive government expenditure for both low to middle-income and high-income 
economies, there is no evidence that corruption has a marked impact on the strength 
relationship between government expenditure, whether in from of productive or non-
productive, and economic growth. These findings do not discount the possibility of 
corruption affecting growth through other means. For example, through altering the 
division of total government expenditure between productive and non-productive types. 
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It also implies that low to middle-income economies may have a high initial share on 
productive government spending components and a shift in favour of an objectively more 
productive type of expenditure may not move closer to a more optimum growth level. 
The difference in using ICRG and CPI has been explained by Ugur (2014) in which he 
mentions that corruption’s adverse effect is reduced when the underlying primary-study 
estimates are based on ICRG corruption data. Unlike, other corruption data sources, 
ICRG data is market-tested as it is financed by users (mainly international investors and 
business managers) who would be willing to pay a fee only if they receive the data as 
sufficiently informative. TI data are not market-tested as they are financed through public 
funds or donations. Ugur (2014) in his meta-analysis suggests that there may be 
significant differences between alternative corruption data sources. Therefore, it is worth 
to conduct sensitivity checks to verify that our findings remain robust across different 
measures of perceived corruption.   
5.5 Robustness Tests 
In this section, the robustness of the empirical results will be tested with respect to 
endogeneity. A critical econometric issue arising in estimating our empirical model is that 
the right-hand side variables in equations (5.4) and (5.5) may not be exogenous. The one-
step system GMM dynamic model with some advantages mentioned in methodology part 
is used to provide more reliable and precise results as it offers more rigorous treatment of 
the presence possibility of endogeneity of fiscal variables on growth.  
This test deals with the endogeneity and simultaneity aspects of the model by means 
of the system GMM for the reasons spelled out in chapter 3. The system GMM estimator 
estimates as system of equations in first differences and levels (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
The GMM system has the added advantage of dealing with the explanatory variables 
being jointly determined with the growth rate in order to reducing the poor precision of 
the single equation GMM and SLS estimators. The consistency of the GMM system 
estimator depends on the assumption that errors are not serially correlated. It is therefore 
crucial to test for the presence of serial correlation. Arellano and Bond’s test reports for 
first and second order serial correlation of the differenced residuals. Hence, there should 
be first order but not second order correlation (Roodman, 2009a). Furthermore, Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggested a Sargan or Hansen test for 
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over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments when 
applying the GMM technique. 
This robustness test applies dynamic model with lagged growth as an explanatory 
variable for both group samples. Fiscal, investment and openness variables entered as 
endogenous, whereas all other variables with time dummies are assumed to be exogenous 
and instrument for themselves (Bose et al., 2007, Christie, 2012 and Gupta et al., 2005). 
To capture the effect of lagged growth and to be consistent with the approach of Bose et 
al. (2007), we exclude log initial GDP from our regressions. The results for the dynamic 
panel GMM one-step system technique for productive and non-productive expenditures 
which take into account the presence of corruption on both group countries sample are 
presented in Table 5.4. These results also report Arellano-Bond’s test for autocorrelation 
and the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restriction.  
In the low to middle-income economies, the GMM system model presents the results 
closely similar to those of the fixed effects model for both productive and non-productive 
government spending with effects of corruption on them. This implies that the main 
results for those economies are not purely an object of endogeneity biases. The 
coefficients of those main interests (productive and non-productive variables) are smaller 
under GMM than fixed effect model, but the standard errors are also smaller. While the 
coefficients on the control variables are of different magnitudes and signs. GMM system 
estimation for high-income countries fails to be valid. While the Hansen J test for over-
identifying restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are 
uncorrelated with the residuals for both samples, it fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
no second order serial correlation for the developed economies at the 10% level. This 
result is similar to the robustness test result for endogeneity in chapter 4 for the same 
sample; even the thesis introduces the effect of corruption on main variables, i.e. 
productive and non-productive government expenditure. The reason for the invalidity of 
GMM technique in high-income group may be due to a common characteristic among 
macro data sets. The dynamic panel data models, which were applied by Arellano and 
Bond (1991), Blundell and Bond (1998) or Bond et al. (2001), have focused mainly on 
those applicable to micro data sets, which normally have a large cross-section dimension 
with a small time-series dimension.  
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Table 5.4: Productive and Non-productive government spending with GMM 
technique (with corruption in the system) 
Estimation technique: 5 years moving average - GMM one-step system  
Dependent variable: Per capita growth - Effect of 
corruption   
  High-income  Low and Middle-income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Productive expenditure -0.0265* 
 0.0312**  
 (0.0191) 
 0.0153285  
Non-productive expenditure 0.0875** 
 -0.0295* 
 
 (0.0343)  (0.0162) 
Investment 0.0116 -0.0338 -0.0086 -0.0049 
 (0.0516) (0.0648) (0.0249) (0.0290) 
Inflation -0.0312 -0.0732 0.0027 0.0029 
 (0.0467) (0.0594) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Labour force growth 0.0585 0.0764 -0.0367 -0.0250 
 (0.0741) (0.0935) (0.0764) (0.0680) 
Openness 0.0011 0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0020 
 (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0046) (0.0056) 
Non-tax revenue 0.0264 -0.0321 0.0020 0.0111 
 (0.0486) (0.0726) (0.0444) (0.0430) 
Tax revenue 0.0130 -0.0831 0.0133 0.0234 
 (0.0533) (0.0739) (0.0467) (0.0608) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.0213 0.0771 0.0759 0.0415 
 (0.0508) (0.0723) (0.0652) (0.0687) 
Constant 0.2541 -0.3829 -1.2510 1.3342 
 (3.4472) (4.0570) (1.5186) (1.0577) 
Observations 550 550 293 293 
No of countries 37 37 20 20 
No of instruments 43 34 38 34 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.022 0.033 0.172 0.156 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.307 0.338 1 1 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but not 
reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1    
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5.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter evaluates empirically the impacts of different components of government 
expenditures on economic growth that is affected by the presence of corruption in an 
economy. In order to take the interdependency between government expenditure 
compositions, corruption and economic growth this analysis has formulated a system of 
equations where corruption is modelled analytically as something that reduces the 
productivity of public spending. It is important to note in chapter 4 that by shifting the 
mix of spending way from non-productive forms of expenditure and towards productive 
forms, countries can move closer to a more optimum growth level for both high-income 
and low to middle-income groups. But it remain unclear whether an increase of higher 
portion of productive government expenditure contribute to a greater economic growth 
and whether with its initial share is too high, a shift in favour of an objectively more 
productive type of expenditure may not raise the growth rate, especially low to middle-
income economies. 
The empirical strategy applied OLS two-way fixed effects methods to a panel of 57 
countries based on the availability of ICRG corruption index during the period from 1993 
to 2012. Additionally, potential biased problems in the relationship between growth and 
government structure in the presence of corruption were tackled using dynamic GMM 
one-step system estimation techniques. By comparing the corruption-adjusted coefficient 
of productive and non-productive government expenditure for both low to middle-income 
and high-income economies, there is no evidence that corruption has a marked impact on 
the strength relationship between government expenditure, whether in from of productive 
or non-productive, and economic growth. These findings do not discount the possibility 
of corruption affecting growth through other means. For example, through altering the 
division of total government expenditure between productive and non-productive types. 
The different results between high-income and low to middle-income economies groups 
are due to the purposes of each group’s government policy and the initial share of 
productive government expenditure on total government expenditure. High-income 
economies try to achieve both sustainable economic growths with high standard of living 
(spending only 61% of total government expenditure on productive components), while 
low to middle-income countries can boost their economic growth by spending more 
money on those productive components (around 78% of total government spending). 
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Therefore, high-income economies can increase their share on productive spending to 
boost economic growth, but low to middle-income countries may reduce its spending as 
Devarajan et al. (1996) stated that a shift in favour of an objectively more productive type 
of expenditure may not raise the growth rate if its initial share is too high. Furthermore, 
by introducing the CPI corruption index from TI instead of ICRG index for robustness 
test, the result suggests that different set of countries, period of time covering and 
different range of CPI score index (from zero to ten) may provide some slightly different 
results. 
The dynamic panel GMM one-step system technique shows that the baseline 
regression results do not experience the possible endogeneity biases, especially low to 
middle-income economies sample. This result is consistent with previous study in chapter 
4 when the research does not take into account the role of corruption.   
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Chapter Six 
The Impact of Government Expenditure on Human Capital 
on Economic Growth: Comparison of OECD and ASEAN 
Countries 
6.1 Introduction 
Economists have long recognised that human capital is important for economic growth 
and it has been much researched theoretically and empirically (see e.g., Schultz, 1961; 
Becker, 1964; Uzawa, 1965; Romer, 1986; Barro, 1991; Levine and Renelt, 1992; 
Mankiw et al., 1992; Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2002; Baldacci et al., 2004; Blankenau et 
al., 2007; Bose et al., 2007; Afonso and Jalles, 2013; Siddiqui and Rehman, 2017). 
Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964) defined human capital as the set of knowledge, skills, 
competencies and abilities embodied in individuals and acquired through education, 
training, medical care and migration. The basic idea is that a more educated and healthier 
labour force is expected to be relatively more productive. Dissatisfied with the exogenous 
technological progress assumed in traditional economic growth, Romer (1986) and Lucas 
(1988) developed endogenous growth models in which human capital was explicitly 
introduced as an additional variable driving the multi-factor productivity reflected in the 
Solow (1956) residual. In their papers, it is essential to understand the human capital 
accumulation process and its impact on economic growth in different countries. For 
various countries, investment in human capital has been the primary and foremost 
objective in creating better human resources which can bring sustainable economic 
development of the nation in the long term. Theoretical contributions highlight different 
mechanisms through which human capital has impact on economic growth with health 
care and education being the most important indicators. First, education and health care 
spending improve the quality of the workforce and positively contribute to the productive 
capacity and thus to economic growth (Kesikoglu and Ozturk, 2013). Second, in 
endogenous growth theories, government expenditures on education and health play an 
important role in increasing the innovative capacity of the economy, knowledge of new 
technologies, products and processes, and therefore have a significant contribution to 
sustainable long-run economic growth (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008). 
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There are empirical studies that show an important positive relationship between 
human capital and long-run economic growth (Barro, 1990; Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro 
and Lee, 1993; Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2002; Baldacci et al., 2004; Bose et al., 2007). 
However, some other studies have found that there is a negative (Prichett, 1996; Bil and 
Klenow, 2000; and Dalic, 2013) or in some cases insignificant effect (Benhabib and 
Spiegel, 1994; Perotti, 1996; Miyakoshi et al., 2010) of human capital on economic 
growth. Though health has been recognised as an important component of human capital 
(Schultz, 1961; Bloom et al., 2001 and Barro, 2013), education has often been the focus 
of attention in the literature on economic growth and development. Furthermore, the 
empirical results on the impact of these government expenditures are mixed and 
inconclusive. Neycheva (2010) and Afonso and Jalles (2013) find a positive impact of 
education government expenditure on growth, while Blankenau et al. (2007) and Ghosh 
and Gregoriou (2007) find opposing results. Similarly, empirical studies that investigate 
the growth effect of government expenditure on health provide mixed results (Easterly 
and Rebelo, 1993; Landau, 1997 and Cooray, 2009). In section 4.5.3, I also found a 
significant positive relationship between expenditure on education and economic growth 
in high-income countries, while it was not found to be significant in low to middle-income 
countries. In term of expenditure on health care, my analysis found a positive and 
significant impact on economic growth in low to middle-income economies, whereas an 
insignificant effect is found in high-income countries.  
 
One possible explanation for the mixed effect results of human capital and its 
important indicators on economic growth is the matter of country heterogeneity. Studies 
utilising samples that include developed countries tend to find weaker results, which is 
consistent with diminishing returns in human capital (Baldacci et al., 2008). To properly 
account for heterogeneity, the solution is to estimate single-country regressions. 
However, while single-country estimates of the parameters of physical capital and human 
capital can capture the heterogeneity of the individual country structures, they ignore 
some useful information contained in the common structure in a regional context. It could 
be a common geographical terrain, similar governance structure and similarities in level 
of economic development and other similarities in culture and economic indicators. These 
commonalities are indeed found in some areas, such as, OECD countries or ASEAN 
countries. Furthermore, there are a number of empirical researches carried out in 
developed nations in order to investigating the effect of government expenditure on 
169 
 
education and health on economic growth. However, in the case of Asian countries, 
especially ASEAN countries, there is limited research. ASEAN countries have enjoyed 
remarkable economic progress in recent years. Viewed as a single entity, the region would 
rank as the seventh-largest economy in the world based on GDP current price in 2013 
(World Economic Forum, 2014). But much of its recent growth has been generated by an 
expanding labour force and the shift of workers from agriculture to manufacturing. Due 
to new urgency for confronting the region’s low levels of productivity when those factors 
will eventually fade and the growing economic activities of this area, the development of 
education sector, health system and their contributions to the economic development is 
crucial. Besides, there are numbers of studies focused on OECD countries to examine the 
growth impacts of government expenditure on human capital, but the previous studies 
confined to the OECD deliver conflicting results. Also, there are great variations across 
countries in human capital investment and its outcomes. In term of the education and 
health expenditure as percentage of GDP, the low and middle-income countries lag far 
behind the high-income ones. Hence, it is interesting to see how government expenditure 
on education and health affect economic growth in OECD and ASEAN countries. 
 
In this context, this chapter focuses on examining the association between human 
capital and its components and economic growth for a panel of 25 OECD countries and 
5 ASEAN countries for the period 1993 to 2012, thus providing a general conclusion per 
development level and region. Again, this analysis uses a 5-year moving average for all 
variables, instead of the traditional 5-year average or 5-year moving average for 
dependent variables, to smooth over some of the cyclical features of the data. The OLS 
two-way fixed effects are also applied to address the concerns of unobservable country-
specific effects. The finding shows that the impact of government expenditure upon 
education on economic growth remains positive for both sets of data. For the association 
between public expenditure upon health and growth, this analysis recognises a negative 
effect in OECD economies, while there is no significant impact of this component in 
ASEAN countries. With regards to the combined government expenditure on human 
capital, this analysis observes that there is a positive and significant connection between 
this expenditure and economic growth in ASEAN economies, but no significant effect in 
OECD countries. With these results, this chapter lays a foundation for and guide future 
studies in examining areas of particular importance in the human capital expenditure – 
growth literature.  
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Furthermore, another weakness in much of the research is the failure to control for 
variable that may have an effect on the effectiveness of government spending on human 
capital. In particular, many studies have highlighted the important role of government 
governance in determining the association between human capital and economic growth. 
Poor governance or high corruption has been identified as a key factor to ineffective 
public spending in human capital (Abed and Gupta, 2002; Gupta et al., 2002; Rodrik et 
al., 2004; Hausmann et al., 2005; Baldacci et al., 2008; Churchill et al., 2015). Besides, 
in chapter 5 of this thesis, the results represent that corruption reduces the productivity 
benefits from productive spending component in high-income economies, while the 
corruption is good in the context of productive government expenditure for low to middle-
income countries. With the case study of 25 OECD countries and 5 ASEAN countries 
from 1993 to 2012, this analysis also investigates the impact of corruption in moderating 
the impact of government expenditure upon human capital and its indicators on economic 
growth. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents an overview 
of the literature on the effect of human capital on growth. Section 6.3 describes the model 
specification, discusses the data and specifies the econometric model. Section 6.4 reports 
the empirical estimates and links these with the analytical results. In Section 6.5, 
robustness tests are carried out. Finally, Section 6.6 concludes the results with some 
policy implications. 
6.2 Literature Reviews 
This section reviews the theoretical and empirical studies on the role of education and 
health in economic growth used in this analysis. It also provides several factors to explain 
why the mixed results can be found from literature on the effectiveness of education and 
health spending in improving economic growth.  
6.2.1 Education 
It is widely accepted that investment in education has been one of the most important 
components in human capital and critical for economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995; Baldacci et al., 2008; Dauda, 2010). The relationship between economic growth 
171 
 
and education can be demonstrated through many different mechanisms. For example, 
education is supposed to create the positive impact on economic growth by improving the 
quality of workforce, by decreasing inequality, by promoting better health and lower 
mortality of children, by providing better conditions for good governance, and by 
increasing knowledge and the innovative capacity of an economy (Jorgenson et al., 1987; 
Schultz, 1990; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Aghion et al., 1999; Glaeser et al., 2004; 
Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008).  
There are many theoretical studies that examine the association between government 
expenditure on education and economic growth. Among those studies are Mankiw et al. 
(1992), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992, 1997, 1998), Barro (1996), Zhang (1996), 
Michaelowa (2000), Benabou (2002), Wigger (2004), and Blankeanu (2005). For 
instance, Zhang (1996) stated that education subsidisation increases growth and decreases 
welfare losses caused by human capital externalities. Michaelowa (2000) showed that 
expenditure on education can bring into the economic system positive externalities and 
other indirect effects, such as higher education attainment by children, better individual 
health and a lower number of births.  All of these together with lower population growth 
and better health of the population tend to positively affect higher economic growth per 
capita. 
While there is strong theoretical support for the role of government expenditure on 
education in promoting economic growth, empirical evidence is not clear-cut and has 
been mixed. Barro and Lee (1993) investigated this relationship in a sample of 129 
countries and found that government expenditure on education has a positive impact on 
economic growth. There are many empirical papers that find the same results, such as 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Zhang and Casagrande (1998), Bose et al. (2007), 
Baldacci et al. (2008), Neycheva (2010), Afonso and Jalles (2013), Mallick et al. (2016), 
and Siddiqui and Rehman (2017). In contrast, some empirical studies find a negative 
relationship between education expenditure and growth (Kelly, 1997; Mo, 2007; and 
Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2007) or even an insignificant connect between two (Levine and 
Renelt, 1992; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Devarajan et al., 1996; Keller, 2006; 
Miyakoshi et al., 2010).  
There are several explanations for these mixed results. For example, Baldacci et al. 
(2008) stated that model specification and the inclusion or exclusion of certain control 
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variables could explain differences in reported estimates. Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002) 
mentioned that the results depend on the use of better data (wherever available) on 
measuring education as well as in the choice of estimation techniques. The use of large 
panel data series with better consistency in compilation can help mitigate these problems. 
Another possible explanation is that of country heterogeneity that has been mentioned in 
the introduction. In light of this heterogeneity, Jones and Olken (2008) showed that 
dramatic changes in growth are common features of the growth experience for many 
countries and growth decelerations and accelerations are asymmetric. Therefore, they 
argue that the within-country dimension is important for explaining the determinants of 
growth.  
6.2.2 Health 
One direct way in which health can have an impact on economic growth is by 
improving labour force productivity. By adding health as a capital good in his model, 
Grossman (1972) showed that people’s health depreciates over time but can recover with 
investment in health. Grossman (1972) also argued that increasing health capital reduces 
the time lost to illness and therefore provides a more effective performance from the 
labour force through increased productivity. Jack (1999) demonstrated that investment in 
human capital, especially in the physical and mental capabilities of the labour force 
improves productivity. Furthermore, Strauss and Thomas (1998) and Bloom and Canning 
(2000) suggested that a healthy community or population has a tendency to enhance 
physical abilities and mental clarity, thereby increasing productivity. 
The empirical studies on the impacts of government expenditure upon health on 
economic growth are relatively limited compared to those empirical studies on the effects 
of education expenditure. In a meta-analysis, Churchill et al. (2015) examines the 
relationship between economic growth and human capital by using a sample of 306 
estimates drawn from 31 primary studies, but only 12 studies were focused on health 
expenditure. They found that there is a positive association between government 
expenditure upon education and growth, while government expenditure on health had a 
negative impact on economic growth. Based on microeconomic evidence, Strauss and 
Thomas (1998), and Thomas and Frankenberg (2002) found that specific health sector 
interventions support a significant rise in recipients’ earnings and general health and 
nutrition status are important predictors of economic success. Research at the 
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macroeconomic level can better capture the impact of government expenditure on health 
on economic growth. Several studies support the positive contribution of government 
expenditure upon health to growth, (Barro, 1996; Bloom and Canning, 2003; Bloom et 
al., 2004; Gyimah-Brempong and Wilson, 2004; Jamison et al., 2004 and Cooray, 2009). 
Gyimah-Brempong and Wilson (2004) pointed out that improvement in health conditions 
equivalent to one more year of life expectancy are consistent with higher growth of up to 
4 percentage points per year from the country in their sample. Jamison et al. (2004) 
noticed that improvement in health account for about one tenth of economic growth by 
using data from developing and developed countries from 1965 to 1990. However, most 
of empirical research that examines public expenditure on health finds a negative (Singh 
and Weber, 1997; Miller and Russek, 1997; Landau, 1997; Dao, 2012; Dalic, 2013) or 
not significant impact on growth (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Perotti, 1996; Kelly, 1997; 
Kneller et al., 1999; Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2007; Miyakoshi et al., 2010; Afonso and 
Jalles, 2013).  
The empirical literature on the effects of government expenditure on health on growth 
is relatively thin, but the mixed results from literature are similar to the effectiveness of 
education spending in improving economic growth. The same reasons for weakness of a 
robust relationship between public spending on education and economic growth have 
been found for public spending on health. Besides, the literature has often failed to capture 
the interaction between the education and health sector and their combination on 
economic growth. As a result, this leads to an understatement of the impact of human 
capital spending on economic growth (Mayer-Foulkes, 2003; Miguel and Kremer, 2004). 
Higher levels of education improve public awareness and the capacity of families to deal 
with their own health needs. At the same time, better health increases the effective and 
sustained use of the knowledge and skills that individuals gain through education 
(Schultz, 1999). Ranis et al. (2000) stated that there is a statistically significant 
relationship in modelling the two-way relationship between human capital and economic 
growth in their 76 developing countries sample for 1960 – 1992. They pointed out that 
government should give the priority to primary education and comprehensive heath 
intervention, both from the perspective of improving human development in an early 
phase and this will increase economic growth. Also, Gyimah-Brempong and Wilson 
(2004) found a positive and robust association between investment in health and 
economic growth in both Sub-Saharan African and OECD countries. Given the 
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heterogeneity presented in the empirical literature as discussed above, it is difficult to 
draw a general conclusion on the relationship of government expenditure on human 
capital and its component and economic growth.  
Another reason to explain the weakness of the association between government 
expenditure on human capital and economic growth is the failure to control governance 
variables which can have an important impact on the effective of human capital. Baldacci 
et al. (2008) with a panel dataset of 118 developing countries for the period 1971 to 2000 
stated that corruption has a significant direct effect on the nexus between human capital 
spending and economic growth. They found that countries with poor governance or high 
corruption have growth lower than 1.6 percentage point compared to other countries. The 
effect of corruption on growth is transmitted through indirect channel via reducing the 
productivity of government expenditure on human capital and thereby affecting economic 
growth. They also mentioned that the role of corruption which had not always been 
noticed in previous studies could help to explain the mixed results in the association 
between human capital and growth. Furthermore, in a meta-regression analysis of 57 
empirical studies to examine the relationship between education and economic growth, 
Benos and Zotou (2014) indicate that the inclusion of political measures (anti-corruption 
programme) can increase the education growth effect by 0.01 point in their research. 
Similar to their study, Churchill et al. (2015) state that the inclusion or exclusion of a 
political instability (corruption measurement) variable affects the impact of government 
expenditure on human capital and its components (education and health) on economic 
growth. 
ASEAN is a grouping of ten neighbouring nations (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) in 
Southeast Asia that has existed for over half a century. Almost five decades after the 
organization’s founding, ASEAN is pursuing a more ambitious form of economic 
integration as a tool for achieving broader regional prosperity and greater global 
competitiveness. This aspiration is not yet a working reality on the ground, but there has 
been tangible progress in areas such as eliminating tariffs. If the region’s leaders succeed 
in dismantling other types of barriers that hinder the movement of goods, services, capital, 
and skilled workers across its borders, ASEAN stands to reap the benefits of increased 
trade, production, and investment (McKinsey Global Institute, 2014). The region has 
experienced two decades of robust economic growth, which has successfully 
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lifted millions out of poverty and created a middle class with newfound spending power. 
If ASEAN were a single country, it would already be the seventh-largest economy in the 
world (World Economic Forum, 2014). Its combined GDP of $2.4 trillion was more than 
25% larger than India’s economy in 2013 (IMF, 2014). Since 1990, ASEAN’s population 
of approximately 625 million people has almost doubled, and by 2025 it is expected to 
reach 694 million. It accounts for 8.6% of the world total, is equal to the combined 
populations of Latin America and the Caribbean, and is larger than that of the European 
Union and doubles that of the United States (IMF, 2016). ASEAN has the third largest 
labour force in the world, behind only China and India, and its youthful population is 
producing a demographic dividend. 
Despite its momentum, Southeast Asia faces some drawbacks on its current route—
and low productivity ranks chief among them. Although productivity has been rising in 
recent decades, much of this progress was driven by a broad shift of labour from 
agriculture into more efficient sectors, rather than improvements within sectors. 
Productivity remains at worryingly low levels in most Southeast Asian countries, which 
hampers their ability to continue to raise living standards. Unless the region builds a more 
competitive manufacturing sector, it could miss out on the opportunity to secure more 
production from multinational corporations (McKinsey Global Institute, 2014). While 
demographics are still favourable, the boost to economic growth from an expanding 
workforce will eventually begin to taper. In fact, some of the region’s countries will need 
to more than double their historic rates of productivity gains to sustain their pace of 
economic growth. Beyond its productivity imperative, Southeast Asia faces urgent 
priorities in addressing infrastructure, housing, health system and education. It can be 
seen that ASEAN is one of the world’s fastest-growing market, but one of the least well 
known and there is also limited empirical studies on the growth effects of government 
expenditure upon human capital.  
On the other hand, education and health have been expanding relentlessly in OECD 
countries. Many OECD member countries have now been providing a basic primary 
education to all citizens for at least a century. The expansion in education has come about 
for many reasons. Economically, there has been pressure to provide an increasingly well-
qualified workforce to meet the demands of business. Socially, changes in the structure 
of OECD economies have cut job opportunities in manufacturing and trade for young 
people. Education has, to some extent, provided a way to keep young people off the streets 
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(OECD Insights, 2007). Whatever the reasons for its expansion, education now eats up a 
large slice of spending in OECD countries – 5.2% of combined GDP for the period from 
1992 to 2012, although there are big variations between countries. Analyses which 
examine the growth effects of government expenditure upon education focus generally 
on OECD countries, as the data quality for OECD countries seems to be more reliable 
and easy to collect. But previous studies confined to the OECD deliver conflicting results. 
Krueger and Lindahl (2001) with their regression for OECD countries found that there is 
a negative impact of education on economic growth. In contrast, OECD (2003) found a 
significant positive relationship between education and economic growth applying a 
dynamic panel approach. Furthermore, spending on health across the OECD has recently 
decreased in the wake of the global financial and economic crisis in 2008. Also, 
governments in OECD nations are facing many complicated issues in the health sector. 
These issues include aging of the population, high prices for medical inputs, expensive 
medical technology, and resource allocation within the health sector, overload of health 
services and shortage of workforce in the sector. In addition, there are very few researches 
investigate the impact of government expenditure upon health on economic growth even 
in OECD case. Hence, this chapter aims to revisit the question whether government 
expenditure upon education, health and human capital affect long term economic growth 
in selected 25 OECD and 5 ASEAN economies, thus providing a general conclusion per 
development level and region. Also, I investigate the impact of corruption from those 
countries on economic growth via these expenditures.  
6.3 Model Specification, Data and Methodology 
6.3.1 Data and Choices of Variables 
The empirical analysis used panel data on 25 high-income OECD countries and 5 
ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) covering 
the period from 1993 to 2012 (list of 25 OECD countries can be seen in Appendix G). 
The fiscal variables for government expenditure on education, health and tax, non-tax 
revenue are collected from IMF’s GFS. Other variables are obtained from the World 
Bank’s Development Indicator (WDI). This chapter also compares and contrasts the 
impact of corruption from those countries on economic growth via education and health 
government expenditure, therefore the data for corruption indices are obtained from 
ICRG. The ICRG index ranges from zero to six. Similar to chapter 5, “𝛿” denotes as 
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corruption index in our theoretical model which ranges between 0 and 1, and is a positive 
function of corruption, the analysis has therefore rescaled the ICRG index accordingly.  
The first set of regression model specification for capturing the relationship between 
the proportion of government expenditure on education as a percentage of total 
government spending and economic growth is: 
 𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 +  𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 (
𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑢,𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾1 (
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +
𝛾2 (
𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾3 (
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) + ∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡     (6.1) 
The second set of regression model specification for capturing the relationship 
between the proportion of government expenditure on health as a percentage of total 
government spending and economic growth is: 
 𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 +  𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 (
𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑎,𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾1 (
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +
𝛾2 (
𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾3 (
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) + ∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡     (6.2) 
The third set of regression model specification for capturing the relationship between 
the proportion of government expenditure on human capital (combination of education 
and health) as a percentage of total government spending and economic growth is: 
 𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 +  𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 (
𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑢,𝑖𝑡+𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑎,𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾1 (
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +
𝛾2 (
𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾3 (
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) + ∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡     (6.3) 
The fourth set of regression model specification for capturing the relationship between 
the proportion of government expenditure on education as a percentage of total 
government spending and economic growth in the presence of corruption is:  
 𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 +  𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 (
(1−𝛿)𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑢,𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾1 (
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +
𝛾2 (
𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾3 (
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) + ∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡     (6.4) 
The fifth set of regression model specification for capturing the relationship between 
the proportion of government expenditure on health as a percentage of total government 
spending and economic growth in the presence of corruption is:  
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 𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 +  𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 (
(1−𝛿)𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑎,𝑖𝑡
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾1 (
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +
𝛾2 (
𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾3 (
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) + ∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡     (6.5) 
The sixth set of regression model specification for capturing the relationship between 
the proportion of government expenditure on human capital (combination of education 
and health) as a percentage of total government spending and economic growth in the 
presence of corruption is:  
 𝐺𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎𝑖 +  𝑏𝑡 +  𝛼1𝐺𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 (
(1−𝛿)(𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑢,𝑖𝑡+𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑎,𝑖𝑡)
𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡+ 𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜,𝑖𝑡
) + 𝛾1 (
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +
𝛾2 (
𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛾3 (
𝐷𝑒𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡
𝑦𝑖𝑡
) + ∑ 𝜎𝑙
𝑘
𝑙=1 𝐼𝑖𝑙𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡     (6.6) 
where i and t denote the cross-sectional and time series dimensions respectively; 
capture the time-invariant unobserved country-specific fixed effects, and capture the 
unobserved individual-invariant time effects. G is the per capita real GDP growth rate, 
Git−1is first lagged of growth variable is introduced for applying dynamic panel GMM 
techniques. gedu, ghea are government expenditure on education and health. gpro + 
gnonpro are represent total government spending. y is GDP, TR is tax revenue, NTR is 
non-tax revenue and (Def or sur) is budget surplus or deficit. Iilt is a vector of non-fiscal 
independent variables (initial of GDP per capita, inflation, labour force growth, 
investment and openness variables capture the inter-national dimension). 𝛿. 𝑔 is an 
interaction term that presents the impact of government expenditure composition on 
growth with presence of corruption. In this set-up, we first examine the impact of 𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑢 
and 𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑎 on economic growth rate for OECD and ASEAN countries, then compare these 
coefficients of the modified equations with the presence of corruption coefficients of 
(1 − 𝛿). 𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑢 and (1 − 𝛿). 𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑎.  
6.3.2 Methodology 
Similar to methodology we used in chapter 4 and chapter 5, this section uses two-way 
OLS fixed effects which control time-invariant individual country characteristics and 
time fixed effect as the main method of estimation. This technique addresses the common 
concern of excluding unobservable country-specific effects in panel data estimation. 
Furthermore, dealing with the endogeneity and simultaneity aspects of our model, this 
analysis tries to apply the dynamic panel one-step system GMM estimation for robustness 
179 
 
test on both sub-sample countries. However, as the number of observations for OECD 
and ASEAN are quite small, at 375 and 75 respectively, the dynamic panel one-step 
system GMM estimation for both groups does not perform well in small samples with 
many regressors, making it unsuitable for estimation (Bond et al., 2001; Roodman, 2009a; 
Roodman, 2009b; Tauchen, 1986 and Ziliak, 1997). Therefore, this chapter will not report 
the result of robustness test of endogeneity. Also, this analysis uses five-year forward 
moving averages for all variable as it can remove business cycle effects, increase the 
number of time series observation in our panel data, minimise the reverse causality 
argument holding in our model and account for endogeneity. 
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics about government expenditure on 
education and health, development and corruption index from ICRG for the period from 
1993 to 2012 for 25 OECD and 5 ASEAN countries. 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics 
  
OECD Countries ASEAN Countries 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Growth rate (GDP per capita) 2.17 1.977 3.27 1.935 
Education expenditure (% 
TGE) 
11.90 3.865 15.25 5.345 
Health expenditure (% TGE) 13.21 4.086 4.71 2.965 
Human Capital (Education + 
Health as % of TGE) 
25.11 3.975 19.96 4.155 
Education expenditure (% 
GDP) 
5.24 1.660 3.02 1.054 
Health expenditure (% GDP) 5.83 1.815 0.95 0.603 
Human Capital (Education + 
Health as % of GDP) 
11.07 1.737 3.97 0.829 
Productive government 
expenditure (% GDP) 
56.69 6.605 86.79 4.578 
Non-productive government 
expenditure (% GDP) 
43.40 6.364 13.26 4.550 
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Corruption index (ICRP) 4.49 1.027 2.61 1.011 
Total government expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
44.41 6.739 20.19 4.100 
Deficit or Surplus (% of GDP) -1.15 3.864 0.35 3.654 
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 26.87 6.029 14.31 2.335 
Non-Tax Revevue (% of GDP) 15.68 4.982 5.04 3.113 
Log Initial p.c. GDP (constant 
2005 US$) 
10.34 0.517 7.72 1.334 
Investment (Gross capital 
formation as % of GDP) 
22.28 3.449 26.58 5.037 
Inflation rate (%) 2.93 2.140 7.23 6.295 
Labour force growth (p.a) 1.10 0.955 2.17 0.867 
Openness (Sum of exports and 
imports as % of GDP) 
90.02 49.920 152.52 113.850 
 
It can be seen that 5 ASEAN economies have a higher average growth rate than OECD 
countries, at 3.3% and 2.2% respectively. Figure 6.1 shows the economic growth rate for 
Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and OECD average from 1993 to 
2012 (taking 5 year moving average from 1995 to 2010). Vietnam has the highest growth 
rate among 5 countries during this period as the country introduced an open economy 
model in the 1990s, which was accompanied by agriculture reforms and developments in 
the manufacturing and services sectors. All 5 ASEAN countries experienced reduced 
growth for the period from 1995 to 2000 as a result of the Asian financial crisis, also 
called “Asian Contagion”. The crisis was a series of currency devaluations and other 
events that spread through many Asian markets beginning in the summer of 1997. The 
effects of the crisis were most evident in Thailand and Indonesia. However, those 
countries’ economies have recovered during the period from 2001 to 2012. Meanwhile, 
OECD countries were hit by the global financial crisis during 2008-2009 and economic 
growth was adversely affected in several countries. OECD economies are on average 
found to have a higher level of total government expenditure (44%) than the ASEAN 
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countries (20%). Although they have smaller government budgets, the five ASEAN 
countries tend to focus spending (87%) on productive government expenditure in order 
to boost economic growth and converge with more developed high-income countries. 
They spend an average of 15.3% of total government expenditure on education, but only 
4.7% on health. Meanwhile, OECD countries spend just 56.7% on productive 
components, with 12% on education and 13% on health. Thus, while the ASEAN 
economies spend a larger proportion of government expenditure on productive issues, a 
smaller proportion of this expenditure is on human capital. 
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Figure 6.1: Economic growth rate (GDP per capita, %) for five ASEAN countries and 
OECD average (1993-2012) 
  
Figure 6.2: Government expenditure on education for five ASEAN countries and OECD 
average (1993-2012) 
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Figure 6.3: Government expenditure on health (% of GDP) for five ASEAN countries 
and OECD average (1993-2012)  
 
Figure 6.2 and 6.3 present government expenditure on education and health as a per 
cent of GDP for the five ASEAN countries and OECD average for the period 1993 to 
2012. It can be seen that even though OECD countries have consistently spent less of 
their government spending on productive components than the ASEAN economies, they 
spend a larger and growing proportion on human capital. Meanwhile, government 
expenditure on education by the five ASEAN countries varies between countries from 
1% to 4% of GDP during this period. Thailand and Vietnam are the only ones to increase 
their proportion of spending on education for the period from 1993 to 2012, and pick up 
to around 4% of GDP in 2012. Indonesia has the lowest government expenditure on 
education among the five ASEAN countries with the average of 1.5% of GDP.  
Moving to government expenditure on health (figure 6.3), there is a significant 
difference between OECD average and the five ASEAN countries. OECD countries 
spend on average 6% of their GDP on health and they increase this spending gradually 
over the period from 1993 to 2012.  The five ASEAN economies spend only 
approximately 1% of GDP on health during this period. Surprisingly, although Singapore 
is a high-income ASEAN economy, its spending on human capital is still very low and 
similar to Vietnam. The Philippines and Indonesia spend only an average of 0.5% of GDP 
on health. Moreover, only Thailand is trying to increase their spending on health in 
recently years, even this portion amount is still small compared to OECD countries. In 
general, it can be seen that OECD and ASEAN countries both focus on education 
expenditure as a key component of investing in human capital to boost economic growth, 
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but there is a marked lack of investment in health from ASEAN governments compared 
to OECD countries. Thus, it leads to lower investment from ASEAN countries in human 
capital. It has been noted by Churchill et al. (2015) that very few studies examine the 
impact of government health expenditure and government expenditure on human capital 
as share of total government spending on economic growth. Hence, this analysis examines 
further in-depth the relationship between these variables on economic growth, captures 
country differences and lays a foundation future studies in investigating areas of particular 
importance of human capital expenditure – growth literature. 
Moving to other fiscal variables, ASEAN countries have a lower average budget 
deficit as percentage of GDP than OECD countries, at 0.35% and -1.15% respectively. 
Meanwhile, tax revenue and non-tax revenue variables as percentage of GDP in OECD 
countries have a higher average rate compared to ASEAN countries, 27% compared with 
14% for tax revenue and 16% compared with 5% for non-tax revenue. Looking at other 
macroeconomic variables in table 6.1, OECD countries have a low average inflation rate 
during this period at 2.9%; while ASEAN countries have markedly high inflation rate 
with average of 7.2%. Regarding trade openness as percentage of GDP, ASEAN 
economies have a higher average rate than OECD economies, at 152.5% and 90% 
respectively; as this variable is believed to one of main streams for significant 
development in those ASEAN countries. In addition, ASEAN countries have higher rate 
for labour force growth than OECD countries, at 2.2% compared with 1.1% respectively; 
and with labour force expansion and productivity improvement, ASEAN is becoming one 
of the most attractive areas for foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. The remaining 
variable, investment as gross capital information percentage of GDP shows no significant 
difference between the two sub-group country samples. In term of corruption, the higher 
corruption rating index of ASEAN countries than OECD countries throughout the period. 
This is indicative of the negative relationship between corruption and development that 
has been reported in many empirical researches (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Campos et 
al., 2010; and Ugur, 2014) as Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam belong to 
middle-income economies while OECD countries are all high-income countries.   
For the correlation matrix between variables of two sub-group country samples with 
presence of corruption variable, it has been described in Appendix H. 
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6.4 Empirical Results 
Table 6.2 represents the effect of government expenditure on human capital and its 
indicators (education and health) on economic growth in 25 OECD and 5 ASEAN 
economies during the period 1993 – 2012 by using a two-way fixed effects method. The 
main variable of interest is the share of public spending on education to total government 
spending, which has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in both OECD and 
ASEAN countries. For OECD countries, a one percentage point increases in the ratio of 
education expenditure to total government spending will increase per capita real GDP 
growth by 0.14 percentage point. Meanwhile, the result is stronger for ASEAN economies 
with per capita real GDP rising by 0.16 percentage point in response to a one percentage 
point increase in government expenditure on education. The result is unsurprising and 
consistent with theoretical papers and previous empirical findings, such as Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995), Zhang and Casagrande (1998), Bose et al. (2007), Baldacci et al. 
(2008), Neycheva (2010), Afonso and Jalles (2013), Mallick et al. (2016), and Siddiqui 
and Rehman (2017). It shows that investment in education plays an important role and is 
one of the key drivers of economic growth. It also shows that the impact of public 
education expenditures on economic growth is greater in the case of five ASEAN 
countries as compare to the 25 OECD countries. This might suggest the presence of 
“catching-up effect” in developing countries, such as ASEAN countries. ASEAN 
countries may replicate the production methods and technologies currently employed by 
the developed nations through education in the most cost effective way by undertaking 
research and development activities at the domestic level that best suits their local 
economic conditions and factor prices. The spending on education can make better human 
capital which can in return implement the use of modern technology in the production 
process by minimizing adoption costs (Mallick et al., 2016).  
 
Regarding government expenditure on health, the coefficient of this spending is 
negatively significant for OECD countries, while it is positive but non-significant for 
ASEAN countries. A one percentage point increases in the ratio of health expenditure to 
total government spending will decrease per capital real GDP growth by 0.11 percentage 
point for OECD countries. Compared to the previous empirical research on the effect of 
health expenditure on growth, this result is consistent with the findings of Kelly (1997), 
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Landau (1997), Miller and Russek (1997), Singh and Weber (1997), Dao (2012), and 
Dalic (2013). These studies mostly used OECD country data.  
Table 6.2: Contribution of government spending on education, health and human 
capital to growth in OECD and ASEAN countries (without corruption) 
Estimation technique: 5 years moving average - two way Fixed Effects    
Dependent variable: Per capita 
growth            
  Without Corruption 
  OECD countries ASEAN countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Education 
expenditure 
0.1404*     0.1550**     
  (0.0737)     (0.0583)     
Health expenditure   -0.1051*     0.0688   
    (0.0566)     (0.2825)   
Human capital 
expenditure 
    
0.0160 
    
0.1217* 
      (0.0715)     (0.0686) 
Investment 0.0806 0.0718 0.0665 0.0287 -0.015 0.0468 
  (0.1075) (0.1025) (0.1077) (0.0418) (0.0581) (0.0486) 
Inflation 0.0051 0.0571 0.0173 -0.1350* -0.1566** -0.1279* 
  (0.0745) (0.0878) (0.0657) (0.0594) (0.0547) (0.0634) 
Labour force growth -0.1374 -0.3007 -0.1474 -0.3181 -0.3438 -0.3089 
  (0.2891) (0.3258) (0.2785) (0.2442) (0.2584) (0.2685) 
Openness 0.0309*** 0.0182 0.0248 0.0076 -0.0044 0.0054 
  (0.0164) (0.0152) (0.0196) (0.0133) (0.0195) (0.0154) 
Non-tax revenue -0.1015 -0.0655 -0.1158 -0.0184 0.0292 -0.0427 
  (0.0907) (0.1059) (0.1122) (0.1518) (0.2002) (0.1559) 
Tax revenue 0.1253 0.1221 0.1870 -0.084 -0.2554* -0.0898 
  (0.1815) (0.1706) (0.1675) (0.0706) (0.1339) (0.0766) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.1788* 0.2561** 0.1902* 0.4473*** 0.6918** 0.3967** 
  (0.1111) (0.1179) (0.1283) (0.0725) (0.1684) (0.1209) 
Constant -3.7305 -0.1015 -3.2627 2.1358 -12.249 2.0908* 
  (4.4528) (4.9999) (5.6539) (0.8896) (5.1139) (1.0145) 
Observations 399 399 399 75 75 75 
No of countries 25 25 25 5 5 5 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6699 0.6642 0.6552 0.8886 0.8889 0.8833 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but not 
reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 
0.1           
 
Possible explanations for this negative impact on growth is that government 
expenditure on health crowds out other factors which contribute to growth, or public 
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resources are inefficiently and inequitably allocated in the health sector, or the quality of 
government expenditure on the health sector is low overall. First, the crowding out impact 
and the welfare losses from tax distortions in the health area have a tendency to happen 
in most OECD economies due to large and rising shares of total government spending 
dedicated to health. In fact, the share of OECD government spending allocated to the 
health sector increased from an average of 10% in 1992 to 15% in 2012. Similarly, this 
expenditure increases faster than GDP growth and total public spending for most of the 
period 1992 to 2012. Meanwhile most other categories of government spending (e.g., 
education) remained roughly constant for the same period. Public expenditure on health 
in the OECD countries is now the second highest government expenditure share with 
about 15%, after social protection with about 40% in 2012. Therefore, governments in 
many OECD countries may have to reduce spending in other sectors or raise taxes to 
sustain their healthcare systems and to reduce their budget deficit. An increase in public 
spending on health sector may adversely affect the public spending compositions and 
economic growth as it reduces the efficiency of public and private resources allocated to 
productive activities, such as Research and Development, investment in physical capital 
stock and education. In addition, distortionary taxes tend to distort saving decisions and 
lower growth when taxes are sufficiently large (see e.g., Barro, 1990). Thus, sufficiently 
high government health expenditures financed by distortionary taxes in developed 
countries tend to aggravate distortions, reduce the efficiency of resource allocation, crowd 
out productive activities, and retard long-run economic growth. 
Furthermore, due to rapid population ageing in OECD countries, a large fraction of 
public health expenditure is devoted to the elderly population over 65. A larger population 
of elderly in a developed country implies a greater demand for public health care, and 
thus higher government expenditure on health because elderly people often require costly 
medical treatment due to multi morbidities and chronic illnesses. Therefore, this 
expenditure may lead to improvements in life expectancy without being accompanied by 
improvements in health status and human capital formation. Also, although it has been 
established that health allows for a more effective performance that increases productivity 
(Grossman, 1972), considering the elderly population who are not part of the active work 
force, investment into health does not necessarily promote productivity. 
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 Finally, another possible explanation for a negative growth impact of government 
health expenditure in developed countries is that governments may not be paying enough 
attention to improve the efficiency and quality of public health expenditure. Increasing 
expenditure alone is insufficient to produce good health outcome and lead to an increase 
in human capital stock. For example, if public investments in medical science help people 
live longer, but with poor mobility, there will be less chance for these people to work, and 
therefore there could be a fall in labour force participation rate and economic growth. 
Thus, high quality and effective public health care are essential to achieve substantial 
improvement in average health status so as to improve the value for money used in the 
provision of health services. According to Anderson and Frogner (2008), there is scant 
evidence that the United States gets better value for its higher health care spending. 
In conclusion, governments in OECD nations are facing many complicated issues in 
the health sector. These issues include administrative complexity, aging of the population, 
high prices for medical inputs such as drugs and the services of specialist physicians, 
expensive medical technology, waiting lists, chronic disease burden, supply and 
utilization rates, access to care, resource allocation within the health sector, among many 
others. Thus, increasing public resources to health sector alone may be insufficient for 
governments to improve health status of a population and achieve faster accumulation of 
human capital and thus, economic growth. Meanwhile, governments in developing 
countries, especially ASEAN area, can take advantages of young population, cheap 
labour cost and replicating the production methods and technologies currently employed 
by the developed economies in the most effective way to improve their healthcare system. 
In this chapter, the analysis finds the positive relationship between public spending on 
health and economic growth on 5 ASEAN countries, but this relationship is insignificant. 
It may be due to the lack of concentration from these governments on health system as 
they spend only average 1% of GDP on health during this period. Healthy communities 
and populations tend to have not only enhanced physical abilities and mental clarity, but 
also can be associated with increase high education performance; thus, in turn increase 
productivity, accumulation of human capital and enhance economic growth.  
From the effects of government expenditure on human capital (education and health 
combined) on growth, this analysis shows there is no significant effect for OECD 
countries, while we find a positive and significant effect for this variable in ASEAN 
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countries. With a positive result for the effect of government expenditure upon education 
and a negative result from impact of government expenditure upon health in OECD 
countries, it may be no surprise to find expenditure on human capital is insignificant, as 
the effects of two components cancel out each other. Whereas, one percentage point 
increase in the ratio of government expenditure on human capital as a share of total 
government spending will increase per capital real GDP growth by 0.12 percentage point 
for the ASEAN countries. With a higher percentage of total government investment on 
education compared with health sector and a significant positive impact on economic 
growth of this expenditure in ASEAN economies, it helps to explain why government 
expenditure on human capital has a positive and significant effect on economic growth in 
these economies. It can be advised that developing countries (in this case: ASEAN 
countries) are catching up the developed economies through increasing government 
expenditure on human capital. Developing countries replicate the production methods and 
technologies currently employed by the developed nations in the most cost effective way 
by undertaking research and development activities at the domestic level that best suits 
their local economic conditions and factor prices (Idrees and Siddiqi, 2013). 
Concerning the budget constraint variables, budget surplus estimated coefficients 
indicate a positive and significant effect on long-term growth for both sets of countries, 
especially for ASEAN countries with one percentage point increase in budget surplus will 
boost per capital real GDP growth by roughly 0.40 percentage point. Meanwhile, the 
thesis does not find any significant impact of tax revenue and non-tax revenues variables 
on economic growth for both sets data. As mentioned in previous chapters, to accurately 
measure the impact of tax on economic growth for these countries, it may necessary to 
decompose total tax revenue into different types of taxes as previous studies have done. 
 
Moving to other macro variables, the analysis finds that inflation has a negative and 
significant effect on economic growth in ASEAN countries, while we observer no 
relationship between them for OECD economies. With a high inflation rate 
(approximately average of 7%) in ASEAN economies, it is expected to have an adverse 
effect on growth rates as high inflation is associated with increased price variability and 
an uncertainty about future profitability of investment projects, which results in lower 
levels of investment and economic growth (Christie, 2012 and Pushak et al., 2007). 
However, this analysis does not find any significant relationship between other variables 
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(investment, labour force growth and openness) and economic growth for both sets of 
countries.  
6.5   The Impact of Corruption on Economic Growth via 
Government Expenditure on Human Capital  
In this section the benchmark empirical results will be re-investigated with the 
presence of corruption. Corruption generally generates unfavourable effect on long-term 
economic growth and sustainable development as it is connected with a misallocation and 
misappropriation of government expenditure components. Mauro (1998) found evidence 
that corruption distorts government spending away from growth promoting components 
(education and health) towards other components (such as, large-scale infrastructure 
investment) which are less productivity-enhancing. From this point of view, this analysis 
adds the corruption index (ICRG index) provided by PRS to examine the growth effects 
of government expenditure on human capital with the presence of corruption (regression 
model specification equation 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6).   
Table 6.3 represents the effects of government expenditure on education, health and 
human capital on economic growth with the presence of corruption in OECD and ASEAN 
economies. In case of OECD economies, the coefficient on (1 − 𝛿). 𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑢 and 
(1 − 𝛿). 𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑎 is 0.139 and -0.112 respectively. It can be seen that the corruption-adjusted 
coefficient of government expenditure on education is still positive, but the productivity 
benefits of its spending turn out to be lower (𝛿𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑢 = - 0.0011). The coefficients of 
education variable before and after corruption adjustment are not significant different 
from each other for OECD countries (Appendix I). In term of government health 
spending, the corruption-adjusted coefficient of this expenditure is again negative and 
significant, and it is more negative (𝛿𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑎 = - 0.0066) than when this variable did not 
take into account corruption. The coefficients of health variable before and after 
corruption adjustment are significantly different from each other. However, the effect size 
of corruption on both government expenditure compositions is very small. Therefore, 
there may be no significant impact of corruption on economic growth in these OECD 
countries and it is the fact that these countries have a lower levels of corruption, thus 
policymakers may not need to pay attention on the effects of corruption present on 
government expenditure on human capital. 
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For ASEAN economies, government expenditure on education still has a positive and 
significant impact on economic growth when the effect of corruption is included (with a 
coefficient of 0.1564). When its effect is netted out, the productivity benefits of this 
spending surprisingly turn out to be lower (the coefficient becomes 0.1550), but the 
coefficients of education variable before and after corruption adjustment are not 
significantly different from each other and the effect is rather small (the difference in this 
case, 𝛿𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑢 = 0.0014). A similar result finds in case of government expenditure on human 
capital for ASEAN countries. There is a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the corruption-adjusted coefficient of government spending on human capital 
and economic growth (0.1252). Meanwhile, the coefficients of health variable before and 
after corruption adjustment are significantly different from each other but government 
health expenditure with the presence of corruption shows no significant impact on the 
growth rate in ASEAN countries. These results from government expenditure on 
education, health, human capital after corruption adjustment show that corrupted 
practices actually do not have a significant impact on economic growth for ASEAN 
countries. The reason for these results is because of corruption is modelled analytically 
as something that reduces the productivity of these spending on economic growth rather 
than examines direct the impact of corruption on these spending and economic growth.   
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Table 6.3: Contribution of government spending on education, health and human 
capital to growth in OECD and ASEAN countries with presence of corruption 
Estimation technique: 5 years moving average - two way Fixed Effects - ICRG index  
Dependent variable: Per capita growth            
  With Corruption Index 
  OECD countries ASEAN countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Education expenditure 0.1393*     0.1564**     
  (0.0770)     (0.0617)     
Health expenditure   -0.1117*     0.0641   
    (0.0587)     (0.2822)   
Human capital 
expenditure 
    
0.0113 
    
0.1252* 
      (0.0742)     (0.0697) 
Investment 0.0811 0.071 0.0662 0.0291 -0.0149 0.0453 
  (0.1074) (0.1026) (0.1074) (0.0424) (0.0583) (0.0486) 
Inflation 0.0031 0.0566 0.0198 -0.1346* -0.1571** -0.1279* 
  (0.0730) (0.0878) (0.0668) (0.0598) (0.0550) (0.0631) 
Labour force growth -0.1319 -0.2964 -0.1552 -0.3208 -0.342 -0.3056 
  (0.2837) (0.3234) (0.2837) (0.2437) (0.2592) (0.2696) 
Openness 0.0308* 0.0186 0.0243 0.0079 -0.0048 0.0051 
  (0.0162) (0.0154) (0.0199) (0.0134) (0.0192) (0.0154) 
Non-tax revenue -0.1007 -0.0689 -0.1142 -0.019 0.029 -0.0404 
  (0.0908) (0.1063) (0.1122) (0.1501) (0.2004) (0.1576) 
Tax revenue 0.1245 0.1259 0.1862 -0.085 -0.2571* -0.0888 
  (0.1817) (0.1701) (0.1672) (0.0703) (0.1351) (0.0763) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.1796* 0.2588** 0.1935* 0.4517*** 0.6948** 0.4014** 
  (0.1110) (0.1181) (0.1283) (0.0739) (0.1683) (0.1160) 
Constant -3.7494 -0.2388 -3.2627 2.1771* -12.341 2.1211* 
  (4.4422) (5.0182) (5.6539) (0.8854) (5.1136) (1.0150) 
Observations 399 399 399 75 75 75 
No of countries 25 25 25 5 5 5 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6692 0.6651 0.6551 0.8889 0.889 0.8833 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but not reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1           
 
Turning to the other explanatory variables, the results are similar to the main empirical 
results’ analyses in section 6.4. There is a positive and significant relationship between 
budget surplus or deficit variable and economic growth in all regressions. It also finds 
that inflation rate has an adverse impact on economic growth in ASEAN economies, 
while it has no effect in OECD countries. In addition, the analysis cannot find a significant 
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impact for other variables (e.g.: tax revenue, non-tax revenue, openness, investment and 
labour force growth) on economic growth for both sets of data. 
6.6   Discussion and Conclusion 
Based on 25 OECD and 5 ASEAN economies for the period from 1993 to 2012, this 
analysis investigates the impact of government expenditure upon education, health and 
human capital on economic growth. The empirical strategy applied OLS fixed effects 
two-way method to capture this relationship. Furthermore, this chapter also evaluates 
empirically the effects of those government expenditure components on economic growth 
in the presence of corruption. Therefore, it provides insights on the role of different levels 
of economic development and geographical terrain play in explaining the 
interdependency between human capital compositions, corruption and economic growth. 
 
Consistent with previous studies on the relationship between government expenditure 
on education and growth, the finding shows that this public spending enhances economic 
growth for both sets of subsample data. For the association between public expenditure 
on health and growth, the analysis finds a negative effect in 25 OECD economies, while 
there is no significant impact of this component in 5 ASEAN countries. Regarding 
government expenditure on human capital (combination of education and health), this 
analysis observes that there is a positive and significant connection between this 
expenditure and economic growth in ASEAN economies, but not significant effect in 
OECD countries. These results provide some important implications. First, investment in 
the education sector is an essential element of long-term economic growth in all countries. 
The public spending on education create skilled workforce and their productivity which 
will improve output levels of the economy. Investment in education not only contributes 
to human capital but also helps the application of modern technology in a lower adoption 
costs. Thus, the countries should make such policies for economic development in which 
prioritise high quality education along with ensuring education for all. Government could 
make education become more affordable for all by subsidising education, which would 
raise the cost of providing education but would decrease the cost of education attainment. 
Therefore, it will increase demand for education and increase the stock of human capital. 
It would be only successful when the governments increase public spending on the 
education sector in an effective way.  
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Secondly, an increase proportion of government expenditure on health tends to 
obstruct economic growth in OECD nations. There are some reasons for this adverse 
effect of public health spending on growth in these economies. The crowding out impact 
and the welfare losses from tax distortions in the health area have occurred in many 
OECD economies due to the large and rising share of government spending on health. An 
increase in government expenditure on health may adversely affect the public spending 
compositions and economic growth as it reduces the efficiency of public and private 
resources allocated to productive activities, such as Research and Development, 
investment in physical capital stock. Furthermore, due to rapid population ageing in 
OECD countries, higher government expenditure on health may lead to improvements in 
life expectancy without being accompanied by improvements in health status, increases 
in the active labour force and human capital formation. Also, governments in OECD 
countries may not pay enough attention to improve the efficiency and quality of public 
healthcare system. They may also be facing a shortage of workforce in the health industry 
and an overload of health services. Increasing expenditure alone is insufficient to produce 
good health outcome and lead to an increase in human capital stock. ASEAN countries 
however are lack of concentration on the important role of health system. They spend 
only average 1% of GDP on health during the period 1993 to 2012. This analysis also 
finds that government expenditure on health has positive but insignificant impact on 
economic growth in the ASEAN countries. Therefore, in order to taking advantages of a 
young population, cheap labour and opportunities to replicate the production methods and 
technologies currently employed by developed economies, to achieve a sustainable and 
long-term economic growth, ASEAN governments should strive to achieve efficiency 
and quality of public health system which in turn increase productivity, accumulation of 
human capital and enhance economic growth.  
 
Finally, the analysis indicates that the effect of government expenditure upon 
education and human capital on economic growth in ASEAN economies is greater than 
OECD countries. These countries can take advantage of replicating the teaching courses, 
methodologies, medical technology currently employed by the developed economies on 
education and health sectors in the most cost-effective way. It can be suggested that 
developing economies are catching-up the developed countries through increase in 
education and human capital. As investment in education and health is a key to economic 
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development, developing country’s policy should strive to achieve high quality education 
and health along with ensuring these services for all people. The quality of education and 
health can be improved by building up an effective and modern education system and 
health system that could meet the challenges of modern society and create a premise of 
economic development. 
 
The empirical evidence provided in this chapter shows that corruption. By comparing 
the corruption-adjusted coefficient of education, health, human capital expenditure for 
both OECD and ASEAN economies, it is not clear that corruption has an impact on the 
growth effects of those government expenditure components. Furthermore, if corruption 
has an effect on economic growth through government expenditure components, this 
impact is not strong enough. Again, the different results between OECD and ASEAN 
countries are due to the purposes of each group’s government policy. Dzhumashev (2014) 
states that for low-income economies with a high incidence of corruption, the size of 
government spending should be less than for an economy with a higher income and a 
lower incidence of corruption. That is, to achieve higher growth potential, low-income 
economies cannot mechanically rely on increasing public spending, as its effects depend 
on the incidence of corruption and the level of economic development in the economy. 
OECD economies, which have a big size of government spending, can achieve both 
sustainable economic growths and high standard of living by increasing their share on 
productive spending. Also, with a bigger size of government spending, it can help these 
high-income economies to control the inefficiencies of corruption. Meanwhile, ASEAN 
(low to middle-income) countries with a smaller size of government expenditure can 
boost their economic growth by focusing their spending on human capital and productive 
government expenditure. Furthermore, the presence of corruption in these economies may 
heighten the administrative efficiency of government agencies, decrease the transaction 
cost and turn around unfavourable situations, which ultimately positively influences 
economic growth. Besides, anti-corruption efforts represent a cost itself in these 
economies. It suggests a better approach by examining the direct relationship between 
corruption and government expenditure components, and between corruption and 
economic growth rather than an indirect relationship between corruption and economic 
growth though impact of government expenditure components.  
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PART C: PERSPECTIVE 
Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the conclusion of this research thesis. This is progressed as 
follows. First, the summary of main empirical evidence of the research will be discussed. 
Second, the contributions of the research will be presented. Third, possible policy 
implication deducted from the thesis will be discussed. Fourth, possible limitations and 
potential future research topics will be identified. 
7.2 Summary of Main Empirical Evidence 
The thesis has presented three distinct empirical works on the subjects of government 
expenditure and economic growth. The first analysis chapter studies the impact of 
government expenditure compositions on economic growth. The main added value of the 
analysis is to compare and contrast the effect of government expenditure on economic 
growth in high-income and low to middle-income countries over a fixed time period and 
a given set of measures, therefore providing a consistent comparison. Consistent with 
those existing studies using developed country data, the findings show that a shift in 
government expenditure towards productive government expenditure and away from 
non-productive expenditure has a positive relationship with economic growth. In relation 
to low to middle-income countries, the thesis finds a similar relationship, which runs 
contrary to the findings of other papers that examined developing countries. It also finds 
that an increase in level of government expenditure has a crowding out effect and thus 
negative effect on long run economic growth. However, by shifting from non-productive 
to productive forms of public spending, countries can move closer to a more optimum 
growth level. These results support the conclusion that the low to middle-income 
countries sample has followed the fiscal policy approach of high-income countries, in 
allocating government expenditure in favour of productive government spending at the 
expense of non-productive expenditure to enhance economic growth. However, the 
results are very sensitive to changes in the estimation methodology. This analysis also 
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takes into account both the sources and uses of government budget in assessing the effect 
of fiscal policy on growth. The analysis finds that greater budget surplus or reduced deficit 
variable encourages growth for both sets of countries, while tax revenue and non-tax 
revenue variables have different effects on growth. Tax revenue has a negative impact on 
economic growth for low to middle-income economies as an increase in tax rate could 
discourage individuals, businesses and shareholders to work, invest and build capital. 
Meanwhile, there is an insignificant relationship between tax revenue and economic 
growth in case of high-income economies. On the other hand, non-tax revenue is found 
to be negative and significant effect on growth in high-income economies, while it is not 
significant in low to middle-income countries. The potential for problems with bias such 
as, possible endogeneity of fiscal variables and unobservable country-specific effects in 
the relationship between economic growth and government expenditure composition are 
tackled by using dynamic panel GMM one-step system. This technique shows that the 
baseline regression results do not experience the possible endogeneity biases, especially 
in the low to middle-income economies sample. Also, by comparing the results between 
using five-year moving averages to common five-year average, the analysis indicates that 
applying five-year moving average for all variables is the most efficient and reliable 
method to capture the impact of public spending components on long-run economic 
growth due to the macroeconomic stability in low to middle-income economies. 
The second analysis chapter studies the effect of government expenditure 
compositions on economic growth in the presence of corruption based on ICRG 
corruption index during the period from 1993 to 2012. In order to examine the 
interdependency between government expenditure compositions, corruption and 
economic growth this analysis has formulated a system of equations where corruption is 
modelled analytically as something that reduces the productivity of public spending. The 
empirical evidence provided in this chapter suggests comparing the corruption-adjusted 
coefficient of productive and non-productive government expenditure for both low to 
middle-income and high-income economies, there is no evidence that corruption has a 
marked impact on the strength relationship between government expenditure, whether in 
from of productive or non-productive, and economic growth. These findings do not 
discount the possibility of corruption affecting growth through other means. For example, 
through altering the division of total government expenditure between productive and 
non-productive types. Furthermore, by introducing the CPI corruption index (range of 
score index from 0 to 10) instead of ICRG index (range of score index from 0 to 6) in the  
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high-income countries sample, the result suggests that corruption has changed the 
percentage of productive and non-productive government spending; thereby have 
different impact on economic growth, even this impact is small. Meanwhile, for low to 
middle-income economies and similar to ICRG index, using the CPI index suggests that 
corruption could reduce the share of productive spending to total government expenditure 
and thereby contribute to a greater economic growth effect. It also implies that low to 
middle-income economies may have a high initial share of productive government 
spending components and a shift in favour of an objectively more productive type of 
expenditure may not move such countries closer to a more optimum growth level. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that these results may be different for a  different set of 
countries, a different period of time or different range of CPI score index (from zero to 
ten). The second analysis also reruns the baseline regression with the dynamic GMM one-
step system technique and it shows that the main results do not experience the possible 
endogeneity biases, especially in the low to middle-income economies sample. 
Finally, the third analysis chapter explores the relationship between government 
expenditure on human capital, its important components (education and health) and 
economic growth for a panel data of case study countries (e.g. 25 OECD countries and 5 
ASEAN countries) during period 1993 – 2012. Consistent with previous studies on the 
relationship between government expenditure on education and growth, the results in this 
chapter find that this public spending boost economic growth for both sets of sub-sample 
data. For the link between public expenditure on health and growth, the results show a 
negative effect in 25 OECD economies, while there is no significant impact of this 
component in 5 ASEAN countries. Regarding to government expenditure on human 
capital (combination of education and health), this analysis observes that there is a 
positive and significant connection between this expenditure and economic growth in 
ASEAN economies, but not significant effect in OECD countries. With the case study of 
25 OECD countries and 5 ASEAN countries from 1993 to 2012, this analysis also 
investigates the impact of corruption from those countries on economic growth via 
government expenditure on human capital and its indicators. The empirical evidence 
provided in this chapter shows that corruption does not affect the impact of government 
expenditure upon human capital on economic growth. 
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7.3 Research Contributions 
This research makes an important contribution to the literature on government 
expenditure allocation, corruption, human capital, government spending on education, 
government spending on health and economic growth. Most of the conclusions drawn 
regarding the growth effects of government spending compositions, corruption and 
human capital are based either on the experiences of a set of high-income countries or on 
the basis of large samples consisting of a mixture of low to middle and high-income 
economies. There remains limited evidence on the way of understanding the process by 
which government spending policies shape the growth prospect for low to middle-income 
economies. This trend has continued regardless of the long-standing view among 
development experts not only that there exists a significant difference in the allocation of 
government spending between low to middle-income and high-income economies, but 
also that the difference is reflective in the way in which government spending shape the 
outcome in these two sets of economies (Bose et al., 2007). Therefore, these contributions 
are not just for high-income countries but also low to middle-income economies.  
Regarding the impacts of government expenditure compositions on economic growth, 
this research is well motivated and includes an interesting review of previous comparable 
results. While the theory linking the growth effects of government expenditure 
compositions, productive and non-productive government expenditure, appears 
reasonably clear, the results from related empirical research are not, especially when 
distinguishing between the effects of changes in the absolute level of government 
expenditure and changes in relative amount of these categories. In term of absolute levels 
of expenditure compositions (as a share in GDP), empirical results have consistently 
reported a positive relationship between productive government expenditure and 
economic growth, and either a negative or no-impact relationship between non-
productive expenditure and economic growth for high-income economies. Meanwhile, 
findings on the relationship between the level of public spending and economic growth 
in low to middle-income economies are mixed. However, there are limited studies to 
investigate the impact of the relative division of total expenditure between productive and 
non-productive uses on economic growth in countries at different stages of development. 
Although there are several studies that are very similar in terms of the model estimated 
and the dataset used, previous studies are extremely heterogeneous in terms of results. 
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Chapter 4 extends the work of Devarajan et al. (1996), which studies the impact of the 
relative division of total expenditure between productive and non-productive uses on 
economic growth. The rationale for expressing productive expenditure as a ratio of total 
government expenditure is that under this measure a unit increase in the budgetary share 
of productive expenditure has to be matched by a unit decrease in non-productive 
expenditure, as the size of total spending remains fixed. Under the alternative approach 
of measurement (i.e. expenditure as a ratio of GDP), a unit increase in the share of 
productive government expenditure in GDP does not necessarily mean that other 
expenditure items are decreasing. This may lead to varied findings for different sets of 
data. Also, the popular view is that low to middle-income countries lack infrastructure 
and other type of public goods and therefore their productive spending hinders economic 
growth. This may have been correct for the data sample period from 1970s to 1990, as 
the average productive government expenditure (as a ratio of total expenditure) was 21% 
for nine developing countries during period 1971-1990 in the Devarajan et al. (1996) 
study. However, for this research samples from 1990 to 2012, low to middle-income 
countries spent a much larger proportion of public spending on productive expenditure 
components (78% in total government expenditure) which helps to develop infrastructure, 
create innovation and improve labour productivity. This may have boosted GDP per 
capital growth and achieved fruitful sustained development economics during our sample 
period. For these reasons, the contribution of the first analysis chapter is useful in terms 
of shedding some light on the fragility of the results to alterations of the model in the 
government expenditure and economic growth literature. Having used this research to fill 
some of the gaps in the public spending policies, it is important to know the following: 
1). although countries and regions may differ in their economic development levels, their 
government spending compositions as a proportion of total government expenditure have 
similar effect on long run economic growth; 2). an increase in absolute levels of 
government expenditure has a negative impact on growth in both groups of countries; 3). 
a change in the expenditure mix towards productive forms of expenditure and away from 
non-productive forms of expenditure enhances economic growth rate in both groups of 
countries. 
In evaluating fiscal policy effects on economic growth, the previous empirical studies 
have suggested that it should ideally take into account both the sources and the uses of 
funds. Also, the growth effect of public expenditure compositions depends not only on 
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the volume and structure of these spending, but also on how these expenditures are 
financed. An empirical analysis that does not incorporate the government budget 
constraint in full into the analysis could have biased results in their parameter estimates 
(Kneller et al., 1999; and Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2007). From this empirical standpoint, 
this thesis contributes to a growing debate on effects of government spending 
compositions on growth by including variables on the revenue side of the government 
budget more fully, e.g., tax revenue, non-tax revenue and budget surplus or deficit 
variables. This enables the thesis to compare with the previous studies which are 
heterogeneous in terms of results when considering the overall budget constraint. The 
thesis finds that a budget surplus has a positive and significant impact on economic 
growth for both groups, while the coefficients estimated for revenue side are negative (on 
non-tax revenue or tax revenue from high-income and low to middle-income 
respectively), the level of total public expenditure may be at or beyond its optimum and 
increasing it further would hinder economic growth. Therefore, governments should 
consider reducing total government spending and focus on reallocating funds towards 
productive and away from non-productive spending to achieve a closer to optimum 
growth level.  
Regarding the effects of corruption on economic growth, a number of contributions to 
literature are also made. Generally, the direct impact of corruption on economic growth 
has been accepted, but the literature on the channels and magnitude of the indirect effect 
has remained divided. One channel that has received limited attention in current literature 
is government expenditure. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), and Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) 
suggest that a possible reason for misallocating government funds towards non-
productive spending was attributed to the possible presence of corruption that generally 
affects government expenditure compositions. The literature finds that corruption either 
may facilitate economic growth by helping firms circumvent the burden of the public 
sector or may hinder it by increasing this burden and reducing the efficiency of 
government expenditure that contributes to productivity and growth (Huntington, 1968; 
Lui, 1985; Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Colombatto, 2003; Paul, 2010; Ugur, 
2014 and Huang, 2016). The literature highlights that whether the positive or negative 
impact dominates rely on the size of the public sector, the structure of government 
expenditure, and the level of economic development; as these factors play an important 
role in corruption outcomes (Dzhumashev, 2014). However, there are some 
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inconsistencies and gaps in the literature in explaining the dependence of the corruption 
growth nexus on these factors, which need a further research. This thesis addressed these 
gaps by capturing corruption in terms of a parameter that potentially reduces the 
productivity of government spending compositions in the analytical model. The empirical 
results in chapter 5 find that there is no evidence that corruption has a marked impact on 
the strength relationship between government expenditure, whether in from of productive 
or non-productive, and economic growth. These findings do not discount the possibility 
of corruption affecting growth through other means. For example, through altering the 
division of total government expenditure between productive and non-productive types. 
Therefore, this thesis has contributed further the understanding of corruption effect on 
government spending allocation then has impact on economic growth. The thesis is also 
the only one to compare and contrast the impact of government expenditure compositions 
on economic growth in presence of corruption between low to middle-income and high-
income economies which used both (ICRG and CPI) corruption indexes for investigation. 
The difference in economic development levels, period of time covering and range of 
corruption score indexes between countries may affect the specification results, but these 
effects are very small.  
The contribution to literature on the relationship between economic growth and 
government expenditure on human capital components (education and health) lies in 2 
case study areas, OECD and ASEAN. The matters of country heterogeneity is normally 
present on examining the link between government expenditure on human capital and 
economic growth. To properly account for heterogeneity, the solution is to estimate 
single-country regressions. However, while single-country estimates of the parameters of 
human capital can capture the heterogeneity of the individual country structures, they 
ignore some useful information contained in the common structure in a regional context. 
OECD countries or ASEAN countries share a common geographical terrain, similar 
governance structure and similarities in level of economic development and other 
similarities in culture and economic indicators. If OECD economies include a group of 
developed nations with long term experience in investment in human capital, ASEAN 
economies consist of mostly low to middle-income emerging economies that look to the 
development of their education sector and health system in order to achieve sustainable 
economic growth. This research provides a different point of view on how government 
expenditure on education and health affect economic growth in OECD and ASEAN 
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countries, especially ASEAN countries, there is a limited research that has been focused 
on them so far. This thesis found that an increase in government spending upon education 
could enhance economic growth for both sets of subsample data and this result is similar 
to the previous studies. Investment in the education sector is an essential element of long-
term economic growth in all countries. The public spending on education create skilled 
workforce and their productivity which will improve output levels of the economy. 
Meanwhile, although government spending on health has been recognised as a vital 
component of human capital, it has paid less attention in the literature on economic 
growth and development compared to government expenditure on education. The thesis 
found a negative relationship between public expenditure on health and growth in OECD 
countries and there is no significant impact of this component in ASEAN countries. An 
increase in government expenditure on health may adversely affect the public spending 
compositions and economic growth as it reduces the efficiency of public and private 
resources allocated to productive activities. Furthermore, due to rapid population ageing 
in OECD countries, higher government expenditure on health may lead to improvements 
in life expectancy without being accompanied by improvements in health status, increases 
in the active labour force and human capital formation. Also, governments in OECD 
countries may not pay enough attention to improve the efficiency and quality of public 
healthcare system. ASEAN countries however lack concentration on the important role 
of their health system. Regarding government expenditure on human capital (combination 
of education and health), this analysis observes that there is a positive and significant 
connection between this expenditure and economic growth in ASEAN economies, but 
not significant effect in OECD countries. With a positive result for the effect of 
government expenditure upon education and a negative result from impact of government 
expenditure upon health in OECD countries, it may be no surprise to find expenditure on 
human capital is insignificant, as the effects of two components cancel out each other. 
Whereas, with a higher percentage of government investment on education compared 
with health sector in ASEAN economies, this may explain why government expenditure 
on human capital has a positive and significant effect on economic growth. Therefore, 
investing in human capital and its components has an important role to play as an engine 
for economic growth thus, understanding what components influence the economic 
growth can lead to the efficient allocation resources.  
Previous efforts to examine the relationship between government expenditure 
compositions, corruption, human capital and economic growth have been affected by 
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limitations in data availability and sensitiveness of the results to small variations in the 
model specification. Recently, data quality has improved and the large numbers of 
empirical research have provided valuable information about the variables that should be 
included in economic growth model. However, there remains a need for more research to 
address two specific limitations that persist in current economic growth regressions: the 
selection of estimation method and the consequences of relying on the period-averaging 
process to capture long-term growth rates. The effects of government expenditure can be 
adequately captured by the OLS fixed effects method. Nonetheless, with the introduction 
of GMM technique by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and 
Blundell and Bond (1998), it has become popular in recent empirical studies to examine 
the growth effects of government expenditure compositions as it captures the endogeneity 
aspects of the model better given the cross-country heterogeneity in the data. However, 
this thesis found that GMM approach does not appear to be valid in some cases of our 
estimation. One of the reasons for the invalidity of GMM technique may be common 
characteristics among macro data sets. Besides, the association of economic growth to 
fiscal variables has been traditionally estimated under the form of static model in which 
the use of variables expressed in long-frequency periods accounts for the long-term 
relationship. However, some studies found the sensitivity of the results due to averaging 
process of variables (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Kneller et al., 1999; Afonso and Alegre, 
2011). The reason for these sensitive results may be due to the absence of automatic 
stabilisers in different levels of economic developments and the impact of some 
categories of public expenditure on growth distributed across several periods. This thesis 
decided to use 5-year forward moving averages for all variables, as it can remove business 
cycle effects, increase the number of time series observation in our panel data, minimise 
the reverse causality argument in the models and account for endogeneity. This thesis 
also tested the model specification with traditional 5-year average and annual data to 
examining the difference in choice of time period and found that applying a 5-year 
moving average for all variables is the most efficient and reliable method to capture the 
effect of government expenditure on long-term economic growth. For these reasons, the 
contribution of this thesis is useful is terms of shedding some light on the fragility of the 
results to alterations of the model and the methodology used. 
The outcome of this research is believed to be of strong interest to the world 
researchers in fiscal policy and economic development areas. Policy makers especially 
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those from developing countries who are looking for an ideal fiscal policy model to ensure 
sustainable economic growth are definitely benefited.  
7.4 Policy Implications 
Based on the findings and contributions of the study, a number of policy implications 
have been derived from the work contained in chapter 4 to 6. The results from this thesis 
suggest that there are significant gains (and losses) to be made from adjusting the 
government expenditure composition within a country. Although it should be cautious 
about using the parameter estimates from any study to give precise measures of the effect 
on economic growth from changes in government expenditure compositions, this thesis 
chooses to consider such changes in order to compare of the relative sizes of government 
spending and different levels of economic development between economies. Due to the 
nature of the research, some of the policy implications can overlap. First, the thesis finds 
that an increase in the levels of government expenditure has a negative impact on growth, 
while a change in the expenditure mix towards productive forms of expenditure and away 
from non-productive forms of expenditure enhances economic growth rate for both high-
income and low to middle-income economies. Therefore, governments can recognise 
which government expenditure components can have a better contribution on economic 
growth and consider reallocating public spending toward these spending. Second, a 
greater budget surplus or reduced deficit can enhance economic growth in different levels 
of economic development between economies. However, if a greater budget surplus or a 
reduced deficit is a result of an increase in non-tax revenue from high-income economies 
or tax revenues from low to middle-income, it could obstruct economic growth. Also, the 
level of total public expenditure may be at or beyond its optimum and increasing it further 
would hinder economic growth. Therefore, governments should consider reducing total 
government spending and focus on reallocating funds towards productive and away from 
non-productive spending to achieve a closer to optimum growth level.  
Third, the empirical results in chapter 4 show that low to middle-income countries 
have been following the approach of high-income countries in allocating government 
expenditure in favour of productive government spending at the expense of non-
productive expenditure, with the aim to enhance economic growth. However, this 
approach still depends on the size of the government. While low to middle-income 
countries have small governments (average total spending is about 26% of GDP) and tend 
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to concentrate spending on productive government spending, high-income countries that 
have a large government size (40% of GDP) tend to spend more on non-productive 
government compositions. Economic growth is assuredly not the only criteria a 
government considers when deciding how to allocate public spending. There are other 
crucial elements such as employment and income equality that should also be considered. 
Even when social protection spending may be an obstruction to greater growth, it may 
help promote income equality. Even though the results suggest that a rise in productive 
expenditure raises economic growth, and the opposite happens when non-productive 
expenditure increase, increasing this kind of productive expenditure compositions too 
much may be counter-productive. Hence, developing countries should pursue policies 
targeted at achieving not only higher economic growth rate by investing more money on 
infrastructure, defence, roads, communications, etc., but also improve the residence life 
quality and income equality.  
Fourth, due to the common perception that corruption is bad for economic 
development, both developing and developed countries have paid attention to the impact 
it has on economic growth and have invested resources in mitigating and controlling its 
effect. However, this analysis finds that corruption does affect the growth impact of 
different components of government expenditures, but this effect is rather small. This 
thesis gains some insights into the effectiveness of anticorruption policies in terms of 
reducing the incidence of corruption and enhancing growth simultaneously. The anti-
corruption policies should be devised by taking into account the disparity between the 
actual and the optimal government spending levels. As Dzhumashev (2014) mentioned 
that the quality of institutions and the government size and structure are not easy to 
change. Hence, change can only be implemented gradually. Nevertheless, to be more 
effective, the efforts to reduce corruption should be intrinsically woven into polices to 
develop institutional capacity and optimise the size of government spending. The policies 
should account not only for their direct effect on corruption outcomes, but also for their 
effect on the public sector burden and the productivity-enhancing government spending.  
Besides, this analysis has formulated a system of equations where corruption is 
modelled analytically as something that reduces the productivity of public spending. The 
results suggest that as corruption could reduce the share of productive spending to total 
government expenditure and this decrease can contribute to a greater economic growth 
effect for low to middle-income economies, these countries may have a high initial share 
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on productive government expenditure components. Therefore, policymakers in these 
economies should pay attention on a shift in favour of an objectively more productive 
type of expenditure because a higher share on this type may not move closer to a more 
optimum growth level. On the other hand, corruption reduces the growth benefits from 
productive spending component in high-income economies, while it helps to improve the 
negative effect of non-productive expenditure. High-income governments can still 
increase the initial share on productive government expenditure to boost economic 
growth.  
Regarding to the growth effects of government expenditure on human capital and its 
important components, the analysis results in chapter 6 provide some important policy 
implications. First, investment in the education sector is an essential element of long-term 
economic growth in all countries. The impact of public education expenditures on 
economic growth is greater in the low to middle-income countries as compared to the 
high-income nations. This is because low to middle-income countries have greater 
marginal productivity in human capital formation even though high-income countries 
invest heavily in human capital is at the advance stages of development with high skilled 
manpower. Idress and Siddiqi (2013)’s study reveals that, in case of developed countries, 
1 dollar increase in public education expenditures brings 21.85 dollars increase in GDP. 
Whereas, in developing nations, 1 dollar increase in public expenditures in education 
brings an increase of 27.29 dollars in GDP. Thus, it can be suggested that developing 
countries are catching-up the developed nations through increased investment in human 
capital. This verifies the “inverted-V hypothesis” or the “flying geese theory”. 
Developing countries replicate the teaching courses and methodologies currently 
employed by the developed nations in the most cost effective way. Thus, investment in 
education is a key to economic progress. It not only builds up human capital but also help 
in the implementation of new technologies by lowering its adoption costs. So, a country’s 
policy for economic development has to focus on educational institutions. Countries 
should strive to achieve high quality education along with ensuring education for all. This 
could be done through increased public expenditures in the education sector. The quality 
of education be improved by building up an effective and modern education system that 
could meet the challenges of modern society and the high demand for innovative 
products. Education should be made affordable for all i.e. subsidizing education that 
would increase the government cost of providing education but would lower the cost of 
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education attainment; thereby raising the demand for education and this in turn would 
increase the stock of human capital. 
Secondly, government expenditure on health tends to obstruct economic growth in 
OECD nations. They are facing complicated issues, such as, aging of the population, high 
prices for medical inputs, expensive medical technology, waiting list, access to care, 
shortage of workforce, resource allocation within the health sector and burden of huge 
and rising shares in the government spending on health. Thus, increasing public resources 
to health sector alone may be insufficient for governments to improve health status of a 
population and achieve faster accumulation of human capital and thus, economic growth. 
Governments in developed economies need to improve the efficiency and quality of the 
public healthcare system. Meanwhile, the lack of a strong link from public spending on 
health to economic growth in ASEAN countries is not necessarily a reason to reallocate 
health investment away from the health sector. The policy implications of this thesis is 
that countries that desire a high levels of per capita income, they can achieve it by 
increasing and improving the stock of health human capital, especially if current stocks 
are at lower end. In other words, the findings indicated that income is an important factor 
across low to middle-income countries in the level and growth of public spending on 
health in long-run. As well, the health-led growth hypothesis in ASEAN is not confirmed. 
These countries will also need to make a number of valuable decisions before determining 
what course of action is appropriate for their population health goals. Policymakers need 
to decide the extent to which they see health as an end in itself, or as a means to economic 
growth. This will inform their willingness to sacrifice economic goals for health goals. 
The governments need to decide how much weight they give to the health of their poorest 
people. This will then direct a relevant amount of their health and growth policies towards 
reducing poverty and disease burden amongst these groups, even at the expense of 
average health and growth. Furthermore, policymakers in developing countries need to 
research the inequalities in their own country. This will assist them in creating poverty 
reducing growth policies, and inform their population health aims. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, they need to renew strong public commitment to widespread 
distribution of health knowledge and services. This includes state political support and 
also the facilitation of public participation in demanding better health. This may, in the 
end, be of more importance than growth itself. Utilization of allocated resources in the 
health sector may depend largely on good governance and efficient institutions, and 
skilled manpower of the country. In order to reap all the benefits of such spending, the 
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authority should ensure a supportive and efficient socioeconomic structure for efficient 
utilization of resources. Particularly, in the case of ASEAN, it may be a difficult task to 
utilize such resources in the face of some practical constraints, such as inappropriate 
planning faltering monitoring and skilled manpower, widespread corruption and 
administrative bottlenecks. In such a situation, inclusion of some potential variables, such 
as good governance and democracy, may provide insights about the efficacy of such 
spending on economic growth. 
7.5 Limitations of the Research 
Although the thesis has contributed to knowledge and arrived at important findings 
and recommendations for policy makers, there are however, limitations to the study. First, 
due to data availability, the sample sizes capture of 22 low to middle-income economies 
only compared to 37 high-income countries. Therefore, the sample used for the analyses 
are not representative. This means different sample sizes and time periods, especially in 
chapter 5 with corruption indexes, are used to answer the research questions and achieve 
the research objectives. Second, this thesis applies the one-step system GMM to retest the 
robustness of the thesis baseline results, but GMM estimations do not always appear to 
be valid for all cases of this research. One possible reason for the invalidity of GMM 
technique is due to common characteristics among macro data sets. The dynamic panel 
data models, which were applied by Arellano and Bond (1991), Blundell and Bond (1998) 
or Bond et al. (2001), have focused mainly on those applicable to micro data sets, which 
normally have a large cross-section dimension with a small time-series dimension. Third, 
the research extends the works of Devarajan et al. (1996) and Ghosh and Gregoriou 
(2007) by including government budget constraint variables (tax revenues, non-tax 
revenues and surplus or deficit variables). However, the scope of this research focused on 
comparing and contrasting the government expenditure component effects on growth 
between high-income and low to middle-income economies. Therefore, the thesis has not 
captured the effects of structure of taxation (such as, distortionary and non-distortionary 
taxation) and different forms of deficit finance (by printing money, and by issuing 
domestic or external debt). Fourth, this research shows that a linear relationship between 
government spending compositions and economic growth fits the data reasonable well 
for the sub-samples of low to middle-income and high-income economies. Nonetheless, 
Barro (1990) suggested a non-linear hypothesis on the relationship between government 
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spending and economic growth. In the Barro model, when the non-linear hypothesis is 
valid and the effect of public spending on long run economic growth does fluctuate with 
its size, this would not only help to explain the vague findings in the empirical growth 
literature, but also offer clearer recommendations for a country with a particular 
government size. Some recent studies in the economic growth and fiscal policy literature 
have employed the non-linear hypothesis on their relationship. However due to the 
direction the research in the field of government spending compositions literature, this 
study has not fully attached to this current wave. Fifth, the research is not able to 
investigate all compositions of functional classifications of government expenditures, 
except government expenditure on education and health to explain economic growth in 
comparing OECD and ASEAN countries. Such other components of government 
spending analyses would have added immense knowledge to this research as such 
findings would provide better judgements for policy makers in order to relocating public 
resources efficiently. Finally, since this research simply look at the quantity of 
government spending compositions without explicitly considering their quality; the 
findings should be taken with some cautions. 
7.6 Further Research 
Based on the limitations of this thesis, a number of possible directions for future 
research have been identified. First, future research should be access to an extended panel 
dataset with a longer time dimension than current research has permitted application of 
the more flexible Pooled Mean Group estimator proposed by Pasaran et al. (1999). Pooled 
Mean Group technique enables research to explore both short run dynamic and long run 
equilibrium relationships between the variables and capture the heterogeneity across 
countries in their short run relationships. Second, the study on the effects of structure of 
taxation and different forms of deficit finance as other side of fiscal policy on economic 
growth would arrive at a more precise policy guidelines and this remains an essential area 
for further study. Third, similar to Devarajan et al. (1996) work, this thesis exercise 
government’s expenditure decision in which is taken as a given rather than deriving from 
some optimising framework. Whereas, Ghosh and Gregoriou (2007) stated that an 
attempt to study optimal fiscal policy instead of taking the government’s decisions as 
given could be a ‘fruitful extension’, thus it is worth noting to attempt to do in the further 
research in order to examine the different impact of government expenditure 
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compositions on economic growth. Fourth, this thesis found that corruption affects the 
growth impact from productive and non-productive government expenditure. However, 
the effect of corruption was not large enough to warrant a switch between these 
government spending components in the interest of long-run economic growth. Hence, it 
is worth to investigate, in future research, the factors other than corruption that reduce the 
productivity of government spending, something that was beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Fifth, with regards to some of important components of the government expenditure 
compositions, such as, infrastructure, defence and social protection that this research have 
not used, future research can employ such variables to investigate their impacts on 
economic growth. A challenge in term of finding adequate proxies to control for the 
quality of government spending among the different expenditure components considered 
in this thesis, which would be interesting for further research. Furthermore, despite its 
undeniable importance, economic growth is surely not the only criteria a government 
wants to take into account when deciding how to allocate public spending. While this 
thesis focuses on economic growth, there are other vital elements such as employment 
and income equality that should also be consider. Investigating the effects of the 
government expenditure compositions on these other key variables is also an important 
dimension for future work.  
Finally, Vietnam, a one-party communist country, initiated a vast economic reform 
program in 1986 to transform its planned economy into a socialist-oriented market 
economy. Since then, Vietnamese economy has been recognised as one of the most 
dynamic emerging economy in the world. Due to sustained high economic growth rates, 
Vietnam has escaped from being a low-income country to become a middle-income 
country. Public sector reform in Vietnam, which was initiated from the 1990s, has aimed 
to improve the quality of public governance. The main goal of the reform is to build a 
democratic, strong, clean, effective and efficient public administrative system, which 
contribute to economic development. Nonetheless, there remain challenges that limit the 
effectiveness and efficiency of government activities in the process of economic 
restructuring. Government revenue as a share of GDP is the highest in Southeast Asia and 
it is difficult to increase further in the context of a persistent economic recession. It 
averaged 25% of GDP over the period of 1993 to 2012. Meanwhile, Vietnam is at the 
high end with average 27% total government expenditure as a share of GDP over the 
period 1993 to 2012 compared to those of countries in the region. With the high 
government spending ratio, Vietnam has chosen to devote a relatively large share of its 
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national income to public purposes. This reflects a desire for a larger government role in 
society and the economy. There is very limited research have attempted to examine the 
relationship between government expenditure components and economic growth in 
Vietnam. Therefore, it is worth to investigate, in future research, the impact of 
government expenditure compositions on economic growth in Vietnam, a country has 
been transitioning from a command to market economy orientation, fully integrated into 
the global economy.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: The Solow-Swan growth equation 
The process of economic growth depends on the shape on the production function. It 
can be said that a production function, F (K, L, A) (where K is capital stock; L is labour 
force and A refer to labour-augmenting technology or knowledge (Todaro and Smith, 
2009)), is neoclassical if the following properties are satisfied: 
1. Constant returns to scale. The function F (.) displays constant returns to scale 
when the function multiply capital and labour by the same positive constant, λ, 
the output of function should get λ amount: 
 F (λK, λL, A) = λ x F (K, L, A) for all λ > 0     (1.1)
  
It is important to note that the definition of scale includes only the two rival inputs, 
capital and labour. The reason is that, while capital and labour are rival goods, 
technology is a non-rival input; so by using the replication argument, the 
definition of returns to scale makes sense (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). 
2. Positive and diminishing returns to private inputs. For all K and L > 0, the 
function displays positive and diminishing marginal product with respect to each 
input as follow: 
 
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐾
> 0; 
𝜕2𝐹
𝜕𝐾2
< 0       (1.2) 
 
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐿
> 0; 
𝜕2𝐹
𝜕𝐿2
< 0 
The neoclassical assumes that adding an additional unit of an input provides 
positive additions to output but by less than the previous unit of input in case 
holding constant the levels of other inputs.  
3. Inada conditions. The neoclassical production function has to satisfies the Inada 
conditions, following Inada (1963): 
 lim
𝐾→0 
(
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐾
) =  lim
𝐿→0 
(
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐿
) =  ∞      (1.3)
  
 lim
𝐾→∞ 
(
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐾
) =  lim
𝐿→∞ 
(
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐿
) =  0 
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4. Essentiality. It has been discussed that the assumption of essentiality to the 
definition of a neoclassical production function is necessary. An input is important 
if strictly positive amount is needed to produce a positive function. The three 
neoclassical properties in equation 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 indicate that each input is 
essential for production, which is F(0, L) = F(K, 0) = 0 (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
2004). 
The Fundamental Equation of the Solow-Swan Model 
The Solow-Swan model is assumed in continuous-time world with no government 
and closed to international trade. The aggregate production function Y (t) = F (Kt, Lt), 
where Y (t) is the flow of output produced at time t, is satisfied all four neoclassical 
properties above. In a closed economy with no public expenditure and international trade, 
all output is dedicated to consumption, C (t) or gross investment, I (t); so Y (t) = C (t) + I 
(t). In this simple economy, the amount saved, S (t) ≡ Y (t) – C (t), equals the amount 
invested, I (t). Denote s (.) be the fraction of output that is saved, the saving rate, so that 
1 – s (.) is the fraction of output that is consumed. In Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) 
articles, they assumed that the saving rate is a constant, 0 ≤ s (.) = s ≤ 1. Giving that 
saving must equal investment, so that the saving rate equals the investment rate. The 
evolution of the capital stock at a point is determined by gross investment less 
depreciation: 
 ?̇?(𝑡) =  𝐼(𝑡) −  𝛿𝐾(𝑡) = 𝑠. 𝐹[𝐾(𝑡), 𝐿(𝑡), 𝐴(𝑡)] −  𝛿𝐾(𝑡)   (1.4) 
Where a dot over a variable means differentiation with respect to time, ?̇?(𝑡) =
 𝜕𝐾(𝑡)/𝜕𝑡 and0 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 1.  
One simple production function that is often thought to provide a reasonable 
description of actual economies is the Cobb-Douglas function: 
  𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐹(𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡) = 𝐾(𝑡)𝛼(𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡))1−𝛼      (1.5)
  
  0 <  𝛼 < 1 
The 𝛼 and 1- 𝛼 are relative income shares of capital and labour respectively 
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All factors of production are fully employed, and initial values of A (0), K (0) and L 
(0) are given. In this chapter, it is simplified by assuming that population grow at a 
constant, exogenous rate, ?̇?(𝑡) 𝐿⁄ = 𝑛 ≥ 0 as well as technology grow exogenously at 
rate, ?̇?(𝑡) 𝐴⁄ = 𝑔 ≥ 0, respectively: 
  𝐿(𝑡) = 𝐿(0)𝑒𝑛𝑡       (1.6) 
  𝐴(𝑡) = 𝐴(0)𝑒𝑔𝑡       (1.7) 
The number of effective units of labour, A (t)L (t), therefore grow at rate (n + 𝑔). 
Since the production function has constant return to scale, it can be written as output per 
effective unit of labour: 
  𝑦(𝑡) =  
𝑌(𝑡)
𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡)
= 𝑘(𝑡)𝛼      (1.8) 
The main concern of Solow-Swan model is the dynamic of capital intensity, 𝑘, the 
capital stock per unit of effective labour. Its behaviour over time is given by the key 
equation of the Solow-Swan model: 
  ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑘(𝑡)𝛼 − (𝑛 + 𝑔 +  𝛿)𝑘(𝑡)     (1.9) 
The first term,𝑠𝑘(𝑡)𝛼 = 𝑠𝑦(𝑡) is the actual investment per unit of effective labour. 
The second term,(𝑛 + 𝑔 +  𝛿)𝑘(𝑡) is the break-even investment; the amount of 
investment that must be invested to prevent k from falling.  
Steady State 
Steady state is defined as a situation in which the various quantities grow at constant 
rates. In the Solow-Swan model, the steady state means that ?̇? = 0 in equation 2.9. The 
equation implies that 𝑘(𝑡) converges to a steady-state value of 𝑘∗, define by 𝑠𝑘(𝑡)𝛼 =
 (𝑛 + 𝑔 +  𝛿)𝑘(𝑡) at which there is neither an increase nor a decrease of capital intensity: 
  k∗ = (
s
n+g+ δ
)
1
1− α      
 (1.10) 
At which the stock of capital K and effective labour AL are growing at rate(𝑛 + 𝑔). Since 
𝑘 is constant in the steady state, 𝑦 and 𝑐 are also constant at the value 𝑦∗ = 𝑓(𝑘∗) and 
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𝑐∗ = (1 − 𝑠). 𝑓(𝑘∗) , respectively. Thus, once and for all changes in the level of the 
technology will be displayed by shifts of the production function, f (.). Shifts in the 
production function, in the saving rate𝑠, in the rate of population growth 𝑛 and in the 
depreciation rate 𝛿 all have impacts on the per capita levels of the various quantities in 
the steady state. It is crucial to note that one time change in all four factors above do not 
affect the steady state growth rates of per capita output, capital and consumption which 
are all still equal to zero. 
The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth key equations  
The representative household is infinitely-lived and choose consumption and saving 
to maximise its dynastic utility. The preferences of the representative household are given 
by the following function, 
  𝑢 =  ∫ 𝑒−𝑝𝑡𝑢(𝑐)𝛿𝑡
∞
0
      (1.11) 
Where𝑐𝑡: consumption per person (C/L), 𝑝 is the constant rate of time preference (𝑝 >
0)and 𝑢(𝑐) is given by the following CIES utility function’ 
  𝑢(𝑐) =  
𝑐1−𝜎−1
1− 𝜎
      (1.12) 
Which 𝜎: a constant rate of inter-temporal substitution. Household utility is 
maximised subject to a budget constraint 
  ?̇? = 𝑟𝑎 + 𝑤 − 𝑐      (1.13)  
Where the assets of the household,𝑎, rise with income, 𝑟𝑎 + 𝑤, and decrease with 
consumption, 𝑐. If we also assume that agents do not leave assets at the end of time, then 
the transversality condition is given that: 
  lim
𝑡→∞
{𝑎(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−∫ (𝑟(𝑣) − 𝑛)𝑑𝑣
𝑡
0
]} = 0   (1.14) 
Household utility equation (2.12) is substituted into equation (2.11) for u(c) and 
maximised subject to the household budget constraint equation (2.13). The growth path 
of consumption, known as a Euler equation, can be derived: 
  𝛾𝑐 = 
𝑐̇
𝑐
= 
1
𝜎
(𝑟 − 𝜌)      (1.15) 
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Hence, the growth of consumption is given by the return to saving, 𝑟, less the rate of 
time preference, 𝜌, divided by the rate at which household are willing to substitute 
consumption across time, 𝜎. 
Like the Solow-Swan model, the RCK model sets out the model with an aggregate 
production function that satisfies all four properties conditions of neoclassical growth 
theory. The aggregate production function F (K, LA) has the amount of labour is equal to 
the population in the economy and grows at a constant𝑛. The level of technology grows 
at a constant rate 𝑔similar in Solow-Swan model. The first key equation of the RCK 
model is the law of motion for capital accumulation: 
  ?̇? = 𝑓(𝑘) − 𝑐 − (𝑛 + 𝑔 +  𝛿)𝑘    (1.16) 
Where𝑓(𝑘): output per worker. Under the assumption that there is no increase in 
either population growth or technology level, this equation shows that capital per worker 
is the result of output which is not consumed minus the rate of depreciation of capital 
(Acemoglu, 2012; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).  
Steady state occurs in the RSK model when consumption and capital grow at a 
constant rate. The growth path of consumption for behaviour of firms is quite similar to 
household. It can be found in the Euler equation for the interest rate. 
  𝛾𝑐 = 
𝑐̇
𝑐
= 
1
𝜎
[𝑓′(𝑘) −  𝛿 − 𝑔 − 𝑛 − 𝜌]   (1.17) 
The growth path for capital is given by equation (2.16). Both equation (2.16) and 
(2.17) along with the initial capital stock and the transversality condition, 
lim
𝑡→∞
{𝑘𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−∫ [𝑓′(𝑘) − 𝛿 − 𝑔 − 𝑛]𝑑𝑡
𝑡
0
]} = 0, provide a system of equations which 
describe the time paths of consumption and capital. The capital/effective labour ratio is 
constant when the growth of the capital stock is exactly equal to the growth rate of labour 
and technology. It can be seen that 
?̇?
𝑘
= 
?̇?
𝐾
− 
?̇?
𝐿
− 
?̇?
𝐴
= 0 when differentiating 𝑘 =
 
𝐾
𝐴𝐿
with respect to time to yield. With
?̇?
𝐿
= 𝑛 , 
?̇?
𝐴
= 𝑔 we have the capital stock grows at 
the rate 
?̇?
𝐾
= 𝑛 + 𝑔. The growth rate of output can be calculated by differentiating the 
production function with respect of time when we assume in Cobb-Douglas technology, 
as followed: 
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?̇?
𝑌
= 𝛼
?̇?
𝐾
+ (1 − 𝛼)(
?̇?
𝐿
+ 
?̇?
𝐴
)     (1.18) 
The growth of output is equal to, 
?̇?
𝑌
= 𝑛 + 𝑔 by substituting for the growth rate of capital, 
technology and labour. If there is no growth in technology or labour force, 
?̇?
𝐿
− 
?̇?
𝐴
= 0, 
then the growth rate of capital and output are both equal to zero because of diminishing 
returns to capital (Acemoglu, 2012; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Savvides and Stengos, 
2008).  
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Appendix B: The results for Pooled OLS and two-way random effects 
Table B1: Productive and Non-productive government spending with Pooled OLS 
technique 
Estimation technique: 5 years moving 
average 
   
Dependent variable: Per capita growth    
 High Income Low to Middle Income 
Technique Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
Productive expenditure -0.0101  -0.0410*  
 (0.0150)  (0.0249)  
Non-productive 
expenditure 
 0.0114  0.0423* 
  (0.0153)  (0.0246) 
Log Initial GDP -1.6082*** -1.6078*** -0.4203 -0.4267* 
 (0.3009) (0.3009) (0.2885) (0.2832) 
Investment 0.0845** 0.0845** 0.2167*** 0.2181*** 
 (0.0338) (0.0339) (0.0321) (0.0316) 
Inflation 0.0828* 0.0827* -0.0047 -0.0047 
 (0.0502) (0.0504) (0.0047) (0.0046) 
Labour force growth -0.2359** -0.2332** -0.3565*** -0.3578*** 
 (0.1103) (0.1105) (0.1038) (0.1021) 
Openness 0.0063*** 0.0063*** -0.0032 -0.0033 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0060) (0.0059) 
Non-tax revenue -0.0333 -0.0340 -0.0610 -0.0629 
 (0.0286) (0.0283) (0.0602) (0.0601) 
Tax revenue 0.0591* 0.0585* -0.0158 -0.0131 
 (0.0319) (0.0317) (0.0661) (0.0647) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.1057*** 0.1060** 0.0413 0.0402 
 (0.0404) (0.0403) (0.0483) (0.0475) 
Constant 15.8414 14.7945 6.125* 1.9757 
 (3.8121) (3.0318) (3.6352) (2.1425) 
Observations 591 591 344 344 
No of countries 37 37 22 22 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3784 0.3787 0.5057 0.5069 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but 
not reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table B2: Productive and Non-productive government spending with two-way 
Random Effect 
Estimation technique: 5 years moving 
average 
   
Dependent variable: Per capita growth    
 High Income Low to Middle Income 
Technique Random Effect  Random Effect  
Productive expenditure -0.0099  0.0361*  
 (0.0153)  (0.0212)  
Non-productive 
expenditure 
 0.0119  -0.0312 
  (0.0167)  (0.0219) 
Log Initial GDP -2.0084*** -2.0091* 0.3355 0.3050 
 (0.4785) (0.4767) (0.3297) (0.3208) 
Investment 0.0505 0.0503 0.1791*** 0.1781*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0564) (0.0458) (0.0452) 
Inflation -0.0373 -0.0379 -0.0007 -0.0005 
 (0.0512) (0.0510) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
Labour force growth 0.0478 0.0486 -0.1850 -0.1875 
 (0.1257) (0.1254) (0.1930) (0.1921) 
Openness 0.0102** 0.0102* 0.0013 0.0008 
 (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0122) (0.0119) 
Non-tax revenue -0.0713* -0.0717* -0.0105 -0.0146 
 (0.0391) (0.0393) (0.0694) (0.0704) 
Tax revenue 0.0889* 0.0880* -0.1337* -0.1308* 
 (0.0480) (0.0480) (0.0852) (0.0856) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.1607*** 0.1612*** 0.1802*** 0.1806*** 
 (0.0517) (0.0513) (0.0577) (0.0570) 
Constant 21.2936 20.2669 -3.7972 -0.0020 
 (4.3078) (4.1532) (4.0692) (2.6603) 
Observations 591 591 344 344 
No of countries 37 37 22 22 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5629 0.5629 0.5576 0.5548 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included 
but not reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table B3: Hausman results for Random Effect vs Fixed Effect in High Income 
countries  
 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       85.97
                 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
       2010      -3.396433     -3.25808       -.1383528        .2407597
       2009       -2.83945    -2.635055       -.2043947        .2412237
       2008      -2.612674    -2.327176       -.2854985        .2393263
       2007      -2.664782    -2.294339       -.3704433        .2366858
       2006      -1.406365    -.9347955       -.4715695        .2326233
       2005      -.9013528    -.5662695       -.3350833         .214002
       2004      -1.036116    -.8436936       -.1924225        .1932945
       2003      -1.289403    -1.187369       -.1020336        .1755452
       2002      -1.059574    -.9489756       -.1105983        .1608367
       2001      -1.109223    -1.008613       -.1006095        .1425912
       2000      -.9964727    -.8500087        -.146464        .1211004
       1999      -.6544001    -.4839702       -.1704299        .1015472
       1998      -.3206174    -.1668161       -.1538013        .0776299
       1997      -.1784996    -.1024815       -.0760181        .0473036
       1996       .0038008     .0688431       -.0650424         .023928
        year  
         OPN      .0424342     .0101488        .0322854        .0058663
         SOD      .2052591     .1606661        .0445931         .017452
          TR      .1359075     .0888831        .0470244        .0326466
         NTR     -.1464641    -.0713021       -.0751619        .0212131
         LIG      -2.61911    -2.008395       -.6107149        .8331795
         LFG      .0962945     .0478114         .048483        .0354924
         INV      .0936399     .0505265        .0431134        .0174506
         INF     -.0439671    -.0373045       -.0066627        .0083999
        PGE1      .0507315      -.00991        .0606415        .0103286
                                                                              
                   fixed          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        on a similar scale.
        estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are
        be sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (10) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested (24);
. hausman fixed ., sigmamore
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                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       85.97
                 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
       2010      -3.396433     -3.25808       -.1383528        .2407597
       2009       -2.83945    -2.635055       -.2043947        .2412237
       2008      -2.612674    -2.327176       -.2854985        .2393263
       2007      -2.664782    -2.294339       -.3704433        .2366858
       2006      -1.406365    -.9347955       -.4715695        .2326233
       2005      -.9013528    -.5662695       -.3350833         .214002
       2004      -1.036116    -.8436936       -.1924225        .1932945
       2003      -1.289403    -1.187369       -.1020336        .1755452
       2002      -1.059574    -.9489756       -.1105983        .1608367
       2001      -1.109223    -1.008613       -.1006095        .1425912
       2000      -.9964727    -.8500087        -.146464        .1211004
       1999      -.6544001    -.4839702       -.1704299        .1015472
       1998      -.3206174    -.1668161       -.1538013        .0776299
       1997      -.1784996    -.1024815       -.0760181        .0473036
       1996       .0038008     .0688431       -.0650424         .023928
        year  
         OPN      .0424342     .0101488        .0322854        .0058663
         SOD      .2052591     .1606661        .0445931         .017452
          TR      .1359075     .0888831        .0470244        .0326466
         NTR     -.1464641    -.0713021       -.0751619        .0212131
         LIG      -2.61911    -2.008395       -.6107149        .8331795
         LFG      .0962945     .0478114         .048483        .0354924
         INV      .0936399     .0505265        .0431134        .0174506
         INF     -.0439671    -.0373045       -.0066627        .0083999
        PGE1      .0507315      -.00991        .0606415        .0103286
                                                                              
                   fixed          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        on a similar scale.
        estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are
        be sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (10) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested (24);
. hausman fixed ., sigmamore
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Table B4: Hausman results for Random Effect vs Fixed Effect in Low to Middle 
Income countries  
 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0052
                          =       28.20
                 chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
       2010       .2339388     .0560128         .177926        .4033996
       2009       .7315166     .5868282        .1446884        .3771385
       2008       1.092277     .9719409        .1203357        .3482676
       2007       1.057556     .9453521        .1122042        .3166667
       2006       1.637906     1.560392        .0775141        .2834385
       2005       1.635501     1.561332        .0741687        .2451381
       2004       1.185297     1.083824        .1014734        .2055748
       2003       .8915606     .7810753        .1104853        .1702925
       2002       .7454223     .6301758        .1152465         .141833
       2001       .2725002     .1482697        .1242305        .1201267
       2000      -.3018004    -.4187835         .116983        .1015333
       1999      -.5719014    -.6432253         .071324        .0856995
       1998      -.4606595    -.4947728        .0341133        .0702093
       1997      -.4420722    -.4908475        .0487753        .0516256
       1996      -.3951921    -.4231847        .0279926        .0278224
        year  
         OPN      .0058054     .0012552        .0045502        .0040143
         SOD      .2201747     .1801845        .0399903        .0225367
          TR      -.232111    -.1336907       -.0984204        .0303355
         NTR      .0068721    -.0105239         .017396        .0332024
         LIG      .4826835     .3355478        .1471356        .9020552
         LFG     -.0883089    -.1849694        .0966605        .0402427
         INV      .1955586     .1791226         .016436        .0162521
         INF      .0000356    -.0006942        .0007297        .0010152
        PGE1      .0648235      .036062        .0287615        .0102725
                                                                              
                   fixed          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        on a similar scale.
        estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are
        be sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (12) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested (24);
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                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0052
                          =       28.20
                 chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
       2010       .2339388     .0560128         .177926        .4033996
       2009       .7315166     .5868282        .1446884        .3771385
       2008       1.092277     .9719409        .1203357        .3482676
       2007       1.057556     .9453521        .1122042        .3166667
       2006       1.637906     1.560392        .0775141        .2834385
       2005       1.635501     1.561332        .0741687        .2451381
       2004       1.185297     1.083824        .1014734        .2055748
       2003       .8915606     .7810753        .1104853        .1702925
       2002       .7454223     .6301758        .1152465         .141833
       2001       .2725002     .1482697        .1242305        .1201267
       2000      -.3018004    -.4187835         .116983        .1015333
       1999      -.5719014    -.6432253         .071324        .0856995
       1998      -.4606595    -.4947728        .0341133        .0702093
       1997      -.4420722    -.4908475        .0487753        .0516256
       1996      -.3951921    -.4231847        .0279926        .0278224
        year  
         OPN      .0058054     .0012552        .0045502        .0040143
         SOD      .2201747     .1801845        .0399903        .0225367
          TR      -.232111    -.1336907       -.0984204        .0303355
         NTR      .0068721    -.0105239         .017396        .0332024
         LIG      .4826835     .3355478        .1471356        .9020552
         LFG     -.0883089    -.1849694        .0966605        .0402427
         INV      .1955586     .1791226         .016436        .0162521
         INF      .0000356    -.0006942        .0007297        .0010152
        PGE1      .0648235      .036062        .0287615        .0102725
                                                                              
                   fixed          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
        on a similar scale.
        estimators for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are
        be sure this is what you expect, or there may be problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (12) does not equal the number of coefficients being tested (24);
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Appendix C: List of countries covered for chapter 5 by using ICRG 
corruption index. 
High-income Economies Low to Middle-income Economies 
Country Classification Country Classification 
Bahamas High Income Ethiopia Low Income 
Bahrain High Income Kenya Low Income 
Croatia High Income Bolivia Lower Middle Income 
Cyprus High Income Egypt Lower Middle Income 
Latvia High Income India Lower Middle Income 
Malta High Income Indonesia Lower Middle Income 
Oman High Income Philippines Lower Middle Income 
Singapore High Income Sri Lanka Lower Middle Income 
Australia High Income OECD Vietnam Lower Middle Income 
Austria High Income OECD Zambia Lower Middle Income 
Belgium High Income OECD Bulgaria Upper Middle Income 
Canada High Income OECD China Upper Middle Income 
Chile High Income OECD Costa Rica Upper Middle Income 
Czech Republic High Income OECD Hungary Upper Middle Income 
Denmark High Income OECD Iran Upper Middle Income 
Estonia High Income OECD Jordan Upper Middle Income 
Finland High Income OECD Lebanon Upper Middle Income 
France High Income OECD Romania Upper Middle Income 
Germany High Income OECD Thailand Upper Middle Income 
Greece High Income OECD Tunisia Upper Middle Income 
Iceland High Income OECD     
Ireland High Income OECD     
Israel High Income OECD     
Italy High Income OECD     
South Korea High Income OECD     
Luxembourg High Income OECD     
Netherlands High Income OECD     
New Zealand High Income OECD     
Norway High Income OECD     
Poland High Income OECD     
Portugal High Income OECD     
Slovak Republic High Income OECD     
Slovenia High Income OECD     
Spain High Income OECD     
Sweden High Income OECD     
Switzerland High Income OECD     
United Kingdom High Income OECD     
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Appendix D: List of countries covered for chapter 5 by using CPI 
corruption index. 
High-income Economies Low to Middle-income Economies 
Country Classification Country Classification 
Croatia High Income Ethiopia Low Income 
Latvia High Income Kenya Low Income 
Singapore High Income Bolivia Lower Middle Income 
Australia High Income OECD Egypt Lower Middle Income 
Austria High Income OECD India Lower Middle Income 
Belgium High Income OECD Indonesia Lower Middle Income 
Canada High Income OECD Philippines Lower Middle Income 
Chile High Income OECD Vietnam Lower Middle Income 
Czech Republic High Income OECD Zambia Lower Middle Income 
Denmark High Income OECD Bulgaria Upper Middle Income 
Estonia High Income OECD China Upper Middle Income 
Finland High Income OECD Costa Rica Upper Middle Income 
France High Income OECD Hungary Upper Middle Income 
Germany High Income OECD Jordan Upper Middle Income 
Greece High Income OECD Romania Upper Middle Income 
Iceland High Income OECD Thailand Upper Middle Income 
Ireland High Income OECD Tunisia Upper Middle Income 
Israel High Income OECD Mauritius Upper Middle Income 
Italy High Income OECD     
South Korea High Income OECD     
Luxembourg High Income OECD     
Netherlands High Income OECD     
New Zealand High Income OECD     
Norway High Income OECD     
Poland High Income OECD     
Portugal High Income OECD     
Slovak Republic High Income OECD     
Slovenia High Income OECD     
Spain High Income OECD     
Sweden High Income OECD     
Switzerland High Income OECD     
United Kingdom High Income OECD     
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Appendix E: Robustness test with new classification based on ICRG 
index in chapter 5 
This further robustness test was carried out by using new classification based on ICRG 
index. As table 18 makes clear that higher corruption index is available not only in low-
income countries but also in high-income countries, while this index varies among 
middle-income countries. Hague and Kneller (2015) also recognise the same distribution 
of the corruption score for their sample data for the period from 1980 to 2003. They decide 
to use this information for their subsequent empirical analysis with two groups of 
countries within the corruption data, those with low corruption (an average score of 4 or 
above) and those with medium to high corruption (an average score of less than 4). 
Similar to their study, this robustness test reruns the regression with two new groups of 
countries, those with ICRG average score >= 4 (20 countries) and those with ICRG 
average score <4 (37 countries), to see the relationship between government expenditure 
compositions and long-term economic growth and examine results with the presence of 
corruption in government expenditure components. The list of countries based on new 
classification can be seen in Appendix C. It can be seen that those countries with ICRG 
greater than 4 have only two countries from outside of OECD countries (Cyprus and 
Singapore), while those countries with ICRG lower than 4 have the mix countries from 
all 3 categories of income: low-income, middle-income and high-income economies. This 
classification has changed our descriptive statistics compared to the original set of data. 
Table E1 provides the summary descriptive statistics for the new groups of country 
classification. Economies with ICRG greater than 4 have a lower average growth rate 
than those with ICRG lower than 4, at 1.8% and 3.2% respectively. These countries (with 
ICRG greater than 4) also have a lower average growth rate than our high-income 
countries in original data, at 1.8% compared with 2.6% respectively. Meanwhile, these 
countries have bigger size of government expenditure than counterpart group, which 
account for approximately 44% and 30% of total GDP respectively. Similar to low and 
middle-income economies, those economies (with ICRG lower than 4) have small 
government sizes tend to spend government expenditure on productive government 
spending. They spend over 75% of total public spending on productive spending, while 
counterpart group just spends 58% of their total public spending on productive spending 
and allocates a larger share of total expenditure to non-productive spending (42%). 
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Moving to other fiscal and explanatory variables, the descriptive statistics results are 
similar to original set of data. 
Table E1: Descriptive statistics 
  
 Countries with ICRG >4 Countries with ICRG <4 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Growth rate 1.857 1.325 3.212 2.578 
Productive government 
expenditure (% TGE) 
57.933 9.978 71.489 13.557 
Non-productive government 
expenditure (% TGE) 
42.183 9.768 28.657 13.511 
Total government 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
43.736 9.007 29.757 10.349 
Deficit or Surplus (% of 
GDP) 
-0.155 4.057 -2.669 3.863 
Tax Revenue (% of GDP) 27.402 6.677 16.644 6.207 
Non-Tax Revevue (% of 
GDP) 
15.132 5.596 11.034 7.079 
Log Initial p.c. GDP (constant 
2005 US$) 
10.489 0.347 8.369 1.352 
Investment (Gross capital 
formation as % of GDP) 
21.692 3.165 24.583 5.768 
Inflation rate (%) 2.328 1.335 9.705 22.428 
Labour force growth (p.a) 1.291 0.979 1.693 1.840 
Openness (Sum of exports and 
imports as % of GDP) 
102.479 80.003 86.267 35.415 
 
Table E2 reports the effects of productive and non-productive government expenditure 
without presence of corruption on economic growth in new classification country groups. 
For those countries with ICRG average score greater than 4, productive government 
spending has a positive and statistically significant effect on per capita growth rate, while 
non-productive government spending is significant negative, at 5.5% and -6.8% 
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respectively. Even the number of high-income countries in the group set has changed, the 
effects of government expenditure compositions on growth rate are consistent and it 
proves that high-income countries tend to be optimum in relocating their public spending 
in order to achieve both sustained development economics and standard of living. On the 
other hand, the productive expenditure has a negative but insignificant impact on 
economic growth, while non-productive is positive and again insignificant for those 
countries with ICRG score lower than 4. The reason for this insignificance may be due to 
the different share of productive and non-productive expenditure components on total 
government expenditure inside the group, as this group included all three different kinds 
of income categories. This makes the group sample data have large skewness and kurtosis. 
These results are similar to the results of full sample data set in our baseline set of 
equations in chapter 4. For other control variables, the coefficients of those variables are 
similar to the main results in part 5.4. The coefficient associated to investment is 
somehow positive and significant for those countries with ICRG lower than 4 only, while 
international trade has a positive and significant impact on economic growth in our 
sample of countries with ICRG bigger than 4. Regarding the budget constraint variables, 
tax-revenue coefficients find to have a negative impact on growth for both sets of sub-
group sample and this is opposite to our main results. Surprisingly, we find labour force 
growth coefficient show negative and significant effects on long-term growth for those 
countries with ICRG lower than 4 only.  
Table E2: Contribution of productive and non-productive spending to growth in 
countries with ICRG greater than 4 and countries with ICRG lower than 4 
(without corruption) 
Estimation technique: 5 years moving average - two way Fixed Effects   
Dependent variable: Per capita growth (without 
corruption) 
    
  Country with ICRG 
greater than 4 
Countries with ICRG lower than 
4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Productive expenditure 0.0554*  -0.0149   
(0.0268)  (0.0335)  
Non-productive expenditure -0.0675**  0.0176  
 (0.0253)  (0.0332) 
Log Initial GDP 1.2276 1.2332 -0.1209 -0.1276  
(2.8292) (2.8766) (1.8450) (1.8463) 
Investment -0.0320 -0.0201 0.1737*** 0.1735***  
(0.06311) (0.0630) (0.0535) (0.0533) 
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Inflation -0.1045 -0.1095 -0.0019 -0.0019  
(0.1217) (0.1214) (0.0052) (0.0052) 
Labour force growth 0.1889 0.1621 -0.4379*** -0.4394***  
(0.1755) (0.1726) (0.1543) (0.1543) 
Openness 0.0176* 0.0199* 0.0053 0.0051  
(0.0190) (0.0104) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
Non-tax revenue -0.1191* -0.1298** -0.2607** -0.2621**  
(0.0613) (0.0605) (0.0975) (0.0973) 
Tax revenue 0.0874 0.0815 0.0630 0.0648  
(0.0925) (0.0924) (0.1252) (0.1259) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.0539 0.0521 0.3991*** 0.3997***  
(0.0617) (0.0620) (0.0676) (0.0673) 
Constant -14.8748 -9.0761 4.9589 3.4585  
(29.239) (29.101) (14.461) (13.727) 
Observations 319 319 576 576 
No of countries 20 20 37 37 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7466 0.7492 0.4269 0.4272 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but not 
reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
   
 
Table E3 repeats result of table E2, but this table considers the role of corruption in 
government expenditure compositions to examine the effect of corruption on economic 
growth. For those countries with ICRG greater than 4, the finding shows that the 
coefficient on (1 − 𝛿). 𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 is 0.054. The corruption-adjusted coefficient of productive 
expenditure in this group is still positive and significant, but the productivity benefits of 
its spending turn out to be lower. The impact of corruption on economic growth in this 
case is bad, but the effect is rather small, 𝛿𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑜 = -0.001. In term of non-productive 
government spending, the corruption-adjusted coefficient of this expenditure for this 
group is again negative and significant (-0.066), but is not as negative as when did not 
take into account corruption. Therefore, with the impact of corruption on non-productive 
spending, it provides a better outlook for non-productive government spending on 
economic growth. These results are similar to our main results in table 18 with the case 
of high-income economies. However, the effect of corruption on economic growth rate is 
rather small for both productive and non-productive components, as the portion of 
corruption index contributed into these spending varies from 1% to 2% only. Regarding 
those countries with ICRG lower than 4, the results show a similar insignificant impact 
of both productive and non-productive spending on economic growth. Corruption in this 
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group does not change the results in table E2 to be significance. Other control variables 
coefficients are similar to the results before we take into account the impact of corruption. 
 
Table E3: Contribution of productive and non-productive spending to growth in 
countries with ICRG greater than 4 and countries with ICRG lower than 4 (with 
presence of corruption) 
Estimation technique: 5 years moving average - two way Fixed Effects   
Dependent variable: Per capita growth (Corruption captured)     
  Country with ICRG greater 
than 4 
Countries with ICRG 
lower than 4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Productive expenditure 0.0542*  -0.0170   
(0.0268)  (0.0373)  
Non-productive expenditure -0.0661**  0.0247  
 (0.0251)  (0.0346) 
Log Initial GDP 1.2156 1.2332 0.1933 0.1911  
(2.8218) (2.8847) (1.767) (1.7600) 
Investment -0.0297 -0.0201 0.1892*** 0.1876***  
(0.0631) (0.0630) (0.0546) (0.0540) 
Inflation -0.1061 -0.1095 -0.0007 -0.0007  
(0.1221) (0.1219) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
Labour force growth 0.1846 0.1621 -0.4174*** -0.4212***  
(0.1746) (0.1712) (0.1486) (0.1489) 
Openness 0.0178* 0.0199* 0.0078 0.0075  
(0.0117) (0.0103) (0.0144) (0.0145) 
Non-tax revenue -0.1203** -0.1298** -0.2548** -0.2581**  
(0.0607) (0.0598) (0.1024) (0.1281) 
Tax revenue 0.0878 0.0815 0.0536 0.0568  
(0.0934) (0.0934) (0.1281) (0.1281) 
Surplus or Deficit 0.0530 0.0521 0.3823*** 0.3840***  
(0.0616) (0.0618) (0.0693) (0.0690) 
Constant -14.8541 -9.0761 1.6632 -0.1180  
(29.128) (29.188) (13.958) (13.050) 
Observations 319 319 576 576 
No of countries 20 20 37 37 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7475 0.7503 0.4329 0.4339 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses. Country and time dummies included but not 
reported 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Appendix F: The correlation matrix between variables with presence of corruption variable 
  GRO INF INV LFG LIG NTR OPN SOD TR PGE1 UPGE1 
Growth (GRO) 
                      
Inflation (INF) 
-0.0083                     
Investment (INV) 
0.5182 -0.1026                   
Labour force growth (LFG) 
-0.1661 -0.1029 0.0044                 
Log initial GDP (LIG)  
-0.3017 -0.2242 -0.176 -0.192               
Non-tax revenue (NTR) 
-0.2432 -0.0201 -0.1824 -0.1151 0.5186             
Openness (OPN) 
-0.0058 -0.0725 0.0298 0.1366 0.2764 0.0905           
Surplus or deficit (SOD) 
0.065 -0.0479 0.0699 0.0845 0.297 0.2246 0.2704         
Tax revenue (TR) 
-0.2027 -0.1132 -0.3466 -0.3681 0.6268 0.2051 0.0099 0.1602       
Productive spending (PGE1) 
0.1258 0.1001 0.1692 0.4505 -0.6785 -0.5839 0.0255 -0.1339 -0.6269     
Non-productive spending 
(UPGE1) 
-0.1242 -0.0963 -0.1746 -0.4504 0.6747 0.5856 -0.0273 0.1356 0.6247 -0.9984   
Corruption index (ICRG) 
-0.2061 -0.0665 -0.2546 -0.2013 0.6847 0.2721 0.1132 0.3054 0.6616 -0.5148 0.5202 
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Appendix G: List of countries covered for chapter 6  
High-income Economies ASEAN Economies 
Country Classification Country Classification 
Australia High Income OECD Indonesia Lower Middle Income 
Austria High Income OECD Philippines Lower Middle Income 
Belgium High Income OECD Vietnam Lower Middle Income 
Canada High Income OECD Thailand Upper Middle Income 
Denmark High Income OECD Singapore High Income 
Estonia High Income OECD     
Finland High Income OECD     
France High Income OECD     
Germany High Income OECD     
Greece High Income OECD     
Iceland High Income OECD     
Ireland High Income OECD     
Israel High Income OECD     
Italy High Income OECD     
Luxembourg High Income OECD     
Netherlands High Income OECD     
New Zealand High Income OECD     
Norway High Income OECD     
Portugal High Income OECD     
Slovak High Income OECD     
Slovenia High Income OECD     
Spain High Income OECD     
Sweden High Income OECD     
Switzerland High Income OECD     
United Kingdom High Income OECD     
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Appendix H: The correlation matrix between variables with presence of human capital and its components 
(education and health) 
Appendix H1: The correlation matrix between variables with presence of human capital and its components (education and health) 
for ASEAN countries 
  GRO INF INV LFG LIG NTR OPN SOD TR HMC EDU  
Growth (GRO)                       
 
Inflation (INF) -0.2481                     
 
Investment (INV) 0.4188 -0.0126                   
 
Labour force growth (LFG) -0.1073 -0.014 -0.1317                 
 
Log initial GDP (LIG)  -0.0185 -0.5753 -0.0399 0.3634               
 
Non-tax revenue (NTR) 0.4204 -0.2306 0.5521 0.1296 0.4461             
 
Openness (OPN) 0.138 -0.5506 0.0465 0.4786 0.9287 0.5828           
 
Surplus or deficit (SOD) 0.1808 -0.4234 0.1129 0.4631 0.8966 0.546 0.8739         
 
Tax revenue (TR) -0.0786 0.009 0.4175 -0.2761 -0.0112 0.1269 -0.0424 -0.0651       
 
Human capital spending (HMC) -0.0178 -0.7287 0.1013 -0.0377 0.6048 0.0632 0.5454 0.4112 0.3915     
 
Education spending (EDU) -0.0348 -0.7477 0.0267 0.0551 0.5914 0.0166 0.5585 0.4136 0.2901 0.9629   
 
Health spending (HEA) 0.0156 -0.5589 0.2142 -0.195 0.5155 0.1339 0.4203 0.33 0.4977 0.8787 0.7174 
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Appendix H2: The correlation matrix between variables with presence of human capital and its components (education and health) 
for OECD countries 
  GRO INF INV LFG LIG NTR OPN SOD TR HMC EDU 
Growth (GRO)                       
Inflation (INF) 0.4783                     
Investment (INV) 0.4226 0.5183                   
Labour force growth (LFG) 0.0552 0.0323 0.1241                 
Log initial GDP (LIG)  -0.4313 -0.4856 -0.5422 0.2343               
Non-tax revenue (NTR) -0.0694 -0.077 -0.0614 -0.3186 -0.0668             
Openness (OPN) 0.1455 0.0407 0.1027 0.1719 0.1942 0.0504           
Surplus or deficit (SOD) 0.1809 0.1441 0.1048 0.1748 0.4069 -0.0396 0.1527         
Tax revenue (TR) -0.1101 -0.1107 -0.3634 -0.0033 0.4686 -0.3335 -0.1134 0.4225       
Human capital spending 
(HMC) 
0.0785 0.2537 0.191 -0.0709 -0.1786 -0.195 -0.0692 0.0912 0.0417     
Education spending (EDU) 0.1648 0.2844 0.1464 0.0379 -0.1028 -0.2219 0.2344 0.205 0.1499 0.7745   
Health spending (HEA) -0.0356 0.12 0.1545 -0.1446 -0.1768 -0.0891 -0.3278 -0.0541 -0.0779 0.8012 0.242 
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Appendix I: The results for testing whether the coefficients of interested variables 
(productive, non-productive, education, health and human capital government 
expenditure) before and after corruption adjustment are significant different from 
each other under “suest” command in Stata 
This thesis run the "suest" (Seemingly Unrelated Estimation) command on Stata to test 
the significant difference of interested variable coefficients before and after corruption 
adjustment. The test name is “seemingly unrelated estimation” which was developed by 
Weesie (1999) to examine whether some relationship between the estimators holds either 
on different datasets, on overlapping datasets, or on the same dataset. Such a hypothesis 
is often that the coefficients estimated by one estimator are equal to the coefficients 
estimated by the other estimator. 
System Hypothesis: 
H0: Coefficient of interested variable before corruption adjustment = coefficient of 
interested variable after corruption adjustment 
H1: Coefficient of interested variable before corruption adjustment ≠ coefficient of 
interested variable after corruption adjustment 
Table I1: Result for testing the coefficient of productive government expenditure in 
high-income economies before and after ICRG adjustment 
  Robust           
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
PGE1 0.0507315 0.0152179 3.33 0.001 0.0209051 0.080558 
INF -0.0439671 0.0263885 -1.67 0.096 -0.0956877 0.0077534 
INV 0.0936399 0.0301292 3.11 0.002 0.0345876 0.1526921 
LFG 0.0962945 0.0652647 1.48 0.14 -0.031622 0.224211 
LIG -2.61911 1.158271 -2.26 0.024 -4.88928 -0.3489405 
NTR -0.1464641 0.0298297 -4.91 0 -0.2049293 -0.0879989 
TR 0.1359075 0.0419785 3.24 0.001 0.0536312 0.2181838 
SOD 0.2052591 0.0303854 6.76 0 0.1457048 0.2648135 
OPN 0.0424342 0.0066984 6.33 0 0.0293055 0.0555629 
_Iyear_1996 0.0038008 0.240337 0.02 0.987 -0.4672511 0.4748526 
_Iyear_1997 -0.1784996 0.2414544 -0.74 0.46 -0.6517416 0.2947424 
_Iyear_1998 -0.3206174 0.2526956 -1.27 0.205 -0.8158916 0.1746569 
_Iyear_1999 -0.6544001 0.2692088 -2.43 0.015 -1.18204 -0.1267606 
_Iyear_2000 -0.9964727 0.2661915 -3.74 0 -1.518198 -0.474747 
_Iyear_2001 -1.109223 0.2828353 -3.92 0 -1.66357 -0.5548759 
_Iyear_2002 -1.059574 0.3010331 -3.52 0 -1.649588 -0.4695599 
_Iyear_2003 -1.289403 0.3275807 -3.94 0 -1.931449 -0.6473561 
_Iyear_2004 -1.036116 0.3438744 -3.01 0.003 -1.710098 -0.3621347 
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_Iyear_2005 -0.9013528 0.3533627 -2.55 0.011 -1.593931 -0.2087746 
_Iyear_2006 -1.406365 0.3676953 -3.82 0 -2.127035 -0.6856954 
_Iyear_2007 -2.664782 0.3799874 -7.01 0 -3.409544 -1.92002 
_Iyear_2008 -2.612674 0.3674955 -7.11 0 -3.332952 -1.892397 
_Iyear_2009 -2.83945 0.3688869 -7.7 0 -3.562455 -2.116445 
_Iyear_2010 -3.396433 0.397305 -8.55 0 -4.175136 -2.617729 
_Iid_2 1.761679 0.5538058 3.18 0.001 0.6762398 2.847119 
_Iid_3 -4.064948 1.063752 -3.82 0 -6.149863 -1.980034 
_Iid_4 -2.795454 1.703571 -1.64 0.101 -6.134392 0.5434848 
_Iid_5 -1.688337 0.6962882 -2.42 0.015 -3.053037 -0.3236373 
_Iid_6 0.3077672 0.3618805 0.85 0.395 -0.4015057 1.01704 
_Iid_7 -2.760301 1.835931 -1.5 0.133 -6.358659 0.8380577 
_Iid_8 -1.041489 1.655115 -0.63 0.529 -4.285455 2.202476 
_Iid_9 -2.468202 0.8532011 -2.89 0.004 -4.140446 -0.7959586 
_Iid_10 -0.7121999 1.561421 -0.46 0.648 -3.772529 2.348129 
_Iid_11 -2.801866 0.8495043 -3.3 0.001 -4.466864 -1.136868 
_Iid_12 -0.5651357 2.201916 -0.26 0.797 -4.880812 3.75054 
_Iid_13 2.076164 0.5628043 3.69 0 0.9730875 3.17924 
_Iid_14 3.432494 0.6043606 5.68 0 2.247969 4.617019 
_Iid_15 3.37548 0.6345184 5.32 0 2.131846 4.619113 
_Iid_16 3.052714 0.8251319 3.7 0 1.435485 4.669943 
_Iid_17 0.2012623 0.5744364 0.35 0.726 -0.9246124 1.327137 
_Iid_18 -0.7760501 0.831313 -0.93 0.351 -2.405394 0.8532934 
_Iid_19 -0.0662182 0.8409212 -0.08 0.937 -1.714393 1.581957 
_Iid_20 1.396871 0.3961783 3.53 0 0.6203757 2.173366 
_Iid_21 -0.6081955 1.193175 -0.51 0.61 -2.946775 1.730384 
_Iid_22 1.499925 2.487631 0.6 0.547 -3.375741 6.375591 
_Iid_23 -6.080386 1.314896 -4.62 0 -8.657536 -3.503237 
_Iid_24 -4.26442 1.523747 -2.8 0.005 -7.250909 -1.277931 
_Iid_25 0.950311 0.7084007 1.34 0.18 -0.4381288 2.338751 
_Iid_26 -1.82 0.4298935 -4.23 0 -2.662576 -0.9774242 
_Iid_27 0.3390525 1.009414 0.34 0.737 -1.639363 2.317468 
_Iid_28 0.0104554 1.691182 0.01 0.995 -3.3042 3.325111 
_Iid_29 2.327462 1.773431 1.31 0.189 -1.148398 5.803322 
_Iid_30 0.3622765 0.8855571 0.41 0.682 -1.373384 2.097936 
_Iid_31 -13.96783 2.626991 -5.32 0 -19.11664 -8.81902 
_Iid_32 -0.5609575 1.834381 -0.31 0.76 -4.156278 3.034363 
_Iid_33 -0.0353256 1.151358 -0.03 0.976 -2.291946 2.221295 
_Iid_34 1.56349 0.5851105 2.67 0.008 0.4166941 2.710285 
_Iid_35 0.9804005 0.6147168 1.59 0.111 -0.2244223 2.185223 
_Iid_36 1.393408 0.7540082 1.85 0.065 -0.0844207 2.871237 
_Iid_37 2.179606 0.422955 5.15 0 1.35063 3.008583 
_cons 20.28159 11.30658 1.79 0.073 -1.878896 42.44208 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
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_cons 0.1857056 0.0658844 2.82 0.005 0.0565745 0.3148367 
              
eqn2_mean             
PGEICRG 0.0471113 0.0160524 2.93 0.003 0.0156492 0.0785733 
INF -0.0612725 0.0254485 -2.41 0.016 -0.1111506 -0.0113943 
INV 0.097376 0.0314708 3.09 0.002 0.0356944 0.1590576 
LFG 0.1350866 0.0616515 2.19 0.028 0.0142518 0.2559214 
LIG -1.959309 1.11571 -1.76 0.079 -4.146059 0.2274423 
NTR -0.1509553 0.030902 -4.88 0 -0.2115221 -0.0903884 
TR 0.1244194 0.0418178 2.98 0.003 0.0424581 0.2063807 
SOD 0.2024592 0.0314804 6.43 0 0.1407587 0.2641597 
OPN 0.0408953 0.0067468 6.06 0 0.0276718 0.0541189 
_Iyear_1996 0.0960515 0.2333927 0.41 0.681 -0.3613897 0.5534927 
_Iyear_1997 -0.0413199 0.2347905 -0.18 0.86 -0.5015008 0.418861 
_Iyear_1998 -0.2057669 0.2518192 -0.82 0.414 -0.6993235 0.2877897 
_Iyear_1999 -0.5646121 0.2688159 -2.1 0.036 -1.091482 -0.0377426 
_Iyear_2000 -0.9303656 0.2650832 -3.51 0 -1.449919 -0.4108122 
_Iyear_2001 -1.056914 0.2822872 -3.74 0 -1.610187 -0.5036416 
_Iyear_2002 -1.020421 0.3009093 -3.39 0.001 -1.610192 -0.4306494 
_Iyear_2003 -1.271288 0.3255563 -3.9 0 -1.909367 -0.6332094 
_Iyear_2004 -1.03184 0.340218 -3.03 0.002 -1.698655 -0.3650252 
_Iyear_2005 -0.9109895 0.3480685 -2.62 0.009 -1.593191 -0.2287879 
_Iyear_2006 -1.428757 0.3614638 -3.95 0 -2.137213 -0.7203012 
_Iyear_2007 -2.705536 0.3745258 -7.22 0 -3.439593 -1.971479 
_Iyear_2008 -2.661155 0.3609777 -7.37 0 -3.368659 -1.953652 
_Iyear_2009 -2.887456 0.3624386 -7.97 0 -3.597822 -2.177089 
_Iyear_2010 -3.446107 0.390563 -8.82 0 -4.211596 -2.680617 
_Iid_2 1.746969 0.5598084 3.12 0.002 0.6497646 2.844173 
_Iid_3 -3.865196 1.068941 -3.62 0 -5.960282 -1.77011 
_Iid_4 -2.428299 1.732299 -1.4 0.161 -5.823544 0.9669449 
_Iid_5 -1.520795 0.7128488 -2.13 0.033 -2.917953 -0.1236368 
_Iid_6 0.2901277 0.3570802 0.81 0.417 -0.4097367 0.9899921 
_Iid_7 -1.791945 1.782926 -1.01 0.315 -5.286417 1.702527 
_Iid_8 -0.1891727 1.598373 -0.12 0.906 -3.321927 2.943581 
_Iid_9 -2.114762 0.8640592 -2.45 0.014 -3.808287 -0.4212375 
_Iid_10 0.0292017 1.533803 0.02 0.985 -2.976997 3.035401 
_Iid_11 -2.772926 0.8489747 -3.27 0.001 -4.436886 -1.108967 
_Iid_12 0.0668504 2.136461 0.03 0.975 -4.120537 4.254237 
_Iid_13 2.118477 0.5686183 3.73 0 1.004005 3.232948 
_Iid_14 3.464231 0.6051477 5.72 0 2.278163 4.650299 
_Iid_15 3.32739 0.6319823 5.27 0 2.088728 4.566053 
_Iid_16 3.396576 0.8230567 4.13 0 1.783414 5.009737 
_Iid_17 0.0533899 0.5640841 0.09 0.925 -1.052195 1.158975 
_Iid_18 -0.8128209 0.8563544 -0.95 0.343 -2.491245 0.8656028 
_Iid_19 0.3546236 0.8372616 0.42 0.672 -1.286379 1.995626 
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_Iid_20 1.53126 0.3994605 3.83 0 0.7483315 2.314188 
_Iid_21 -0.1583224 1.183259 -0.13 0.894 -2.477467 2.160823 
_Iid_22 2.66672 2.418956 1.1 0.27 -2.074346 7.407786 
_Iid_23 -6.272033 1.334063 -4.7 0 -8.886749 -3.657317 
_Iid_24 -3.537299 1.504994 -2.35 0.019 -6.487034 -0.587564 
_Iid_25 0.8909777 0.7213511 1.24 0.217 -0.5228444 2.3048 
_Iid_26 -1.653773 0.4390183 -3.77 0 -2.514233 -0.7933133 
_Iid_27 0.1113995 0.9709363 0.11 0.909 -1.791601 2.0144 
_Iid_28 0.65931 1.722078 0.38 0.702 -2.715901 4.034521 
_Iid_29 3.404591 1.705816 2 0.046 0.0612529 6.74793 
_Iid_30 0.7718831 0.8811382 0.88 0.381 -0.955116 2.498882 
_Iid_31 -13.44897 2.681175 -5.02 0 -18.70398 -8.193964 
_Iid_32 0.3460185 1.80073 0.19 0.848 -3.183348 3.875385 
_Iid_33 0.6171163 1.153045 0.54 0.593 -1.64281 2.877043 
_Iid_34 1.675812 0.5915516 2.83 0.005 0.516392 2.835232 
_Iid_35 1.017456 0.6154746 1.65 0.098 -0.188852 2.223764 
_Iid_36 1.036939 0.724089 1.43 0.152 -0.3822493 2.456128 
_Iid_37 2.132751 0.41581 5.13 0 1.317779 2.947724 
_cons 13.98839 10.97082 1.28 0.202 -7.514021 35.4908 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons 0.1545161 0.063758 2.42 0.015 0.0295527 0.2794796 
 
. test [eqn1_mean]PGE1=[eqn2_mean]PGEICRG 
      
 [eqn1_mean]PGE1 - [eqn2_mean]PGEICRG = 0   
      
 chi2(  1) =    0.86    
 
Prob > chi2 =    0.3530 
    
Table I2: Result for testing the coefficient of non-productive government 
expenditure in high-income economies before and after ICRG adjustment 
    Robust         
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
UPGE1 -0.0498319 0.0165403 -3.01 0.003 -0.0822503 -0.0174135 
INF -0.0442001 0.0264779 -1.67 0.095 -0.0960958 0.0076956 
INV 0.0935323 0.0303796 3.08 0.002 0.0339894 0.1530752 
LFG 0.0934735 0.0655998 1.42 0.154 -0.0350998 0.2220468 
LIG -2.534145 1.159963 -2.18 0.029 -4.80763 -0.2606601 
NTR -0.1475618 0.0299193 -4.93 0 -0.2062026 -0.088921 
TR 0.1338604 0.0421178 3.18 0.001 0.0513111 0.2164098 
SOD 0.2060042 0.0305091 6.75 0 0.1462076 0.2658009 
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OPN 0.041532 0.0066749 6.22 0 0.0284494 0.0546146 
_Iyear_1996 0.0077231 0.2414873 0.03 0.974 -0.4655833 0.4810295 
_Iyear_1997 -0.1782894 0.2432429 -0.73 0.464 -0.6550368 0.2984579 
_Iyear_1998 -0.3272528 0.2534168 -1.29 0.197 -0.8239407 0.169435 
_Iyear_1999 -0.6643553 0.2704084 -2.46 0.014 -1.194346 -0.1343647 
_Iyear_2000 -1.008226 0.2668289 -3.78 0 -1.531201 -0.4852513 
_Iyear_2001 -1.123553 0.2836954 -3.96 0 -1.679586 -0.5675203 
_Iyear_2002 -1.076392 0.301639 -3.57 0 -1.667594 -0.4851903 
_Iyear_2003 -1.30854 0.3280298 -3.99 0 -1.951466 -0.6656131 
_Iyear_2004 -1.05945 0.3441133 -3.08 0.002 -1.733899 -0.3850001 
_Iyear_2005 -0.9251245 0.3542243 -2.61 0.009 -1.619391 -0.2308576 
_Iyear_2006 -1.430682 0.36881 -3.88 0 -2.153536 -0.7078278 
_Iyear_2007 -2.687162 0.3808549 -7.06 0 -3.433624 -1.9407 
_Iyear_2008 -2.63508 0.3686212 -7.15 0 -3.357564 -1.912595 
_Iyear_2009 -2.857066 0.3700825 -7.72 0 -3.582414 -2.131717 
_Iyear_2010 -3.414699 0.3988738 -8.56 0 -4.196477 -2.63292 
_Iid_2 1.791675 0.5553921 3.23 0.001 0.7031262 2.880223 
_Iid_3 -4.055365 1.095157 -3.7 0 -6.201832 -1.908897 
_Iid_4 -2.657884 1.72379 -1.54 0.123 -6.03645 0.7206822 
_Iid_5 -1.601876 0.6910626 -2.32 0.02 -2.956334 -0.2474184 
_Iid_6 0.3251546 0.370019 0.88 0.38 -0.4000693 1.050379 
_Iid_7 -2.587664 1.834647 -1.41 0.158 -6.183505 1.008178 
_Iid_8 -0.9027941 1.656661 -0.54 0.586 -4.14979 2.344201 
_Iid_9 -2.36666 0.853134 -2.77 0.006 -4.038772 -0.6945477 
_Iid_10 -0.5882545 1.564828 -0.38 0.707 -3.655261 2.478752 
_Iid_11 -2.78716 0.8587348 -3.25 0.001 -4.470249 -1.10407 
_Iid_12 -0.3902099 2.203364 -0.18 0.859 -4.708725 3.928305 
_Iid_13 2.085513 0.5663059 3.68 0 0.9755739 3.195452 
_Iid_14 3.439767 0.6075008 5.66 0 2.249087 4.630447 
_Iid_15 3.376708 0.6388257 5.29 0 2.124632 4.628783 
_Iid_16 3.095248 0.826398 3.75 0 1.475538 4.714959 
_Iid_17 0.2035712 0.5750084 0.35 0.723 -0.9234246 1.330567 
_Iid_18 -0.7166217 0.8309975 -0.86 0.388 -2.345347 0.9121034 
_Iid_19 0.0178955 0.8411497 0.02 0.983 -1.630728 1.666519 
_Iid_20 1.408222 0.3980846 3.54 0 0.6279908 2.188454 
_Iid_21 -0.5367792 1.211165 -0.44 0.658 -2.910619 1.837061 
_Iid_22 1.643098 2.490359 0.66 0.509 -3.237915 6.524111 
_Iid_23 -5.885223 1.294134 -4.55 0 -8.42168 -3.348766 
_Iid_24 -4.0915 1.520046 -2.69 0.007 -7.070734 -1.112265 
_Iid_25 0.9999501 0.7067202 1.41 0.157 -0.3851961 2.385096 
_Iid_26 -1.785574 0.4319814 -4.13 0 -2.632242 -0.9389065 
_Iid_27 0.3484829 1.018704 0.34 0.732 -1.64814 2.345105 
_Iid_28 0.1150859 1.712724 0.07 0.946 -3.241792 3.471963 
_Iid_29 2.455053 1.77236 1.39 0.166 -1.018708 5.928815 
_Iid_30 0.4713209 0.8808272 0.54 0.593 -1.255069 2.197711 
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_Iid_31 -13.65302 2.645652 -5.16 0 -18.8384 -8.467638 
_Iid_32 -0.3872769 1.836531 -0.21 0.833 -3.986812 3.212258 
_Iid_33 0.0825725 1.148255 0.07 0.943 -2.167967 2.333112 
_Iid_34 1.589058 0.5845127 2.72 0.007 0.4434337 2.734682 
_Iid_35 1.014108 0.620739 1.63 0.102 -0.202518 2.230734 
_Iid_36 1.379109 0.7567214 1.82 0.068 -0.1040377 2.862256 
_Iid_37 2.192622 0.4312405 5.08 0 1.347406 3.037838 
_cons 24.5654 11.65212 2.11 0.035 1.727667 47.40313 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
_cons 0.1887405 0.0659553 2.86 0.004 0.0594704 0.3180106 
              
eqn2_mean             
UPGEICRG -0.0448344 0.0176177 -2.54 0.011 -0.0793645 -0.0103042 
INF -0.0591845 0.0257157 -2.3 0.021 -0.1095863 -0.0087828 
INV 0.0955488 0.0315148 3.03 0.002 0.0337809 0.1573168 
LFG 0.1342694 0.0617985 2.17 0.03 0.0131466 0.2553923 
LIG -1.912551 1.123093 -1.7 0.089 -4.113772 0.2886701 
NTR -0.1536203 0.0311108 -4.94 0 -0.2145962 -0.0926443 
TR 0.1238645 0.0418661 2.96 0.003 0.0418084 0.2059205 
SOD 0.2027449 0.0316182 6.41 0 0.1407744 0.2647154 
OPN 0.0398025 0.0067345 5.91 0 0.0266031 0.0530018 
_Iyear_1996 0.0984205 0.2340333 0.42 0.674 -0.3602763 0.5571173 
_Iyear_1997 -0.0489112 0.2365883 -0.21 0.836 -0.5126158 0.4147934 
_Iyear_1998 -0.222314 0.2521904 -0.88 0.378 -0.716598 0.27197 
_Iyear_1999 -0.587648 0.2694146 -2.18 0.029 -1.115691 -0.059605 
_Iyear_2000 -0.9612298 0.2645115 -3.63 0 -1.479663 -0.4427967 
_Iyear_2001 -1.09621 0.2814383 -3.9 0 -1.647819 -0.5446009 
_Iyear_2002 -1.066351 0.2992288 -3.56 0 -1.652829 -0.4798731 
_Iyear_2003 -1.321517 0.3233601 -4.09 0 -1.955291 -0.6877427 
_Iyear_2004 -1.087499 0.3375212 -3.22 0.001 -1.749028 -0.4259691 
_Iyear_2005 -0.964257 0.3463846 -2.78 0.005 -1.643158 -0.2853557 
_Iyear_2006 -1.479654 0.3607119 -4.1 0 -2.186636 -0.7726713 
_Iyear_2007 -2.75208 0.3741443 -7.36 0 -3.485389 -2.018771 
_Iyear_2008 -2.706501 0.3613594 -7.49 0 -3.414752 -1.998249 
_Iyear_2009 -2.92758 0.3641302 -8.04 0 -3.641262 -2.213898 
_Iyear_2010 -3.485587 0.3936771 -8.85 0 -4.25718 -2.713994 
_Iid_2 1.796355 0.5612072 3.2 0.001 0.6964086 2.8963 
_Iid_3 -3.856113 1.108996 -3.48 0.001 -6.029706 -1.682521 
_Iid_4 -2.332313 1.782384 -1.31 0.191 -5.825722 1.161096 
_Iid_5 -1.445122 0.7145559 -2.02 0.043 -2.845625 -0.0446178 
_Iid_6 0.3255965 0.3684251 0.88 0.377 -0.3965034 1.047696 
_Iid_7 -1.715905 1.796138 -0.96 0.339 -5.236271 1.804461 
_Iid_8 -0.1661764 1.617325 -0.1 0.918 -3.336075 3.003722 
_Iid_9 -2.027556 0.879028 -2.31 0.021 -3.750419 -0.3046927 
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_Iid_10 0.084772 1.554811 0.05 0.957 -2.962601 3.132145 
_Iid_11 -2.735859 0.8603676 -3.18 0.001 -4.422148 -1.049569 
_Iid_12 0.1813951 2.152124 0.08 0.933 -4.036691 4.399481 
_Iid_13 2.195924 0.5719211 3.84 0 1.07498 3.316869 
_Iid_14 3.440331 0.609722 5.64 0 2.245298 4.635364 
_Iid_15 3.347489 0.6378582 5.25 0 2.09731 4.597668 
_Iid_16 3.377477 0.8338559 4.05 0 1.74315 5.011805 
_Iid_17 0.1116143 0.5628354 0.2 0.843 -0.9915229 1.214751 
_Iid_18 -0.7831073 0.8650316 -0.91 0.365 -2.478538 0.9123234 
_Iid_19 0.3689146 0.8561779 0.43 0.667 -1.309163 2.046992 
_Iid_20 1.45227 0.4008468 3.62 0 0.6666245 2.237915 
_Iid_21 -0.1296742 1.218572 -0.11 0.915 -2.518032 2.258683 
_Iid_22 2.67041 2.439434 1.09 0.274 -2.110792 7.451612 
_Iid_23 -5.982387 1.306891 -4.58 0 -8.543846 -3.420927 
_Iid_24 -3.423664 1.519294 -2.25 0.024 -6.401425 -0.4459029 
_Iid_25 1.007387 0.7161891 1.41 0.16 -0.3963176 2.411092 
_Iid_26 -1.606922 0.445408 -3.61 0 -2.479905 -0.7339382 
_Iid_27 0.1707172 0.9808527 0.17 0.862 -1.751719 2.093153 
_Iid_28 0.7167618 1.773132 0.4 0.686 -2.758514 4.192037 
_Iid_29 3.397237 1.720926 1.97 0.048 0.0242844 6.77019 
_Iid_30 0.855464 0.8840547 0.97 0.333 -0.8772513 2.588179 
_Iid_31 -13.03564 2.707109 -4.82 0 -18.34148 -7.729807 
_Iid_32 0.443692 1.825408 0.24 0.808 -3.134042 4.021426 
_Iid_33 0.6769796 1.163633 0.58 0.561 -1.6037 2.957659 
_Iid_34 1.674619 0.5949414 2.81 0.005 0.5085554 2.840683 
_Iid_35 1.085242 0.6224527 1.74 0.081 -0.1347426 2.305227 
_Iid_36 1.065924 0.7285676 1.46 0.143 -0.3620419 2.493891 
_Iid_37 2.124116 0.422171 5.03 0 1.296676 2.951556 
_cons 18.22789 11.37442 1.6 0.109 -4.065572 40.52134 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons 0.1583639 0.0640219 2.47 0.013 0.0328833 0.2838445 
 
. test [eqn1_mean]UPGE1=[eqn2_mean]UPGEICRG 
      
 
[eqn1_mean]UPGE1 - 
[eqn2_mean]UPGEICRG = 0   
      
 chi2(  1) =    1.38    
 Prob > chi2 =    0.2403    
 
Table I3: Result for testing the coefficient of productive government expenditure in 
low to middle-income economies before and after ICRG adjustment 
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  Robust           
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
PGE1 0.0447862 0.01645 2.72 0.006 0.012545 0.077028 
INF 0.0019932 0.003262 0.61 0.541 -0.0044 0.008386 
INV 0.1988606 0.02813 7.07 0 0.143727 0.253994 
LFG -0.155817 0.100463 -1.55 0.121 -0.35272 0.041086 
LIG -0.2191268 0.668842 -0.33 0.743 -1.53003 1.09178 
NTR -0.036643 0.040103 -0.91 0.361 -0.11524 0.041957 
TR -0.1908802 0.045255 -4.22 0 -0.27958 -0.10218 
SOD 0.2462485 0.039554 6.23 0 0.168724 0.323773 
OPN -0.0048104 0.008402 -0.57 0.567 -0.02128 0.011657 
_Iyear_1996 -0.4347397 0.360807 -1.2 0.228 -1.14191 0.272429 
_Iyear_1997 -0.4428086 0.347031 -1.28 0.202 -1.12298 0.23736 
_Iyear_1998 -0.5382082 0.3656 -1.47 0.141 -1.25477 0.178354 
_Iyear_1999 -0.6210163 0.353449 -1.76 0.079 -1.31376 0.071731 
_Iyear_2000 -0.2433563 0.342207 -0.71 0.477 -0.91407 0.427357 
_Iyear_2001 0.4178792 0.37752 1.11 0.268 -0.32205 1.157804 
_Iyear_2002 0.9392635 0.391374 2.4 0.016 0.172185 1.706343 
_Iyear_2003 1.23163 0.376273 3.27 0.001 0.494148 1.969111 
_Iyear_2004 1.592749 0.393455 4.05 0 0.821591 2.363906 
_Iyear_2005 2.082858 0.376354 5.53 0 1.345218 2.820498 
_Iyear_2006 2.083154 0.429873 4.85 0 1.240618 2.92569 
_Iyear_2007 1.471619 0.431075 3.41 0.001 0.626729 2.31651 
_Iyear_2008 1.493399 0.436473 3.42 0.001 0.637927 2.348871 
_Iyear_2009 1.113241 0.458061 2.43 0.015 0.215459 2.011023 
_Iyear_2010 0.5888119 0.493895 1.19 0.233 -0.3792 1.556828 
_Iid_2 1.558691 0.842724 1.85 0.064 -0.09302 3.210399 
_Iid_3 -0.6154696 0.860184 -0.72 0.474 -2.3014 1.070459 
_Iid_4 -0.8616242 1.100765 -0.78 0.434 -3.01908 1.295835 
_Iid_5 0.5955583 0.322835 1.84 0.065 -0.03719 1.228304 
_Iid_6 -1.420846 1.173487 -1.21 0.226 -3.72084 0.879145 
_Iid_7 2.43001 1.313361 1.85 0.064 -0.14413 5.004151 
_Iid_8 -1.15946 0.667853 -1.74 0.083 -2.46843 0.149507 
_Iid_9 -3.636121 0.663022 -5.48 0 -4.93562 -2.33662 
_Iid_10 -4.449589 1.063194 -4.19 0 -6.53341 -2.36577 
_Iid_11 0.2424226 0.698531 0.35 0.729 -1.12667 1.611519 
_Iid_12 -2.686774 0.563595 -4.77 0 -3.7914 -1.58215 
_Iid_13 -0.1480001 1.494622 -0.1 0.921 -3.07741 2.781406 
_Iid_14 -2.686149 0.710572 -3.78 0 -4.07884 -1.29346 
_Iid_15 0.7276409 0.959914 0.76 0.448 -1.15376 2.609037 
_Iid_16 0.1979187 0.622578 0.32 0.751 -1.02231 1.418149 
_Iid_17 -2.679321 1.008728 -2.66 0.008 -4.65639 -0.70225 
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_Iid_18 0.4079934 0.692372 0.59 0.556 -0.94903 1.765018 
_Iid_19 -1.458048 0.944221 -1.54 0.123 -3.30869 0.392591 
_Iid_20 -1.902556 0.549832 -3.46 0.001 -2.98021 -0.8249 
_cons 1.431657 5.096051 0.28 0.779 -8.55642 11.41973 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
_cons 0.2991986 0.069904 4.28 0 0.16219 0.436207 
              
eqn2_mean             
PGEICRG 0.0499142 0.016511 3.02 0.003 0.017554 0.082274 
INF 0.0016965 0.003238 0.52 0.6 -0.00465 0.008044 
INV 0.1978741 0.028118 7.04 0 0.142765 0.252983 
LFG -0.1519651 0.099806 -1.52 0.128 -0.34758 0.043651 
LIG -0.2120464 0.659664 -0.32 0.748 -1.50496 1.080872 
NTR -0.0344901 0.039889 -0.86 0.387 -0.11267 0.043692 
TR -0.1912281 0.044615 -4.29 0 -0.27867 -0.10378 
SOD 0.2435098 0.03962 6.15 0 0.165856 0.321164 
OPN -0.0047601 0.008353 -0.57 0.569 -0.02113 0.011611 
_Iyear_1996 -0.4300712 0.360934 -1.19 0.233 -1.13749 0.277346 
_Iyear_1997 -0.4328046 0.348135 -1.24 0.214 -1.11514 0.249528 
_Iyear_1998 -0.5188899 0.367127 -1.41 0.158 -1.23845 0.200665 
_Iyear_1999 -0.5970539 0.354728 -1.68 0.092 -1.29231 0.098199 
_Iyear_2000 -0.2100697 0.344999 -0.61 0.543 -0.88626 0.466116 
_Iyear_2001 0.4589134 0.382251 1.2 0.23 -0.29028 1.208112 
_Iyear_2002 0.9892842 0.396252 2.5 0.013 0.212646 1.765923 
_Iyear_2003 1.288755 0.381111 3.38 0.001 0.541792 2.035718 
_Iyear_2004 1.654989 0.398177 4.16 0 0.874578 2.435401 
_Iyear_2005 2.145578 0.380763 5.63 0 1.399295 2.89186 
_Iyear_2006 2.146925 0.433394 4.95 0 1.297489 2.996361 
_Iyear_2007 1.536943 0.433633 3.54 0 0.687038 2.386848 
_Iyear_2008 1.552972 0.438617 3.54 0 0.693298 2.412646 
_Iyear_2009 1.171857 0.460043 2.55 0.011 0.270189 2.073526 
_Iyear_2010 0.6450191 0.494574 1.3 0.192 -0.32433 1.614365 
_Iid_2 1.624207 0.838391 1.94 0.053 -0.01901 3.267424 
_Iid_3 -0.5718515 0.850929 -0.67 0.502 -2.23964 1.095939 
_Iid_4 -0.8980355 1.084413 -0.83 0.408 -3.02345 1.227375 
_Iid_5 0.615806 0.322218 1.91 0.056 -0.01573 1.247341 
_Iid_6 -1.440355 1.166357 -1.23 0.217 -3.72637 0.845663 
_Iid_7 2.419472 1.304772 1.85 0.064 -0.13783 4.976778 
_Iid_8 -1.196196 0.664245 -1.8 0.072 -2.49809 0.1057 
_Iid_9 -3.646798 0.644871 -5.66 0 -4.91072 -2.38288 
_Iid_10 -4.445278 1.047288 -4.24 0 -6.49792 -2.39263 
_Iid_11 0.2115481 0.690821 0.31 0.759 -1.14244 1.565533 
_Iid_12 -2.683688 0.561381 -4.78 0 -3.78397 -1.5834 
_Iid_13 -0.1830558 1.452456 -0.13 0.9 -3.02982 2.663705 
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_Iid_14 -2.70759 0.69951 -3.87 0 -4.07861 -1.33658 
_Iid_15 0.7720382 0.954424 0.81 0.419 -1.0986 2.642675 
_Iid_16 0.1491753 0.621813 0.24 0.81 -1.06956 1.367905 
_Iid_17 -2.670921 0.992011 -2.69 0.007 -4.61523 -0.72661 
_Iid_18 0.4304607 0.684898 0.63 0.53 -0.91191 1.772836 
_Iid_19 -1.464576 0.941149 -1.56 0.12 -3.3092 0.380043 
_Iid_20 -1.954918 0.545375 -3.58 0 -3.02383 -0.886 
_cons 1.074015 4.99867 0.21 0.83 -8.7232 10.87123 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons 0.2948723 0.069888 4.22 0 0.157894 0.431851 
 
. test [eqn1_mean]PGE1=[eqn2_mean]PGEICRG 
   
 [eqn1_mean]PGE1 - [eqn2_mean]PGEICRG = 
   
 chi2(  1) =    13.76 
 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0003 
 
 
Table I4: Result for testing the coefficient of non-productive government 
expenditure in low to middle-income economies before and after ICRG adjustment 
  Robust           
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
UPGE1 -0.038342 0.0169795 -2.26 0.024 -0.07162 -0.00506 
INF 0.0022215 0.0032969 0.67 0.5 -0.00424 0.008683 
INV 0.1954984 0.0282927 6.91 0 0.140046 0.250951 
LFG -0.1581362 0.1024491 -1.54 0.123 -0.35893 0.04266 
LIG -0.2019974 0.6967083 -0.29 0.772 -1.56752 1.163526 
NTR -0.0412626 0.040374 -1.02 0.307 -0.12039 0.037869 
TR -0.1911163 0.0463462 -4.12 0 -0.28195 -0.10028 
SOD 0.252287 0.0396482 6.36 0 0.174578 0.329996 
OPN -0.0051695 0.0084176 -0.61 0.539 -0.02167 0.011329 
_Iyear_1996 -0.4374801 0.3601224 -1.21 0.224 -1.14331 0.268347 
_Iyear_1997 -0.450467 0.3462974 -1.3 0.193 -1.1292 0.228263 
_Iyear_1998 -0.5475039 0.3656055 -1.5 0.134 -1.26408 0.16907 
_Iyear_1999 -0.6284846 0.3544654 -1.77 0.076 -1.32322 0.066255 
_Iyear_2000 -0.2567407 0.3413368 -0.75 0.452 -0.92575 0.412267 
_Iyear_2001 0.3957283 0.3761269 1.05 0.293 -0.34147 1.132924 
_Iyear_2002 0.9104597 0.3899221 2.33 0.02 0.146226 1.674693 
_Iyear_2003 1.197554 0.3751793 3.19 0.001 0.462217 1.932892 
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_Iyear_2004 1.556268 0.391885 3.97 0 0.788188 2.324349 
_Iyear_2005 2.043476 0.373975 5.46 0 1.310499 2.776454 
_Iyear_2006 2.04065 0.4278223 4.77 0 1.202134 2.879166 
_Iyear_2007 1.42565 0.4303117 3.31 0.001 0.582255 2.269045 
_Iyear_2008 1.451063 0.4362909 3.33 0.001 0.595948 2.306178 
_Iyear_2009 1.067534 0.4583613 2.33 0.02 0.169162 1.965906 
_Iyear_2010 0.5428305 0.4954144 1.1 0.273 -0.42816 1.513825 
_Iid_2 1.466458 0.8504724 1.72 0.085 -0.20044 3.133353 
_Iid_3 -0.5620798 0.8614688 -0.65 0.514 -2.25053 1.126368 
_Iid_4 -0.8247355 1.142026 -0.72 0.47 -3.06307 1.413594 
_Iid_5 0.6107857 0.31766 1.92 0.055 -0.01182 1.233388 
_Iid_6 -1.239003 1.210794 -1.02 0.306 -3.61212 1.134109 
_Iid_7 2.386834 1.345219 1.77 0.076 -0.24975 5.023414 
_Iid_8 -1.023916 0.6708494 -1.53 0.127 -2.33876 0.290925 
_Iid_9 -3.55295 0.6714672 -5.29 0 -4.869 -2.2369 
_Iid_10 -4.414482 1.084176 -4.07 0 -6.53943 -2.28954 
_Iid_11 0.2913061 0.710961 0.41 0.682 -1.10215 1.684764 
_Iid_12 -2.632911 0.5712378 -4.61 0 -3.75252 -1.51331 
_Iid_13 0.0161002 1.547591 0.01 0.992 -3.01712 3.049324 
_Iid_14 -2.605723 0.7154427 -3.64 0 -4.00797 -1.20348 
_Iid_15 0.6503978 0.9755098 0.67 0.505 -1.26157 2.562362 
_Iid_16 0.3153711 0.6121678 0.52 0.606 -0.88446 1.515198 
_Iid_17 -2.614645 1.021785 -2.56 0.011 -4.61731 -0.61198 
_Iid_18 0.3785273 0.7080299 0.53 0.593 -1.00919 1.76624 
_Iid_19 -1.329449 0.945807 -1.41 0.16 -3.1832 0.524298 
_Iid_20 -1.790671 0.5516743 -3.25 0.001 -2.87193 -0.70941 
_cons 5.802507 4.257244 1.36 0.173 -2.54154 14.14655 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
_cons 0.3047234 0.069448 4.39 0 0.168608 0.440839 
              
eqn2_mean             
UPGEICRG -0.0374906 0.0176614 -2.12 0.034 -0.07211 -0.00287 
INF 0.0023862 0.003306 0.72 0.47 -0.00409 0.008866 
INV 0.1956239 0.0283048 6.91 0 0.140148 0.2511 
LFG -0.1602267 0.1026407 -1.56 0.119 -0.3614 0.040945 
LIG -0.22533 0.6996773 -0.32 0.747 -1.59667 1.146012 
NTR -0.0427232 0.040464 -1.06 0.291 -0.12203 0.036585 
TR -0.1898438 0.046542 -4.08 0 -0.28106 -0.09862 
SOD 0.2538099 0.039658 6.4 0 0.176082 0.331538 
OPN -0.0053775 0.008426 -0.64 0.523 -0.02189 0.011137 
_Iyear_1996 -0.4379801 0.359962 -1.22 0.224 -1.14349 0.267533 
_Iyear_1997 -0.4513825 0.3458118 -1.31 0.192 -1.12916 0.226396 
_Iyear_1998 -0.5504088 0.365116 -1.51 0.132 -1.26602 0.165205 
_Iyear_1999 -0.6313241 0.3541313 -1.78 0.075 -1.32541 0.062761 
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_Iyear_2000 -0.2611669 0.3405094 -0.77 0.443 -0.92855 0.406219 
_Iyear_2001 0.3897305 0.3749826 1.04 0.299 -0.34522 1.124683 
_Iyear_2002 0.9025971 0.3888121 2.32 0.02 0.14054 1.664655 
_Iyear_2003 1.18861 0.3740202 3.18 0.001 0.455544 1.921676 
_Iyear_2004 1.54569 0.3908097 3.96 0 0.779717 2.311663 
_Iyear_2005 2.03298 0.3729947 5.45 0 1.301924 2.764037 
_Iyear_2006 2.030258 0.4271152 4.75 0 1.193128 2.867389 
_Iyear_2007 1.415091 0.4297409 3.29 0.001 0.572814 2.257367 
_Iyear_2008 1.442095 0.4357533 3.31 0.001 0.588034 2.296155 
_Iyear_2009 1.059213 0.4578268 2.31 0.021 0.161889 1.956537 
_Iyear_2010 0.5354865 0.4952267 1.08 0.28 -0.43514 1.506113 
_Iid_2 1.451063 0.852725 1.7 0.089 -0.22025 3.122373 
_Iid_3 -0.5565306 0.8648032 -0.64 0.52 -2.25151 1.138453 
_Iid_4 -0.7770813 1.146379 -0.68 0.498 -3.02394 1.46978 
_Iid_5 0.6056802 0.3179077 1.91 0.057 -0.01741 1.228768 
_Iid_6 -1.245837 1.215816 -1.02 0.306 -3.62879 1.13712 
_Iid_7 2.438864 1.345834 1.81 0.07 -0.19892 5.07665 
_Iid_8 -1.000626 0.6724477 -1.49 0.137 -2.3186 0.317347 
_Iid_9 -3.520563 0.6752882 -5.21 0 -4.8441 -2.19702 
_Iid_10 -4.391161 1.089711 -4.03 0 -6.52696 -2.25537 
_Iid_11 0.3284269 0.7114612 0.46 0.644 -1.06601 1.722865 
_Iid_12 -2.634691 0.572631 -4.6 0 -3.75703 -1.51236 
_Iid_13 0.10912 1.555179 0.07 0.944 -2.93898 3.157215 
_Iid_14 -2.576423 0.7180285 -3.59 0 -3.98373 -1.16911 
_Iid_15 0.6544396 0.977657 0.67 0.503 -1.26173 2.570612 
_Iid_16 0.3432263 0.6116639 0.56 0.575 -0.85561 1.542066 
_Iid_17 -2.576267 1.025314 -2.51 0.012 -4.58585 -0.56669 
_Iid_18 0.3907822 0.710903 0.55 0.583 -1.00256 1.784127 
_Iid_19 -1.309912 0.9463824 -1.38 0.166 -3.16479 0.544964 
_Iid_20 -1.769062 0.5537063 -3.19 0.001 -2.85431 -0.68382 
_cons 5.925037 4.273793 1.39 0.166 -2.45144 14.30152 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons 0.3063865 0.0694435 4.41 0 0.17028 0.442493 
 
. test [eqn1_mean]UPGE1=[eqn2_mean]UPGEICRG 
      
 
[eqn1_mean]UPGE1 - 
[eqn2_mean]UPGEICRG = 0   
      
 chi2(  1) =    0.83    
 Prob > chi2 =    0.3615    
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Table I5: Result for testing the coefficient of productive government expenditure in 
high-income economies before and after CPI adjustment 
  Robust           
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
PGE1 0.155066 0.035958 4.31 0 0.08459 0.225543 
INF -0.20752 0.064325 -3.23 0.001 -0.3336 -0.08145 
INV 0.275627 0.061261 4.5 0 0.155559 0.395696 
LFG 0.086831 0.172631 0.5 0.615 -0.25152 0.425181 
LIG -5.42731 1.515557 -3.58 0 -8.39775 -2.45688 
NTR -0.30821 0.073299 -4.2 0 -0.45187 -0.16454 
TR -0.13152 0.085439 -1.54 0.124 -0.29898 0.035937 
SOD 0.218833 0.048647 4.5 0 0.123487 0.314178 
OPN 0.054523 0.01162 4.69 0 0.031749 0.077297 
_Iyear_2001 0.092626 0.243675 0.38 0.704 -0.38497 0.57022 
_Iyear_2002 0.330232 0.23287 1.42 0.156 -0.12618 0.786649 
_Iyear_2003 0.185517 0.24652 0.75 0.452 -0.29765 0.668687 
_Iyear_2004 0.49341 0.259906 1.9 0.058 -0.016 1.002816 
_Iyear_2005 0.691917 0.275266 2.51 0.012 0.152406 1.231428 
_Iyear_2006 0.098605 0.286175 0.34 0.73 -0.46229 0.659499 
_Iyear_2007 -1.15268 0.304265 -3.79 0 -1.74903 -0.55634 
_Iyear_2008 -1.00682 0.315517 -3.19 0.001 -1.62522 -0.38842 
_Iyear_2009 -1.11257 0.347836 -3.2 0.001 -1.79432 -0.43083 
_Iyear_2010 -1.62254 0.38219 -4.25 0 -2.37161 -0.87346 
_Iid_2 4.815866 1.345193 3.58 0 2.179336 7.452396 
_Iid_3 0.363337 1.336525 0.27 0.786 -2.25621 2.982878 
_Iid_4 2.996245 0.817531 3.66 0 1.393914 4.598576 
_Iid_5 -9.0555 2.487202 -3.64 0 -13.9303 -4.18067 
_Iid_6 -4.16877 2.221753 -1.88 0.061 -8.52333 0.185782 
_Iid_7 -5.11142 2.383561 -2.14 0.032 -9.78311 -0.43972 
_Iid_8 4.028518 1.736929 2.32 0.02 0.624201 7.432835 
_Iid_9 -6.45468 2.945877 -2.19 0.028 -12.2285 -0.68086 
_Iid_10 6.010062 1.29709 4.63 0 3.467812 8.552312 
_Iid_11 7.110974 1.443171 4.93 0 4.28241 9.939538 
_Iid_12 6.150078 1.56623 3.93 0 3.080323 9.219833 
_Iid_13 2.590832 1.421275 1.82 0.068 -0.19482 5.37648 
_Iid_14 3.04869 0.846715 3.6 0 1.389159 4.70822 
_Iid_15 -2.16345 1.256498 -1.72 0.085 -4.62614 0.299245 
_Iid_16 -0.60285 1.256487 -0.48 0.631 -3.06552 1.859818 
_Iid_17 3.683999 0.855169 4.31 0 2.007899 5.3601 
_Iid_18 -7.81815 2.01515 -3.88 0 -11.7678 -3.86853 
_Iid_19 -7.30881 3.310509 -2.21 0.027 -13.7973 -0.82033 
_Iid_20 -4.40393 2.502026 -1.76 0.078 -9.30781 0.499952 
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_Iid_21 2.611839 1.529104 1.71 0.088 -0.38515 5.608828 
_Iid_22 -0.85034 0.512811 -1.66 0.097 -1.85544 0.154747 
_Iid_23 6.648222 1.905125 3.49 0 2.914245 10.3822 
_Iid_24 -0.47712 2.405359 -0.2 0.843 -5.19154 4.237294 
_Iid_25 -1.02643 1.43389 -0.72 0.474 -3.83681 1.783942 
_Iid_26 -24.9731 4.67293 -5.34 0 -34.1319 -15.8143 
_Iid_27 -5.42893 2.784135 -1.95 0.051 -10.8857 0.027875 
_Iid_28 -1.27751 1.991957 -0.64 0.521 -5.18167 2.626654 
_Iid_29 0.309022 1.278349 0.24 0.809 -2.1965 2.814541 
_Iid_30 6.264777 1.18861 5.27 0 3.935143 8.59441 
_Iid_31 2.238262 1.398717 1.6 0.11 -0.50317 4.979698 
_Iid_32 5.379299 0.791266 6.8 0 3.828447 6.930151 
_cons 45.72528 14.53266 3.15 0.002 17.24179 74.20876 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
_cons -0.08806 0.067867 -1.3 0.194 -0.22107 0.044958 
              
eqn2_mean             
PGECPI 0.159031 0.035971 4.42 0 0.088529 0.229532 
INF -0.2045 0.064581 -3.17 0.002 -0.33108 -0.07792 
INV 0.27378 0.061342 4.46 0 0.153552 0.394008 
LFG 0.094832 0.172502 0.55 0.582 -0.24327 0.432929 
LIG -5.6627 1.525824 -3.71 0 -8.65326 -2.67214 
NTR -0.31044 0.072403 -4.29 0 -0.45235 -0.16853 
TR -0.1363 0.084935 -1.6 0.109 -0.30277 0.03017 
SOD 0.219466 0.048593 4.52 0 0.124226 0.314707 
OPN 0.053937 0.011557 4.67 0 0.031287 0.076588 
_Iyear_2001 0.097722 0.243964 0.4 0.689 -0.38044 0.575883 
_Iyear_2002 0.340662 0.233298 1.46 0.144 -0.11659 0.797918 
_Iyear_2003 0.199112 0.248054 0.8 0.422 -0.28706 0.685288 
_Iyear_2004 0.510725 0.261558 1.95 0.051 -0.00192 1.023369 
_Iyear_2005 0.716251 0.276879 2.59 0.01 0.173579 1.258923 
_Iyear_2006 0.130394 0.287481 0.45 0.65 -0.43306 0.693846 
_Iyear_2007 -1.11678 0.305942 -3.65 0 -1.71641 -0.51714 
_Iyear_2008 -0.96599 0.317138 -3.05 0.002 -1.58757 -0.34441 
_Iyear_2009 -1.06591 0.349497 -3.05 0.002 -1.75091 -0.38091 
_Iyear_2010 -1.57089 0.384212 -4.09 0 -2.32393 -0.81785 
_Iid_2 4.97868 1.336194 3.73 0 2.359789 7.597572 
_Iid_3 0.62756 1.329777 0.47 0.637 -1.97876 3.233875 
_Iid_4 3.05378 0.808974 3.77 0 1.468221 4.639339 
_Iid_5 -9.32069 2.491757 -3.74 0 -14.2044 -4.43694 
_Iid_6 -3.98541 2.205958 -1.81 0.071 -8.30901 0.33819 
_Iid_7 -4.89546 2.363546 -2.07 0.038 -9.52792 -0.26299 
_Iid_8 4.187833 1.731709 2.42 0.016 0.793747 7.58192 
_Iid_9 -6.46438 2.935136 -2.2 0.028 -12.2171 -0.71162 
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_Iid_10 6.053853 1.28373 4.72 0 3.537788 8.569919 
_Iid_11 7.311876 1.443754 5.06 0 4.48217 10.14158 
_Iid_12 6.273609 1.556867 4.03 0 3.222205 9.325013 
_Iid_13 2.90414 1.40896 2.06 0.039 0.14263 5.665651 
_Iid_14 3.136455 0.843437 3.72 0 1.483349 4.789561 
_Iid_15 -1.9174 1.244895 -1.54 0.124 -4.35735 0.522553 
_Iid_16 -0.47349 1.248672 -0.38 0.705 -2.92084 1.973862 
_Iid_17 4.04178 0.888129 4.55 0 2.30108 5.782481 
_Iid_18 -7.5421 1.968177 -3.83 0 -11.3997 -3.68455 
_Iid_19 -7.27151 3.294763 -2.21 0.027 -13.7291 -0.81389 
_Iid_20 -4.02663 2.480156 -1.62 0.104 -8.88765 0.834383 
_Iid_21 2.712035 1.515272 1.79 0.073 -0.25784 5.681914 
_Iid_22 -0.9569 0.509216 -1.88 0.06 -1.95494 0.041147 
_Iid_23 6.876306 1.918301 3.58 0 3.116504 10.63611 
_Iid_24 -0.41973 2.383759 -0.18 0.86 -5.09181 4.252355 
_Iid_25 -0.92082 1.419816 -0.65 0.517 -3.70361 1.861967 
_Iid_26 -25.0198 4.668572 -5.36 0 -34.17 -15.8695 
_Iid_27 -5.19368 2.759428 -1.88 0.06 -10.6021 0.2147 
_Iid_28 -1.13877 1.97309 -0.58 0.564 -5.00596 2.728413 
_Iid_29 0.425496 1.265505 0.34 0.737 -2.05485 2.90584 
_Iid_30 6.365445 1.187689 5.36 0 4.037617 8.693274 
_Iid_31 2.374186 1.395162 1.7 0.089 -0.36028 5.108653 
_Iid_32 5.466232 0.799568 6.84 0 3.899109 7.033356 
_cons 48.23746 14.55595 3.31 0.001 19.70832 76.76661 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons -0.08715 0.06742 -1.29 0.196 -0.21929 0.044994 
 
. test [eqn1_mean]PGE1=[eqn2_mean]PGECPI 
      
 [eqn1_mean]PGE1 - [eqn2_mean]PGECPI = 0   
      
 chi2(  1) =    3.56    
 Prob > chi2 =    0.0593    
 
Table I6: Result for testing the coefficient of non-productive government 
expenditure in high-income economies before and after CPI adjustment 
  Robust           
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
UPGE1 -0.15787 0.035638 -4.43 0 -0.22772 -0.08802 
INF -0.21394 0.063909 -3.35 0.001 -0.33919 -0.08868 
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INV 0.282922 0.060964 4.64 0 0.163434 0.40241 
LFG 0.067497 0.173048 0.39 0.697 -0.27167 0.406664 
LIG -5.41215 1.515896 -3.57 0 -8.38325 -2.44105 
NTR -0.31136 0.072681 -4.28 0 -0.45382 -0.16891 
TR -0.12698 0.086572 -1.47 0.142 -0.29666 0.042694 
SOD 0.218572 0.048428 4.51 0 0.123655 0.313489 
OPN 0.056067 0.011696 4.79 0 0.033144 0.07899 
_Iyear_2001 0.089303 0.240324 0.37 0.71 -0.38172 0.560329 
_Iyear_2002 0.318521 0.230672 1.38 0.167 -0.13359 0.77063 
_Iyear_2003 0.167221 0.244037 0.69 0.493 -0.31108 0.645524 
_Iyear_2004 0.471489 0.257059 1.83 0.067 -0.03234 0.975316 
_Iyear_2005 0.656437 0.271376 2.42 0.016 0.12455 1.188323 
_Iyear_2006 0.054847 0.282485 0.19 0.846 -0.49881 0.608508 
_Iyear_2007 -1.18672 0.300968 -3.94 0 -1.77661 -0.59684 
_Iyear_2008 -1.03944 0.312329 -3.33 0.001 -1.6516 -0.42729 
_Iyear_2009 -1.14418 0.344779 -3.32 0.001 -1.81994 -0.46843 
_Iyear_2010 -1.65145 0.378902 -4.36 0 -2.39409 -0.90882 
_Iid_2 4.824064 1.324073 3.64 0 2.228928 7.4192 
_Iid_3 0.271727 1.327202 0.2 0.838 -2.32954 2.872996 
_Iid_4 3.033355 0.804934 3.77 0 1.455715 4.610996 
_Iid_5 -8.92254 2.493004 -3.58 0 -13.8087 -4.03635 
_Iid_6 -4.12953 2.221641 -1.86 0.063 -8.48387 0.224805 
_Iid_7 -5.1675 2.387022 -2.16 0.03 -9.84597 -0.48902 
_Iid_8 3.91637 1.763087 2.22 0.026 0.460783 7.371958 
_Iid_9 -6.53244 2.9474 -2.22 0.027 -12.3092 -0.75564 
_Iid_10 5.981394 1.274033 4.69 0 3.484335 8.478453 
_Iid_11 7.203985 1.428789 5.04 0 4.40361 10.00436 
_Iid_12 6.236399 1.547366 4.03 0 3.203618 9.269181 
_Iid_13 2.667919 1.418543 1.88 0.06 -0.11237 5.448213 
_Iid_14 2.986293 0.853675 3.5 0 1.31312 4.659466 
_Iid_15 -2.31517 1.249243 -1.85 0.064 -4.76364 0.133302 
_Iid_16 -0.57315 1.260026 -0.45 0.649 -3.04276 1.896457 
_Iid_17 3.741311 0.846371 4.42 0 2.082454 5.400167 
_Iid_18 -7.85873 2.041087 -3.85 0 -11.8592 -3.85827 
_Iid_19 -7.3195 3.325571 -2.2 0.028 -13.8375 -0.8015 
_Iid_20 -4.69805 2.4864 -1.89 0.059 -9.57131 0.175204 
_Iid_21 2.5977 1.508256 1.72 0.085 -0.35843 5.553827 
_Iid_22 -0.84924 0.512621 -1.66 0.098 -1.85396 0.155483 
_Iid_23 6.694749 1.893381 3.54 0 2.98379 10.40571 
_Iid_24 -0.3889 2.408617 -0.16 0.872 -5.1097 4.331899 
_Iid_25 -0.90836 1.429771 -0.64 0.525 -3.71066 1.893943 
_Iid_26 -25.4246 4.691447 -5.42 0 -34.6197 -16.2295 
_Iid_27 -5.4776 2.787972 -1.96 0.049 -10.9419 -0.01327 
_Iid_28 -1.26839 1.983856 -0.64 0.523 -5.15668 2.619897 
_Iid_29 0.379908 1.276409 0.3 0.766 -2.12181 2.881623 
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_Iid_30 6.254919 1.188984 5.26 0 3.924553 8.585284 
_Iid_31 2.233343 1.379531 1.62 0.105 -0.47049 4.937175 
_Iid_32 5.494906 0.792581 6.93 0 3.941477 7.048336 
_cons 60.89126 15.50531 3.93 0 30.50141 91.2811 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
_cons -0.09281 0.067955 -1.37 0.172 -0.226 0.040375 
              
eqn2_mean             
UPGECPI -0.1699 0.036576 -4.65 0 -0.24158 -0.09821 
INF -0.21821 0.063284 -3.45 0.001 -0.34225 -0.09418 
INV 0.285783 0.060583 4.72 0 0.167044 0.404523 
LFG 0.059831 0.172366 0.35 0.729 -0.278 0.397662 
LIG -5.21755 1.495196 -3.49 0 -8.14808 -2.28702 
NTR -0.32369 0.072223 -4.48 0 -0.46525 -0.18214 
TR -0.12183 0.086213 -1.41 0.158 -0.2908 0.047148 
SOD 0.216536 0.048185 4.49 0 0.122096 0.310976 
OPN 0.05699 0.011675 4.88 0 0.034108 0.079872 
_Iyear_2001 0.086873 0.239514 0.36 0.717 -0.38257 0.556312 
_Iyear_2002 0.313774 0.230062 1.36 0.173 -0.13714 0.764687 
_Iyear_2003 0.160072 0.242974 0.66 0.51 -0.31615 0.636292 
_Iyear_2004 0.459792 0.255755 1.8 0.072 -0.04148 0.961062 
_Iyear_2005 0.63814 0.270064 2.36 0.018 0.108825 1.167455 
_Iyear_2006 0.028729 0.281449 0.1 0.919 -0.5229 0.58036 
_Iyear_2007 -1.21561 0.299586 -4.06 0 -1.80279 -0.62844 
_Iyear_2008 -1.07324 0.311103 -3.45 0.001 -1.68299 -0.46349 
_Iyear_2009 -1.18139 0.343381 -3.44 0.001 -1.85441 -0.50838 
_Iyear_2010 -1.69137 0.377054 -4.49 0 -2.43038 -0.95235 
_Iid_2 5.004291 1.318643 3.8 0 2.419799 7.588783 
_Iid_3 0.255697 1.313341 0.19 0.846 -2.31841 2.829798 
_Iid_4 3.225709 0.813814 3.96 0 1.630663 4.820755 
_Iid_5 -8.66848 2.463082 -3.52 0 -13.496 -3.84093 
_Iid_6 -4.09637 2.204979 -1.86 0.063 -8.41805 0.225315 
_Iid_7 -5.15097 2.368693 -2.17 0.03 -9.79352 -0.50841 
_Iid_8 3.926481 1.756082 2.24 0.025 0.484624 7.368338 
_Iid_9 -6.33595 2.916352 -2.17 0.03 -12.0519 -0.62 
_Iid_10 6.272505 1.283481 4.89 0 3.756928 8.788081 
_Iid_11 7.366228 1.418925 5.19 0 4.585186 10.14727 
_Iid_12 6.482213 1.544214 4.2 0 3.455608 9.508817 
_Iid_13 2.656518 1.404883 1.89 0.059 -0.097 5.410039 
_Iid_14 2.874647 0.848646 3.39 0.001 1.211331 4.537963 
_Iid_15 -2.46893 1.245888 -1.98 0.048 -4.91083 -0.02704 
_Iid_16 -0.56328 1.247016 -0.45 0.651 -3.00738 1.88083 
_Iid_17 3.6491 0.81856 4.46 0 2.044753 5.253447 
_Iid_18 -7.99283 2.038287 -3.92 0 -11.9878 -3.99786 
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_Iid_19 -7.23909 3.302449 -2.19 0.028 -13.7118 -0.76641 
_Iid_20 -4.85612 2.468931 -1.97 0.049 -9.69513 -0.0171 
_Iid_21 2.779849 1.498779 1.85 0.064 -0.1577 5.717402 
_Iid_22 -0.73139 0.511517 -1.43 0.153 -1.73395 0.271161 
_Iid_23 6.835947 1.879266 3.64 0 3.152653 10.51924 
_Iid_24 -0.22858 2.391552 -0.1 0.924 -4.91594 4.458774 
_Iid_25 -0.79051 1.418239 -0.56 0.577 -3.57021 1.989189 
_Iid_26 -25.823 4.685728 -5.51 0 -35.0069 -16.6392 
_Iid_27 -5.46379 2.766461 -1.98 0.048 -10.886 -0.04163 
_Iid_28 -1.13095 1.965286 -0.58 0.565 -4.98284 2.720937 
_Iid_29 0.494873 1.26719 0.39 0.696 -1.98877 2.97852 
_Iid_30 6.416394 1.194294 5.37 0 4.07562 8.757168 
_Iid_31 2.333669 1.370845 1.7 0.089 -0.35314 5.020476 
_Iid_32 5.586761 0.790297 7.07 0 4.037808 7.135713 
_cons 59.08772 15.25699 3.87 0 29.18457 88.99088 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons -0.10168 0.06808 -1.49 0.135 -0.23512 0.031754 
 
. test [eqn1_mean]UPGE1=[eqn2_mean]UPGECPI 
      
 [eqn1_mean]UPGE1 - [eqn2_mean]UPGECPI = 0   
      
 chi2(  1) =    54.43    
 Prob > chi2 =    0.0000    
 
Table I7: Result for testing the coefficient of productive government expenditure in 
low to middle-income economies before and after CPI adjustment 
    Robust         
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
PGE1 0.055218 0.031129 1.77 0.076 -0.00579 0.116229 
INF 0.115183 0.030458 3.78 0 0.055487 0.174879 
INV 0.173909 0.045457 3.83 0 0.084814 0.263004 
LFG 0.250902 0.149115 1.68 0.092 -0.04136 0.543162 
LIG 1.251734 1.339046 0.93 0.35 -1.37275 3.876215 
NTR -0.05295 0.052477 -1.01 0.313 -0.1558 0.049901 
TR -0.02467 0.074733 -0.33 0.741 -0.17114 0.121808 
SOD 0.247743 0.05531 4.48 0 0.139337 0.356149 
OPN -0.06432 0.010994 -5.85 0 -0.08586 -0.04277 
_Iyear_2001 0.956433 0.317109 3.02 0.003 0.334912 1.577954 
_Iyear_2002 1.629793 0.34549 4.72 0 0.952645 2.306942 
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_Iyear_2003 2.00693 0.34258 5.86 0 1.335487 2.678374 
_Iyear_2004 2.417217 0.370735 6.52 0 1.690589 3.143844 
_Iyear_2005 2.864996 0.400022 7.16 0 2.080968 3.649024 
_Iyear_2006 2.874447 0.477399 6.02 0 1.938763 3.810131 
_Iyear_2007 2.134653 0.487693 4.38 0 1.178792 3.090515 
_Iyear_2008 2.06894 0.51246 4.04 0 1.064536 3.073344 
_Iyear_2009 1.686449 0.557912 3.02 0.003 0.592961 2.779937 
_Iyear_2010 1.17776 0.547666 2.15 0.032 0.104354 2.251166 
_Iid_2 3.358688 1.678564 2 0.045 0.068764 6.648612 
_Iid_3 1.478702 1.312126 1.13 0.26 -1.09302 4.050422 
_Iid_4 -0.917 1.930042 -0.48 0.635 -4.69981 2.865813 
_Iid_5 0.519241 0.568912 0.91 0.361 -0.59581 1.634287 
_Iid_6 1.402183 2.870339 0.49 0.625 -4.22358 7.027944 
_Iid_7 4.176632 2.907785 1.44 0.151 -1.52252 9.875787 
_Iid_8 0.208323 1.364852 0.15 0.879 -2.46674 2.883384 
_Iid_9 -3.21251 1.062411 -3.02 0.002 -5.2948 -1.13023 
_Iid_10 3.929325 1.085474 3.62 0 1.801836 6.056814 
_Iid_11 -1.87351 1.081224 -1.73 0.083 -3.99267 0.245655 
_Iid_12 2.918792 2.138817 1.36 0.172 -1.27321 7.110796 
_Iid_13 0.350877 1.089368 0.32 0.747 -1.78425 2.485999 
_Iid_14 1.43922 1.850906 0.78 0.437 -2.18849 5.06693 
_Iid_15 2.578694 1.503514 1.72 0.086 -0.36814 5.525528 
_Iid_16 1.243652 1.433122 0.87 0.386 -1.56522 4.05252 
_Iid_17 4.094833 1.540455 2.66 0.008 1.075597 7.114069 
_Iid_18 -1.49861 1.107991 -1.35 0.176 -3.67023 0.673015 
_cons -11.127 9.391793 -1.18 0.236 -29.5346 7.280588 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
_cons -0.06205 0.088402 -0.7 0.483 -0.23531 0.111216 
              
eqn2_mean             
PGECPI 0.057151 0.033077 1.73 0.084 -0.00768 0.12198 
INF 0.115842 0.030504 3.8 0 0.056056 0.175628 
INV 0.171795 0.045727 3.76 0 0.082173 0.261417 
LFG 0.250792 0.149544 1.68 0.094 -0.04231 0.543893 
LIG 1.284223 1.342879 0.96 0.339 -1.34777 3.916218 
NTR -0.05412 0.052476 -1.03 0.302 -0.15697 0.048732 
TR -0.02796 0.07528 -0.37 0.71 -0.17551 0.119586 
SOD 0.249834 0.055227 4.52 0 0.141591 0.358078 
OPN -0.06413 0.011007 -5.83 0 -0.0857 -0.04256 
_Iyear_2001 0.959423 0.317708 3.02 0.003 0.336728 1.582119 
_Iyear_2002 1.633401 0.346146 4.72 0 0.954966 2.311835 
_Iyear_2003 2.0114 0.343746 5.85 0 1.337671 2.685129 
_Iyear_2004 2.419773 0.37185 6.51 0 1.69096 3.148586 
_Iyear_2005 2.864916 0.401252 7.14 0 2.078477 3.651356 
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_Iyear_2006 2.870221 0.478085 6 0 1.933191 3.807251 
_Iyear_2007 2.12846 0.488669 4.36 0 1.170687 3.086232 
_Iyear_2008 2.059891 0.51291 4.02 0 1.054605 3.065177 
_Iyear_2009 1.67582 0.55836 3 0.003 0.581455 2.770185 
_Iyear_2010 1.161359 0.547946 2.12 0.034 0.087404 2.235314 
_Iid_2 3.245295 1.664405 1.95 0.051 -0.01688 6.50747 
_Iid_3 1.431083 1.315056 1.09 0.276 -1.14638 4.008545 
_Iid_4 -1.0857 1.936797 -0.56 0.575 -4.88175 2.710354 
_Iid_5 0.458446 0.564052 0.81 0.416 -0.64707 1.563967 
_Iid_6 1.4626 2.874684 0.51 0.611 -4.17168 7.096876 
_Iid_7 4.011554 2.902313 1.38 0.167 -1.67688 9.699983 
_Iid_8 0.228524 1.36542 0.17 0.867 -2.44765 2.904698 
_Iid_9 -3.18151 1.059449 -3 0.003 -5.258 -1.10503 
_Iid_10 3.810564 1.087338 3.5 0 1.67942 5.941707 
_Iid_11 -1.8254 1.077115 -1.69 0.09 -3.9365 0.285712 
_Iid_12 2.750471 2.131036 1.29 0.197 -1.42628 6.927225 
_Iid_13 0.339177 1.092782 0.31 0.756 -1.80264 2.480991 
_Iid_14 1.335831 1.843484 0.72 0.469 -2.27733 4.948993 
_Iid_15 2.510079 1.507097 1.67 0.096 -0.44378 5.463935 
_Iid_16 1.112625 1.425749 0.78 0.435 -1.68179 3.907042 
_Iid_17 4.125625 1.53881 2.68 0.007 1.109613 7.141637 
_Iid_18 -1.48494 1.109095 -1.34 0.181 -3.65872 0.688851 
_cons -11.0714 9.413691 -1.18 0.24 -29.5219 7.379071 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons -0.06116 0.088486 -0.69 0.489 -0.23459 0.112269 
 
. test [eqn1_mean]PGE1=[eqn2_mean]PGECPI 
      
 [eqn1_mean]PGE1 - [eqn2_mean]PGECPI = 0   
      
 chi2(  1) =    0.59    
 Prob > chi2 =    0.4416    
 
Table I8: Result for testing the coefficient of non-productive government 
expenditure in low to middle-income economies before and after CPI adjustment 
    Robust         
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
UPGE1 -0.05192 0.030735 -1.69 0.091 -0.11216 0.008321 
INF 0.114983 0.030531 3.77 0 0.055144 0.174822 
INV 0.172715 0.045946 3.76 0 0.082662 0.262767 
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LFG 0.261851 0.154389 1.7 0.09 -0.04075 0.564447 
LIG 1.378371 1.358475 1.01 0.31 -1.28419 4.040932 
NTR -0.05453 0.05253 -1.04 0.299 -0.15749 0.048423 
TR -0.03361 0.076468 -0.44 0.66 -0.18349 0.11626 
SOD 0.255908 0.053851 4.75 0 0.150361 0.361454 
OPN -0.06321 0.011179 -5.65 0 -0.08512 -0.04129 
_Iyear_2001 0.940807 0.318478 2.95 0.003 0.316602 1.565012 
_Iyear_2002 1.59996 0.34373 4.65 0 0.926262 2.273658 
_Iyear_2003 1.963895 0.340404 5.77 0 1.296715 2.631074 
_Iyear_2004 2.366849 0.367257 6.44 0 1.647037 3.08666 
_Iyear_2005 2.799746 0.394908 7.09 0 2.025741 3.573752 
_Iyear_2006 2.794674 0.469935 5.95 0 1.873619 3.715729 
_Iyear_2007 2.048001 0.483505 4.24 0 1.100349 2.995653 
_Iyear_2008 1.979747 0.509978 3.88 0 0.980208 2.979286 
_Iyear_2009 1.590293 0.553973 2.87 0.004 0.504526 2.67606 
_Iyear_2010 1.077159 0.544359 1.98 0.048 0.010234 2.144083 
_Iid_2 3.124415 1.650959 1.89 0.058 -0.11141 6.360235 
_Iid_3 1.351282 1.317828 1.03 0.305 -1.23161 3.934178 
_Iid_4 -1.21187 1.951199 -0.62 0.535 -5.03615 2.612408 
_Iid_5 0.483724 0.570031 0.85 0.396 -0.63352 1.600964 
_Iid_6 1.618597 2.883625 0.56 0.575 -4.0332 7.270398 
_Iid_7 3.855546 2.918051 1.32 0.186 -1.86373 9.574821 
_Iid_8 0.289562 1.370724 0.21 0.833 -2.39701 2.976132 
_Iid_9 -3.24867 1.081851 -3 0.003 -5.36906 -1.12828 
_Iid_10 3.766648 1.098877 3.43 0.001 1.612889 5.920406 
_Iid_11 -1.79287 1.085591 -1.65 0.099 -3.92059 0.334848 
_Iid_12 2.615708 2.143624 1.22 0.222 -1.58572 6.817133 
_Iid_13 0.273297 1.121484 0.24 0.807 -1.92477 2.471365 
_Iid_14 1.236363 1.843334 0.67 0.502 -2.37651 4.849231 
_Iid_15 2.375306 1.531524 1.55 0.121 -0.62643 5.377037 
_Iid_16 1.043336 1.432108 0.73 0.466 -1.76355 3.850216 
_Iid_17 4.074539 1.553703 2.62 0.009 1.029337 7.119741 
_Iid_18 -1.43187 1.106587 -1.29 0.196 -3.60075 0.736998 
_cons -6.36621 9.168437 -0.69 0.487 -24.336 11.60359 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
_cons -0.06066 0.08823 -0.69 0.492 -0.23359 0.112263 
              
eqn2_mean             
UPGECPI -0.05713 0.033049 -1.73 0.084 -0.12191 0.007643 
INF 0.114797 0.030495 3.76 0 0.055027 0.174567 
INV 0.172876 0.045864 3.77 0 0.082985 0.262768 
LFG 0.265709 0.154871 1.72 0.086 -0.03783 0.56925 
LIG 1.381505 1.356129 1.02 0.308 -1.27646 4.039469 
NTR -0.05338 0.052505 -1.02 0.309 -0.15629 0.049529 
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TR -0.03256 0.076182 -0.43 0.669 -0.18187 0.116756 
SOD 0.254474 0.05397 4.72 0 0.148694 0.360254 
OPN -0.06322 0.011163 -5.66 0 -0.0851 -0.04134 
_Iyear_2001 0.94022 0.318349 2.95 0.003 0.316267 1.564173 
_Iyear_2002 1.599843 0.343527 4.66 0 0.926542 2.273143 
_Iyear_2003 1.963731 0.340208 5.77 0 1.296935 2.630527 
_Iyear_2004 2.368695 0.366836 6.46 0 1.64971 3.087679 
_Iyear_2005 2.802423 0.394375 7.11 0 2.029462 3.575384 
_Iyear_2006 2.79884 0.469455 5.96 0 1.878725 3.718956 
_Iyear_2007 2.052844 0.482883 4.25 0 1.106411 2.999278 
_Iyear_2008 1.984703 0.509411 3.9 0 0.986275 2.98313 
_Iyear_2009 1.595018 0.553189 2.88 0.004 0.510788 2.679247 
_Iyear_2010 1.083691 0.543588 1.99 0.046 0.018279 2.149103 
_Iid_2 3.183447 1.653713 1.93 0.054 -0.05777 6.424665 
_Iid_3 1.39081 1.316689 1.06 0.291 -1.18985 3.971474 
_Iid_4 -1.16569 1.945574 -0.6 0.549 -4.97894 2.647565 
_Iid_5 0.508553 0.571721 0.89 0.374 -0.612 1.629105 
_Iid_6 1.62504 2.874922 0.57 0.572 -4.0097 7.259783 
_Iid_7 3.91697 2.915495 1.34 0.179 -1.7973 9.631234 
_Iid_8 0.297964 1.365516 0.22 0.827 -2.3784 2.974327 
_Iid_9 -3.24549 1.075976 -3.02 0.003 -5.35436 -1.13661 
_Iid_10 3.803583 1.09633 3.47 0.001 1.654816 5.952351 
_Iid_11 -1.78856 1.082448 -1.65 0.098 -3.91012 0.332994 
_Iid_12 2.685065 2.143475 1.25 0.21 -1.51607 6.8862 
_Iid_13 0.284638 1.115687 0.26 0.799 -1.90207 2.471345 
_Iid_14 1.281128 1.841937 0.7 0.487 -2.329 4.891257 
_Iid_15 2.395565 1.52821 1.57 0.117 -0.59967 5.390802 
_Iid_16 1.096018 1.432328 0.77 0.444 -1.71129 3.903329 
_Iid_17 4.080261 1.55075 2.63 0.009 1.040847 7.119675 
_Iid_18 -1.42534 1.100549 -1.3 0.195 -3.58238 0.731696 
_cons -6.41744 9.149349 -0.7 0.483 -24.3498 11.51496 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons -0.06162 0.088109 -0.7 0.484 -0.23431 0.111065 
 
. test [eqn1_mean]UPGE1=[eqn2_mean]UPGECPI 
      
 [eqn1_mean]UPGE1 - [eqn2_mean]UPGECPI = 0   
      
 chi2(  1) =    4.63    
 Prob > chi2 =    0.0314    
 
Table I9: Result for testing the coefficient of government expenditure on education 
in OECD economies before and after ICRG adjustment 
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    Robust         
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
EDU 0.140353 0.033498 4.19 0 0.074698 0.206008 
INF 0.005088 0.049544 0.1 0.918 -0.09202 0.102193 
INV 0.080575 0.045573 1.77 0.077 -0.00875 0.169895 
LFG -0.13738 0.150904 -0.91 0.363 -0.43315 0.158382 
NTR -0.10147 0.043795 -2.32 0.021 -0.1873 -0.01563 
TR 0.12535 0.075502 1.66 0.097 -0.02263 0.273332 
SOD 0.178806 0.042952 4.16 0 0.094621 0.262991 
OPN 0.030876 0.007429 4.16 0 0.016315 0.045437 
_Iyear_1996 0.216712 0.27336 0.79 0.428 -0.31906 0.752488 
_Iyear_1997 -0.03943 0.267883 -0.15 0.883 -0.56447 0.485609 
_Iyear_1998 -0.27065 0.298184 -0.91 0.364 -0.85508 0.313779 
_Iyear_1999 -0.71776 0.300954 -2.38 0.017 -1.30762 -0.1279 
_Iyear_2000 -1.25273 0.286882 -4.37 0 -1.81501 -0.69046 
_Iyear_2001 -1.66424 0.280165 -5.94 0 -2.21336 -1.11513 
_Iyear_2002 -1.74736 0.275391 -6.35 0 -2.28712 -1.20761 
_Iyear_2003 -2.05571 0.285177 -7.21 0 -2.61464 -1.49677 
_Iyear_2004 -1.85887 0.290686 -6.39 0 -2.4286 -1.28913 
_Iyear_2005 -1.6834 0.30498 -5.52 0 -2.28115 -1.08565 
_Iyear_2006 -2.16381 0.3179 -6.81 0 -2.78689 -1.54074 
_Iyear_2007 -3.52987 0.336643 
-
10.49 0 -4.18968 -2.87006 
_Iyear_2008 -3.51504 0.364749 -9.64 0 -4.22994 -2.80015 
_Iyear_2009 -3.75017 0.380253 -9.86 0 -4.49545 -3.00489 
_Iyear_2010 -4.40279 0.408355 
-
10.78 0 -5.20315 -3.60243 
_Iid_2 0.381863 0.779045 0.49 0.624 -1.14504 1.908762 
_Iid_3 -2.19598 0.938527 -2.34 0.019 -4.03546 -0.3565 
_Iid_4 0.444029 0.495903 0.9 0.371 -0.52792 1.415982 
_Iid_5 -4.71066 1.363983 -3.45 0.001 -7.38402 -2.03731 
_Iid_6 1.092198 1.665429 0.66 0.512 -2.17198 4.356378 
_Iid_7 0.330873 0.816223 0.41 0.685 -1.26889 1.930641 
_Iid_8 1.581373 0.882562 1.79 0.073 -0.14842 3.311162 
_Iid_9 1.711202 0.973308 1.76 0.079 -0.19645 3.61885 
_Iid_10 3.386646 1.000598 3.38 0.001 1.425511 5.347781 
_Iid_11 -1.68795 0.514378 -3.28 0.001 -2.69611 -0.67978 
_Iid_12 -1.0048 1.067415 -0.94 0.347 -3.0969 1.087291 
_Iid_13 0.755265 0.698496 1.08 0.28 -0.61376 2.124292 
_Iid_14 0.272888 0.508077 0.54 0.591 -0.72292 1.268701 
_Iid_15 -6.78195 1.857704 -3.65 0 -10.423 -3.14091 
_Iid_16 -0.27406 1.102689 -0.25 0.804 -2.43529 1.887172 
_Iid_17 -2.4393 0.449887 -5.42 0 -3.32106 -1.55754 
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_Iid_18 -2.31843 1.138205 -2.04 0.042 -4.54927 -0.08758 
_Iid_19 0.362017 0.91376 0.4 0.692 -1.42892 2.152953 
_Iid_20 2.212448 1.385583 1.6 0.11 -0.50324 4.92814 
_Iid_21 0.417288 1.108219 0.38 0.707 -1.75478 2.589358 
_Iid_22 1.358148 0.836384 1.62 0.104 -0.28114 2.997431 
_Iid_23 -0.81877 0.870093 -0.94 0.347 -2.52412 0.886582 
_Iid_24 -0.64141 0.952009 -0.67 0.5 -2.50732 1.224488 
_Iid_25 0.435563 0.477543 0.91 0.362 -0.5004 1.371529 
_cons -3.40334 2.064091 -1.65 0.099 -7.44888 0.642203 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
_cons 0.004292 0.084224 0.05 0.959 -0.16078 0.169367 
              
eqn2_mean             
FLO 0.139266 0.033873 4.11 0 0.072875 0.205657 
INF 0.007059 0.050523 0.14 0.889 -0.09197 0.106082 
INV 0.079975 0.045528 1.76 0.079 -0.00926 0.169209 
LFG -0.1427 0.153265 -0.93 0.352 -0.44309 0.157698 
NTR -0.10225 0.043899 -2.33 0.02 -0.18829 -0.01621 
TR 0.126577 0.075368 1.68 0.093 -0.02114 0.274295 
SOD 0.179698 0.043037 4.18 0 0.095347 0.26405 
OPN 0.030882 0.007459 4.14 0 0.016262 0.045501 
_Iyear_1996 0.219544 0.274721 0.8 0.424 -0.3189 0.757987 
_Iyear_1997 -0.04202 0.268522 -0.16 0.876 -0.56832 0.484268 
_Iyear_1998 -0.27201 0.298473 -0.91 0.362 -0.857 0.31299 
_Iyear_1999 -0.7169 0.301247 -2.38 0.017 -1.30734 -0.12647 
_Iyear_2000 -1.24834 0.287407 -4.34 0 -1.81164 -0.68503 
_Iyear_2001 -1.65723 0.280485 -5.91 0 -2.20697 -1.10749 
_Iyear_2002 -1.73732 0.275602 -6.3 0 -2.27749 -1.19715 
_Iyear_2003 -2.04318 0.285386 -7.16 0 -2.60253 -1.48384 
_Iyear_2004 -1.84439 0.291086 -6.34 0 -2.41491 -1.27387 
_Iyear_2005 -1.66958 0.30548 -5.47 0 -2.26831 -1.07085 
_Iyear_2006 -2.15077 0.318222 -6.76 0 -2.77447 -1.52707 
_Iyear_2007 -3.51724 0.336994 
-
10.44 0 -4.17773 -2.85674 
_Iyear_2008 -3.50238 0.365129 -9.59 0 -4.21802 -2.78674 
_Iyear_2009 -3.73784 0.380813 -9.82 0 -4.48422 -2.99146 
_Iyear_2010 -4.39003 0.409345 
-
10.72 0 -5.19233 -3.58773 
_Iid_2 0.394151 0.781047 0.5 0.614 -1.13667 1.924974 
_Iid_3 -2.16938 0.941092 -2.31 0.021 -4.01389 -0.32487 
_Iid_4 0.425124 0.49479 0.86 0.39 -0.54465 1.394894 
_Iid_5 -4.74669 1.361098 -3.49 0 -7.41439 -2.07899 
_Iid_6 1.160561 1.664835 0.7 0.486 -2.10246 4.423577 
_Iid_7 0.317783 0.819567 0.39 0.698 -1.28854 1.924105 
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_Iid_8 1.614556 0.882682 1.83 0.067 -0.11547 3.344581 
_Iid_9 1.724972 0.974393 1.77 0.077 -0.1848 3.634746 
_Iid_10 3.413947 0.999313 3.42 0.001 1.455331 5.372564 
_Iid_11 -1.69458 0.518961 -3.27 0.001 -2.71173 -0.67744 
_Iid_12 -0.95905 1.067096 -0.9 0.369 -3.05052 1.132422 
_Iid_13 0.811068 0.69884 1.16 0.246 -0.55863 2.180769 
_Iid_14 0.302293 0.507717 0.6 0.552 -0.69281 1.297399 
_Iid_15 -6.76791 1.868302 -3.62 0 -10.4297 -3.10611 
_Iid_16 -0.26265 1.107599 -0.24 0.813 -2.4335 1.908206 
_Iid_17 -2.43394 0.452527 -5.38 0 -3.32088 -1.54701 
_Iid_18 -2.32782 1.141606 -2.04 0.041 -4.56533 -0.09032 
_Iid_19 0.403847 0.912851 0.44 0.658 -1.38531 2.193003 
_Iid_20 2.25355 1.384963 1.63 0.104 -0.46093 4.968027 
_Iid_21 0.470365 1.107468 0.42 0.671 -1.70023 2.640963 
_Iid_22 1.394278 0.835898 1.67 0.095 -0.24405 3.032608 
_Iid_23 -0.82975 0.870229 -0.95 0.34 -2.53537 0.875868 
_Iid_24 -0.62114 0.953139 -0.65 0.515 -2.48926 1.246979 
_Iid_25 0.447766 0.478229 0.94 0.349 -0.48955 1.385077 
_cons -3.3971 2.065207 -1.64 0.1 -7.44483 0.650629 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons 0.006353 0.084208 0.08 0.94 -0.15869 0.171398 
 
. test [eqn1_mean]EDU=[eqn2_mean]FLO 
      
 [eqn1_mean]EDU - [eqn2_mean]FLO = 0   
      
 chi2(  1) =    0.25    
 
Prob > chi2 =    0.6201 
    
 
Table I10: Result for testing the coefficient of government expenditure on education 
in ASEAN economies before and after ICRG adjustment 
    Robust         
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
EDU 0.1549801 0.0366266 4.23 0 0.083193 0.226767 
INF -0.1349679 0.0360261 -3.75 0 -0.20558 -0.06436 
INV 0.0287115 0.0384368 0.75 0.455 -0.04662 0.104046 
LFG -0.318059 0.1207783 -2.63 0.008 -0.55478 -0.08134 
NTR -0.0183796 0.0926013 -0.2 0.843 -0.19987 0.163116 
TR -0.0840314 0.05629 -1.49 0.135 -0.19436 0.026295 
283 
 
SOD 0.4472661 0.0935105 4.78 0 0.263989 0.630543 
OPN 0.0076422 0.0060803 1.26 0.209 -0.00427 0.019559 
_Iyear_1996 -1.544974 0.5423358 -2.85 0.004 -2.60793 -0.48202 
_Iyear_1997 -1.752535 0.6572103 -2.67 0.008 -3.04064 -0.46443 
_Iyear_1998 -1.6826 0.7978298 -2.11 0.035 -3.24632 -0.11888 
_Iyear_1999 -2.252687 0.8819817 -2.55 0.011 -3.98134 -0.52403 
_Iyear_2000 -1.779736 0.9676103 -1.84 0.066 -3.67622 0.116745 
_Iyear_2001 -0.3915877 0.9306623 -0.42 0.674 -2.21565 1.432477 
_Iyear_2002 -0.0131829 0.9352454 -0.01 0.989 -1.84623 1.819864 
_Iyear_2003 -0.1447389 0.9216564 -0.16 0.875 -1.95115 1.661675 
_Iyear_2004 0.2605228 0.8793682 0.3 0.767 -1.46301 1.984053 
_Iyear_2005 0.4250367 0.8084522 0.53 0.599 -1.1595 2.009574 
_Iyear_2006 0.0684848 0.793297 0.09 0.931 -1.48635 1.623318 
_Iyear_2007 -1.011649 0.8364869 -1.21 0.227 -2.65113 0.627836 
_Iyear_2008 -0.2272021 0.8021588 -0.28 0.777 -1.79941 1.345 
_Iyear_2009 -0.3990626 0.7931318 -0.5 0.615 -1.95357 1.155447 
_Iyear_2010 -0.5010492 0.8252014 -0.61 0.544 -2.11841 1.116316 
_Iid_2 -2.660057 0.6610518 -4.02 0 -3.95569 -1.36442 
_Iid_3 -8.678472 2.304214 -3.77 0 -13.1947 -4.1623 
_Iid_4 -3.994526 0.9375176 -4.26 0 -5.83203 -2.15703 
_Iid_5 0.9837375 0.4938481 1.99 0.046 0.015813 1.951662 
_cons 5.249436 1.398259 3.75 0 2.508899 7.989973 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
_cons -0.8537874 0.1146373 -7.45 0 -1.07847 -0.6291 
              
eqn2_mean             
FLO 0.1563957 0.0372802 4.2 0 0.083328 0.229464 
INF -0.1346931 0.0365283 -3.69 0 -0.20629 -0.0631 
INV 0.0284622 0.0384505 0.74 0.459 -0.0469 0.103824 
LFG -0.3156457 0.1210775 -2.61 0.009 -0.55295 -0.07834 
NTR -0.0179856 0.0928953 -0.19 0.846 -0.20006 0.164086 
TR -0.0830587 0.0566375 -1.47 0.143 -0.19407 0.027949 
SOD 0.451721 0.0934557 4.83 0 0.268551 0.634891 
OPN 0.0074633 0.006124 1.22 0.223 -0.00454 0.019466 
_Iyear_1996 -1.538763 0.5436297 -2.83 0.005 -2.60426 -0.47327 
_Iyear_1997 -1.741362 0.6578266 -2.65 0.008 -3.03068 -0.45205 
_Iyear_1998 -1.662679 0.7973068 -2.09 0.037 -3.22537 -0.09999 
_Iyear_1999 -2.227142 0.8807989 -2.53 0.011 -3.95348 -0.50081 
_Iyear_2000 -1.748313 0.965742 -1.81 0.07 -3.64113 0.144507 
_Iyear_2001 -0.3578899 0.9303429 -0.38 0.7 -2.18133 1.465549 
_Iyear_2002 0.022506 0.9343898 0.02 0.981 -1.80886 1.853876 
_Iyear_2003 -0.1099486 0.9213815 -0.12 0.905 -1.91582 1.695926 
_Iyear_2004 0.2917914 0.8804123 0.33 0.74 -1.43379 2.017368 
_Iyear_2005 0.4508788 0.8094695 0.56 0.578 -1.13565 2.03741 
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_Iyear_2006 0.0890717 0.7932349 0.11 0.911 -1.46564 1.643784 
_Iyear_2007 -0.9881221 0.8362757 -1.18 0.237 -2.62719 0.650948 
_Iyear_2008 -0.2024908 0.8021031 -0.25 0.801 -1.77458 1.369602 
_Iyear_2009 -0.3749233 0.7930731 -0.47 0.636 -1.92932 1.179472 
_Iyear_2010 -0.4743944 0.8257152 -0.57 0.566 -2.09277 1.143978 
_Iid_2 -2.611634 0.6599643 -3.96 0 -3.90514 -1.31813 
_Iid_3 -8.66401 2.316495 -3.74 0 -13.2043 -4.12376 
_Iid_4 -3.912588 0.9407549 -4.16 0 -5.75643 -2.06874 
_Iid_5 1.019087 0.4967407 2.05 0.04 0.045493 1.99268 
_cons 5.254232 1.402674 3.75 0 2.505041 8.003423 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons -0.8508478 0.1147072 -7.42 0 -1.07567 -0.62603 
 
. test [eqn1_mean]EDU=[eqn2_mean]FLO 
      
 [eqn1_mean]EDU - [eqn2_mean]FLO = 0   
      
 chi2(  1) =    0.66    
 
Prob > chi2 =    0.4158 
    
 
Table I11: Result for testing the coefficient of government expenditure on health in 
OECD economies before and after ICRG adjustment 
    Robust         
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
HEA -0.10506 0.033786 -3.11 0.002 -0.17128 -0.03884 
INF 0.057145 0.057054 1 0.317 -0.05468 0.168968 
INV 0.071815 0.044936 1.6 0.11 -0.01626 0.159888 
LFG -0.30066 0.162888 -1.85 0.065 -0.61991 0.018597 
NTR -0.06553 0.054051 -1.21 0.225 -0.17147 0.040412 
TR 0.122088 0.073574 1.66 0.097 -0.02211 0.26629 
SOD 0.256164 0.043699 5.86 0 0.170516 0.341812 
OPN 0.018245 0.00659 2.77 0.006 0.005329 0.03116 
_Iyear_1996 0.26137 0.259582 1.01 0.314 -0.2474 0.770141 
_Iyear_1997 0.019959 0.259325 0.08 0.939 -0.48831 0.528227 
_Iyear_1998 -0.20937 0.282746 -0.74 0.459 -0.76354 0.344803 
_Iyear_1999 -0.58822 0.293218 -2.01 0.045 -1.16292 -0.01352 
_Iyear_2000 -1.02435 0.280338 -3.65 0 -1.5738 -0.4749 
_Iyear_2001 -1.35945 0.269996 -5.04 0 -1.88863 -0.83027 
_Iyear_2002 -1.34214 0.269669 -4.98 0 -1.87068 -0.81359 
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_Iyear_2003 -1.56171 0.280048 -5.58 0 -2.1106 -1.01283 
_Iyear_2004 -1.29733 0.285879 -4.54 0 -1.85764 -0.73702 
_Iyear_2005 -1.10245 0.304763 -3.62 0 -1.69977 -0.50512 
_Iyear_2006 -1.55126 0.314896 -4.93 0 -2.16845 -0.93408 
_Iyear_2007 -2.87013 0.331282 -8.66 0 -3.51943 -2.22082 
_Iyear_2008 -2.79769 0.355669 -7.87 0 -3.49479 -2.10059 
_Iyear_2009 -2.99131 0.357002 -8.38 0 -3.69102 -2.2916 
_Iyear_2010 -3.56502 0.392803 -9.08 0 -4.3349 -2.79514 
_Iid_2 0.527552 0.817233 0.65 0.519 -1.07419 2.129299 
_Iid_3 -1.16144 0.83451 -1.39 0.164 -2.79705 0.474168 
_Iid_4 -1.35844 0.611976 -2.22 0.026 -2.55789 -0.15899 
_Iid_5 -4.13413 1.387654 -2.98 0.003 -6.85389 -1.41438 
_Iid_6 2.397944 1.309332 1.83 0.067 -0.1683 4.964187 
_Iid_7 0.089251 0.887351 0.1 0.92 -1.64993 1.828427 
_Iid_8 1.466563 1.005962 1.46 0.145 -0.50509 3.438212 
_Iid_9 1.356035 1.079834 1.26 0.209 -0.7604 3.472472 
_Iid_10 2.663183 1.134127 2.35 0.019 0.440334 4.886031 
_Iid_11 0.010311 0.56924 0.02 0.986 -1.10538 1.126 
_Iid_12 1.353085 0.850685 1.59 0.112 -0.31423 3.020397 
_Iid_13 1.730784 0.690443 2.51 0.012 0.377541 3.084027 
_Iid_14 -0.01761 0.579635 -0.03 0.976 -1.15367 1.118457 
_Iid_15 -4.71672 1.43106 -3.3 0.001 -7.52154 -1.91189 
_Iid_16 0.397089 1.045721 0.38 0.704 -1.65249 2.446665 
_Iid_17 -0.72375 0.444881 -1.63 0.104 -1.5957 0.148201 
_Iid_18 -3.40627 1.160054 -2.94 0.003 -5.67994 -1.13261 
_Iid_19 1.349361 0.770546 1.75 0.08 -0.16088 2.859604 
_Iid_20 3.462143 1.15849 2.99 0.003 1.191545 5.732742 
_Iid_21 1.173201 0.94976 1.24 0.217 -0.6883 3.034696 
_Iid_22 1.530965 0.882495 1.73 0.083 -0.19869 3.260623 
_Iid_23 -0.73698 0.870805 -0.85 0.397 -2.44373 0.969764 
_Iid_24 -0.22448 0.89473 -0.25 0.802 -1.97812 1.529156 
_Iid_25 1.032979 0.472608 2.19 0.029 0.106684 1.959275 
_cons -0.26772 2.366692 -0.11 0.91 -4.90635 4.370913 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
_cons 0.021159 0.088658 0.24 0.811 -0.15261 0.194925 
              
eqn2_mean             
GEN -0.11174 0.032823 -3.4 0.001 -0.17608 -0.04741 
INF 0.05737 0.057156 1 0.315 -0.05465 0.169393 
INV 0.072642 0.044943 1.62 0.106 -0.01544 0.160728 
LFG -0.30388 0.163654 -1.86 0.063 -0.62463 0.016878 
NTR -0.06241 0.053893 -1.16 0.247 -0.16804 0.043215 
TR 0.118674 0.073496 1.61 0.106 -0.02537 0.262723 
SOD 0.258788 0.043461 5.95 0 0.173605 0.34397 
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OPN 0.017948 0.006521 2.75 0.006 0.005167 0.030728 
_Iyear_1996 0.259931 0.257514 1.01 0.313 -0.24479 0.764649 
_Iyear_1997 0.021764 0.257931 0.08 0.933 -0.48377 0.527299 
_Iyear_1998 -0.20879 0.281567 -0.74 0.458 -0.76066 0.343068 
_Iyear_1999 -0.58857 0.292065 -2.02 0.044 -1.161 -0.01613 
_Iyear_2000 -1.0252 0.278734 -3.68 0 -1.57151 -0.47889 
_Iyear_2001 -1.36065 0.268277 -5.07 0 -1.88646 -0.83484 
_Iyear_2002 -1.34317 0.267596 -5.02 0 -1.86765 -0.81869 
_Iyear_2003 -1.56185 0.277558 -5.63 0 -2.10586 -1.01785 
_Iyear_2004 -1.29658 0.283129 -4.58 0 -1.8515 -0.74166 
_Iyear_2005 -1.10058 0.301659 -3.65 0 -1.69182 -0.50934 
_Iyear_2006 -1.54801 0.311386 -4.97 0 -2.15832 -0.93771 
_Iyear_2007 -2.86455 0.327779 -8.74 0 -3.50698 -2.22211 
_Iyear_2008 -2.79068 0.352235 -7.92 0 -3.48104 -2.10031 
_Iyear_2009 -2.98318 0.353642 -8.44 0 -3.67631 -2.29006 
_Iyear_2010 -3.55498 0.390277 -9.11 0 -4.31991 -2.79005 
_Iid_2 0.495711 0.816274 0.61 0.544 -1.10416 2.095578 
_Iid_3 -1.18285 0.831707 -1.42 0.155 -2.81297 0.447262 
_Iid_4 -1.41315 0.606175 -2.33 0.02 -2.60123 -0.22506 
_Iid_5 -4.06827 1.386641 -2.93 0.003 -6.78604 -1.3505 
_Iid_6 2.319248 1.312397 1.77 0.077 -0.253 4.891499 
_Iid_7 0.063522 0.885055 0.07 0.943 -1.67116 1.798198 
_Iid_8 1.403149 1.00566 1.4 0.163 -0.56791 3.374207 
_Iid_9 1.298709 1.078326 1.2 0.228 -0.81477 3.412189 
_Iid_10 2.577653 1.133435 2.27 0.023 0.356161 4.799146 
_Iid_11 0.068959 0.565008 0.12 0.903 -1.03844 1.176353 
_Iid_12 1.362399 0.842579 1.62 0.106 -0.28903 3.013824 
_Iid_13 1.697481 0.689697 2.46 0.014 0.345699 3.049262 
_Iid_14 -0.07512 0.581902 -0.13 0.897 -1.21562 1.065391 
_Iid_15 -4.74549 1.424731 -3.33 0.001 -7.53792 -1.95307 
_Iid_16 0.362749 1.043295 0.35 0.728 -1.68207 2.407569 
_Iid_17 -0.68671 0.444036 -1.55 0.122 -1.55701 0.183583 
_Iid_18 -3.46568 1.156284 -3 0.003 -5.73196 -1.19941 
_Iid_19 1.305597 0.77153 1.69 0.091 -0.20657 2.817768 
_Iid_20 3.408789 1.158327 2.94 0.003 1.13851 5.679069 
_Iid_21 1.101679 0.952822 1.16 0.248 -0.76582 2.969175 
_Iid_22 1.471291 0.88134 1.67 0.095 -0.2561 3.198687 
_Iid_23 -0.74122 0.871018 -0.85 0.395 -2.44838 0.965944 
_Iid_24 -0.26467 0.893039 -0.3 0.767 -2.015 1.485651 
_Iid_25 1.030387 0.472203 2.18 0.029 0.104886 1.955888 
_cons -0.11906 2.35205 -0.05 0.96 -4.729 4.490872 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons 0.01874 0.088633 0.21 0.833 -0.15498 0.192457 
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. test [eqn1_mean]HEA=[eqn2_mean]GEN 
      
 [eqn1_mean]HEA - [eqn2_mean]GEN = 0   
      
 chi2(  1) =    4.93    
 Prob > chi2 =    0.0264    
Table I12: Result for testing the coefficient of government expenditure on health in 
ASEAN economies before and after ICRG adjustment 
    Robust         
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
HEA -0.1315467 0.1371244 -0.96 0.337 -0.40031 0.137212 
INF -0.1635205 0.0400827 -4.08 0 -0.24208 -0.08496 
INV 0.0714476 0.0334682 2.13 0.033 0.005851 0.137044 
LFG -0.4484606 0.1233199 -3.64 0 -0.69016 -0.20676 
NTR -0.0773621 0.0933982 -0.83 0.407 -0.26042 0.105695 
TR -0.076096 0.0570567 -1.33 0.182 -0.18793 0.035733 
SOD 0.5915144 0.1174758 5.04 0 0.361266 0.821763 
OPN 0.0214895 0.0078967 2.72 0.007 0.006012 0.036967 
_Iyear_1996 -1.259339 0.5767112 -2.18 0.029 -2.38967 -0.12901 
_Iyear_1997 -1.295419 0.6525544 -1.99 0.047 -2.5744 -0.01644 
_Iyear_1998 -1.178061 0.77452 -1.52 0.128 -2.69609 0.339971 
_Iyear_1999 -1.609145 0.8635087 -1.86 0.062 -3.30159 0.083301 
_Iyear_2000 -1.126747 0.910912 -1.24 0.216 -2.9121 0.658608 
_Iyear_2001 0.0604798 0.8995636 0.07 0.946 -1.70263 1.823592 
_Iyear_2002 0.2725682 0.9127012 0.3 0.765 -1.51629 2.06143 
_Iyear_2003 -0.0208442 0.9115203 -0.02 0.982 -1.80739 1.765703 
_Iyear_2004 0.1980684 0.8659773 0.23 0.819 -1.49922 1.895353 
_Iyear_2005 0.265258 0.7971059 0.33 0.739 -1.29704 1.827557 
_Iyear_2006 -0.1916375 0.7862836 -0.24 0.807 -1.73273 1.34945 
_Iyear_2007 -1.055148 0.8300189 -1.27 0.204 -2.68196 0.571659 
_Iyear_2008 0.0689159 0.8126931 0.08 0.932 -1.52393 1.661765 
_Iyear_2009 -0.0564144 0.8142014 -0.07 0.945 -1.65222 1.539391 
_Iyear_2010 -0.0369864 0.8686849 -0.04 0.966 -1.73958 1.665605 
_Iid_2 -1.711341 0.6841354 -2.5 0.012 -3.05222 -0.37046 
_Iid_3 -11.60454 2.964833 -3.91 0 -17.4155 -5.79357 
_Iid_4 -2.455287 1.354987 -1.81 0.07 -5.11101 0.200438 
_Iid_5 0.9122291 0.5716979 1.6 0.111 -0.20828 2.032736 
_cons 5.433027 1.439313 3.77 0 2.612025 8.254029 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
_cons -0.715966 0.1118971 -6.4 0 -0.93528 -0.49665 
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eqn2_mean             
GEN -0.1455233 0.1450308 -1 0.316 -0.42978 0.138732 
INF -0.1642153 0.0401911 -4.09 0 -0.24299 -0.08544 
INV 0.0714616 0.0333362 2.14 0.032 0.006124 0.136799 
LFG -0.4508525 0.1234205 -3.65 0 -0.69275 -0.20895 
NTR -0.0777539 0.0929741 -0.84 0.403 -0.25998 0.104472 
TR -0.0758107 0.0570318 -1.33 0.184 -0.18759 0.03597 
SOD 0.5943189 0.1172356 5.07 0 0.364541 0.824096 
OPN 0.0217836 0.0079464 2.74 0.006 0.006209 0.037358 
_Iyear_1996 -1.254293 0.5764055 -2.18 0.03 -2.38403 -0.12456 
_Iyear_1997 -1.289881 0.6513326 -1.98 0.048 -2.56647 -0.01329 
_Iyear_1998 -1.173995 0.7723778 -1.52 0.129 -2.68783 0.339837 
_Iyear_1999 -1.606552 0.8607861 -1.87 0.062 -3.29366 0.080558 
_Iyear_2000 -1.12671 0.9078425 -1.24 0.215 -2.90605 0.652629 
_Iyear_2001 0.0561284 0.8965559 0.06 0.95 -1.70109 1.813346 
_Iyear_2002 0.2646873 0.9097578 0.29 0.771 -1.51841 2.04778 
_Iyear_2003 -0.0313059 0.9086722 -0.03 0.973 -1.81227 1.749659 
_Iyear_2004 0.1848889 0.8637743 0.21 0.831 -1.50808 1.877855 
_Iyear_2005 0.2518671 0.7955596 0.32 0.752 -1.3074 1.811135 
_Iyear_2006 -0.2044513 0.7849548 -0.26 0.795 -1.74293 1.334032 
_Iyear_2007 -1.061223 0.827578 -1.28 0.2 -2.68325 0.5608 
_Iyear_2008 0.0693969 0.8110537 0.09 0.932 -1.52024 1.659033 
_Iyear_2009 -0.0537514 0.8123306 -0.07 0.947 -1.64589 1.538387 
_Iyear_2010 -0.0295943 0.866166 -0.03 0.973 -1.72725 1.66806 
_Iid_2 -1.722337 0.6855332 -2.51 0.012 -3.06596 -0.37872 
_Iid_3 -11.66635 2.965354 -3.93 0 -17.4783 -5.85437 
_Iid_4 -2.425607 1.357276 -1.79 0.074 -5.08582 0.234606 
_Iid_5 0.907002 0.5719093 1.59 0.113 -0.21392 2.027924 
_cons 5.449953 1.437783 3.79 0 2.63195 8.267956 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons -0.7170138 0.1119627 -6.4 0 -0.93646 -0.49757 
 
. test [eqn1_mean]HEA=[eqn2_mean]GEN 
      
 [eqn1_mean]HEA - [eqn2_mean]GEN = 0   
      
 chi2(  1) =    2.66    
 Prob > chi2 =    0.1026    
 
Table I13: Result for testing the coefficient of government expenditure on human 
capital in OECD economies before and after ICRG adjustment 
    Robust         
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  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
ECO 0.0160214 0.0348224 0.46 0.645 -0.05223 0.084272 
INF 0.0173179 0.0473493 0.37 0.715 -0.07548 0.110121 
INV 0.0664724 0.0460363 1.44 0.149 -0.02376 0.156702 
LFG -0.1473947 0.1502673 -0.98 0.327 -0.44191 0.147124 
NTR -0.1157761 0.0528742 -2.19 0.029 -0.21941 -0.01214 
TR 0.1870423 0.0690686 2.71 0.007 0.05167 0.322414 
SOD 0.1901796 0.0492104 3.86 0 0.093729 0.28663 
OPN 0.0247625 0.0080649 3.07 0.002 0.008956 0.040569 
_Iyear_1996 0.2534603 0.2751071 0.92 0.357 -0.28574 0.79266 
_Iyear_1997 0.0169695 0.2713216 0.06 0.95 -0.51481 0.54875 
_Iyear_1998 -0.2216138 0.2955437 -0.75 0.453 -0.80087 0.357641 
_Iyear_1999 -0.6193124 0.3031571 -2.04 0.041 -1.21349 -0.02514 
_Iyear_2000 -1.098953 0.2919533 -3.76 0 -1.67117 -0.52674 
_Iyear_2001 -1.463798 0.2838875 -5.16 0 -2.02021 -0.90739 
_Iyear_2002 -1.495854 0.2853434 -5.24 0 -2.05512 -0.93659 
_Iyear_2003 -1.769603 0.3011979 -5.88 0 -2.35994 -1.17927 
_Iyear_2004 -1.558768 0.3106138 -5.02 0 -2.16756 -0.94998 
_Iyear_2005 -1.385009 0.3321121 -4.17 0 -2.03594 -0.73408 
_Iyear_2006 -1.856241 0.3464925 -5.36 0 -2.53535 -1.17713 
_Iyear_2007 -3.208443 0.3678037 -8.72 0 -3.92932 -2.48756 
_Iyear_2008 -3.15959 0.4058722 -7.78 0 -3.95509 -2.3641 
_Iyear_2009 -3.365305 0.4147076 -8.11 0 -4.17812 -2.55249 
_Iyear_2010 -3.978827 0.4309086 -9.23 0 -4.82339 -3.13426 
_Iid_2 0.9633893 0.8381855 1.15 0.25 -0.67942 2.606203 
_Iid_3 -1.161816 0.9672605 -1.2 0.23 -3.05761 0.73398 
_Iid_4 -0.0359964 0.7007991 -0.05 0.959 -1.40954 1.337545 
_Iid_5 -5.054811 1.345656 -3.76 0 -7.69225 -2.41737 
_Iid_6 3.413015 1.442584 2.37 0.018 0.585602 6.240427 
_Iid_7 0.8901853 0.8821992 1.01 0.313 -0.83889 2.619264 
_Iid_8 2.260733 0.9845586 2.3 0.022 0.331033 4.190432 
_Iid_9 2.390386 1.033474 2.31 0.021 0.364815 4.415957 
_Iid_10 3.991722 1.044459 3.82 0 1.94462 6.038824 
_Iid_11 -0.9144804 0.7383922 -1.24 0.216 -2.3617 0.532742 
_Iid_12 0.3326968 1.163301 0.29 0.775 -1.94733 2.612726 
_Iid_13 1.807435 0.7326463 2.47 0.014 0.371475 3.243395 
_Iid_14 0.5558224 0.563862 0.99 0.324 -0.54933 1.660972 
_Iid_15 -4.24795 1.677755 -2.53 0.011 -7.53629 -0.95961 
_Iid_16 1.054278 1.075503 0.98 0.327 -1.05367 3.162225 
_Iid_17 -1.386363 0.5859779 -2.37 0.018 -2.53486 -0.23787 
_Iid_18 -2.053388 1.194556 -1.72 0.086 -4.39468 0.287899 
_Iid_19 1.829213 0.8326987 2.2 0.028 0.197154 3.461273 
_Iid_20 3.627191 1.334192 2.72 0.007 1.012224 6.242159 
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_Iid_21 1.917048 1.023859 1.87 0.061 -0.08968 3.923775 
_Iid_22 2.275962 0.825638 2.76 0.006 0.657742 3.894183 
_Iid_23 -0.4831618 0.9043829 -0.53 0.593 -2.25572 1.289396 
_Iid_24 0.4856682 0.8861256 0.55 0.584 -1.25111 2.222442 
_Iid_25 0.9991829 0.5120663 1.95 0.051 -0.00445 2.002814 
_cons -3.802358 2.359582 -1.61 0.107 -8.42705 0.822338 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
_cons 0.0476678 0.0877298 0.54 0.587 -0.12428 0.219615 
              
eqn2_mean             
DEF 0.0113337 0.0351907 0.32 0.747 -0.05764 0.080306 
INF 0.0197586 0.0481767 0.41 0.682 -0.07467 0.114183 
INV 0.0661644 0.045997 1.44 0.15 -0.02399 0.156317 
LFG -0.1552237 0.1521852 -1.02 0.308 -0.4535 0.143054 
NTR -0.1141642 0.0529974 -2.15 0.031 -0.21804 -0.01029 
TR 0.1862432 0.0689405 2.7 0.007 0.051122 0.321364 
SOD 0.1935286 0.0491961 3.93 0 0.097106 0.289951 
OPN 0.0242897 0.0080797 3.01 0.003 0.008454 0.040126 
_Iyear_1996 0.2553496 0.27465 0.93 0.353 -0.28295 0.793654 
_Iyear_1997 0.0184548 0.2709983 0.07 0.946 -0.51269 0.549602 
_Iyear_1998 -0.2196817 0.2949184 -0.74 0.456 -0.79771 0.358348 
_Iyear_1999 -0.6146757 0.3027243 -2.03 0.042 -1.208 -0.02135 
_Iyear_2000 -1.09017 0.2913302 -3.74 0 -1.66117 -0.51917 
_Iyear_2001 -1.451891 0.2825496 -5.14 0 -2.00568 -0.8981 
_Iyear_2002 -1.479758 0.2833013 -5.22 0 -2.03502 -0.9245 
_Iyear_2003 -1.749712 0.2987789 -5.86 0 -2.33531 -1.16412 
_Iyear_2004 -1.535786 0.3082145 -4.98 0 -2.13988 -0.9317 
_Iyear_2005 -1.361225 0.3300828 -4.12 0 -2.00818 -0.71427 
_Iyear_2006 -1.831293 0.3441629 -5.32 0 -2.50584 -1.15675 
_Iyear_2007 -3.181725 0.3656726 -8.7 0 -3.89843 -2.46502 
_Iyear_2008 -3.130829 0.4043018 -7.74 0 -3.92325 -2.33841 
_Iyear_2009 -3.335194 0.4133902 -8.07 0 -4.14542 -2.52496 
_Iyear_2010 -3.945747 0.4299469 -9.18 0 -4.78843 -3.10307 
_Iid_2 0.9644175 0.8394498 1.15 0.251 -0.68087 2.609709 
_Iid_3 -1.125653 0.9653755 -1.17 0.244 -3.01775 0.766448 
_Iid_4 -0.110735 0.6983352 -0.16 0.874 -1.47945 1.257977 
_Iid_5 -5.030463 1.346496 -3.74 0 -7.66955 -2.39138 
_Iid_6 3.448829 1.43859 2.4 0.017 0.629245 6.268413 
_Iid_7 0.8701803 0.8836179 0.98 0.325 -0.86168 2.602039 
_Iid_8 2.252335 0.9868481 2.28 0.022 0.318148 4.186522 
_Iid_9 2.368165 1.035 2.29 0.022 0.339603 4.396728 
_Iid_10 3.95695 1.043167 3.79 0 1.912379 6.00152 
_Iid_11 -0.8524346 0.7498722 -1.14 0.256 -2.32216 0.617288 
_Iid_12 0.4259836 1.15431 0.37 0.712 -1.83642 2.68839 
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_Iid_13 1.844007 0.7314876 2.52 0.012 0.410318 3.277696 
_Iid_14 0.5450062 0.5652389 0.96 0.335 -0.56284 1.652854 
_Iid_15 -4.188632 1.679037 -2.49 0.013 -7.47949 -0.89778 
_Iid_16 1.067748 1.078096 0.99 0.322 -1.04528 3.180776 
_Iid_17 -1.325238 0.5896584 -2.25 0.025 -2.48095 -0.16953 
_Iid_18 -2.105433 1.191126 -1.77 0.077 -4.44 0.229132 
_Iid_19 1.858966 0.8309019 2.24 0.025 0.230428 3.487504 
_Iid_20 3.671475 1.326632 2.77 0.006 1.071324 6.271627 
_Iid_21 1.93876 1.018217 1.9 0.057 -0.05691 3.934429 
_Iid_22 2.277139 0.8261604 2.76 0.006 0.657894 3.896383 
_Iid_23 -0.4855843 0.904754 -0.54 0.591 -2.25887 1.287701 
_Iid_24 0.4917005 0.8855513 0.56 0.579 -1.24395 2.227349 
_Iid_25 1.019409 0.5120535 1.99 0.047 0.015803 2.023016 
_cons -3.658181 2.364835 -1.55 0.122 -8.29317 0.976811 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons 0.0481069 0.0878448 0.55 0.584 -0.12407 0.220279 
 
. test [eqn1_mean]ECO=[eqn2_mean]DEF 
      
 [eqn1_mean]ECO - [eqn2_mean]DEF = 0   
      
 chi2(  1) =    2.16    
 Prob > chi2 =    0.1416    
 
Table I14: Result for testing the coefficient of government expenditure on human 
capital in ASEAN economies before and after ICRG adjustment 
    Robust         
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
eqn1_mean             
ECO 0.1217242 0.035261 3.45 0.001 0.052613 0.190835 
INF -0.1279038 0.03473 -3.68 0 -0.19597 -0.05983 
INV 0.0467736 0.038622 1.21 0.226 -0.02892 0.122471 
LFG -0.3089456 0.123877 -2.49 0.013 -0.55174 -0.06615 
NTR -0.0427315 0.095914 -0.45 0.656 -0.23072 0.145256 
TR -0.0897769 0.056116 -1.6 0.11 -0.19976 0.020207 
SOD 0.3967261 0.10135 3.91 0 0.198084 0.595369 
OPN 0.0053731 0.006381 0.84 0.4 -0.00713 0.01788 
_Iyear_1996 -1.610933 0.563061 -2.86 0.004 -2.71451 -0.50735 
_Iyear_1997 -1.812211 0.690037 -2.63 0.009 -3.16466 -0.45976 
_Iyear_1998 -1.750194 0.832737 -2.1 0.036 -3.38233 -0.11806 
_Iyear_1999 -2.274075 0.933651 -2.44 0.015 -4.104 -0.44415 
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_Iyear_2000 -1.775395 1.012618 -1.75 0.08 -3.76009 0.2093 
_Iyear_2001 -0.343256 0.95863 -0.36 0.72 -2.22214 1.535624 
_Iyear_2002 0.059461 0.960087 0.06 0.951 -1.82227 1.941196 
_Iyear_2003 -0.0581444 0.939768 -0.06 0.951 -1.90006 1.783768 
_Iyear_2004 0.3774688 0.889313 0.42 0.671 -1.36555 2.12049 
_Iyear_2005 0.5546208 0.81427 0.68 0.496 -1.04132 2.150561 
_Iyear_2006 0.1751862 0.80046 0.22 0.827 -1.39369 1.744059 
_Iyear_2007 -0.9975487 0.860632 -1.16 0.246 -2.68436 0.689259 
_Iyear_2008 -0.2392514 0.832466 -0.29 0.774 -1.87085 1.392351 
_Iyear_2009 -0.4454237 0.827665 -0.54 0.59 -2.06762 1.176769 
_Iyear_2010 -0.6079554 0.878849 -0.69 0.489 -2.33047 1.114557 
_Iid_2 -2.271321 0.635186 -3.58 0 -3.51626 -1.02638 
_Iid_3 -7.515927 2.376162 -3.16 0.002 -12.1731 -2.85874 
_Iid_4 -4.279819 0.982172 -4.36 0 -6.20484 -2.3548 
_Iid_5 1.054975 0.505431 2.09 0.037 0.064348 2.045602 
_cons 4.923023 1.381358 3.56 0 2.21561 7.630435 
              
eqn1_lnvar             
_cons -0.8072212 0.114079 -7.08 0 -1.03081 -0.58363 
              
eqn2_mean             
DEF 0.1251954 0.036188 3.46 0.001 0.054268 0.196123 
INF -0.1275823 0.035231 -3.62 0 -0.19663 -0.05853 
INV 0.0452924 0.038769 1.17 0.243 -0.03069 0.121277 
LFG -0.3055955 0.124209 -2.46 0.014 -0.54904 -0.06215 
NTR -0.0403674 0.096217 -0.42 0.675 -0.22895 0.148215 
TR -0.0888401 0.056386 -1.58 0.115 -0.19935 0.021674 
SOD 0.4014303 0.10111 3.97 0 0.203258 0.599602 
OPN 0.0051363 0.006426 0.8 0.424 -0.00746 0.017732 
_Iyear_1996 -1.605667 0.563755 -2.85 0.004 -2.71061 -0.50073 
_Iyear_1997 -1.803841 0.690067 -2.61 0.009 -3.15635 -0.45133 
_Iyear_1998 -1.732998 0.831649 -2.08 0.037 -3.363 -0.103 
_Iyear_1999 -2.254358 0.931019 -2.42 0.015 -4.07912 -0.4296 
_Iyear_2000 -1.750581 1.009646 -1.73 0.083 -3.72945 0.228289 
_Iyear_2001 -0.3159365 0.956859 -0.33 0.741 -2.19135 1.559472 
_Iyear_2002 0.0897035 0.957293 0.09 0.925 -1.78656 1.965964 
_Iyear_2003 -0.0273804 0.937308 -0.03 0.977 -1.86447 1.80971 
_Iyear_2004 0.4056201 0.888603 0.46 0.648 -1.33601 2.147249 
_Iyear_2005 0.5777227 0.813594 0.71 0.478 -1.01689 2.172338 
_Iyear_2006 0.1951934 0.798494 0.24 0.807 -1.36983 1.760213 
_Iyear_2007 -0.9744797 0.858137 -1.14 0.256 -2.6564 0.707438 
_Iyear_2008 -0.2190388 0.831018 -0.26 0.792 -1.8478 1.409726 
_Iyear_2009 -0.4251353 0.826412 -0.51 0.607 -2.04487 1.194603 
_Iyear_2010 -0.5854679 0.877524 -0.67 0.505 -2.30538 1.134448 
_Iid_2 -2.250422 0.635411 -3.54 0 -3.4958 -1.00504 
293 
 
_Iid_3 -7.532846 2.38686 -3.16 0.002 -12.211 -2.85469 
_Iid_4 -4.219723 0.97627 -4.32 0 -6.13318 -2.30627 
_Iid_5 1.082764 0.506712 2.14 0.033 0.089627 2.075901 
_cons 4.935236 1.384816 3.56 0 2.221046 7.649427 
              
eqn2_lnvar             
_cons -0.807183 0.114071 -7.08 0 -1.03076 -0.58361 
 
. test [eqn1_mean]ECO=[eqn2_mean]DEF 
      
 [eqn1_mean]ECO - [eqn2_mean]DEF = 0   
      
 chi2(  1) =    2.8    
 Prob > chi2 =    0.0944    
 
 
 
 
